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This project explores the contemporary history of segregation in Scottish prisons, 
focusing on measures of ‘special handling’ particularly the network of small units 
that was operative between the 1950s and the 1990s. Scotland has a complicated, 
troubling, idiosyncratic and, to a lesser degree, inspiring tradition of special 
handling measures, involving generic punishment blocks, anachronistic isolation 
units, highly innovative specialist units, ‘safe’ and ‘silent’ cells, and more 
collective segregation spaces such as vulnerable prisoners wings. Such sites have 
provoked considerable attention across public and political arenas; they have been 
sources of shame, pride, criticism and confusion; in specific penal moments, they 
have been experienced by prisoners (and officers) as warzones, sanctuaries, 
coffins and creative spaces; and, in terms of efficacy, they have both exacerbated 
and ameliorated the behavioural difficulties of the prisoners contained within 
them. 
The objectives of this research are (1) to chronologically map the evolution of key 
segregation sites, attending to the external pressures that have informed the 
policies, procedures and rules governing their protean use, (2) to explore the 
impact of particular environmental factors on the initial design, operation and, 
subsequently, the closure of these sites, and (3) to reflect on the relationship 
between space and the ways individuals have understood, coped with, and in 
various ways ‘acted-out’ their segregated confinement. Deciding who, how and 
why to segregate prisoners raises questions of a conceptual, operational, political, 
and moral nature. But deciding where to segregate prisoners situates such 
questions within the physical constraints and potentialities of space. By adopting 
a spatial-temporal approach, this research straddles disciplines, utilising the 
methods of penal history, prison sociology, and – though in a more approximate 
manner – the steadily burgeoning sub-discipline of carceral geography. 
Additionally, by marshalling a number of personal testimonies, this history 
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attempts to capture the emotional resonances of segregation – how it feels to 











To segregate means to control. Segregation is that which is forced on 
inferiors by superiors. But separation is that which is done voluntarily by 
two equals – for the good of both. 
- Malcolm X 
The link between persons and environments holds a position in the social 
sciences similar to that of virtue in society. We love to preach and teach it, 
but we often ignore it in practice 
- Hans Toch (1977:1) 
 
 
Project Aims and Chapter Summaries 
I began this project with a single, broad question: what has segregation meant in 
Scottish prisons throughout the twentieth century and up to the present? Initially 
my intention was to explore the topic from multiple perspectives, chiefly those of 
the prisoners against whom segregation has been imposed, but also prison officers 
who were tasked with implementing it, prison officials who had overseen it, and 
policy makers who had designed and legislated its parameters. It quickly became 
clear, however, that this term ‘segregation’ encompasses many more practices, 
ideas, and physical sites than merely the traditional segregation unit, as is 
typically assumed. A central divide emerges between routine segregation 
measures on the one hand, applicable to all prisoners - including classification and 
allocation mechanisms, spatial zoning, and situational controls – and, on the 
other, specialist segregation measures. This latter category includes various forms 
of punitive, administrative and protective custody intended for those prisoners 
who are considered especially problematic and/or vulnerable. While the means 
and to some extent the effects may differ, the motives underpinning these two 
categories of segregation are consistent: security, order, discipline, and to a lesser 
degree, care.   My objectives for this research then shifted; the project’s first aim 
became understanding the conceptual and practical nuances of both these 
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categories, along with the differences and parallels between them. (Chapter Two 
addresses this).  
In the course of that early research, and after having interviewed several prison 
officials (Chapter One offers a full methodological discussion), the topic that 
assumed the most significance in the data was Scotland’s particular and peculiar 
history of specialist measures, namely the network of small units operative 
between the late 1950s and the early 1990s. Consequently, my second aim for this 
work was to present a more specific account of how this network evolved, 
concentrating on this narrower time period: the latter half of the twentieth century. 
I was concerned to outline the specific spatial and operational arrangements that 
comprised the small units network, the categories of prisoners it targeted, how 
individual units were managed, with what effects, and for what purpose each unit 
served – both in practice and rhetoric (Chapter Three considers these questions). 
Given the paucity of archival materials relating to certain units, as well as the 
excess of documentation regarding others, it was apparent that my ambition to 
offer a comprehensive analysis of this network was unfeasible. Instead I decided 
to devote the second half of this thesis to examining in more detail the extreme 
poles of the unit spectrum, i.e. those units that were worryingly anachronistic, 
adopting authoritarian and often brutal approaches to the management of so-
called ‘problem’ prisoners1 (e.g. the Peterhead ‘Digger’ and the Inverness 
‘Cages’), and those that were markedly progressive (e.g. the Barlinnie Special 
Unit). This was partly a decision made for prosaic reasons (based on what source 
material was available, accessible, and the accounts given by interview 
participants) and partly a more deliberate strategy to understand specialist 
segregation in Scotland by way of highlighting examples of its best and worst 
practices – both of which, inevitably, had a disproportionate impact on the wider 
prison system as well as triggering often strikingly emotive responses within the 
public sphere. The third aim of this work was to piece together micro portraits of 
these two kinds of special units, drawing in particular on prisoners’ published 
                                                          
1 By ‘problem’ prisoners, I am referring to the heightened risks and needs they present from a 
management perspective, rather than making a qualitative judgement about the essential nature or 
character of these prisoners as human beings 
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autobiographies (see Chapter One pp. 34-32 for a methodological discussion of 
prisoner-authored writing). 
The conjoined themes that textured these personal testimonies - featuring in all 
six of the life-story accounts written by Scottish prisoners that I engaged with - 
were autonomy and its connection to dignity, and indeed, degradation. Each of 
these men had spent significant periods in segregation settings, beginning in 
traditional segregation units (usually but not always on punitive grounds) and 
later being transferred between several of the more specialist small units dispersed 
across the penal estate. Their testimonies speak to the raw and embodied 
experience of living within extreme places – environments of profound social 
isolation and material impoverishment, which they often resisted through violent, 
disturbing means (see Chapters Four and Five), along with those which inspired a 
sense of hope, enough in some cases to provide the conditions for personal 
transformations (see Chapter Six). To make sense of the stories prisoners tell 
about these radically different environments, and how they themselves interpreted 
their responses to them, the concepts of autonomy/dignity first warranted closer 
theoretical attention. The fourth aim of this project was to attempt that analysis 
and to do so primarily through a philosophical lens (see Chapter Four).  
The fifth and final aim of this project was to grapple with the spatial resonances 
of segregation. As an explicitly situated praxis, experienced by those who operate 
and endure it, or sometimes even thrive because of it, the features of the physical 
environments where people are segregated literally shape the phenomenon itself – 
as a psychological process and as a material reality. This comes through most 
pertinently in personal testimonies, thus particular attention is paid to this socio-
spatial dynamic in the final two chapters of the work. Chapter Six, for example, 
makes these connections especially explicit: first by developing a concept of what 
I am terming ‘spatial autonomy’ and secondly by arguing that it was this feature 
of the Barlinnie Special Unit (BSU) which accounts for much of the unit’s 
dignity-enabling, desistance-promoting success. Questions of space – its limits 
and possibilities – were equally significant within the institutional archives, 
though for different reasons, largely related to the more pragmatic issues of 
efficiency, risk, and economics. Where questions of space are relevant elsewhere 
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they are woven throughout each of the chapters, as are reviews of the germane 
academic literatures.  
Structurally, this thesis deviates in some respects from the standard scientific 
format, though I hope in ways that enhance rather than detract from its overall 
coherence. There is, for example, a more philosophical chapter (Four) positioned 
between the first part of the thesis – offering analyses of segregation in general, 
and specialist measures in Scottish prisons specifically - and more micro analyses 
of discrete small units in the second part.  
For the sake of clarity, the direction of travel is as follows: first a wide-lens view 
of segregation in prisons is presented, expanding the conceptual and procedural 
boundaries beyond simply the discrete punishment block. This is followed by an 
account that hones-in on specialist forms of segregation, which in the Scottish 
context refers in particular to the network of small units. The topic is then distilled 
further through a targeted examination of specific examples of small units. 
Chapters Two and Three are paired in that they both trace the conceptual 
underpinnings of segregation in prison, and offer procedural analysis as well as 
historical context. Chapters Five and Six are similarly paired but as comparative 
analyses of individual units existing at either end of a degradation-dignity 
spectrum. Sandwiched between these two pairings is a more theoretical account 
of in/dignity, which is intended to tie together the first and second parts of the 
thesis.  
Segregation as a Penal-Administrative Norm 
Where all prisoners are segregated by prison, sequestered away from their 
families and the communities in which they live, prisoners are further segregated 
within prison through the imposition of numerous practical mechanisms and in a 
variety of distinct and often liminal spaces. Since the birth of the modern prison in 
the late Eighteenth Century, the separating-out of prisoners and the dividing-up of 
prison space, or what Foucault (1977) framed as ‘meticulous tactical partitioning’, 
has become the penal-administrative norm. Arguably the praxis of segregation – 
whereby physical and ideological boundaries are established across which only 
certain people in certain circumstances may go - has become the very sine qua 
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non of contemporary carceral worlds. More than just a discrete tactic of control, 
or a discrete containment site (applicable to only a small minority of prisoners), 
the concept of segregation has been translated into a systemic organisational 
strategy with much wider meanings and applications than merely the traditional 
segregation unit, or ‘punishment block’ as it is known colloquially.  
All prisoners are subject to categorization procedures – a key mechanism of 
segregation - at the point of entry into the system in order to determine prison 
allocation; they are initially managed separately through induction processes 
(though this is a relatively recent development), and in the case of untried 
prisoners, they are accommodated in segregated remand facilities for the entirety 
of their imprisonment. The conditions of confinement for further groupings of 
prisoners, including specific residential arrangements along with access to work, 
education and recreation activities, is delineated, supported by various systems of 
differentiation e.g. Incentives and Earned Privileges Schemes. This relates to 
whether or not, and when, prisoners enjoy ‘enhanced’ as opposed to ‘basic’ 
regimes, which in some prisons means placement in different parts of the 
establishment. The stage at which a prisoner has reached in their sentence may 
also determine the ways they are segregated within the prison community. For 
example, separate units – though still understood as ‘mainstream’ locations - 
operate in some prisons with the purpose of preparing long term prisoners for 
release, consisting of often less restrictive regimes, more freedom of movement, 
and a greater emphasis on providing work and educational opportunities.  
Given this plethora of differentiated spatial, social, and management 
arrangements, it becomes difficult to rigidly distinguish between ‘segregated’ and 
‘mainstream’ prisoners. A central distinction then in discussions of segregation in 
prisons is that between routine segregation measures and specialist segregation 
measures. The difference between them relates to: numerical scope (i.e. whether 
measures are applicable to all or only some prisoners); and linked, the target of 
segregation, and criteria for inclusion (i.e. based on conceptions of risk, 
dangerousness and vulnerability, or based on disciplinary infractions); collective 
or individual segregation (i.e. whether or not prisoners are able to associate with 
one another within a segregated site); the nature of segregation conditions (the 
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particular set of spatial and social restrictions); and, the length of time prisoners 
are held in segregated custody. One retired Scottish prison governor I spoke with 
described the leadership of a prison community as being “like mastering a rubik’s 
cube”. He was referring to the difficulties of getting all the competing interests to 
align. This metaphor also feels apt when considering segregation practices insofar 
as the image summons the multiple component parts of an individual prison 
entity; the separate, divided blocks which are positioned close together, though 
not always in a perfect fit. 
In penal settings, where prisoners are already at a distance from life on the 
outside,  internal segregation arrangements create various layers of remoteness – 
distance (both spatial and social) between individual prisoners, between groups of 
prisoners, and between staff and prisoners. But this does not necessarily imply 
malevolent or repressive intent (though segregation has often and emphatically 
involved deeply brutalizing conditions); in theory if not always in practice 
segregation may be used as a justifiable, even ethical means to keep people safe 
and to minimize harm. If this is the conceptual backdrop of segregation then in 
broad terms, segregation in prisons refer to the range of practices that are used to 
divide-up and separate-out particular prisoners, the protean sites installed to 
contain them, and the number of different rules that are employed to govern its 
use.  
Specialist Segregation Measures & ‘Problem’ Prisoners 
The greatest attention in this project is paid to the network of small specialist 
units emerging in Scotland in the 1950s, developed and extended between the 
1970s-1990s, and used chiefly for administrative but also, to a lesser degree, 
punitive purposes. Notwithstanding the expansiveness of segregation 
arrangements, this narrowed focus is warranted owing (1) to the numerous 
distinctive features that have characterised Scottish approaches to the 
management of administratively difficult prisoners, which (2) has not been fully 
recorded or examined in an historical context, despite (3) high-profile national 
and international attention that elements of this network has provoked at various 
moments in recent penal history.  
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Administrative segregation in Scottish prisons, as well as in other systems 
throughout the world, typically represents the apex of this practice, and of the 
end-point of punishment itself. As a penal control technique it is the most extreme 
form of segregation, generally used for the longest periods, and usually involving 
the most totalising and therefore controversial conditions of isolation. If we can 
judge a society by how it imprisons its most troublesome citizens, we can also 
judge a prison by how it manages its most challenging prisoners. To that extent, a 
close examination of this network tells us something about the changing nature of 
Scottish prisons in a wider sense, as I hope this thesis demonstrates.  
Specialist segregation is best understood as a deliberate penal strategy used in 
pursuit of administrative, punitive and/or protective ends. These three justificatory 
frameworks apply to the following types of prisoners respectively: those who 
demonstrably or perceivably pose a threat to either security (i.e. escape) or order 
(i.e. incitement to disturbance); those on disciplinary charges (for rule 
infractions); vulnerable prisoners (e.g. sex offenders, ‘grasses’, victims of 
prisoner abuse, ex-police personnel, etc.), along with those suffering severe 
mental illness and who cannot be accommodated in a secure hospital. In relation 
to these specialist sites, there is a hardcore of prisoners who either do in fact or 
who are merely perceived as presenting elevated threats to security and order and 
thus against whom alternative, often more extreme forms of segregation are 
deemed necessary. It is somewhat perplexing that while England & Wales have 
retained specialist administrative sites (e.g. the system of CSC and DSPD units)2, 
and while other advanced democracies have similarly targeted systems, e.g. the 
‘supermax’ phenomenon in the U.S. (see Chapter Three, pp.120-133), the Scottish 
Prison Service now operates without any such measures. This omission is 
especially interesting given Scotland’s early experience with small units – of 
which this thesis is principally concerned (see especially Chapters Five and Six). 
                                                          
2 CSC refers to ‘Close Supervision Centres’, a special system of administrative segregation 
comprising a number of high security units spread across the penal estate in England & Wales. It 
was established in 1998 on   
the recommendations of the Spurr Report (1996) and despite its many changing forms, it has 
continued to operate according to the principle of’ prisoner progression’. DSPD refers to 
‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disordered’ used as additional sites of specialist 
administrative segregation and developed in the mid-1990s. 
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The bromidic phrase ‘prisons within prisons’ is an accurate description of many, 
though emphatically not all, specialist segregation environments; we should be 
careful to avoid the implicitly negative associations it seems to uncritically 
suggest. That is, certain segregation spaces and practices have proved necessary 
and broadly beneficial from both an institutional perspective and from the 
standpoint of individual prisoners – providing, for example, respite and specialist 
conditions for those who are unable to cope with, or who face additional stresses 
in, mainstream locations. We should note that in the case of protective 
segregation where it is practiced in segregation units (as opposed to separate 
vulnerable prisoners halls), therefore involving the same spatial and 
accompanying regime constraints considered necessary for those under punitive 
and administrative segregation, it is still often requested by prisoners themselves. 
Moreover, with regards to administrative arrangements, in Scotland at least, 
certain sites within the small units network might be considered both progressive 
(e.g. the Barlinnie Special Unit, 1973-1996, see especially Chapter Six), and, 
from prisoners’ perspectives, advantageous as spaces to live and work. 
Nevertheless, each of the small units instituted in Scotland – and in relation to 
specialist segregation measures more generally – were intended for the 
management of so-called ‘problem’ prisoners, although what exactly this means 
has been articulated in a number of different ways throughout the recent past.  
Official definitions of problem prisoners are difficult to find in the archival record 
until the 1990s,  at which point there was in general a more concerted effort to 
formalise matters by providing a clear, theoretical basis for the range of ideas, 
terms and practices relating to segregation which had previously been adopted 
without much analysis. The Working Party on the Barlinnie Special Unit (see 
Chapter Five), for example, defined problem prisoners as simply, “those whom it 
would have been preferable to manage off-site” (1994:para.7). The report goes on 
(in para.41) to profile prisoners who belong within that category as those who are 
“violent”, “those who are manipulative”, and “those who are unable to cope”, 
with a fourth category for “those who are mentally ill” – though with the caveat 
that Governors should “not put them forward on an regular basis as candidates for 
off-site management…they generally pose problems which can be contained 
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within normal prison locations.” Much of this project is concerned with what that 
off-site management has meant. In other words, how have segregation systems 
been used to contain prisoners who require management outwith the ostensibly 
mainstream?  Moving from routine segregation to specialist segregation 
measures, then, this project addresses the Scottish penal approach to prisoners 
deemed either especially vulnerable, excessively difficult or dangerous, and/or 
those who contravene the disciplinary code. 
Small Units in Scotland 
There are a number of features which make the development of specialist 
segregation measures in Scotland especially interesting, two are particularly 
significant. First, during much of the period between 1960 to the late 1990s, the 
geographic dispersal of individual small units within the network was peculiarly 
unbalanced. For example, within Peterhead prison there was for a time five 
separate units within this individual establishment used to segregate prisoners and 
for a variety of purposes: two sites were used to contain prisoners under an 
administrative framework (the Individual or ‘Thomas McCulloch’ Unit, and the 
’10 Cell’ Unit); one site was used as a punishment block to contain for short 
periods prisoners who had breached particular rules (the notorious ‘Digger’) – this 
was also used for administrative purposes but less formally; one site was used for 
broadly protective purposes (the Protection Unit); and the final site, a fortified 
entry block (the B Hall Unit), which after an incendiary riot in 1984 underwent 
modifications to strengthen the security of each cell. (For a good overview of 
these arrangements, see Coyle, 1987). Thus, the internal geography of segregation 
within Peterhead prison was highly differentiated, so much so that Adler and 
Longhurst (1994:109) were apt to describe it as “a penal complex rather than a 
unitary establishment”. A place of internal spatial pluralism within a monolithic 
institutional edifice. In addition to the units concentrated in Peterhead, several 
more were dispersed across other prisons within the estate, including the ‘Time-
Out’ Unit in Perth prison, and the eponymous Inverness ‘Cages’.   
The second feature of Scottish small units which made this network unique was 
the extraordinary variation between how each unit was managed and operated, 
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with many taking on a distinctly experimental quality. It has been argued that 
different spatial segments within an individual prison have their own set of 
conventions, practices and social dynamics, and that staff and prisoners both 
create and adapt to these distinctive unit identities or unit ‘cultures’ (Liebling et al, 
2011). This was strikingly the case with respect to small units in Scotland. Indeed, 
this network might be considered as containing a spectrum of arrangements with 
conditions of deep, individual isolation at one pole and collective, participatory 
communities at the other. The Inverness ‘Cages’ and Peterhead ‘Digger’ best 
exemplify the former, while the Barlinnie Special Unit is the shining example of 
the latter.  
The disparities between Scottish small units cannot be explained simply by the 
different uses to which each unit was put since many that adopted the same or 
very similar rationales, under the same framework (i.e. administrative 
segregation) and managing the same profile of offender (i.e. the perpetually 
disruptive/violent) still had contrasting internal approaches, cultures, systems, and 
effects. Neither can these disparities be explained as the result of temporal 
progression given that some units operated concurrently - in the same prison even. 
Two alternative explanations are offered in this thesis. The first relates to crisis 
events (riots, protests, escape attempts, serious assaults) which produced a climate 
of palpable fear within Peterhead prison particularly - where many of these events 
occurred – and in turn precipitated a number of alternative approaches. The 
second explanation relates to the general welfarist tradition in Scotland which 
allowed units such as the BSU to emerge albeit with initial and ongoing resistance 
from various quarters. Both explanations are further supported by the small size 
of the Scottish prison estate along with its degree of detachment from its 
Westminster policy masters (until the Scotland Act 1998, Scottish prisons were at 
least nominally under the control of the British Secretary of State for Scotland). 
These matters are discussed in detail in Chapters Two and Three.  
At this juncture a spatial consciousness becomes helpful insofar as it introduces 
the importance of environmental factors in shaping (literally) the particular nature 
of and variation between each unit. The key question is how does the space itself 
inform identity and culture construction - at an individual, group and 
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organisational level?  In other words, how do the physical features pf segregation 
sites (size of cells, layout, surveillance potential, communal/outside areas, levels 
of light and darkness, temperature, optics, and acoustics, etc.) affect experience? 
And moreover, who is given control over these elements? In posing such 
questions I am treading the same analytical ground as Mitchell (2000:5-6), who 
asserts in his cultural geography thesis that ‘arguments over “culture” are 
arguments over real spaces, over landscapes, over the social relations that define 
the places in which we and others live.’ 
Directly connected to these questions of crisis events, penal politics and space are 
more phenomenological elements – how prisoners and staff feel about their prison 
experiences; their roles, treatment and what is expected of them. The stories both 
groups tell contain frequent references to, if not explicit mention of, the themes of 
dignity, autonomy, and indeed their opposites. Within segregated (especially 
specialist) environments, there are much greater challenges given the troublesome 
profiles of such prisoners. A delicate balance must be struck, therefore, between 
securing the aims of prison management on the one hand (principally, 
maintaining security, establishing order, and ensuring the safety of staff and 
prisoners (see Chapter Two for a discussion of these objectives), and fulfilling the 
essential emotional and existential needs of human beings on the other. (Having 
one’s dignity respected might not be a pre-requisite for life, but it is vital for 
living well). This has often led to many more restrictions within segregation sites 
compared with mainstream locations, including: of amenities, of contact with 
others, of movement, and of material comforts. These privations, and the control 
of one group over another required to enact them, necessarily constrains the 
individual autonomy of some whilst over-extending the power of others. The 
prisoners whose testimonies I have engaged with in this work typically describe 
this experience as profoundly threatening to their dignity. Additionally, their 
testimonies contain explicit descriptions of how this process of dignity lost (and 
indeed regained) manifests in, as well as a consequence of, the spaces within 
which they lived, i.e. segregation units. They go further and explain if not quite 
justify their violence and general recalcitrance in terms of a struggle to reassert 
their autonomy thereby reclaiming their dignity.  
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To a degree, this project is about what kinds of actions desperate prisoners have 
taken and the various, often anxiety-fueled approaches the Scottish Prison Service 
(SPS) has adopted by way of response, namely segregation and specifically 
specialist measures. “The one element which we must always build into the prison 
system is hope because a prisoner who doesn’t have hope is a dangerous prisoner” 
(Andrew Coyle, then Chairman of the Prison Governor’s Association, in a BBC 
Radio Scotland, 13th October 1988). This comment – a variation on a theme 
expressed by a range of penal managers and policy-makers – encompasses both a 
perennial penal dilemma, and one of the central arguments this thesis explores; 
what it means to both have and to lose the hope which a sense of personal dignity 
ensures, along with the myriad ways segregated environments have and might 
function to contribute to either of those experiential processes.  
“There are cases”, wrote Sir Alexander Paterson in 1922, “where it is kinder to 
break a man’s neck in a second than to spend twenty years breaking his heart.” 
Scotland’s history of small units (post capital punishment) has included 
components that have certainly broken men’s spirits – both the men locked in 
places of segregation, and the men we have collectively tasked to keep them 
there. Within the context of particular types of segregated environments, however, 
this project is also about the ways some prisoners have repossessed a sense of 
hope through both their own struggles and the creative efforts of the SPS.  
Viewing the contemporary history of segregation in Scottish prisons through a 
spatial lens means encountering the walls against which people have felt 
repeatedly backed-up and glimpsing the bridges that have, at redeeming moments, 
offered those same people a way out.  The 'walls and bridges' of segregation offer 
a useful metaphor to carry with us through this unusual and complicated history. 
It is taken from the title of an article written in the second edition of the Key 
Magazine in 1974 – the in-house publication of the Barlinnie Special Unit (an 
extraordinary segregation site discussed comprehensively in Chapter Six).  
Why is the Socio-Spatial Dynamic Important? 
In this project space is a filtering lens through which the past might be viewed, 
bringing into focus certain aspects of that past which are otherwise often 
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concealed or appear only marginal. It is not that the spaces of segregation per se 
are the main topic but that segregation practices through time might be more fully 
understood, or understood in richer ways, through marshalling what Soja (1989) 
calls a ‘spatial consciousness’. Space is something of a motif in this history, a 
permeating idea which enhances straight diachronic and more policy oriented 
analyses of prison worlds. 
Evoking the fusion between Soja’s (1989) use of the Kantian concepts of 
nacheinander (phenomena in sequence) and nebeneinander (phenomena side by 
side), the basic argument for an integrated temporal-spatial approach holds that 
space is more than merely a physical environment within which particular actors, 
activities and ways of technical ordering are located; rather, space is a complex 
and causal variant that both reflects and produces action and meaning. Therefore, 
understanding the history of an institution, or more specifically, the development 
of one aspect of it (in this case segregation), requires analysis of the forms, 
features, imaginings and effects of the spatial contexts within which it occurs. 
Dominique Moran (a founding advocate of carceral geography) argued that 
researchers working in this field need to be ‘cautious not to reproduce a one-
dimensional focus on space which reflects an unhelpful dualism between space 
and time’ (2012:307). Moran may have been referring to the need to recognise the 
space-time synergy as it is experienced in the present, but by way of exploring the 
evolution of segregation through time, within the spatial contexts it was 
experienced, and, crucially, the mutually-informing dynamic between the two, 
this research hopefully presents a three dimensional picture.  
If we take seriously Canter’s (1987:214) assertion that ‘the whole system of 
events associated with imprisonment contains a network of human activities 
inextricably linked to the places in which those activities occur’, then a socio-
spatial approach is meaningful since it provides a way of seeing the generative 
relationships between the development of penal policy and practice (as well as 
individual experience), and the particular spatial contexts that have quite literally 
shaped them. Adopting an overly deterministic attitude to space is not my 
intention here, insofar as it is even possible to claim empirically that certain 
elements of space precisely cause behavioural and policy outcomes; the 
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relationship is decidedly unclear (Fairweather, 2000). Instead, it is a sense of 
place and space that I have tried to capture when chronicling segregation’s past, 
motivated by a recognition that where events took place very much structured the 
content of those events, along with the ways they were both experienced 
contemporaneously and come to be remembered in the present. Quietly assumed 
more than outright apparent, what lies beneath questions of what went on and 
why, is the question of ‘where was I when it happened?’ These ‘where’ questions 
tend to be painfully addressed in prisoners’ testimonial writings, which usually 
describe the spaces in which people lived in minute detail, recalling through 
metaphor, literary allusions and the raw language of emotion, the human impact 
of these environments.  
In policy documents, official evaluations, and other kinds of institutional 
documents, the mechanics of space may be recorded (though not always) – i.e. the 
dimensions, the placement of windows, heating pipes, sanitation, the surveillance 
potential, etc. – to the extent they are relevant to the concerns of security, order 
and safety, but rarely are the deeper psychological and emotional aspects of space 
given credence. In the context of ‘elite’ interviews (with retired and still-serving 
prison officials), this richer understanding of the various impressions of space was 
initially absent from discussion - an absence which suggested, to me at least, not a 
lack of salience but a lack of recognition. (A full account of the spatially-oriented 
methods used in interview encounters to help trigger the spatialized memories of 
segregated environments is offered in Chapter One). So then, the potential of a 
spatial optic for historical analysis is: to capture the visceral atmospherics and 
emotional landscapes of the past; to illustrate the limitations and opportunities of 
lived experience in space; to provide structure and shape to micro histories; and, 
to expose contradictions between penal ideas & penal practices. 
Viewing history through a spatial lens provides a means of description i.e. a set of 
concrete measures and objects through which experience can be portrayed 
through its literal situation in space. We might talk generally about the tensions of 
human relations in prisons in the context of the specific spatialized stresses that 
arise from double cell occupancy living; we might consider the general pains of 
imprisonment through the spatial prism of a cell, what it does and does not 
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contain and how its design and features meet (or do not) the functioning 
emotional, practical and spiritual needs of human beings; we might, for example, 
focus on sanitation provisions – its placement in-cell, questions of visibility and 
disposal – and from there begin to make connections with much broader ideas 
about human rights, surveillance trends, and control practices. But a spatial lens 
also allows for more analytical reflections about how space itself determines 
history (rather than simply containing it). Deciding who, how and why to 
segregate prisoners raises questions of a conceptual, operational, political, moral 
and emotional nature. But deciding where to segregate prisoners situates such 
questions within the physical constraints and potentialities of space. Locked in a 
mutually constitutive dynamic, the specificities of prison life (its people, cultures 
and practices) both change and are changed by the specificities of prison spaces. 
Issues relating to the sometimes insurmountable contradictions between how 
prison spaces are designed (often during periods with cultures and traditions that 
significantly deviate from the present) and how they function and are used within 
contemporary contexts are clearly pertinent here.  
What this means for analysis of particular segregation arrangements is that in 
addition to exploring a range of external and internal variables, some of which 
have been identified above, space itself is an important category or determinant 
for exploring change. The features of spatial environments, including the material 
design of them as well as more ideational aspects, directly and more subtly affect 
the operation of segregation, its characteristics as a lived experience, and its 
functional evolution through time. As Lefebvre (1970: 25) asserts, space is 
organised so that ‘it expresses social relationships but also reacts back upon them’ 
and thus, as he reasons in a later work, “to recognise space, to recognise what 
‘takes place’ there and what it is used for is to resume the dialectic; analysis will 
reveal the contradictions of space’ (1974:14).  Lefebvre separated space into three 
analytical categories: (1) The representation of space, i.e. how it is designed and 
constituted; (2) Spatial practice, i.e. what kinds of activities and interactions occur 
within it; (3) The representational aspect of space, i.e. the meanings people imbue 
in and derive from it. Each of these elements are explored throughout this thesis 
in the context of discrete segregation sites and their development, but it is the last 
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of these categories which is mined further (in Chapter Six especially). The 
implication is that we change how we act and who we are (or might become) not 
simply in different spaces but, in part, because of them - this idea resonates with 
Ted Hughes’ poetic statement: ‘what alters the imagination, alters everything’. 
Space is a factor contributing to that process of perspective-shifting.  
Within the growing sub-field of carceral geography, a body of work is emerging 
developing theorisations and empirical insights of this imaginative aspect, of the 
ways prisoners through personal agency processes create, construct and reclaim 
prison spaces (Baer, 2005 in the UK context; Sibley & van Hoven, 2009 in 
relation to prisons in New Mexico). This work goes some way to dismantling the 
Foucauldian notion of the prison as a site of total, Panopticon control where 
prisoners are all but stripped of their power to act in and on the carceral 
environments in which they are locked. With reference to women’s prisons in 
South Africa, Dirsuweit (1999) offers a deep micro study of how prisoners resist 
that spatial and social domination via their means of repossessing space. In 
something of a similar vein, I want to suggest that in the case of certain sites 
within the special handling framework in Scotland, the material, optic and aural 
atmospherics of such sites, as well as the linked practices and regimes that were 
operative, generated certain kinds of self-constructed unit (and personal) 
identities. The consequences of which in terms of behaviour and subsequent 
management responses informed in quite direct ways the development – and thus 
the greater history – of the small units network.  What distinguishes this work 
from those cited is that while prisoners may actively ‘make their own spaces, 
material and imagined’ (Sibley & van Hoven, 2009:205), thereby distorting or 
eclipsing the representational forms that others have attempted to impose, this 
process alone does not in every case signify a reclaiming of space in the positive 
sense. It does not always lesson feelings of subjugation, nor promote a sense of 
personal power. During periods of Scotland’s penal history prisoners contained in 
certain segregation spaces have variously imagined those physical environments, 
and engaged with them accordingly, as graves, coffins and warzones, as well as 
sanctuaries and creative places. The demonstration of autonomy in how carceral 
geographies are materially personalised and imagined by prisoners may displace 
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the power of those guarding the guarded (insofar as they are able to determine 
how spaces are conceived of and interacted with) but the experience of 
domination remains, only now it is the prisoner himself who tightens the noose of 
control (see Chapters Four and Five). 
Original Contribution(s) 
Academic attention has been paid both to elements of the history of Scottish penal 
policy and practice (see Cameron, 1983; Coyle, 1994; Hutton, 1999; McAra, 
1999; McManus, 1999), and, in a more limited fashion, to specific segregation 
arrangements at specific moments in time (Adler & Longhurst, 1989; Cooke, 
1989a&b; Coyle 1987; Sparks, 2002; Whatmore, 1987; Wozniak, 1989). What 
has not been attempted is a detailed portrait merging the two, i.e. an historical 
analysis of multiple segregation arrangements side by side. By documenting the 
multiple forms, frameworks and locations of segregation, by exploring the 
relationships between them and by examining the policy context in which they 
have arisen, I hope to make a useful contribution.  
Analyses that merge spatial, sociological and historical perspectives is a relatively 
underexplored path in prisons research – the emerging scholarship of carceral 
geography scholarship is the exception to this general rule. This project 
contributes to that body of work by applying this kind of analyses to segregation 
measures in recent Scottish history.  
In methodological terms, I hope this research makes two further contributions. 
First I have collected the personal and institutional oral histories of a number of 
prison officials, many of whom come from a generation of people who have 
relevant knowledge of significant segregation developments in Scottish prisons -
we are now approaching the last years in which their experiences may be 
collected directly. Secondly, the use of certain spatially-oriented interview 
techniques to provoke spatialized recollections is a useful and novel method for 
this kind of project; it is an approach that might be worth developing (in theory 








A combination of qualitative methods were used in this project: archival research, 
secondary textual analysis of prisoners’ published autobiographies, and semi-
structured interviewing. Further, to explore the spatial dimensions pertinent for 
this work, I experimented with novel interview techniques including the use of 
spatial prompts (photographs, maps, floorplans, etc.) during interview encounters, 
and, though to a lesser degree, engaging with what might be called ‘situated 
storytelling’, whereby conversations were had in the physical places where the 
experiences had taken place.  
In three sections, this chapter offers descriptions of these methods, explaining the 
research design and the precise techniques used. This is woven into broader 
discussions of pertinent methodological dilemmas and debates relating to 
processes of remembering within the context of both institutional historical 
consciousness and, at the individual level, the ways people summon and share 
personal memories. The first sections address the process of archival research; the 
materials I accessed, the methods of analysis, and the limitations encountered, 
primarily those concerned with the storage, preservation and nature of records. 
Drawing on the work of Derrida this section also includes a wider analysis of the 
implications of data preservation and the role of historical consciousness in the 
prison context. This is followed by discussion of the status of prisoner 
autobiography in social science research. The preceding sections concerns the 
process of interviewing, particularly focusing on elements of narrative inquiry. 
An argument is advanced proposing why and how psychogeographical 
approaches might be useful in qualitative, historical research. Insights from 
memory studies are examined in some detail and used to support the 
methodological value of merging these two research approaches. Subtitled ‘what I 
would do differently’, the final section offers additional analysis of the 
19 
 
methodological, epistemological and, to a lesser degree, the ethical challenges I 
encountered in this project.  
In general (and in this project specifically) historical and qualitative research 
methods require ongoing adjustments, which is not to suggest a lack of careful 
planning; rather, a certain flexibility of approach contingent upon the kinds of 
material that one unearths (largely by accident) and the kinds of conversations 
(both formal and informal) that one has, again some of which are fortuitous rather 
than strictly planned. Qualitative methods in the social sciences are often more 
comfortably positioned within an arts paradigm rather than one that is strictly 
scientific. By way of caution, Gergen (1985:273) provides an earthy analogy 
suggestive of this point:  
The sciences have been enchanted by the myth that the assiduous 
application of rigorous method will yield sound fact – as if empirical 
methodology were some form of meat grinder from which truth could be 
turned out like so many sausages.  
With narrative (and indeed archival) methodologies there is no agreed set of data 
collection or analysing procedures, rather ‘good narrative analysis makes sense in 
intuitive, holistic ways. The knowing in such work includes but transcends the 
rational’ (Josselson, 1993:pxii). Mindful of the craft of historical, qualitative 
research, and whilst still attentive to issues of credibility and validity, this chapter 
describes the methods used on that basis. 
Notes on Archival Research 
The process of writing (in some senses making) one version of penal history is a 
descriptive as well as an explanatory exercise. It must engage with the tools of, 
but requires more than, the methods used in sociological or evaluative 
investigations of prison life and practice. Cause and effect is not always neatly 
established given the long-range temporal span of study, and for that same reason 
neither is perfect description possible. As said by Bertrand Russell in Mysticism 
and Logic,  
every advance in [social] science takes us further away from the crude 
uniformities which are first observed into a greater differentiation of 
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antecedents and consequent and into a continually wider circle of 
antecedents recognised as relevant” (quoted in Carr, 1961: 84-85).  
If decisions relating to segregation – where, why, who, how, how long – have 
been responsive to shifts in broad penal patterns relating to, for example, 
particular conceptions of prisoners, operational and management 
philosophies/apparatuses, politics and legal activism, then the practice of 
segregation is a valuable prism through which to glimpse the essential nature of 
an individual prison (and the wider system to which it belongs) at any given time. 
For that reason, documenting this history in the limited time-frame of a PhD and 
with limited resources became, inevitably, an exercise of omission. How to write 
a reasonably comprehensive history of aspects of segregation in Scottish prisons 
without also writing an extraordinarily complex history of Scottish prisons? One 
way of doing so is to use space as a key descriptive frame, as well as analytical 
category, through which to view segregation at certain points in time. As a 
methodological starting point, then, I began by exploring the spaces of 
segregation that are currently being used in Scottish prisons, which in the early 
stages of this project amounted to the traditional segregation units, or ‘punishment 
blocks’, attached to most prisons and positioned within the perimeters of 
individual institutions. However, as stated above, it became apparent that these 
sites represented only one kind of environment within which prisoners are 
segregated, and indeed only one category of segregation. At this juncture the 
difference between ‘routine’ and ‘specialist’ measures of segregation emerged, as 
did Scotland’s peculiar history with the latter category – in the majority of 
historical policy documents that reference ‘segregation’ particular mention is 
made of the small units network. I therefore adjusted my approach and decided to 
dedicate the bulk of my research to this specialist network, spending less time 
attending to routine measures (this is reflected in the structure of the thesis, with 
only Chapter Two dedicated to them).  
The small units network in Scotland comprised seven physical sites: 
- The Inverness ‘Cages’ 
- The Barlinnie Special Unit 
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- The Individual Cell Unit 
- The Perth ‘Time Out’ Facility 
- The Shotts Unit 
- The Peterhead ‘Digger’ 
Strictly speaking this final unit in Peterhead prison was not formally part of the 
specialist network; rather, it was one of Scotland’s longest-standing, and most 
notorious routine segregation blocks, ostensibly commissioned as a place of short-
term punishment for disciplinary infractions. In practice, this site was used to hold 
the same prisoner demographic the officially designated small units targeted and, 
moreover, it held prisoners for extended periods of time (weeks and months rather 
than days). It also served as something of an unofficial ‘feeder-site’ to the formal 
small units and, based on interview data and prisoners’ autobiographies, it helped 
to set the tone both for the ways particular units were run, and for how prisoners 
and staff responded to them. For these reasons it warrants inclusion in this 
analysis. 
I intended to examine all seven of these sites and to collect relevant archival and 
interview data so as to offer a reasonably comprehensive account of how, why, 
and when this network evolved. In addition, I assumed I would also have the 
space, time and means to include analysis of the various approaches to protective 
segregation, charting for example the development of both partitioned Vulnerable 
Prisoners Halls within individual prisons and, later, the use of Peterhead prison as 
an entire establishment devoted to the management of protection prisoners (in this 
case sex offenders). This proved to be wildly ambitious for a variety of prosaic 
reasons, but archival questions (preservation and related issues of accessibility) 
also factored into the more limited portrait I am able to offer here.  
The story that it is possible to construct along with the spaces that might be 
selected relies on the range and nature of archival materials that have been 
preserved (and what has been lost), the storage of those archives, and, 
particularly, how easily they might be accessed. In this project, while there were 
multiple data sources from which to draw, the institutional archives were 
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dominated by particular kinds of documents detailing only certain kinds of 
segregation spaces and practices. Contacts in the SPS research department were 
extremely generous and helpful in providing entry to the archives kept at HQ. I 
was also fortunate to have accessed the wonderfully arcane jumble of materials 
kept at Peterhead prison just in time before the prison was decommissioned. 
Additionally, some of the people I interviewed had their own impressive 
collections through which I had the opportunity to rummage. But the process of 
identifying and then exploring the archives felt distinctly improvised, 
unsystematic and strangely dependent on forces of serendipity. To varying 
degrees this might be the case with all historical studies but I was surprised in this 
case by the lack of careful and properly organised archival stores. I was surprised 
that a detailed and comprehensive record of certain segregation arrangements had 
not been preserved, or, if it had been, that it was not immediately clear where 
exactly such records are kept. This was a point of discussion that featured in 
several interviews with penal managers. Extracts from one such interview, 
conducted in the early part of this research are included below to give a sense of 
these difficulties and how officials within the system viewed them: 
Jessica Bird (JB): Why is it proving so difficult to find internal 
documentation relating to the units? 
Participant (P): I don’t know, I think, I suppose we don’t have a proper 
structure in place and it’s just been left to particular establishments to keep 
records over the years and decisions have been made at a very low level. 
We just haven’t made it a priority. 
R: So it’s accidental? 
P: Oh yes, absolutely. It’s never been a priority; it’s never been one 
person’s area of responsibility. It’s writ large at the moment with records, 
mostly prisoners’ records that we’re in a mess. We just set up quite a big 
project team. The records are all over the place just now and we’ve no 
policy about who’s accessing what, who manages what, it’s just evolved 
over the years with the vast expansion of case management, ICM….um 
R: and all the paper that comes with it. 
P: yes (laughs). Parole processes haven’t really been updated for a long 
time and there’s been various working parties and projects and they’ve all 
run into the ground and so there’s yet another attempt to regenerate work 
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on parole dossiers. These documents are massive, lots of 
unnecessary….they repeat this every year regardless. The SPS produces 
lots and lots of paper! But it hasn’t’t been stored over the years. Some of it 
will still be in establishments but a lot of it is gone. 
 
In light of these difficulties, I chose to lower my ambitions and attempt to offer a 
detailed examination of far fewer sites – those which either had considerable 
archival materials attached to them or those which were given the most attention 
and ascribed significant meaning by the people I interviewed, or whose stories I 
read. As it happened, these two elements mostly overlapped. Reflecting this 
emphasis, then, this thesis offers considerable description and analysis of: The 
Peterhead ‘Digger’, the Inverness ‘Cages’ (which are considered most fully and in 
parallel in Chapter Five), and the Barlinnie Special Unit (Chapter Six). 
If a key strength of this project is the depth of description offered of these discrete 
sites, this same feature stands as one of the project’s limitations insofar as wider 
analysis detailing the network as a whole (as well as other specialist and routine 
segregation measures beyond it) is not given. I did, however, map the general 
policy development relating to other segregation sites though in a more summary 
form than I had initially hoped. 
The archival records that were available to me are listed below:  
Accessible and complete materials: 
(a) SPS policy documents and internal reports, including: 
- Custody and Care (1990) 
- Assessment and Control (1989) 
- Opportunity and Responsibility (1990) 
- Peterhead Unit: The First Two Years September 1995 – September 1997 
(b) HMIPS reports from 1982 – 
N.B. I also came across draft copies of specific inspection reports (early 1980s) 
with comments, notes and underlined passages written by particular governors    
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(c) The three reports on Scottish prisons conducted by the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture  
Accessible but only partially complete materials:  
(d) Standing Orders;  
(e) Register of Receptions, Peterhead Prison (1926-1967) 
(f) Register of Punishments, Peterhead Prison (1979-1984) 
(g) Internal documents and press releases relating to BSU open days, outings, 
and charity events  
(h) Minutes of meetings 
- Working Party to review the unit at Inverness prison (Thursday 26th 
October, 1978) 
- Meeting to discuss Inspection Report of Barlinnie Special Unit, dated July 
2nd, 1984 
- Barlinnie Special Unit meeting with the Governor and Deputy Governor, 
Dr. Whatmore, Dr. Cooke, and E McKelvie, Senior Social Worker (19th 
April, 1990)  
- Whitely Council Meeting (1965), attended by members of the SPOA 
(i) Fragments of risk prediction reports for Peterhead prison (1980s but dates 
were unclear) 
(j) A small collection of staff notices from the Inverness Unit (early 1970s 
but dates are unclear) 
(k) Prisoners’ personal files (or fragments of) and other documents relating to 
specific prisoners, these range from the period between 1969 – 1979 and 
include details of the following, 
- Background 
- Index offences 
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- Behaviour in the prison, including descriptions of specific infractions and 
disciplinary records 
- Notes on personality 
(l) Private correspondences 
- Dozens of letters between penal officials, including Directors of the Prison 
Service governors, assistant governors, medical officers, operations staff, 
unit managers, political actors, e.g. representatives of and the Secretaries 
of State for Scotland, Executive Committee members of the Scottish 
Prison Officers’ Association. These letters cover the period between 1960s 
– 1980s. Most relate to either specific prisoners, specific incidents, or 
specific policies (e.g. special escorted leave schemes from units, and there 
was a particularly long letter from one prison governor to the chief 
medical office about the use of mechanical restraints – dated 1972).     
(m) Photographs  
- ‘Separate Cells’ – Peterhead 10 Cell Unit 
- Barricades in bottom flat ‘Separate Cells’ – Peterhead mainstream 
- Damages to the roof and landings during the 1987 rooftop protests 
- Vandalism in Peterhead ‘Digger’ cells 
(n) Media archives 
- Original newspaper cuttings, most from the 1970s and related to the 
BSU, including the Glasgow Herald, the Guardian, the Courier, the 
Daily Telegraph, the Sun, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail, the Daily 
Record 
- Transcripts of radio segments, again most from the 1970s and related 
to the BSU  
(o) The Key Magazine, Issue 1 1975 (in house publication of the Barlinnie 
Special Unit) 
(p) Inverness ‘Cages’ daily schedule 17th December 1987 
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(q) Cassette tape recordings of prisoner interviews from an internal SPS 
research project (never completed or published) in the aftermath of the 
1987 protests at Peterhead prison. 
Data Analysis 
These records cover a relatively long time-span, they comprise myriad types of 
sources which were not coherently ordered or stored (i.e. not all material relating 
to Peterhead, for example, were stored in the Peterhead archives); rather, they 
were stored in various locations (most either in unmarked boxes in both Peterhead 
prison and SPS HQ, or in individual private collections). All materials were 
physical (i.e. none had been digitized), which is something of a departure from 
the general trend in historical archiving. In this research a more traditional 
approach was required without the need for digital techniques, and given the 
variation in types of sources (as well as the degree of completeness) the method 
of analysis was source-specific. In general, the method of content analysis I 
adopted was qualitative and ‘open’ as opposed to systematic and ‘prescriptive’ 
(McKeone, 1995) – this meant identifying dominant themes and messages 
without a strict set of categories or parameters. Time restrictions also influenced 
the methods of analysis I was able to adopt; whilst visiting Peterhead prison, for 
example, in the first few months of the research, I spent three concurrent days at 
the prison in an auxiliary office building where I was able to go through the 
archives but was unable to remove any materials. The approach I took, therefore, 
was to hand-write summaries of as many documents as I could in the timeframe. I 
subsequently used these notes to cross-reference with other records I found as the 
research progressed. Time restrictions were also imposed in relation to the 
archival collections held in personal collections, although one individual allowed 
me to keep files pertaining to the Barlinnie Special Unit for a period of months, 
which meant the information I had for this unit was much more comprehensive, 
hence the more thorough analysis I was able to offer in this thesis (in Chapter 
Six). Additionally, I was also able to spend longer periods with the documents 
stored at SPS HQ (a total of 15 days), which similarly allowed for a more 
comprehensive analysis. Since I accessed these archives later in the research 
process I had by that time (two years after I began the project) developed a 
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number of pertinent themes which I separated into categories and used to direct 
my reading of these documents. This procedure involved ‘thematic analysis of 
text’ and ‘indexing’ (Trochim and Donnelly, 2008:151). More specifically, where 
mention was made of topics within my chosen categories I lifted key extracts, 
quotes and dates and recorded these data in notebooks. These related to: 1) 
classification procedures; 2) small units; 3) segregation measures more broadly; 
4) riots, protests and violent incidences; 5) vulnerable prisoners; 6) prisoners who 
posed management problems (of any kind); 7) miscellaneous, which principally 
included any information that related specifically to the time period I was 
interested in (1950s-1990s). For each document, I established (where possible) its 
external validity, i.e. ‘where, when and by whom it was produced’ (Wiersma, 
1986:223). Subsequent, ‘internal criticism’ of each source involved evaluating the 
‘meaning, accuracy and trustworthiness of the content of the document’ 
(Wiersma, 1986:224), which was more challenging to gauge.  
The policy-oriented documents were used to establish facts since they contained 
information relating to specific practices. These were compared with the HIMPS 
reports of roughly the same period, which also included factual and statistical 
information. The outlines of particular ‘crisis’ events and extreme incidences of 
violence were often recorded in these documents, as well as in some of the letters 
– individual incidences were also referred to in the prisoners’ files (occasionally it 
was possible to match isolated events noted in the policy and inspection reports to 
the particular prisoners involved, and thus to glean more detailed accounts, the 
same was also the case with respect to individual newspaper reports). I did not 
find cases where the historical record pertaining to crisis events were disputed 
between sources; but there were numerous examples of variation in the 
interpretations of their meanings. This was especially evident when comparing 
accounts offered in prisoners’ autobiographies with descriptions of those same 
events (or general time periods) presented in letters between prison officials, and 
accounts in internal prison documents. To gauge a wider range of interpretations, 
I also relied on secondary analyses of major events, policies or practices e.g. the 
inquiry into the Peterhead protests conducted by an external committee 
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commissioned by Gateway Exchange (1987), and the book members of that 
committee subsequently published (Scranton, Sim, and Skidmore, 1990). 
The prisoners’ personals files were incomplete; there were files on four prisoners 
as part of the BSU archives which were the most comprehensive, including for 
example reports written by medical staff, prison staff, and details of their 
backgrounds, index crimes, and behaviour within the prison system. There were 
also much older files in Peterhead prison relating to dozens of prisoners but 
documents relating to individual prisoners were scattered between multiple boxes 
of documents so piecing together complete pictures of individuals was much more 
difficult. The prisoners about whom there was the most documentation were those 
who had presented the most serious management problems – and within a limited 
time frame (the late 1970s and 1980s during which much of the most incendiary 
disorder occurred). Reference to such prisoners were made in many of the letters 
sent between prison officials and representatives of the Office of the Secretary of 
State for Scotland, or from and to the various Secretaries themselves. Again, I 
adopted a comparative analytical approach to this range of data to make sense of 
the variations in interpretations of disorder (related to etiological explanations, 
and justifications of responses). I also cross-referenced these data with the 
accounts presented in prisoners’ autobiographies. The fragments of prisoners’ 
files I drew on in this research were not confidential at the time I was given 
access to them; I was not asked to sign any confidentiality documents, though as 
an ethical decision I chose not to identify any of the prisoners whose information 
I made reference to – except data already made public in prisoners’ 
autobiographies, or those who had shared their insights on the record via media.   
At the beginning of this project I was advised that I would probably stumble upon 
relevant articles by accident, that I would find boxes of material at the back of a 
drawer somewhere. This was hard to believe especially since this project is 
concerned with the recent past and with a practice that has at times generated 
significant external attention, but in the event, that was exactly the case. 
Questions about institutional memory, about historical consciousness and about 
the degree of responsibility that a state body does and should assume with regard 
to preserving its own history became more concerning as the research progressed. 
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Given these omissions, before detailing the additional research methods used in 
this project (namely, interviewing), it seems apposite to take a slight detour here 
in order to think though more carefully some of the larger implications of penal 
archiving, or indeed the failures to do so, which the next section attempts with 
reference to insights from Derrida in particular.  
Institutional Remembering and Forgetting: Warnings from Derrida 
In his book Archive Fever: a Freudian impression (1996) Derrida explains the 
intrinsic conflict between the impulse (understood as a burning passion) to 
conserve institutional memories through the maintenance of archives and the 
parallel drive to destroy - to actively forget. According to Derrida, the 
vulnerability of archives, along with memory more broadly conceived, is 
attributable not only to inevitable accidents of time – where documents are lost or 
mismanaged as the places they are kept, the people keeping them, and the 
practices of recording/storing change – but also to intentional acts of denial and 
repression, ultimately amounting to acts of oblivion. Drawing on Freudian 
concepts, Derrida terms this the ‘death drive’ which exists, and can only exist, in 
relation to a fever for remembering. Such vivid reflections are relevant for any 
historical study that relies on institutional archival materials since power 
hierarchies structure what is remembered and what is forgotten rendering 
questions of justice all the more urgent. But they are especially pertinent when 
exploring the specific topic of segregation in prisons and for several reasons.  
First, as inherently locked institutions, prisons have traditionally maintained their 
impenetrability to outside gazes, guarding its present practices and opening its 
gates to research only on its own limited terms. This general impulse to safeguard 
extends to its history for “there is no political power without control of the 
archive, if not memory” (Derrida, 1996:4), which may mean more than merely 
refusing outside access (which was not my experience with this research). Rather, 
control of the past (and therefore the future-present) may be tacitly ensured 
through complacent archive-keeping; not only through the willful concealment or 
closure of records - that may in any case be minimally legitimate for reasons of 
security and personal confidentiality – but through passive negligence. The loss of 
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particular records can act to preserve dominant orthodoxies of history just as 
much as the selective retention of others. 
Secondly, the specific practice of segregation has historically included uniquely 
controversial elements which a self-consciously humane organisation might rather 
forget, or remember only in a detached manner in ways that draw the starkest 
lines of difference between what was then and what is now. Certain forms of 
segregation have caused (and still do) significant psychological harm to the 
people to whom it has been applied (see subsection on solitary confinement, p.? 
of this thesis) and indeed to those who have been tasked with imposing it. The 
body of research on the destructive impacts of solitary confinement in particular 
stretches back almost to the very beginnings of the modern prison; a consensus of 
harm that is now well established (see Sharff-Smith, 2006). But other less 
extreme, less totalising forms of segregation have also created human suffering, 
provoking external concern and legal challenge along with some (though not 
enough) institutional soul-searching. This is inevitable given the sensitivities, 
challenges and consequences of decisions to formally separate certain kinds of 
individuals from the mainstream prison population. Segregation is used to militate 
against, or as a means of providing an incomplete answer to, very serious 
questions of suicide, escapes, violence, and various forms of personal and 
institutional disturbance. Routine crises that can so easily become uncontrollable 
and in turn can have a critical bearing on the reputation of a prison service. It is 
unsurprising then that degrees of denial and repression, if not quite oblivion, are 
sustained through time regarding precise details of the ethical and operational 
dimensions of certain practices. Yet, as Derrida reminds us, death-driven amnesia 
is not merely the lack of remembering enabled through intentionally complacent 
archive-keeping; it also represents processes of misremembering, of over 
romanticising or over demonising the past.  
In terms of recording the history of segregation, there has been a tendency 
evidenced in the archives to preserve documents relating to very best- and very 
worst-practice, a conscious chronicling of both the most harm-inducing 
approaches (even if only by way of outside pressure) and those shining examples 
where benefits can be measured and heads may be held high. By contrast, the 
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much broader, often banal, and somewhat ambiguous range of spaces and 
practices that have also constituted segregation have apparently evaded archival 
attention. In this way, “the [particular] archivization [of segregation] produces as 
much as it records events” (Derrida, 1996:17). Illustrative of this point: the vast 
bulk of preserved SPS archives specifically regarding small units in Scottish 
prisons relate to the Barlinnie Special Unit, compared to information about many, 
if not most, other units, which is scattered, lost or has simply been destroyed in 
the sweep of time. It says something about the place the BSU assumes in 
institutional memory as both a source of often excessive (though in other ways 
warranted) pride and embarrassment, that such a detailed collection of public and 
private documents has been kept – untypically, all in one place.3 Documents 
concerning the 10 Cell Unit in Peterhead, however - notable for the fact it was re-
functionalised at least three times since its construction in the early 1980s – are 
difficult to locate, and where they are the information is only patchy. A similar 
lack of careful, comprehensive archiving also pertains to the Perth Time-Out 
facility, the Inverness ‘Cages’ (unexpectedly given its notoriety), and the 
Individual-Cell Unit (also known as the McCulloch Unit), again located in 
Peterhead prison. In terms of the more generic segregation sites, the ‘punishment 
blocks’ (though recently and tellingly re-named Separation and Integration Units), 
the archival picture is even more fragmentary. These “feeder” sites are interesting 
in themselves but also relevant to the extent they were the places from where 
prisoners deemed suitable for specialist sites both tended to come from and later 
were often returned to. With the exception of the punishment block in Peterhead 
prison (the infamous “Digger”), very little in the way of official documentation 
still exists, or is at least uneasily obtainable. Certain kinds of data, including for 
example statistical information past and present regarding the number of people 
kept in these segregation units, length and reasons for containment, design 
features and adaptations, and incidences of dirty protests or other kinds of trouble 
specifically within those settings, are either not recorded at all, were collected but 
                                                          
3 It is perhaps un-coincidental that the official who was able to locate this archive, having taken 
responsibility for preserving it, was described by one criminologist I spoke with as ‘the conscience 
of the SPS’. 
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have not been archived, or are not made publicly available. This is a problem 
common to many prison systems particularly within supermax prisons in the 
United States (see Reiter 2012). With respect to explicitly protective sites, 
however, e.g. ‘safe’ or ‘anti ligature’ cells, along with collective segregation 
spaces i.e. vulnerable prisoners wings, there is a substantial body of 
predominantly policy-oriented literature. This might be expected given the 
comparably recent introduction of standardized spaces and practices applicable to 
protection prisoners. But still, before the early 1990s when the SPS adopted a new 
approach to the containment of sex offenders (the largest group of protection 
prisons), and before targeted attempts to improve suicide prevention with better 
designed spaces, the state of protective segregation in the preceding periods is 
virtually unaccounted for. I did come across a few fleeting references to the VP 
wing operative in the 1940s in Peterhead prison but this represented a (welcome) 
archival anomaly, distinctive due to its rarity. 
If the production of institutional history depends on available and accessible 
source material, and in turn if that depends on the kinds of institutional archives 
that have been preserved, then, as Derrida suggests, the way it is possible to 
produce a particular history (as much as how that past is interpreted) to a large 
extent determines what that history is understood as being. Perspective is 
unavoidably skewed by the traces that have been deliberately (or inadvertently) 
protected. In the case of Scottish segregation, it is possible to write a properly 
sourced history of the small unit network but it is not possible to write it 
comprehensively (the BSU would be the star of the show). Equally, it would be 
possible to write an institutional history of punishment blocks but the Peterhead 
Digger would seem to assume even more significance than the albeit considerable 
status it undoubtedly had. Based solely on institutional archives, even more 
challenging are attempts to write a balanced and detailed history of protective 
segregation since the impression would be that it was formally invented only in 
the last few decades and with only, or especially, the SO population in mind. 
However, as previously suggested, for reasons of both practical limitations and 
archival considerations, I have chosen to focus this research on more 
administratively and punitively oriented forms of specialist segregation (though 
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the materials I have amassed on protective segregation in Scotland indicate a 
possible avenue for future research.) 
From an empirical standpoint, then, there is the problem of ever narrowing fields 
of archival data coupled with, from an analytical standpoint, the above referenced 
challenge of ‘ever widening circles of antecedents’ to explain that data. The 
result: a history of segregation which aims to overview as well as detail its 
constituent parts, making clear the connections between them, but only succeeds 
in offering a limited account which gives greater written space, if not weight, to 
certain aspects of segregation based on what is possible to document owing to 
what has been only partially preserved. And this is the situation even before 
issues of compromised neutrality, speculation and biased or otherwise imperfect 
interpretation have a bearing on the story being told. (Though, the impossibility of 
forming an active allegiance with and thereby representing every side does not 
preclude the possibility of empathising with all sides – in this respect, Becker’s 
‘whose side are you on?’ logic may represent something of a false choice).  
In failing to properly maintain prison archives by allowing some archives by 
accident or design to vanish, a prison service may be demonstrating passive 
neglect more than intentional obfuscation. Nevertheless, this archival 
complacency represents a general absence of historical consciousness (which may 
or may not be motivated directly by Derrida’s possibly overly-dramatic notion of 
the ‘death-drive’) and also a lack of public accountability. In practice, researchers 
are often left to rely on serendipity, encountering by chance particular archival 
stores in the course of study. One example from this research: while sifting 
through a small collection of documents personally stored by a member of the 
SPS research department, I stumbled upon a box of cassette tapes. These tapes 
were recorded interviews with Scottish prisoners from the late 1980s in the 
aftermath of a series of riots.  Participants were asked to give their personal 
reflections on how and why the riots came about, with many interviewees also 
cataloguing a litany of complaints about prison life in general. Whilst many of the 
recordings are inaudible, the data that was retrievable offered rich insight. 
Subsequently, in conversation with the interviewer in those tapes, I learnt that this 
data has not been published elsewhere, in fact he was unaware these tapes still 
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existed at all. Telling the most faithful story one can, pieced together from 
documentary fragments, rather than offering a complete version of what really 
happened is the best one can hope for. It is for these reasons – the wish to be 
faithful and the limitations of archives – that narrative testimonies are so vital. 
Beginning with a discussion of the status of autobiography in social science 
research, as one narrative form, the next sections discuss the value of narrative 
research more generally as well as the specifics of the interview process in this 
project.  
Prison Autobiographies 
When the prisoners began to speak, they possessed an individual theory of 
prisons, the penal system and justice. It is this form of discourse which 
ultimately matters, a discourse against power, the counter-discourse of 
prisoners and those we call delinquents – and not a theory about 
delinquents. 
- Foucault (1977:209) 
As an ethical imperative the ‘heterological historian’ (Wyschogrod, 1998) must 
integrate the testimonies of excluded voices into the dominant historical 
orthodoxies that are typically preserved through institutional archives. Along with 
the above-referenced prisoner tapes, many of which have a narrative quality 
insofar as participants tended to consider the specific issue of riots through the 
larger prism of their own personal histories within and outside of prison, I 
engaged with two additional narrative sources: published prisoner 
autobiographies and interviews, mainly with SPS personnel. Some prisoner-
authors have certainly been heard, often with much popular acclaim - think of 
Bobby Sands in Northern Ireland or Jimmy Boyle in Scotland, both of whom had 
their accounts made into successful films. In individual cases, then, prisoners’ 
voices can be popularised and therefore not always marginalised, silenced or 
entirely excluded from the record, even if the majority of such testimonies do not 
usually receive such publicity. 
In this project I engaged with six self-told life stories of five Scottish prisoners – 
Jimmy Boyle (1977;1984); Hugh Collins (1997); Tommy Campbell (2002); 
Johnny Steele (1992); Larry Winters (1979) - each of whose testimonies included 
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lengthy descriptions of their experiences in Scottish small units. The Peterhead 
‘Digger’, Inverness ‘Cages’ and the Barlinnie Special Unit were particularly 
focused on in their accounts, which is indicative of the unusual nature of these 
environments and indeed the impact they had on those who were confined within 
them. Reasons for writing prison autobiographies vary, and few prisoner-authors 
offer lengthy reflections of their own motives. Nellis (2002:435), however, 
identifies general motivations:  
…to justify the offender to himself (more rarely herself) and the world; to 
help the writer come to terms with the traumatic experience of 
confinement; to expose prison conditions and prompt debate on penal 
(and/or wider social) reform; to make money where the stigma of 
imprisonment makes gainful employment difficult after release; and for 
purely literary reasons – to evoke, describe and explain a world all too 
often hidden from, and ignored by the public. 
The six accounts used in this research share many similar qualities in terms of 
their adherence to particular conventions of storytelling. Through charged, often 
haunting descriptions, thick with sensory detail, they force readers ‘into the scene’ 
(Ellis, 2004:142) allowing us to ‘experience an experience’ (Ellis, 1993:711). By 
way of following a largely chronological rather than temporally fragmented path 
they develop plot and character (Ellis & Ellingson, 2000) – the latter is presented 
in each of these six accounts through a redemptive arc – an explicit 
autobiographical presentation of Maruna’s (2001) concept of the ‘redemptive 
script’ - so that by the end we the readers are given a sense of the personal 
development, if not in every case transformation, the prisoner-author felt they had 
experienced.  What is being communicated comes across as a statement of ‘I 
began as one kind of person and finished-up as another.’ Although, this is not to 
suggest an inconsistency of character; rather, these authors find ways to first 
explain their prison-based offending, as in large part the product of brutalizing 
conditions, and secondly to reclaim certain aspects of themselves which in one 
context contributed to their recalcitrance but later was reinterpreted as crucial to 
their more positive behaviours. For example, a highly developed sense of personal 
autonomy (and its inherent connection to individual dignity) is used to legitimize 
violent behaviour in response to a prison system that, as they viewed it, sought to 
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crush their spirits. This same quality of almost unrelenting self-possession is 
again used to explain how prisoners were able to transcend the indignities and 
privations of imprisonment but in ways that were non-violent, creative, and 
personally meaningful. (Chapters Four and Five discuss this movement in detail). 
This accords with Maruna’s (2001) findings that some ‘desisters’ (though in the 
community rather than in prison) do not entirely shed their identities when they 
abandon their offending activities but instead redeploy particular identity-
elements in productive, non-offending forms. In this way, these prisoners’ 
accounts contain a coherence of character, themes and ideas – a coherence which 
Agar and Hobbs (1982) suggest are common elements in narrative forms.  
At some level, the act and art of writing one’s life story ‘offers an opportunity to 
experiment with becoming a person’ (Gilmore 2001:103). This recalls Bruner’s 
(1987:15) much cited, almost aphoristic statement, ‘we become the 
autobiographical narratives by which we ‘tell about’ our lives.’ So influential has 
narrative theory become to how scholars across many social science disciplines 
understand identity construction that a sub-branch of ‘narrative criminology’ has 
emerged which attempts etiological analyses, as Presser (2012:5) holds, ‘to 
explain crime and other harmful action as a function of the stories that actors and 
bystanders tell about themselves’. She makes explicit this connection between 
identity-construction and narrative:   
We talk ourselves into feeling resentment, anger, or anything else; we tell 
ourselves who we are and should be, who others are and should be, and 
what the world is like and should be like….One changes one’s thoughts, 
primarily through self-talk (Presser, 2012:8) 
Narrative criminology, however, has tended to concentrate on oral testimonies 
(see especially Presser, 2004;2009), largely produced through qualitative 
interviewing methods and ethnographies, while story telling in written formats, 
autobiography in particular, has been less well attended to. In the case of prisoner 
autobiographies, this genre has been especially underexploited within our 
discipline (see Morgan, 2002; Nellis, 1988; 2002) for similar reasons to those 
which are occasionally levied against convict criminology and the method of 
auto/ethnography more specifically. The criticism centers on what Newbold et al 
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(2014:444) term ‘the problem of excessive subjectivity’, particularly as it relates 
to the dangers of emotionalism (Jewkes, 2012). ‘In prison research, becoming 
emotionally attached to one side or the other is not unusual, but doing so affects 
the perceptions of the researcher’ (Newbold et al, 2012:439). In the case of 
prisoner-authors (as distinct from researchers with or without a criminal record), 
how much more affecting it is when what is being described is one’s own 
experience, one’s own side? The understandable and valuable emotions elicited 
by imprisonment for those who have first-hand experience of it may bleed into a 
more dubious emotionalism, which Newbold et al (2014:441) describe in the 
following terms: 
For the ex-prisoner, the contaminating potential of hyper-emotionalism 
lies in passions such as frustration, resentment, and perceived injustice, 
which can be considerable and sometimes consuming, and which can 
compromise objectivity. Jewkes validly points out that the existence of 
emotion does not necessarily invalidate an “insider” criminologist’s views. 
Rather, the passion engendered by the experience of incarceration can add 
color, context, and contour both to objective and subjective findings. 
Provided it does not unrealistically skew the researcher’s perception or 
analysis (441) 
They conclude, however, that the “insider” perspective may be ‘regarded as an 
essential thread in the tapestry of criminological inquiry’ (441). This same 
essential proposition should also be applied to the genre of prison autobiography. 
While it is distinct from academic writing, such testimonies, as Morgan 
(2002:337) contends, ‘are not criminology in a formal sense as they do not adhere 
to any formal conventions of sociological method’, they contain the same 
qualities of ‘color, context, and contour’ as academic auto/ethnographies.   
They represent some of the most extended narratives and analyses of a 
particular social experience normally hidden from public view. They are 
also documents of significance for penal history…The meaning of prison 
and its practices may thus be interrogated over a substantial period. 
(Morgan, 2002:337) 
Linked to these sets of concerns regarding emotionalism, but applicable 
specifically to prison autobiography, is the issue of verisimilitude. The concern 
being the extent to which such testimonies are factually accurate (Nellis 
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1988:2002). While there may be ‘no place for hot-headedness in academic 
writing” (Jewkes, 2012:71), there is certainly a place for it, or at least there is an 
abundance of it, within prisoners’ autobiographies. Some degree of caution, 
therefore, is legitimate when considering the range of grievances prisoners might 
have and the particular motivations or hope that they might harbor as to the 
possible effects of their writing. In discussions of Truth, however, it is arguably 
more useful to replace the question of ‘did these events really (i.e. objectively) 
happen in the way the author describes’ with Bocher’s (2002:86) question ‘Does 
the narrator believe this is what happened to him?’ (italics added). Indeed, if we 
accept the premise that narrative does not merely communicate identity but in 
some senses actually helps shape it, then it matters very much how prisoner-
authors narrate their experiences, how they themselves construct and interpret 
both their offending and their processes of desistance, and that this is arguably of 
equal if not more significance than matters of fact. This is where prison 
autobiography and academic auto/ethnography critically diverge.  
If this truth problem is prison autobiography’s trickiest characteristic, then its 
superlative advantage is its relatively unmediated construction. In his study of 
‘desisters’ and ‘persisters’ in Manchester, Maruna (2001) provides one of the best 
examples of narrative criminology’s attempts to capture offenders’ narrations, yet 
this work, while hugely important, is a mediated academic process – the 
participants tell their story about themselves to another. Autobiographical writing, 
by contrast, is unhindered by the presence of an embodied audience and therefore 
the story is less affected (directly at least) by the Hawthorne Effect. In her work 
with (on?) Jim David Adkisson – a man who committed a mass shooting in 
Tennessee in 2008 – Presser (2012) makes this point in relation to the written 
account Adkisson produced before the commission of the crime as compared to 
the oral account he gave to her during interviewing:  
The pre-crime note is tailored to a general audience including would-be 
supporters. The post-crime interview is tailored to a particular audience of 
one who interrogates his behavior, however dispassionately. The interview 
data are also shaped by my questions and responses. (11) 
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Though prison-authors may be partially informed by the perceived responses of 
the readership he hopes to gain, their stories are not overtly influenced by their 
particular relational dynamics with the researcher. On that basis, the testimonies 
are therefore undiluted. Qualitative research with prisoners incorporates into the 
research those voices, it actually listens to them – the criminologist is ‘a gate-
keeper to the truth’ (Morgan, 2002:330) - but the genre of prison autobiographies 
is those voices – unmediated. 
Another benefit of the specific autobiographies engaged with in this project 
relates to the demographic qualities of the prisoner-authors. Storytelling in 
general involves multiple ways of communicating one’s experiences and beliefs 
that may be grounded in part by, for example, one’s gendered position (Blair et al, 
1994), or class status (Hooks, 2000; Dykins-Callahan, 2008). Within the genre of 
prison autobiography specifically, middle class and highly educated prisoners, 
usually those without long histories of offending, have tended to receive more 
literary prestige and wider public attention beyond the merely puerile versus those 
written by lower status, persistent offenders. Morgan (2002) labels these groups 
‘Straights’ and ‘Cons’ – the former, he suggests, typically offer more prison-
based account, while the latter tend to present more person-based narratives.  
The five Scottish prisoners whose life-stories are considered in this research all 
came from relatively deprived social backgrounds; their testimonies include 
reflections on what this meant and means to them. Returning again to Presser’s 
analysis of Jim David Adkisson, she notes a similar theme in his written 
testimony and further, she identifies a set of tendencies within the structure of 
account which directly correspond to crucial constructions in Scottish prison-
author’s accounts. 
David’s homicide/suicide note begins with a brief orientation, followed by 
discussion of the personal hardship problem. It concludes with a reference 
to that problem. Yet, personal hardship is nowhere mentioned in the 
interior of the story. In contrast, David vividly set out the evils caused by 




Clear structural parallels are evident within the Scottish prisoners’ 
autobiographies; they begin with at least one chapter identifying the material, 
social and educational limitations of their childhoods, some circle back to these 
deprivations towards the end by way of demonstrating a narrative arc of ‘look 
how far I have come’, while the central bulk of the texts – the “interior of the 
story” – deal almost exclusively with the abuses perpetrated by the prison system 
and with the harms caused. Connects are made in these life stories between their 
low social and economic statuses and the particular models of masculinity that are 
celebrated and thus imbibed by boys and young men within that milieu. This 
becomes highly relevant when attempting to interpret their prison-based violence 
– that which is recounted in the main body of the texts - and, in particular, the 
notions of masculine honour they associated with it. Presser makes some pertinent 
arguments regarding this violence-honour dynamic: 
I disagree with Katz when he observes: “Words are not necessary to make 
violence a means of honoring offended respectability” (1988: 37). The 
individual actor may not utter words aloud, but words link concepts – 
states of being, events, and actions – to one another within conventional 
stories, such as the story about “violence restoring honor”. (2012:7) 
Rather, Presser maintains that ‘Language and language forms, especially story 
forms and metaphors, structured his [Jim David Adkisson’s] sense of 
self/other/situation’ (18). I am arguing in this work (articulated fully in Chapters 
Four and Five) that the constructions of “self/other/situation” communicated in (if 
not because of, as Presser might contend) Scottish prisoners’ autobiographies rely 
principally on their particularly close attachments to their ideas of personal 
autonomy. The violence they committed was to a large degree justified by them 
as a legitimate response to attempts by the prison authorities to cripple this 
capacity. Presser introduces the concept of the ‘power paradox’ to explain a 
comparable impulse in Adkisson’s case. She writes ‘David constructed his 
violence as both strategic and compelled. His agency was a paradox’ (18). This 
analysis might also be applied to Scottish prisoners; in order to protect their 
autonomy – and by extension their human dignity – they chose to resist the prison 
strictures through violent force, but such was the strength of their attachment to 
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honouring their autonomy that this choice was, appeared at the time, as the only 
option – thus, it was not an entirely free choice.  
My hunch is that I was able to arrive at this substantive analysis (developed in 
Chapters Four and Five) precisely because of the nature of the source material, 
i.e. the long form autobiographical testimony. The level of chronological detail 
and particular structure of these texts would not have been possible, or rendered 
far less likely, if the data had been drawn from interviews (had that been a 
practical option). The interview data I was able to amass with mainly retired and 
presently serving prison officials (see the next subsection on ‘participants’), did 
not yield the same depth of content as these prisoners’ autobiographies and 
consequently, their personal perspectives were less easily mined and represented 
here. Unfortunately, given that there does not currently exist a well-established 
body of autobiographies written by prison officers, the stories of prison staff, 
detailing their experiences of segregation in particular, have largely been un-told. 
Whilst there are accounts by management elites, in many instances they offer a 
policy-oriented perspective often reproducing what the official record has already 
established.  
In summary, the genre of prison autobiography provides depth and nuance, it 
serves to augment, to breathe life into, and in some cases to directly challenge the 
institutional record. These testimonies may fill certain factual gaps but their 
greater offering is through a rich, vivid and usually ambiguous portrait of lived 
human experience. In seeking to understand the recent past of segregation, we are 
fortunate to have a number of Scottish prisoners’ autobiographies from which to 
draw. Given that these autobiographies are written by men who have typically 
experienced segregation through its most excessive forms of spatial control, and 
given that “the unintended consequence of making space a means of control is to 
simultaneously make it a site of meaningful resistance” (Creswell, 1996:163), 
these published stories are particularly useful in offering visceral depictions of the 
various ways prisoners have struggled within segregated environments, and how 
those struggles have manifested in, through and to some degree as a direct result 
of space. Insofar as these accounts have deeply-felt emotional and sensory content 
- indicating a re-living more than a mere re-telling of past events - their attending 
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intensity gives us a sense of what it felt like to be there. The strength of this 
phenomenological quality marks the line between autobiographical memory and 
autobiographical fact (Berntsen & Hall, 2004).  
What matters is the way in which the story enables the reader to enter the 
subjective world of the teller—to see the world from her or his point of 
view, even if this world does not 'match reality' (Plummer, 2001;401). 
Prison history is all the poorer for the absence of a similar wealth of 
autobiographical writing from prison officers, notably those serving on the front 
lines.  
Interviews  
I conducted formal, semi-structured interviews with: 
- 7 SPS staff – 3 retired, 4 currently serving  
- 3 prison researchers 
- 1 ex-prisoner 
Formal, unstructured interviews with: 
- 2 SPS staff – both currently serving 
- 2 members of the Inspectorate 
All of these participants, with two exceptions, had particular knowledge and/or 
first-hand experience of aspects of Scottish segregation; many had been directly 
involved in the design and/or operation of aspects of the small units network. The 
exceptions were members of HMIPS, whose perspectives added value to this 
project insofar as they offered insight into how the Inspectorate operates and its 
process of conducting inspections. This proved useful given the attention paid 
(especially in Chapter Five) to various inspections of segregation sites since its 
founding in 1981.  
In addition, I had multiple conversations with my supervisor, Richard Sparks, 
who was one of three researchers involved in the first and only academic 
evaluation of the Barlinnie Special Unit (conducted in 1993). These conversations 
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were informal (and thus not included in the list above); I took extensive written 
notes during conversations but they were not audio recorded; they were largely 
unstructured; and, consent was established implicitly on an ongoing basis. I have 
not included any direct quotes from these conversations in this thesis but the 
material gathered significantly informed the work to the extent that particular 
themes, factual details, and personal impressions often guided the kinds of 
questions I posed to other participants, allowing for cross-referencing. Further, 
Richard’s memories of his research experience in the BSU helped direct the sub-
topics, people and places that I went on to investigate more fully. In a sense this 
form of guidance is typical of the supervisor-student dynamic, though I received 
deeper and highly relevant assistance given that Richard’s professional history 
corresponded so closely with the peculiar institutional history I was attempting to 
capture. 
These interviews were hugely diverse in terms of interview length (ranging from 
thirty minutes to six hours), setting and the techniques used. Some interviews 
were stand-alone, others involved several follow-up conversations, some of which 
were audio recorded, others were recorded with hand-written notes. With some 
participants I had continuing and more informal electronic correspondence after 
interview encounters. During the course of research, I attended a number of 
criminal justice-related events in Scotland (e.g. public lectures, academic 
seminars, conferences, etc.) where I had further conversations with these 
participants as well as with others who I did not have the opportunity to interview 
formally but would have liked to given their knowledge of aspects of Scottish 
penalty. The information and insights shared in these kinds of social interactions 
was not transmuted into research data in a definable manner, and therefore 
required no additional mechanisms for establishing consent – i.e. I did not directly 
quote any of these individuals neither did I make reference in this work to their 
particular perspectives or interpretation of events without properly citing them – 
but such conversations did inform my general approach to the topic insofar as I 
gained a better understanding of the particular themes or areas that might be 
worth investigating further – and in more systematic ways. In some cases, the 
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contacts I made at these events put me in touch with particular people who I was 
then able to interview formally.  
I had an extended research relationship with the ex-prisoner, involving many 
hours of recorded conversation as well as numerous hours of more social contact. 
The protracted and ongoing encounters I had with many participants allowed for a 
depth of engagement, as well as subsequent revisions and clarifications, both of 
factual content and in terms of the development of memory.  
In terms of the interview schedule, I had in every case a general set of topics and 
themes I asked participants about but in all cases I adopted a loose approach 
thereby allowing participants to tell their own stories. Many of the interviews with 
SPS staff took a narrative form; I initiated conversations based on participants’ 
early career memories and from there they tended to give largely chronological 
accounts, with moments of prompting from me when issues relating to specific 
segregation practices or discrete small units were introduced. This semi- and 
unstructured interview method made sense in the context of an historical project 
such as this since attempting to elicit and capture individuals’ memories of past 
events through too formulaic an approach (or in this case, set of questions) would 
be to miss the point; it would be too narrow and unyielding an approach.  
Clandinen and Connelly (2000:20) write of narrative inquiry: 
It is a collaboration between researcher and participant, over time, in a 
place or series of places, and in social interaction with milieus. An 
inquirer enters this matrix in the midst and progresses in this spirit, 
concluding the inquiry still in the midst of living and telling, reliving and 
retelling, the stories of the experience that make up peoples’ lives both 
individually and socially.  
This conformed to my research experience. The conversations I had were dialogic 
in nature; characterised by mutual exchange whereby both the participants’ and 
my own interpretations, uncertainties and confusions were discussed. This more 
discursive approach avoids, to some extent, the pitfalls of “polite interrogation” 
(Kellehear, 1996:98) that might otherwise occur in more unbalanced researcher-
participant dynamics. Asking questions and providing comment and reaction to 
or, more commonly, clarification of the given answers helped to establish rapport 
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and also to validate the participant as the expert of their own story. Many of these 
discussions went on much longer than the scheduled timeframe, and many felt 
unfinished. For this reason follow-up interviews proved helpful. The order I 
interviewed people in also had an effect. For example, my first set of interviews 
took place inside the soon-to-be decommissioned Peterhead prison. There I 
interviewed four members of SPS staff who were all, though at different stages, 
nearing the twilight of their careers, all of whom had begun their careers in the 
dangerous cauldron of the late 1970s or early 1980s. Each of these individuals 
was involved in the decommissioning process of Peterhead; they were working in 
the physical backdrop of an institution that was all but empty (the final group of 
prisoners were due to be transferred in the following few months). As with all 
transitions, there was a sense of accompanying pressure and uncertainly, along 
with frustrations – present concerns which seeped into the tone of the memories 
they shared about the past. In these interviews, for example, there was a much 
greater emphasis than in others on the tensions between grade officers and 
management. One of the participants spent nearly an hour describing how 
misunderstood and unsupported by management and by the Inspectorate he had 
felt as a rookie prison officer working in Peterhead in the 1980s. He focused on 
the use of protective or “riot” gear and how resistant officers were to the decision 
by the then governor to dispense with such protection, how some officers felt 
“literally thrown to the wolves” as a result. I had the impression that current 
stresses were in some indiscernible way influencing the strength of these 
particular memories. After spending a few days ensconced in Peterhead, I left 
with a baseline view of recent Scottish penal history that was perhaps unfairly 
skewed towards the needs and interests of officers, and less generous towards the 
experiences of managers (and indeed prisoners).  As a result, then, aware of those 
allegiances, I spent the next few months actively seeking appointments with 
retired governors. I also spent a week at the Inspectorate HQ, reading old 
inspection reports and talking to currently-serving inspectors. It was at this point 
that I began to engage closely with prisoners’ autobiographies to further redress 
the balance.  
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The point of interviewing those who had either already retired or who were 
nearing the end of their careers was (1) to record shifts that have occurred in 
segregation policy and practice through the personal recollections of the people 
who had designed/implemented them, (2) the assumption that there might be 
fewer institutional barriers to full, open and more emotionally nuanced 
discussions with this group, and (3) more prosaically, to record the memories of 
people whose stories might soon be lost. 
Recruitment of participants depended mainly on the ‘snowball effect’. This was 
useful in terms of establishing credibility and name recognition. I approached 
individuals often through third party contacts at the SPS, which meant they 
already had a provisional sense of what the research was about. Additionally, 
some participants provided me with a list of names of potential interviewees and 
in some cases contacted others on my behalf.  
Interview locations varied; they included prison offices, segregation units (those 
still operative along with now de-commissioned spaces), participants’ homes, SPS 
headquarters, and public cafes. Specific locations affected the techniques of 
recording. Inside prison walls the use of recording devices is restricted so for 
some interviews I relied instead on pen and paper notes. Initially this undermined 
more natural, reciprocal modes of communication but as the research progressed 
(and as I became a more adept and subtle note-taker) I found the absence of a 
voice recorder created more informality and therefore proved beneficial. It was 
difficult to take even paper notes whilst interviewing participants ‘on the move’, 
which was how a number of interviews were conducted – these encounters took 
place whilst touring particular segregation sites, producing accounts in some way 
influenced by the spatial environment itself. These discussions I term ‘situated 
storytelling’. The value of this technique for narrative historical studies is rooted 
in the link between what is unconsciously provoked or spontaneously retrieved 
through what is coincidentally encountered in space. As Rapoport (1980:286) 
suggests, physical environments make concrete “the immaterial, spaceless, 
timeless nature of values, meanings and the like”. Being in the physical spaces 
where incidences actually occurred served to generate the remembering and 
retelling of particular details as well as whole stories which may not have been 
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told at all, or recalled in quite the same way if a static interview had taken place in 
an office for example. To further explore the role of spatial affectivity, I used 
mnemonic devices to encourage participants to situate their memories within the 
spatial contexts in which they occurred – this precipitated discussion of how, 
whether, and to what extent particular features of space impacted on experience.  
In terms of observation, I spent time in the various segregation units of four 
prisons, where I was given guided tours and the opportunity to speak with 
currently serving segregation officers (both individually and in groups). I do not 
include these encounters in the interview count (specified above) since they were 
of a more informal nature, as were my notes. Moreover, given the historical 
nature of this project, my field notes from these visits re current practice were less 
pertinent than the interview data. That said, aspects of the design of these units 
have remained reasonably fixed throughout the recent past; the look and feel of 
them now is, in various ways, consistent with what it has been. The design of the 
distinct outside exercise “pens”, for example, has not changed much since they 
were first used, though there have been small modifications. My field notes from 
these visits, along with the body of policy-related and procedural information 
(which are matters of public record) did inform some of the thesis (see especially 
Chapters Two and Three).  
Ethics 
Guillemin & Gillam (2004) mark a key distinction between ‘procedural ethics’ 
and ‘ethics in practice’, defining the former as “seeking approval from a relevant 
ethics committee” and the latter as “the everyday ethical issues that arise in the 
doing of research” (p.263). As primarily historical in nature, this research 
involved few obvious ethical concerns relating to the harmful impact on 
participants. In terms of procedural ethics, then, prior to conducting this research 
the necessary approvals were sought, which amounted to a Level 2 self-
assessment submitted to the Research Ethics and Governance Committee at the 
University of Edinburgh. I did not interview any ostensibly vulnerable groups, nor 
was my subject matter overtly sensitive beyond the concomitant issues of it, i.e. 
the authoritarian and restrictive nature of certain forms of segregation. In any 
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case, with the exception of one ex-prisoner participant, all interview data 
concerned accounts given by SPS staff or other non-prisoner groups and therefore 
the potential for their memories of these more insalubrious sites to provoke 
distress was minimal.   
Before interviews I wrote a detailed summary of the project, emphasizing its 
open-ended nature. Consent was established at the beginning of each interview 
regarding recording devices. I made it clear that quotes would be anonymised, but 
stressed that the size and connectedness of the SPS meant that in some instances 
identification might be unavoidable. All participants gave their permission with 
some expressing that they were comfortable with being quoted directly, though I 
confirmed I would only be quoting people in terms of their position (i.e. 
‘governor’, ‘segregation manager’, ‘chaplain’ etc.) rather than by name.  
The procedural ethics in this project were generally clear-cut, yet there were 
certain ethical considerations that arose in the course of research that were not 
entirely expected, those which fall into the ‘ethics in practice’ category.  
The potential harms to participants in qualitative social research are often 
quite subtle and stem from the nature of the interaction between researcher 
and participant. As such, they are hard to specify, predict and describe in 
ways that ethics forms ask for, and likewise, strategies for minimizing risk 
are hard to spell out (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004:271) 
Some of the conversations I had touched on dramatic past events particularly 
those involving the control of prisoners prior to, during and after rioting and other 
kinds of incendiary disturbances. In places, some participants seemed 
uncomfortable discussing their role in managing these incidences, their 
experience of suppressing violence (sometimes directed at them personally), and 
the impact these had on them in the aftermath. The discomfort may have been 
relatively low-level but I was still cognizant of striking a balance between 
allowing the space to explore these ambivalences (which involved gently nudging 
them to expand on certain answers, and asking potentially awkward follow-up 
questions), and respecting their cues to move on to other subjects. In only one 
interview did I get the sense that the discussion was having a particularly 
heightened emotional effect – though not necessarily adversely. This was a 
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product, I think, of the location of the interview: the now decommissioned Silent 
Cell in the segregation unit of Peterhead prison, where the participant recalled an 
experience that had taken place there when he had just begun his career with the 
SPS. It seemed the interviewee wanted to tell this story, although his tone shifted 
and became more personal and emotive, which meant I relied more on instinct 
about how to negotiate the conversation, and when to move on. This particular 
encounter is described in more detail below.  
Listening to, participating in and actively encouraging the affective dimension of 
situated storytelling incurs an emotional cost. For the researcher this can 
jeopardise objectivity, though not necessarily in ways that undermine the 
objective value of the research. Rather, honest reflexivity regarding emotional 
impacts (see Liebling, 1999) and a deployment of ‘emotional resources’ (Jewkes 
2012) during research interactions as well as during subsequent data analysis, can 
yield additional layers of rich, nuanced data. Another ethical consideration 
involved the un-elicited enthusiasm some participants showed for ‘telling tales’ 
about others, and specifically identifying individuals who were thought to have 
made errors of judgement. In some cases, there seemed to be residual resentments 
about decisions that were taken relating both to individual’s own careers and to 
particular aspects of segregation. The SPS is a small, well connected system with 
its own set of internal politics, and at times I was uncomfortable with the critical 
assessments people were offering regarding the behaviour of their former 
colleagues. In some, though certainly not all, interviews, disparaging comments 
were made either by inferences or more explicitly in direct reference to people I 
had either already interviewed or were due to interview. Given the conversational 
approach I adopted in interviews, I felt the weight of expectation to participate in 
some way, or at least offer some response, which was uncomfortable and difficult 
to navigate. 
In the remainder of this section I want to further support the argument that aspects 
of psychogeography – its underlying ideas and methods – might be usefully 
deployed in narrative inquiry. The argument is first developed theoretically. A 
very brief overview of both narrative inquiry and psychogeography is provided, 
with insights from memory studies interleaved between them to emphasise the 
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connections in terms of their associated methodologies. Secondly, I discuss 
specific examples demonstrating how these spatial approaches were applied in 
practice.  
Institutional History through Personal Narrative 
Narrative inquiry is the process of gathering, in some cases co-creating, and then 
analysing stories. It is an attempt to capture the texture of people’s lives as they 
remember it, and in this sense stories are generally reflections (rather than exact 
representations) of lived experience, expressing the often messy, usually 
complicated “social reality of the narrator” (Etherington, 2004:81). The depth and 
variety of knowledge communicated through stories reflects the extent to which 
they are embedded in both the personal beliefs, attitudes and values of the teller 
(constructionism) and in wider cultural contexts and histories (social 
constructionism). Situated within this web of intersecting influences, stories 
provide rewarding data with varying meanings. In contrast to modernist 
frameworks, where the notion of ‘objective truth’ is stressed, narrative inquiry, as 
a postmodernist approach, holds that truth is multi-perspectival (Polkinghorne, 
1988). Further, as “both the method and the phenomena of study” (Pinnegar & 
Danes, 2004), storytelling communicates a range of perspectives by how the 
narratives are told, its specific linguistic properties, as well as through the content 
of those stories. The socio-linguistic components of stories are in themselves 
considered constitutive of reality (Riessman, 1993), gauged by applying various 
hermeneutical approaches (e.g. discourse, textual, conversational analysis which 
examine closely discrete forms of speech, grammar and lexicon structures). 
Added to this already complex set of concerns is the degree to which narrative 
researchers themselves interact with the storytelling process. Narrative inquiry 
often contains an explicitly dialogical and collaborative dimension involving 
reciprocal sharing and a kind of transparent engagement with the story where the 
‘listener’ communicates emotional and other impacts. Such interactivity renders 
stories as co-constructions (Chase, 2005), where researchers are not so much 
‘objective observers’ as active participants in a research relationship (Keeney & 
Ross, 1992). However, while this may serve to deepen trust and as a corollary 
provide the conditions for more unguarded and multifaceted conversations, it also 
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has a bearing on the nature of stories that are told. Here questions of validity 
arise; issues of personal positioning, personality, agenda and relational dynamics 
become relevant (Skinner & Allen, 1991). Moreover, the dialogical aspect also 
comes into play during processes of transcribing since the researcher is required 
to make choices about the selection of data and where to place emphasis, which 
necessarily modifies the story in some way. (I have said something above about 
the relevance of this point to this research - such questions were especially 
pertinent in the case of my prolonged research relationship with Thomas 
McCulloch, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four). 
With respect to historical studies specifically, narrative testimonies are paramount 
insofar as personal stories enrich the institutional account provided in archival 
data. Since the chief object of historical work is to document and interpret past 
phenomena, stories are valuable to the extent they allow individuals to speak to 
their experience of that past, to humanise it, rather than primarily as objects of 
study in themselves. Which is to say, in building a picture of segregation by 
integrating individuals’ storied memories of it, I was more concerned with the 
content of their personal experiences and how they made sense of them, and less 
attentive to the particular linguistic composition of the stories through which 
those personal histories were articulated. Since stories are a conduit for memory, I 
was concerned with how particular memories are retrieved and what effect 
retrieval situations might have on the content of those memories. “Historians” 
writes Tumblety (2013:2) “seek evidence not only of memory (what is 
remembered) but evidence about memory (how and why the past is remembered 
in one way and not another).” Beyond linguistics and the cultural/psychosocial 
forces that inform the ways memories are selected, distorted and re-constructed, 
this also refers to the mechanics of the memory encounter. From a methodological 
standpoint this aspect became an increasing point of interest in this project. Whilst 
all stories rely on processes of recollection, the longer-range span of narratives in 
historical research is much more dependent on the qualities of memory. How 
much of the past and how well it is remembered (which amounts to emotional 
authenticity as well as mere factual accuracy), is closely related to the kinds of 
retrieval situations the narrator is exposed to. This was something that became 
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evident to me initially by accident during an early interview: the presence of 
external, sensory cues precipitated a distinct change of tone in the narrative and 
unearthed memories quite different in nature from those previously shared 
(discussed below).  This memory component, all the more relevant for the 
construction of historical narratives, is the focus of the following subsection.  
Many of the interviews I conducted were with (what is uncomfortably termed) 
‘elite’ participants, Interestingly, because this project is historical in nature, which 
encouraged the telling of more open-ended narratives over a longer temporal 
span, the professional strictures of the elite persona which might ordinarily apply 
appeared to be less of a constraining force here. Telling stories about the 
relatively distant past, where current institutional practice and policy appears 
detached from it, provided a kind of safety, allowing greater freedom to share 
personal impressions. In general, narrative inquiry in historical studies may 
generate possibilities for stronger emotional content, and for personal views that 
may deviate from official lines, compared with studies that are more present-
focused and evaluative. At least, that was the case in this project, though this 
point is not quite so simplistic. With some participants there was a degree of 
‘subjective distancing’, where “differences in the evaluative implications of past 
episodes affect(ed) people’s feelings of the subjective distance of those events” 
(Ross & Wilson, 2003). In other words, past events/practices that are understood 
by the storyteller as suggestive of personal failure seem further away in time than 
those events which are considered successes. For example, when discussing the 
turbulent 1980s – the violence of prisoners’ riots and the SPS’s controversially 
rough tactics by way of response – participants stressed and repeated phrases such 
as ‘it was a completely different era’, ‘ancient history’, ‘unrecognisable’. Yet at 
the same time, I was surprised by how eager people were to talk about it, 
particularly their emotional experiences. With one or two exceptions, most 
participants offered detailed accounts that included descriptions of fear, 
insecurity, bafflement and, to a lesser degree, a sense of betrayal – that 
management had failed to adequately protect officers.   




Since the telling of stories inherently relies on memory processes then to say we 
are (or become) the narratives we tell about ourselves is to say that the contours of 
our self-recognised identity are shaped by the particular qualities of memory 
(Ross & Wilson, 2003). In a sense this inverts Bruner’s analysis insofar as it is the 
conditions and properties of memory that shape narrative as much as the reverse 
is true. If that is the case then the varying effects of different memory retrieval 
mechanisms are important for constructing those narratives and by extension for 
constructing the self. In other words, the conditions of remembering informs what 
is remembered. Bruner appears to relegate memory processes to an effect of 
narrative – where memory is organised through the story - rather than having a 
causal relationship to it – where the story is organised through processes of 
remembering. “Our very memories” writes Bruner “become victims of our self-
making stories” (2003:210). I want to suggest that while the story is the medium 
through which memories are composed and communicated - which might very 
well be guided by “culturally shaped cognitive and linguistic processes”, as 
Bruner asserts - “external perceptual cues (such as particular objects, persons or 
locations)” along with “internal conceptual cues (such as themes, life themes or 
feelings)” (Berntsen & Hall, 2004:793) are the means by which those memories 
are retrieved. Therefore, narrative inquiry should pay attention to memory-
retrieval mechanisms; narrative research might be further developed by 
deliberately engineering situations that contain particular kinds of cues in order to 
generate particular kinds of memories (and thus stories).  
Influenced by Bruner, the prevailing view within narrative inquiry holds that, 
"making stories from one's lived history is a process by which ordinarily we 
revise the past retroactively, and when we do we are engaged in processes of 
languaging and describing that modify the past" (Bochner, 2007:203). What is 
being referenced here is the engagement of only voluntary memory, famously 
described by Proust as “the memory of the intellect and the eyes, [which gives] us 
only imprecise facsimiles of the past which no more resemble it than pictures by 
bad painters resemble the spring.” Without devaluing voluntary memory in quite 
that way, we might still hold that the autobiographical accuracy it seeks to 
establish is elusive, that degrees of distortion, though valuable for the forces they 
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represent, are inevitable. Yet this is the most common form of memory evoked in 
narrative interviewing. As Berntsen and Hall (2000:790) suggest, “when asked to 
(deliberately) retrieve memories for specific events, people often respond with 
descriptions of higher order knowledge”, that is knowledge which is intentionally 
summoned, offering a summary of events based on rational calculations of what is 
considered relevant. Revisions and modifications are indeed made; impressions of 
the past are retroactive projections informed by the accumulated knowledge, 
experience and position of the teller as they are now, all of which may be 
culturally structured.  
By comparison, involuntary memory denotes spontaneous remembering, where 
there is a stronger embodied and emotive (and a less explicitly cognitive) 
component, and where myriad cultural and cognitive forces exert less power in 
shaping the narrative. Movingly, Proust says this of such memories:  
 
(T)heir primary character was that I was not free to choose them, that they 
were given to me just as they were…the very fortuity, the inevitability of 
the manner in which the sensation was encountered controlled the 
authenticity of the past that it resuscitated, the images it let loose, since we 
feel it striving towards the light, we feel the joy of the real, found again. 
(VI:187). 
 
Involuntary memories have an immediacy; they require less cognitive effort than 
voluntary memories and have been found to have faster retrieval times as a result 
(Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). One difference, then, albeit crude, between 
voluntary and involuntary memory is the distinction between re-telling and re-
living past events, between recalling the past, and inhabiting it: one is a conscious 
process of retrieval while the other is, in a sense, transportive. Proust again: “if we 
get a whiff of a long-forgotten smell we are suddenly intoxicated and…if by 
chance we come across an old glove [belonging to a departed loved one] we burst 
into tears”, and further exemplified, of course, by the celebrated madeleine and 
lime flower tea episode where one taste of the tea-soaked cake acts as an 
immediate vehicle not simply to the re-constructed past but to Proust’s embodied 
experience of it. Proust’s treatment of involuntary memory, and indeed within 
literary traditions more generally, is inevitably powered by creative license, 
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which, through exquisite description, heightens the memory-effect of sensory 
experience (often defining it as a moment of epiphany), and exaggerates the 
oppositional split between voluntary and involuntary memory. This vivid lyrical 
intensity, whilst compelling in literary terms, does not in every way accord to the 
facts of cognitive science (see Mace, 2004). However, with some caveats 
subsequent clinical studies have partly confirmed aspects of Proust’s anecdotal 
speculations, and on the following grounds:  
 
1. Involuntary memory is considered “more effective than voluntary goal-
directed retrieval in accessing memories of specific episodes” (Berntsen & 
Hall, 2000:791);  
2. With respect to retrieval mechanisms (or memory cues), findings suggest 
that there is a greater connection between episodic memories and external 
rather than internal cues, specifically those associated with features of the 
physical environment (Berntsen, 1996; 2001)  
3. Further, there is a connection between sensory cues and emotional 
affectivity – in relation to olfaction in particular, neuroscience has 
established a link between the lateral olfactory stria and the ‘neural 
substrate of emotional memory’(Herz & Schooler, 2002:22; Herz & 
Cupchik, 1992). Some studies have suggested that verbal cues more 
frequently trigger involuntary memories, but still maintain that sensory 
cues have greater emotional affectivity and therefore become more salient 
for individuals (Mace, 2004) and thus perhaps over-privileged in research;  
4. While involuntary memories were originally understood in terms of 
intrusive or negative recollections associated with traumatic past events 
(Horowitz, 1975; Klos & Singer, 1981), more recently they have been 
shown to include positive and neutral emotional content (Berntsen & 
Rubin, 2002; Brewin et al, 1996).  
 
This last point may serve to offer limited ethical cover for research that attempts 
to trigger involuntary memories. It does so by counteracting the argument that in 
every case such memory encounters are emotionally disturbing and consequently 
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unwanted. In terms of this research I was persistently mindful of the possibility 
for distress that certain kinds of segregation experiences, specifically evoked 
through external cues, might involve. However, given that this outcome is more 
likely with people who have been segregated (i.e. prisoners) rather than people 
who have imposed it (i.e. officers and policy makers), and given that the vast 
majority of interviews were conducted with the latter, the likelihood of distress 
was minimal, though there were moments of obvious discomfort, as indicated 
above. The ex-prisoner I spoke at length with, and on numerous occasions, 
demonstrated an active willingness to engage with the more painful aspects of 
their experiences, repeatedly volunteering to use spatial prompts as means to 
describe and explain them. In only one of the other interviews did the emotional 
pitch of the story, specifically provoked by spatial triggers, feel problematic, and 
in that instance I re-directed the conversation to more neutral ground by asking 
more general, factual-based questions.   
 
Importantly, academic memory studies, unlike literary traditions, establish 
something of a synergetic relationship between voluntary and involuntary 
memories with neither category having precise or contained parameters. The 
mysteries of consciousness and the still contested processes of cognition that are 
linked to memory retrieval render any rigid delineation near-impossible. Given 
these difficulties, Mandler (2007) helpfully suggests using the epistemologically 
looser categories of ‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’ to describe and explain 
particular memory encounters. If we can apply these insights to personal 
autobiography we might also draw on them when constructing institutional 
history since the content of the stories people tell about an institution’s practices – 
the order and nature of knowledge they remember with regard to it – are similarly 
generated by, if not entirely contingent upon, the memory-retrieval situations 
within which narratives are told. In this project I wanted to write a history that 
engaged with the phenomenology of segregation, to explore how it felt to live 
within and to impose different kinds of segregated conditions. On this basis I was 
interested both in participants' general summaries of the past but, pertinently, in 
their lived experiences of specific episodes from that past. Developing ways to 
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evoke involuntary memory, therefore, was a useful avenue of investigation. 
Moreover, given the socio-spatial perspective this thesis takes, I was interested in 
how the spaces of segregation affected people’s experience of it. To explore this I 
used spatial prompts in some interviews (photographs of particular sites, floor 
plans, drawings) as well as conducting other interviews in the actual spaces where 
segregation was/is operative. By accident more than by design I found that in 
some cases these spatial cues triggered involuntary memories, which altered the 
nature of the story being told – sometimes radically. Certainly the constructed 
linearity of stories was temporarily disrupted, and in this sense conformed to 
Mandler’s ‘unexpected’ categorisation. I found that external cues, especially when 
they were heavily sensory, often provoked emotional responses and enabled 
stories to be told that felt almost atmospheric, where one had a sense of the feel 
and smell and sound of a place.  
 
Journalists and documentary film makers routinely employ such methods. As 
standard practice they report incidences by actually being there in the locations 
where the incidences occurred. They interview people in significant environments 
often touring them together thereby allowing the space itself to foreground the 
story as well as, in various ways, to inspire the structure and content of the story 
being told. Originally inadvertently and later more deliberately, I attempted to 
apply a similar approach in this project, developing in a very preliminary manner 
a method of ‘situated storytelling’ for historical research. In addition to insights 
from memory studies, as identified above, this method was also informed by 
those from psychogeography, which the next subsection examines. In terms of 
practical application I would have liked to have used spatially-informed 
techniques in every interview. I would have liked to develop a systematic way of 
doing so. For reasons described in the final section, this was not possible. The fact 
this method was only partially applied constitutes a key limitation of this project.  
 
Lessons from Psychogeography: the Potential of ‘Situated Storytelling’ 
I did not apply a comprehensive psychogeographical approach; rather, its two 
basic tenets informed aspects of the interview techniques. These tenets – (1) the 
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role of spatial affectivity in shaping lived experience and social relations, and (2) 
the link between what is unconsciously provoked or spontaneously retrieved 
through what is coincidentally encountered in space – are particularly relevant for 
narrative historical studies. This sub-section attempts to explore and substantiate 
such claims, especially to further support the claim that spatial triggers might 
function as valuable emotional mnemonics.  
Guy Dubord (1955), one of its earliest proponents, defined psychogeography as, 
"the study of the precise laws and specific effects of the geographical 
environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and behaviour of 
individuals."  He tempered the suggestion of spatial determinism, however, by 
also describing the approach as having “a rather pleasing vagueness”, which is 
fitting given how nebulous this hybrid term has subsequently become. To the 
extent that this approach is concerned with the affective dimension of 
environments (particularly urban environments) on emotional and behavioural 
experience, it shares key characteristics with the broader discipline of 
environmental psychology. What distinguishes psychogeography is the means by 
which environmental impacts on individual subjectivities are observed. On this 
point the concept of dérive is employed, referring to a kind of mindful wandering, 
a ‘continuous drift’ (Chtcheglov, 1953). It involves physically entering spaces, 
exploring them without a specific destination or planned route, relying instead on 
what is coincidentally encountered. Consequently, one might observe and feel the 
effects of the political structures, relational patterns and aesthetic features of an 
environment that might otherwise have been missed or taken for granted through 
force of habit. In this way the un-purposeful though still attentive act of dérive 
serves to reveal “a symbolic order of the unconscious” (de Certeau, 1988). 
Traditionally, psychogeographical practices have had a subversive element; they 
allow for a playful disruption of how we interact with and interpret place. Indeed, 
given the politically revolutionary roots of psychogeography, the kind of urban 
wandering originally advanced by the Lettrist Group (later the Situationist 
International) was actively transgressive; spatial prohibitions were flouted, 
barriers scaled, forbidden zones entered, and in doing so the meanings of place 
were radically re-imagined. The ideas and methods of psychogeography have 
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been used in numerous ways, e.g. with a targeted psychoanalytical focus (Sennett, 
2008); to explore the often hidden socio-political and cultural connections within 
spaces including, more recently, cyber spaces; as a means of examining touristic 
practices; to investigate how power manifests and is unequally distributed through 
space; and, as an entry point for literary critique (see Coverley, 2006) as well as 
for specific forms of travel writing (Ackroyd, 2000, 2007; Moorcock, 1988; 
Sinclair, 2003). I was interested in how psychogeography, particularly the derive 
concept, might be applied in carceral settings. 
With respect to prison research, ethnographers naturally engage some form of the 
dérive concept: they inhabit carceral spaces, often drifting between areas without 
a specific purpose, observing practices and people. Yet typically an overt spatial 
consciousness tends to be absent from prison ethnography hence the value, 
necessity and growing appetite for carceral geography. But at the intersection 
between history and social science – that is, where the recent past of prisons is 
being studied thereby allowing for the possibility of narrative interviews with 
those who were there – such spatially informed methods are less widely practiced. 
In a basic sense, every act of personal storytelling is situated, which is to say 
embodied; when we talk about personal experiences, share memories, or reflect 
on our subjective impressions of events, the stories we tell have a psychic and 
physical reality. We feel as we speak. ‘Situated storytelling’ as a targeted method 
for collecting oral histories draws on this affective aspect with the aim of 
compounding it through the use of spatial triggers. This method is legitimised 
when it can be demonstrated that (a) affectivity yields epistemologically valuable 
kinds of data, (b) spatial triggers - which may involve directly accessing the 
spaces within which particular experiences occurred (and exploring them in the 
manner of the dérive concept) and/or using cues such as photographs, maps, floor 
plans etc., - stimulate affectivity in particularly distinct and interesting ways, and 
(c) sufficient ethical attention is paid to the potential effects of this method for all 
participants.  
Two examples of situated storytelling 
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Informed by the dérive concept, the first example establishes how fruitful aimless 
and attentive spatial wandering can be with respect to the unexpected insights that 
are generated from the associations triggered by spatial cues. The second example 
illustrates the emotive power of sensory environments as a means of memory 
retrieval. Both these examples are taken from the same visit to Peterhead prison at 
the beginning of the field work, before I had carefully thought through interview 
techniques. We were accidentally applying the tactics of psychogeography and 
unintentionally confirming the insights of memory studies. It was after the fact 
when I reflected on my field notes and on the interview transcript that the value of 
these elements became apparent. Subsequently I attempted to employ similar 
techniques but found there were particular practical challenges in doing so – these 
are described in the final section. Nonetheless, there were other ways to adapt 
spatially-informed techniques through the use of non-sensory spatial prompts.  
Example #1 – Touring Peterhead prison 
In June 2013 I visited Peterhead prison. At that point most of the prison was in a 
state of disuse as the drive to construct a brand new, purpose-built ‘community 
facing’ prison (HMP Grampion) were nearing completion. There was still a small 
number of prisoners contained here but the vast majority had been transferred 
elsewhere. Some of the auxiliary buildings had already been completely razed4, 
much of the prison complex was a building site, and the new prison was almost 
built. The juxtaposition was stark between the ash-black stone of the 200 year old 
Victorian convict jail and, close by, the pale almost gleaming edifice of Grampion 
- both monoliths of progress in their own times, both in their own ways physical 
testaments to the enduring traditions of punishment. Almost proportional to the 
noise and activity of the building site was the near-silence and dormancy 
everywhere else. Walking through abandoned wings and people-free courtyards, 
entering virtually empty spaces or filled only with the material detritus of 
                                                          
4 It was particularly unfortunate that the self-contained accommodation block - formerly known as 
the 10 Cell Unit, and later used variously as a staff training facility and for containing enhanced 
regime prisoners – had been demolished by the time I visited the prison. This unit had certain 
spatial features that were intentionally designed into the structure in order to operate the targeted 
regimes it did. And yet, I found no photographs of the space in the Peterhead archives. The 
importance of narrative testimonies of the space (and what occurred in it) are therefore all the 
more vital.  
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institutional life, feeling the cold and smelling the bodily traces of its former 
caged men, which, in the arched ‘slopping out’ areas was still disturbingly 
pungent, was in every sense haunting.  
Wandering through the mostly vacant spaces, I was accompanied by an assistant 
governor who almost played the role of museum tour guide. On this ‘dérive’, 
particular details of the space were noted and discussed, the implications of which 
I’m not sure would have properly registered had we conducted the interview in an 
office. Aspects of prison management, of prisoner containment, and the 
experience of supervising these tasks, would have perhaps gone unnoticed had I 
not be able to point to specific features and ask what they were for, how they were 
used, why they were necessary, what effect they had, how officers and prisoners 
negotiated them, etc. Some details of note:  
- The Lino flooring throughout the halls, including within the Digger, was 
added in 1993, before which time the hard concrete was left exposed 
(exacerbating the cold and presenting a hazard during bouts of violence);  
- Each cell door had a metal bung, another 90s modification, for water 
hoses in cases of fire – a response to the dangers of the troubles in the late 
80s, and reflective of the emerging health and safety agenda;  
- Cell windows were built high into the wall so that a view of the ‘outside’ 
could only be glimpsed by standing on the heating pipes running along the 
base of cells – a Victorian design presumably intended for security reasons 
and to encourage internal reflection by, amongst other things, restricting 
communication between prisoners in adjoining cells. Windows were a 
honeycomb of very small glass panes, with the bottom four panes left 
glassless for ventilation. To keep the fierce cold of the North Sea at bay 
they initially had wooden coverings but these were later removed in the 
mid-1980s since prisoners were tearing them up and using them as 
weapons. 
- The top floor of the halls had extremely narrow galleries making it 
difficult for more than one officer to supervise prisoners. For this reason, 
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at times of disturbance difficult prisoners unable to be accommodated in 
the Digger due to lack of space were confined to the bottom flats only. 
During total lockdowns involving mass segregation (which occurred for 
significant periods throughout the prison’s history) access to the top floor 
landings was controlled via temporary cages erected around the 
connecting stairways. 
- The accommodation blocks were vast buildings with towering ceilings and 
multiple landings, between which were “suicide nets” to prevent 
accidental or deliberate injury.  
Such details generated lengthy reflection by my tour guide, who offered micro 
stories for each of them drawn from his own experience. The precise design and 
layout of halls, once registered, sparked discussion of how prisoners manipulated 
the space during confrontations with officers, and in taking control over aspects of 
their daily living routines. In turn this spontaneously precipitated memories of 
vulnerability. Recalling the violence and aggression within these settings – which 
the space itself in various ways enabled – initiated broader policy-oriented 
dialogue. Unprompted, my guide spoke of the primacy of the ‘custody and order’ 
agenda over that of ‘care and opportunity’, in spite of what the rhetoric indicated 
from that time. He spoke of officers’ resistance to small units, characterising them 
as “fanciful” with prisoners given “too much say”. He talked about the rituals 
officers observed before entering certain spaces and before transferring prisoners 
from one segregated zone to another; the advice given to rookies during lockdown 
periods to keep their ‘helmets down!’ to avoid dirty missiles and other weapons. 
Under those conditions he explained the tensions between ground-level officers 
and management staff: “it wasn’t their chin on the line”. The accumulation of 
these recollections along with the vividness of particular memories was, I think, 
in large part effected by the fact of where and how our conversation was 
conducted.  
Example #2 – Sensing the Silent Cell 
Cold-boxed in a block adjacent to the Digger, the Peterhead silent cell is a cave-
like space, windowless, shrouded in low artificial light or in total darkness. The 
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space is slightly larger than a typical cell, an effect compounded by the absence of 
furniture and fittings besides the low plinth intended for resting  - original design 
attention given to sleeping and toiletry arrangements was understandably 
negligible given the restricted time periods – hours rather than days – for which 
this space was used. What distinguishes the silent cell in Peterhead from both 
mainstream and segregation cells as well as from other silent cells across the 
prison estate is its novel internal construction: it is a ceiling-less box within a cell 
which can be viewed from above via a small staircase built along the right hand 
side. (Fig One illustrates these features). The sparseness, the sensation of being 
watched from the shadows above, the scent of dust and dank concrete, the 
absence of any view of an ‘outside’, together created a deeply uncomfortable 
atmosphere. In this setting, the account given by my guide of Peterhead’s history 
switched to an acutely personal story of his lived experience of it. He remembered 
what it had been like as a young officer to hustle a rebellious prisoner into the 
cell, how he had felt doing it, the noise the prisoner had made as he shouted and 
banged, struggling. Standing in the freezing, uninhabited room, he recalled a 
particular incident where he had been locked-in with a prisoner in the course of a 
bungled transferral process, “only for a few minutes but it felt like hours”. He 
remembered the anxiety, the uncertainty; he looked unnerved. The telling of this 
story in this echoing space sparked a chaining of memories. He talked about what 
it took for officers to do this job safely and effectively, continually exposed to 
danger then to return home depleted to play the role of father and husband: “you 
had to shower when you got home to wash the smell of the prison off…nobody 
wants their kids to know about dirty protests.” 
The transportive memory effect of this setting generated an emotional poignancy 
and a richness of detail so that it seemed as if we were talking of events that had 
only just occurred. There was a Proustian immediacy and impact which felt quite 
distinct from discussions preceding and following this encounter, and which 
unearthed previously veiled ambivalences about the disconnect between how 
officers and prisoners perceived and treated one another, between operational and 
ethical demands, between policy and practice, and between the pressures of 
professionalism and the private unease of individuals who were tasked with 
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forcibly segregating others. T.S. Elliot said “the first condition of right thought is 
right sensation – the first condition of understanding a foreign country is to smell 
it.” Without direct experience of imprisonment, I initially felt lowered and 
dejected in the silent cell, shamed that this kind of environment was where we 
kept human beings. I felt I understood more of what the fact of segregation might 
mean for prisoners and what it might indicate about the system which imposed it. 
I had not been considering the emotional complexities and real pains experienced 
by officers until the memories my guide shared interrupted this limited view, 
expanding it with manifold shades of subtlety.  








What I would do differently 
Archives 
As previously noted, there are significant gaps in the archives. Certain materials 
have been either destroyed, lost or exist in personal collections only. 
Consequently, parts of this project are under-sourced requiring a more speculative 
approach informed by fragmentary evidence. While this might be an inevitable 
shortcoming of all historical studies, in this case the archival deficit might have 
been reduced had I approached the research more creatively. I could have spent 
more time scouting archives kept in individual prisons instead of relying primarily 
on what was immediately available in central stores. Equally, I could have 
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worked harder to identify personal archives and attempted to access them. The 
impulse to conserve documents at an individual level became more evident as the 
research progressed; many participants alluded to their own archival collections, 
which in many cases I did not pursue chiefly due to time constraints. At the 
beginning of this project I over-estimated the extent of institutional record-
keeping. I naively assumed the SPS would have a comprehensive store of data 
including raw statistical information stretching back decades, rules and regime 
information for every segregation site, records of meetings, and a full set of 
planning reports. This was not the case and had I been cognizant of that I would 
have made a more determined effort in seeking permission to access private 
collections. Of the archives I did manage to discover and access, it took me a 
while to learn how to navigate the material efficiently. Since many of the SPS 
stores are literally kept in un-categorised boxes in filing cabinets in disparate parts 
of different buildings, I spent long periods reading everything I could find, rather 
than being selective. As the research progressed I learned strategies for sorting 
materials, for assessing relevance at a glance, and for rapid, well-organised note-
taking (I was unable to take any SPS materials away with me, which meant I was 
tethered to the spot and had to work within prescribed time limits). This saved 
enormous amounts of time and energy but I came to it relatively late.  
Interviews: Recruitment and Techniques 
Given the time and scheduling constraints of a project of this kind I spoke 
formally with far fewer people than I would have liked, though informally with 
many more people than I had expected – in the ordinary course of academic 
conferences and public events it seemed that most people with any experience of 
the SPS (in whatever capacity) had a view and a set of memories about particular 
segregation arrangements, and people were usually enthusiastic about sharing 
them. Nevertheless, whilst I heard a range of perspectives, the research would 
have benefitted from a more diverse collection of voices. A consequence of 
snowballing is that one tends to access networks of similarly positioned people. If 
I could go back to the beginning I would spend more energy locating people who 
had served as ground-level officers during key points in this history. I would also 
have liked to speak with senior members of the now defunct SPOA. The tensions 
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between officers and management particularly with regard to how segregation 
was conceived of and implemented is a theme that became increasingly apparent 
throughout the research. I would have liked to explore this further. Two additional 
groups of people whose memories would have made a valuable contribution to 
this project are members of the architectural teams who designed or adapted 
particular segregation spaces, and prisoners who spent significant portions of time 
in spaces of protective segregation. Both of these groups are difficult to access: 
the first because (a) many sites were constructed in the distant past so their 
architects are no longer living, and (b) where this is not the case, there are 
significant gaps in the archives so that it is unclear who was involved in this 
process; the second group includes the sex offender population, and those people 
who have experienced heightened vulnerabilities in carceral settings. Given the 
confidentiality of prisoners’ files (and the fact that many have not been retained) 
and given the ethical sensitivities surrounding this group, I was unable to pursue 
this line of inquiry. On reflection, however, I might have found ways to negotiate 
these barriers. I had the opportunity to conduct several interviews with an ex-
prisoner who had spent the bulk of his incarceration in Peterhead prison, 
eventually graduating to the enhanced regime block (formerly the Digger). His 
insights proved extremely helpful in building a picture of the experience of 
protective custodial separation. It is a significant limitation of this project that I 
was unable to incorporate this aspect of segregation into the final thesis. The 
amount of material I gathered relating to other arrangements meant decisions had 
to be made about how to prioritise content within the prescribed word limit. The 
information I gathered on protective segregation was comparatively limited and 
for that reason I decided to prioritise administrative and punitive segregation 
forms given the significantly more extensive and varied range of data I was able 
to access with respect to it. There is a sense of waste about not including all the 
material I have gathered (and how unfinished the thesis feels as a result), though I 
do now have a small but valuable store of information and transcripts on 
protective segregation which might be marshalled in a future project. (The trope 
of thesis ‘abandonment’ rather than ‘completion’ exists for a reason).  
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With respect to interview techniques, there were many obstacles to fully 
implementing the methods theorised above. The relative ease at which I was able 
to employ elements of psychogeography in Examples #1 and #2 above was the 
result of Peterhead prison being virtually non-operational. The extraordinary 
history lesson I received on this tour, structured almost entirely by personal 
memories, would not have been possible had the prison been fully functional. We 
would not have been able to enter the deepest places, or to linger on particular 
features. The route would have been carefully stage managed and hugely limited 
in terms of both time frame and access had the prison been operational. These 
differences became patently obvious during the ‘walking interviews’ I attempted 
with other staff in other prisons. That said, while touring some presently operative 
segregation units (in Glenochil, Shotts and Barlinnie prisons), on each occasion 
guided by officers of long-standing service, I was able to see its unoccupied areas: 
the exercise “pens”, the “safe cells”, staff areas etc., and to ask targeted questions 
regarding the features they contained. But notably, I had to actively request to 
view these spaces and I had to gently push to extend the time we could spend 
talking within them. The extent to which we were able to slowly explore and 
digest these spaces, to loiter and change directions - thus allowing the space to 
subtly direct conversation – was critically hampered by operational demands as 
well as perhaps by the incongruence between un-purposeful wandering and  
professional behavioural norms. Within strict boundaries, then, researchers might 
conduct ‘walking interviews’ with their prison assigned guide as they tour certain 
areas, but the opportunity to conduct situated interviews within areas of historical 
relevance specifically with people who were there (e.g. ex-prisoners, retired 
officers, former policy-makers, etc.) is, in almost every case, unfeasible. There is 
also the problem that relevant spaces might no longer exist, that entire buildings 
might have been demolished or so radically adapted as to no longer represent its 
previous form thus undermining the potential for memory-retrieval through 
sensory and emotional affectivity.  
Spatial Prompts  
On the use of spatial prompts in interviews conducted in ordinary settings (e.g. 
offices, homes, public cafes), if I was organising this research again, there are a 
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range of adjustments I would make. First, I would compile photographs and 
floorplans (where possible) of every segregation site before beginning the 
interview process. I would conduct a number of test interviews to experiment with 
systematic ways of questioning participants on the basis of these visual aids. I 
could then develop a semi structured interview schedule that would produce more 
obviously comparable data. As it was, I was only able to use spatial prompts in a 
very limited number of interviews – I did not have the materials nor had I 
understood the value of this method until the research had significantly 
progressed.  
More broadly, I regret the gulf between my initial ambitions for this study and the 
finished thesis. As with most projects, the tale grew in the course of research, and 
while the breadth of material seemed to increase, I made the decision to limit the 
segregation sites I would critically engage with, and in that way attempt to offer a 
depth of descriptive analysis. An inevitable though unfortunate consequence was 
the forfeiting of many other, equally significant sites and practices, which while 



















Segregation as a Penal-Administrative Norm; 





In today’s world, boundaries are fixed, and most significant facts have 
been generated….the heroic frontier now lies in the ordering and 
deployment of those facts. Classification, organisation, presentation. To 
put it another way, the pie has been made – the contest is now in the 
slicing. 
- The Pale King, David Foster Wallace 
 
Segregation: n. the action or state of setting someone or something apart 
from others.  
- Oxford English Dictionary  
 
The Impulse to Compartmentalise  
 
The way we live is influenced by urges to categorize and compartmentalise.  Such 
demarcations allow us to make sense of other people, order our environments, 
distribute material resources efficiently, maintain the security of the group for the 
benefit of the individual, and protect our personal identities. Human experience is 
fundamentally structured by the continuous (re)drafting of such interfaces.  We 
intentionally split into separate parts our built environments, our social groupings, 
and our personal lives – our private selves even. Scholars across multiple 
disciplines have attempted to explain this impulse. In the context of city-splitting, 
for example, Carl Nightingale (2012) offers a sweeping history of urban 
segregation from 5000 BCE Mesopotamian to the bordered neighbourhoods of 
21st Century Chicago, arguing in particular that ever since racial designations first 
entered city planning decisions (1700s Calcutta he concludes), there has been a 
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global “segregation mania” (3). In the case of social splitting, the French historian 
Phillipe Aries, in his pioneering work Centuries of Childhood (1963), traced the 
invention of childhood as a distinct and separate category of personhood. This 
concept, he argued, emerged in the upper classes of the 17th century but did not 
fully embed across the social strata until the 19th century. It was perhaps one of 
our more advantageous attempts to categorise human beings since once a theory 
of innocence/dependence was widely accepted this ushered in new practical 
mechanisms for educating, managing, and caring for this especially vulnerable 
category of person. In philosophy, the most significant shift in the history of 
modern ideas was the Cartesian split between the material and the rational, with 
the latter framed as master over the former. This cornerstone of Enlightenment 
thinking (hardly challenged except notably by Pascal) emerged in parallel with 
the increasing dominance of technology over nature, that which underpinned the 
extraordinary advancements of the Industrial Revolution. Rollo May (1950), a 
leader of American existential psychoanalysis, argued that in addition to these 
crucial divides in the sciences and philosophy, the nineteenth century was also 
marked by a “cultural compartmentalization”.  
 
In art, there was the “art for art’s sake” movement and an increasing 
separation of art from the realities of nature…In religion there was a 
separation of theoretical beliefs and Sunday practices from the affairs of 
weekday life….With respect to the psychological life of the individual, the 
nineteenth century is broadly characterized by a separation of “reason” 
and “emotions”, with voluntaristic effort (will) enthroned as the method 
for casting the decision between the two – which resulted generally in a 
denial of the emotions. (May, 1950:31) 
 
Influenced by the early existentialist ideas of Kierkegaard in particular, Carl Jung 
(1933) attempted to explain such psychological disunity with the concept of 
the ’shadow self’. He argued that feared parts of the psyche are hidden from our 
conscious selves, that we separate these (our) selves from dangerous thoughts and 




Together these various tendencies towards compartmentalization suggest that 
separation(s) rather than integration has been an organising principle for much of 
our human history and across multiple spheres. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
segregation as a practical method of order and control has also manifested within 
the carceral sphere (increasingly so). However, the divisions, boundaries and 
specific forms of isolation that have been implemented often serve to amplify the 
tensions they were originally intended to ameliorate. In other words, just as city-
splitting was and is intended to establish order (and maintain power structures) 
through territorial delineation, but instead tends to cement discord between groups, 
the segregation of particular categories of prisoners, particularly under a rubric of 
“dangerousness”, has often stoked resentments and led to various forms of protest 
and resistance (see Chapters Four and Five). Similarly, in the case of 
psychological splitting, the hidden aspects of the psyche which the ego sequesters 
away in an attempt to protect the self from its most frightening tendencies 
(usually those related to sex, as Freud maintained), re-emerge in destructive and 
uncontrolled ways precisely because they have been so hidden. The crucial point 
here is that while segregation might be politically expedient in some cases, and 
seemingly pragmatic in others, it can also be, in the penal sphere specifically, 
spectacularly damaging from both psychological and ethical perspectives (see 
Jeffreys, 2013; Coyle, 2002.) 
The drawing of lines, where and how, what/who is put within and outside of 
them, structures human experience, just as it has come to structure the world of 
prisons (Foucault’s concept of ‘meticulous tactical partitioning’ is pertinent here, 
discussed on p.86). To that extent, the concept of segregation, understood 
expansively as the deliberate and controlled partitioning of spatial social and 
personal worlds - along with the particular systems employed to make practicable 
our impulses to compartmentalise - is a valuable prism through which to gauge a 
society’s organisation, its general character, and to glimpse traces of its historical 
roots. Far from being a narrow or singular concept, segregation is a capacious 
concept inclusive of these ideas of classification, ordering, and differential 
management. And far from being applicable to only recognisable minorities, the 
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closer a community is observed the more difficult it is to identify the segregated 
from the mainstream.  
Segregation in Prisons: a Spacious Concept.  
Segregation in prisons relies on myriad tools, regimes and spatial arrangements 
that serve first, in general terms, to order individual prisoners and groups of 
prisoners, and secondly, in more discrete and targeted terms, to ‘set-apart’ certain 
kinds of prisoners from the mainstream. That binary constitutes the distinction 
between routine segregation measures and specialist, or ‘special handling’, 
measures. The former includes categorisation methods, other processes of 
differentiation, and systems of spatial and social zoning, while the latter is a more 
concentrated expression of these methods with greater restrictions, more rigid 
boundaries, and applicable to far fewer numbers of prisoners.  
Broadly understood, segregation is a strategy of penal organisation that has its 
roots in the systems of spatial and social partitioning within prisons that emerged 
in the late Eighteenth Century – of which the silent and separate systems are 
particularly illustrative examples (see Forsyth, 2004; Ignatieff, 1978; Scharff 
Smith, 2004, 2006; Johnston, 1974; Evans, 1982). Segregation has since 
developed in Scottish prisons, quite rapidly since the 1950s, into a pervasive and 
heterogeneous mode of penal administration. The dominancy of cellular 
confinement in modern prisons and later the gradual proliferation of sophisticated 
segregation forms in the post war period illustrates the fundamental role that ideas 
and practices of division, isolation and boundaries (of many kinds) have come to 
play in the carceral sphere. Nevertheless, when segregation in prisons is 
mentioned what is typically brought to mind are very specific kinds of spaces, 
practices and experiences that are popularly defined first by their exceptionalism 
insofar as they are assumed to be an anomalous form of incarceration, and 
secondly by their exclusivity such as they are viewed as applicable to only and 
always the very worst prisoners, operationally speaking: the most violent, 
disruptive and/or vulnerable. On these grounds, segregation is commonly framed 
in terms of the ‘prison within the prison’, understood as something of a penal 
aberration, or at least as a discrete, hauntingly extreme type of containment 
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intended as one concrete response (though demonstrably not a solution) to the real 
problem of ‘problem’ prisoners.  
Spatially characterised in the public penal imaginary by the language of ‘holes’, 
‘blocks’, ‘cages’, ‘dungeons’, ‘tombs’, these are places where the practice of 
individual isolation (a.k.a. solitary confinement) is the norm; places where 
segregated prisoners’ experiences are shaped by profoundly impoverished 
physical environments and severe limits on human contact, compounded by 
distorted perceptions of time and a lack of purposeful, creative activity with 
disturbing ethical implications (Jeffreys, 2013). What is less commonly 
understood is that isolation of this nature is not limited to formal segregation 
units. In the Scottish context, recent findings of the Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture (CPT), for example, exposed that prisoners in remand units across 
Scottish prisons (but specifically in Barlinnie prison) “often spend up to 22 hours 
confined to their cell” (Council of Europe, 2014). Neither is extreme isolation 
used only as a short-term penal measure. That is, while the system of legal and 
operational rules governing Scottish prisons may heavily circumscribe the length 
of time prisoners can be legally kept within various segregation units, throughout 
contemporary history and into the present such restrictions have been routinely 
thwarted by continuous transferral between segregation units – a practice known 
colloquially as ‘ghosting’.  
From an international perspective, it has become increasingly inaccurate to 
understand such extreme forms of segregation as peculiar given the proliferation 
of so-called ‘supermax’ prisons where entire populations are held in these kinds 
of solitary conditions. Bauman (2000) argues that such facilities are consistent 
with the general ‘paradigm of exclusion’ that penal policies tend to rely on in 
pursuit of order. In the US the Bureau of Justice estimated that in 2005 there were 
25,000 people contained in supermax facilities (where solitary confinement is 
standard practice) and a further 82,000 kept in segregation units distributed across 
lower-security prisons (Gibbons & Katzenbach, 2006.). In her comprehensive 
study of supermax prisons, Sharon Shalev (2006) rejects a singular causal 
explanation for this complex phenomenon and instead offers an holistic portrait 
integrating discourses around the ‘waste management’ function of prisons (Feeley 
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& Simon, 1992) as part of ‘the new punitiveness’ (Pratt et al, 2005); its practical 
consequences in terms of rising prison populations, overcrowding, and attending 
resource constraints; the decreasing purchase of rehabilitative ideals (Allen, 1981) 
coupled with a more risk oriented and managerial administrative approach to 
‘problem’ prisoners (Ward, 1999); the increased possibilities for economic 
advantage that supermax prisons provide for communities and private 
stakeholders (Burton-Rose, et al, 1998; Currie, 1998); and, more historically 
specific to the U.S., the role of racism in the criminal justice system (Miller, 
1996). 
Nevertheless, neat and overly reductive precisely because it is so irresistibly 
evocative, segregation narrowly understood as only discrete segregation units or 
as the particular practice of solitary confinement, or as related only to one type of 
prison environment (e.g. supermax facilities) is simplistic, though it does 
accurately capture its central and lowest expression. Occupying the nadir-position 
of extreme custody, the harms exacted by segregation of this kind are 
proportionately greater, lending moral weight as well as operational urgency to 
reform efforts (given the associated risks in terms of long-term order maintenance 
and institutional reputational costs). Solitary confinement has expressly become 
the most culturally potent segregation practice, a totem of harm around which 
significant criticism, legal challenge and lobbying activities have been mobilised. 
To this end, core international human rights instruments specifically addressing 
the connection between extreme isolation and torture are routinely evoked, e.g. 
the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (1985), the UN Basic Principles for the Treatment of 
Prisoners (1990), and more recently, the Istanbul Statement on the Use and 
Effects of Solitary Confinement (2007). Furthermore, given that solitary 
confinement as a standardized practice of prison administration emerged at the 
very genesis of the ‘modern’ prison in the late Eighteenth Century, it assumes 
historical importance (the next section describes this transformation). For these 
reasons, it is unsurprising that the traditionally-understood segregation unit, with 
its customary (over)reliance on the practice of solitary confinement, has come to 
preoccupy those concerned with segregation.  
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However, closer scrutiny of the concept of segregation broadens our 
understanding of the multiplicity of forms through which it manifests within penal 
settings with regards to spatial and social arrangements. This chapter draws a 
crucial distinction then between (1) routine segregation measures, those which 
include generalised and widely applicable practices such as categorisation 
mechanisms, spatial zoning, and the plethora of residential arrangements that 
whilst ostensibly ‘mainstream’ still serve to segregate prisoners according to 
discrete categories; and (2) specialist measures, encompassing administrative, 
punitive and protective forms and including both individual isolation and group 
seclusion, those which constitute the formal core of a segregation subsystem and 
thus warrant particular attention.  
Encouraged by Selznick (1969:4), who argued, “(S)ocial science is best served 
when definitions are weak and concepts are strong”, in this chapter I explore a 
number of claims about where and how the conceptual boundaries of segregation 
might be drawn, using Scottish prisons specifically as a case study to exemplify 
its various manifestations through contemporary history. To understand 
segregation, such claims may be further sub-divided into three interdependent 
components: (1) ideological – the system of ideas underpinning particular kinds 
of prison administration; (2) mechanistic – the functional practices and processes 
that make it work; and, (3) spatial – the physical contexts within which segregated 
prisoners are housed. Such arrangements include both collective segregation and 
individual isolation. The former involves association between and integration 
amongst a group in a segregated environment, while the latter amounts to total 
(albeit short-term) seclusion, where individuals are almost entirely excluded from 
the company of others and from accessing particular resources.  
The nature, interaction between and implementation of these three elements (see 
Fig Two below) determine a prison’s spatial layout and how it internally operates; 
it determines who is kept where, why, for how long, and the conditions under 
which they live. By exploring these elements, this chapter attempts to demonstrate 
the centrality of segregation thinking and practices to prison management, and the 
extent to which it has come to structure the lived experience of prisoners. 
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At the level of the individual, prisoners experience segregation through four 
general processes, sketched below in very general terms:  
1. Initial institutional allocation, whereby convicted offenders are distributed 
across the prison estate, determining whether they will be contained in, for 
example, Young Offenders Institutes, women’s prisons, category A-D 
adult male prisons, Immigration Removal Centres, or possibly secure 
hospitals. Untried prisoners are transferred to remand units. 
2. At the point of entry, prisoners are housed in separate induction units for 
the purpose of acclimatising them to the prison environment, providing 
information regarding prison rules and procedures. They undergo an 
increasingly technical process of risk/needs assessment, which in turn 
determines where they are accommodated within the prison according to 
the predicted level of care and/or control that is assessed as appropriate.  
3. Most prisoners are then transferred to mainstream halls and put under a 
basic level regime. Progression to enhanced level regimes, based on 
behaviour, may involve transferral to separate mainstream halls. (The 10 
Cell Unit in Peterhead prisoner, for example, was re-functionalised in the 
late 1990s to house enhanced level prisoners). Some prisons have 
additional facilities for long term prisoners nearing release. Barlinnie 
prison, for example, has a separate block for long term prisoners, within 
which prisoners are granted increased freedom of movement and 
experience far less restrictive controls.  
4. For prisoners who manifest particularly heightened vulnerabilities, or 
those whose behaviour warrants specialist attention – either on 
disciplinary or administrative grounds – special handling measures are 
used to discretely segregate them. Segregation units, silent/safe cells, and 
special units may be used for either short-term or medium-term periods, 
while formal Vulnerable Prisoners Units, particularly regarding sex 
offenders, are used in the longer-term, which may involve the entirety of 
their sentence.  
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An additional component of penal segregation, which occurs concurrently in a 
more diffuse, informal manner concerns the ways in which prisoners themselves 
practice segregation. These unofficial although often quite rigid arrangements 
whereby prisoners create distinct and exclusive groups amongst themselves, can 
be both insidious and advantageous in effect. This internal and informal use of 
segregation is prison-specific, highly variable and shaped in part by the protean 
patterns of prison populations. The perceived rise of gang culture in some urban 
prisons and the position it is assumed religious affinity plays in this process is 
presently of concern to policy makers, prison managers, and academics. However, 
the misidentification of religious piety, particularly Islamic faith, as extremism is 
of concern (Williams, 2016). Prisoner-orchestrated social segregation has 
implications for prison management extending to the use of formal segregation 
measures in instances where fears surrounding security, control and protection 
become heightened.  In turn, the variable nature of staff-prisoner relations on 
individual wings, informed by how individual officers subjectively understand 
and execute their role (see Liebling et al, 2011) often serves to both magnify and 
alleviate possible tensions. Indeed this relational spectrum, ranging in nature from 
the co-operative to the internecine, has wider ramifications for the maintenance of 
prison order more generally (Sparks et al, 1996), and indeed for the subsequent 
necessity (or perceived necessity) of formal special handling measures.  
Antecedents: ‘Disciplinary Partitioning’ as the Paradigm for Modern Prison 
Administration 
Prior to the Eighteenth Century, state-sanctioned punishment was largely 
corporal. Law-breakers, rebels, rogues and wretches suffered various kinds of 
public humiliations that tended to have an explicit physical dimension: whipping, 
branding, the use of stocks, and death by the gallows. Examples of capital 
punishment imposed on minor as well as more serious offenders can be found 
throughout the early 1700s, though objections to this practice were gaining 
traction during this period - Thomas More’s Utopia (1615) is one of the earliest 
written indictments, advocating imprisonment as an alternative for petty 
criminals. However, the lack of an adequate, centrally-managed and bureaucratic 
network of penitentiaries required a penal substitute, which was for much of the 
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eighteenth century the use of transportation to the colonies to parts of Africa, to 
America, and later in 1786 to Australia following a temporary moratorium after 
the American Revolution (see Willis, 2005). For the most egregious crimes, or for 
those who were most unfortunate, public hangings remained a popular form of 
punishment. The emphasis was on bodily pain and public shaming, often imposed 
capriciously according to local customs and/or subject to the personal moods of 
individual sentencers. Local jails and lock-ups were primitive, small, and largely 
used as temporary holding facilities for those awaiting exile or before the main 
punishment event – and it was very much a designed ‘spectacle’ (see Foucault, 
1977). To accommodate prisoner overspill – a product of the rise of petty 
offending in the wake of industrialisation and the attending waves of urban 
migration - great floating hulks moored on the banks of the River Thames came to 
be used, though they were never intended as permanent carceral settings despite 
being in use for an 80 year period (Campbell, 1994). The concept much less the 
(now common) practice of long-term imprisonment would have appeared quite 
bizarre to contemporaneous law-makers. Instead, penal settings were used for the 
containment of minor offenders, including debtors, who were serving relatively 
short sentences (Pugh, 1970). Up until the end of the 1700s, many of these penal 
environments were informal, which is to say somewhat chaotic spaces with few 
demarcations in terms of spatial function and categories of prisoners, thus 
allowing for the co-mingling of men, women and children, along with remand and 
convicted prisoners (see Muncie, 2001). N.B. In early Scottish prisons, the lack of 
gender-based segregation and general classification was cited as a particular 
concern by John Howard after his visits to Scotland in 1779, 1782 and 1783 
(Cameron, 1983:58). 
Within the context of a wider social reform agenda, the nature, methods and 
delivery of punishment began to shift. From swift, sharp doses of corporal 
punishment to longer-term sequestering in penal settings; from high visibility 
public shaming to the removal of offenders from public view. But it is not entirely 
clear the extent to which, or at what point in time, public appetites for visceral 
scenes of degradation truly diminished – or whether they have at all. 
Nevertheless, in opposition to the deeply entrenched views of policy 
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traditionalists as well as general public apathy (if not outright disdain) for the 
plight of criminals, a rising swell of independent reformers and commentators 
continued to react against the arbitrariness and brutality of this system of criminal 
justice, out-crying in particular the often appalling and unsanitary material 
conditions of these early penal settings. Amongst them were the now celebrated 
accounts of John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, Joseph John Gurney, James Neild and 
Alexander Wedderburn. Charles Dickens’ highly popular, serialised portraits of 
prison life, though fictional, arguably had equal if not more impact in terms of 
spotlighting the acute deprivations of prisons, and pertinently of humanising 
prisoners through powerfully sympathetic narratives.  
During the period between the end of the eighteenth century and the opening 
decades of the Nineteenth Century, an uneasy confluence of three sets of factors 
gradually triggered a transformation within penality initiating what Foucault 
terms ‘the birth of the [modern] prison’ – the admixture of which translated into 
the operational dominancy of the praxis of segregation:  
1. The gradual supplanting of corporal and capital punishment, followed by 
transportation, as the dominant punitive forms with imprisonment as the 
primary state sanction. 
2. The social and spatial systemisation of internal penal management. 
3. The role of religious ideologies connecting particular segregation 
elements, chiefly individual and total isolation (i.e. solitary confinement), 
with spiritual salvation. 
Once transportation was finally abandoned in the 1850s, the position of prisons as 
the principal, certainly the most symbolically important, state sanction was 
reinforced and by extension so too was the power of the state. The expression of 
this movement was concretised in the architectural designs of prisons: from 
turreted towers and dungeons to purpose-built monoliths imposing in their dark, 
gothic splendour and often geographically (as well as ideologically) positioned at 
the heart of urban communities. Moreover, by the 1860s, there had been a 
substantial growth in the number of penal laws (Ignatieff, 1978), resulting in the 
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criminalisation of a larger minority of the population, and since imprisonment 
became a more widely used penalty, segregation in the first instance – i.e. the 
spatial and civic setting apart of law-breakers from their communities – readily 
became a customary and almost presupposed component of the criminal justice 
system. Whilst overall imprisonment rates remained comparatively low, questions 
relating to efficiencies became more expedient as the figures grew 
proportionately, resulting in the second set of factors relating to changes in how 
prisons were internally organised and managed. This attention to internal 
operations became especially urgent when prison administration was centralised 
following the enactment of the Prison Commission in 1878. A bifurcation 
between local prisons (for short-sentence and remand prisoners) and convict 
prisons (for long-sentence prisoners) was then established. At this stage prison 
buildings became yet more sophisticated and deliberate in their external design, 
more recognisably distanced from society and, crucially, more dependent on 
segregation mechanisms to structure the internal ordering of space and the people 
within them.  
Secondly then, informed by Enlightenment ideals, there was a move towards 
reason, towards planned, systematic, what we might now call ‘evidence-based’ 
management approaches, away from the superstitions, haphazardness and 
irregularities of the past. In the legal arena and in terms of general public policy 
this may have constituted a progressive agenda, however the extent to which 
imprisonment was consequently made a more humane experience for those 
prisoners was tempered by the increasingly sophisticated (read: oppressive) 
surveillance technologies and orderliness that rationalisation produced - the aim 
and effect of which was to intimately control prisoners, and did so extraordinarily 
successfully. In Foucault’s (1977) analysis, the tremendous power of the state 
over prisoners’ lives was extended and consolidated by this calculated, coldly 
rational model of prison administration, involving “enclosed, segmented space” 
where prisoners were “inserted in a fixed place”, where “the slightest movements 
are supervised” and where “all movements are recorded.” Bentham’s theory of 
the Panopticon is taken as the purest expression of how these ideas of optical and 
spatial control might be achieved: chiefly through segregation practices. While 
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this ideal architectural form was never wholly translated into concrete reality, 
nevertheless prisons were transformed from places of collective, mostly short-
term quarantine to highly differentiated environments where prisoners were 
segregated not merely from the outside world but internally segregated by an 
increasingly complex array of disciplinary mechanisms, those which served to 
define their daily routines and activities, their capacity to move within and 
between various zones and, most encumbering and affective of all, their 
psychological experiences of confinement. Famously contextualising this shift by 
drawing parallels between differing approaches to leprosy and the plague on the 
one hand, and approaches to prison organization on the other, Foucault says this:  
If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion, which to a 
certain extent provided the model for and general form of the great 
Confinement, then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects. Rather 
than the massive, binary division between one set of people and another, it 
called for multiple separations, individualizing distributions, an 
organization in depth of surveillance and control, an intensification and a 
ramification of power. The leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, 
of exile-enclosure; he was left to his doom in a mass among which it was 
useless to differentiate; those sick of the plague were caught up in a 
meticulous tactical partitioning in which individual differentiations were 
the constricting effects of a power that multiplied, articulated and 
subdivided itself; the great confinement on the one hand; the correct 
training on the other. The leper and his separation; the plague and its 
segmentations.  (Foucault, 1977, part 3:2-3) 
This ‘meticulous tactical partitioning’ predicated on ‘individual differentiations’ 
changed the penal landscape from collective, dormitory-style prisoner 
containment (most fully practiced in debtors prisons) to individual cellular 
confinement (see Forsythe, 2004). A shift that is perhaps the first and most 
explicit example of a general movement towards the operational primacy of 
segregation. Notably, however, throughout contemporary history this model of 
prison organisation has not developed equally across all jurisdictions (in parts of 
Latin America, for example, group rather than individual residential arrangements 
remain common, see Berbeck, 2011), nor within individual prison systems (in the 
UK context up until the 1970s dormitory arrangements were a typical feature of 
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prisons within the open estate – in lower security categories of U.S. prisoners they 
still are).  
During this period approaches to the management of people through spatial 
organisation became more intentional, compounded by advances in surveillance 
techniques and later by technologies. So too was institutional allocation 
increasingly structured around the principles of segregation, whereby individual 
prisons were formally designated to separately contain men and women, young 
and adult prisoners, and low-level and more serious offenders. From a relatively 
ill-defined, primitive approach of collective warehousing to the regimentation of 
design layouts which ensured the perpetual segmentation of prisoners through 
both individual cellular confinement and the functional designation of non-
residential spaces into specific purpose-defined areas. These measures were 
deliberate attempts to control and restrict prisoner association and communication 
in the interests first of moral reformation and later rationalised in terms of 
maintaining discipline and order.  
The third set of factors that contributed to the transformation of imprisonment, 
providing further legitimisation for segregation practices beyond a Foucauldian 
control-impulse, was the divine rooted notion of reformation, and its importance 
as a concurrent aim with that of simple punitive order. At a point in time when 
retributive attitudes to social miscreants were particularly pronounced and where 
public literacy of the dogmas of damnation set the cultural tone, this 
understanding of wrong-doers as redeemable (and how wrong-doing ought to be 
addressed) represented, at that time, a progressive liberalism. Although, the often 
misconstrued leniency of this position masked the heavy burdens it imposed on 
individual prisons, to say nothing of the oppressive management strategies it 
subsequently gave rise to i.e. the near-absolute isolation of individual prisoners 
through, most particularly, the separate and silent systems. The former 
constituting solitary confinement in the spatial sense while the latter defined the 




Through an emphasis on the redemptive function of prisons (advanced especially 
by the Quakers), the system of institutional, systemic discipline became conjoined 
to the notion of self-discipline, underscored by the belief that individual prisoners 
were capable of effecting their own reform (Smith, 2009). The concern here was 
not merely with what we might now call ‘rehabilitating’ offenders’ surface selves 
but with the more profound, all-embracing and spectacularly paternalistic if well-
intentioned drive to save men’s very souls.This was thought achievable through 
almost complete social isolation. As one nineteenth century commentator 
confidently alleges, ‘it is almost universally found that such self-communion is 
the precursor of moral amendment’ (Adshead, 1845: x). Insofar as spatial and 
social isolation was thought to aid processes of spiritual introspection thus 
enabling a closer proximity to God, segregation was further rationalised and 
indeed widely implemented as standard practice. On the grounds of contagion, or 
‘moral pestilence’ (Kingsmill, 1854) both from a management perspective and in 
the sense of hindering the purging of sin, the separate and silent systems also 
represented a coalescence of the control and redemptive functions of 
imprisonment. For religiously-minded reformers, improving material conditions 
within prisons may have been a core aim, but the value of spiritual cleanliness 
was the predominate objective, serving both preventative and curative functions 
(Evans, 1982).  
Such efforts towards the spiritual and behavioural rehabilitation of prisoners were 
located within a kind of individuating-introspective modernism, made possible by 
a general movement in social, political and economic spheres towards the 
primacy of the individual over the collective – this was the period in which 
society was beginning to structure itself according to the capitalist model of 
individualism, precipitated by the grand transformations activated by the 
Industrial Revolution. Stressing the role of individual (moral) autonomy – an 
ideological trend led by Enlightenment philosophers such as Kant, Descartes and 
Rousseau – resulted, in criminal justice terms, in a greater onus on the concept of 
personal, legal responsibility. At the same time, attachments to still culturally-
pervasive religious ideologies sustained the spiritual notion of personal salvation. 
In this aspect, like many other features of segregation, it is not the practices of 
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segregation that have changed (nor in some cases the actual physical spaces) so 
much as the underlying ideology: from a separate system to save men’s souls (the 
redemptive agenda) to a separate system as a way to mitigate men’s risks (the 
security agenda). 
Together these three elements created carceral environments that were structured 
around the principles of segregation – a meta-structure that endures since for the 
most part it continues to define the shape of contemporary Western prisons even 
if they are rationalised in new ways, largely by the various logics of risk-
mitigation (as opposed to the expunging of sin, for example). Foucault’s 
descriptions of the internal organisation of the earliest modern prisons in many 
cases still accurately characterises prisons in the Twenty First Century. While the 
‘silent’ and ‘separate’ systems fell out of use, finally abandoned by the end of the 
nineteenth century, Shalev (2009) makes the point that, 
Many of the prisons which were constructed during that period, however, 
remained in operation, albeit in a modified form. Indeed, some of these 
prisons, including Pentoville in London and Vestre in Copenhagen, still 
operate today. Most crucially, solitary confinement became an integral 
part of prison systems. (17, italics added) 
After more than a century of myriad and strict approaches to segregation, the 
basic rationale underpinning its use had become deeply embedded into penal 
thought and administration. To qualify Shalev’s argument, in the UK and Scottish 
context (unlike in the U.S.), it was segregation in a more expanded sense 
(including both collective and individual forms of isolation), rather than the 
specific practice of solitary confinement, that remained integral. This durability of 
the rationale and practices of segregation is attributable partly to the efficiency 
and orderliness that it produces, which remain key operational aims of prison 
management. But other factors are also pertinent here, including the issue of 
architectural constraints.  
Architectural Constraints to Routine Segregation Measures 
Prison buildings constructed in earlier periods (according to different socio-
cultural, political and penal-administrative ideologies) continue to operate as 
carceral settings. The extent to which they may be re-functionalised on the basis 
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of more contemporary approaches to prisoner-management – reflective of 
changes to systems of segregation, for example - is impeded by the their original 
physical layouts and design features. The various stages of prison building in the 
Twentieth Century (see Dunbar & Fairweather, 2000), which might have 
provided a genuine opportunity to fundamentally re-imagine the nature of 
imprisonment through architectural innovation, instead proved remarkably similar 
in effect (if not eternal aesthetics) to earlier designs. Gone were the ostentatious, 
symbolic ornaments of power – the towers, menacing gargoyles, foreboding stone 
columns and wrought-iron gates – replaced by flat roofs, pale-painted exteriors, 
less visibly obtrusive security measures (i.e. wire mesh perimeter fences rather 
than high, impenetrable stone walls), and low, stocky building blocks interspersed 
with patches of green space redolent of less insidious state institutions e.g. 
hospitals, government complexes and schools. Yet, internally the similarities 
remained striking: halls of individual cells stacked one atop the other, central 
(often minimally-used) communal areas surveyed by well-positioned officers’ 
stations with clear sight-lines ensuring maximum levels of optic and spatial 
control, separate areas connected by long, caged walkways studded by a series of 
locked doors, and self-contained outside “pens” adjoining segregation blocks. 
Prison layouts can be divided broadly into two categories: ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ 
supervision, with the latter the more advantageous in terms of supporting healthy 
relationships between prisoners and officers (Fairweather, 2000), and for reducing 
the tensions that give rise to violence (Wener, 2000).  
Prisons with indirect supervision are those where inmates and staff 
occupy, to some extent, their own territories. Staff may intermingle with 
inmates to a limited degree, but supervision and control are more remote 
and characterized by reliance on distant visual surveillance; officers can 
retreat to their own secure stations. Control may be exercised from one 
central point or by patrolling corridors or landings…They [prisons] may 
have central open galleries off a series of landings or enclosed corridors. 
(Fairweather, 2000: 34-35) 
The layouts that more readily produce indirect supervision tend to be older 
institutions. The monolithic prisons built towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, for example, were remarkably similar to those constructed a century 
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earlier given the attachment to stacked cells on often vast landings with central 
viewing ports allowing staff to manage prisoners ‘at a distance’. The three main 
prisons in Scotland used throughout the twentieth century – Peterhead (built in 
1888), Inverness (1902), and Barlinnie (1882-1897) – followed this design layout. 
Each of these institutions was initially designed with few spatial opportunities for 
interaction either amongst prisoners themselves or between staff and prisoners. 
While the ground floor landings were reasonably large, the upper level floors 
were incredibly narrow limiting the number of bodies that could be there at any 
one time. Additionally, there were no purpose-designed areas for general 
congregation, reflecting the preferences at the time for individual cellular 
confinement and isolation. The food hatches built into each cell door are further 
evidence of this orientation; rendering it unnecessary for prisoners to be released 
from their cells except for ablutions and limited periods of work. This assumption 
of cellular confinement was even reflected in the design approach to health and 
safety. During an ‘walking interview’ in Peterhead prison, I asked my guide, an 
SPS officer of long standing, what the bungs in the cells doors were for, he said 
“they were put in in case of fires… sometime in the 70s I think…the hole is the 
size of a water hose”  
The predicament for progressive-minded penal managers – those who accept the 
benefits of direct forms of supervision – is how to foster more and better 
interactions in a physical environment that severely inhibits this. Beyond 
expensive, time-consuming, and politically sensitive building projects, this 
dilemma requires huge feats of imagination and innovation – which are qualities 
that have not generally characterized prison administration, particularly when 
operating within restrictive and unyielding design frameworks. The intersection 
between architecture and ideology is important here; they can work in symmetry 
just as one can either impede or indeed expedite the positive evolution of the 
other. For example, the built environment of cellular confinement can, as shown 
above, hamper efforts towards more collective and participatory forms of 
community (and direct supervision). But this very design layout can also, when 
managed in a particular way, allow prisoners the degree of privacy, solitude and 
safety that human beings require for wellbeing.  Research suggests that single 
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occupancy housing (i.e. individual cells) has fewer negative psychological effects 
on prisoners than either double occupancy cells or dormitories (Fairweather, 
2000). Wener (2000) provides an explanation for this association between privacy 
and personal safety, as well as its advantageous implications for prison security:  
Privacy – in particular, environmental support for exerting control over 
social interactions – can play an important role in affecting inmates sense 
of security. A door to a cell or bedroom that can be opened or closed gives 
inmates the ability to shut off or remove themselves from potentially 
difficult situations. If, for example, another person is agitated and 
threatening, and inmate may be able to avoid confrontation simply by 
going into his or her room. The ability to increase or reduce access to 
others in this and more subtle ways can alleviate the tensions that lead to 
violent confrontations. (52-52) 
In The Ecology of Survival, Toch (1992) presents a similar argument but does so 
from a more explicitly psychological and less instrumental perspective: 
The incentive to privacy is the threat of overstimulation. This threat is 
“transactional” in the sense that some persons are more annoyed and 
endangered by stimulus “overload” than others. The need for privacy is 
related to introspection, for instance, in that a complex inner life demands 
protection from interference….Even where insulation affords opportunity 
for study or reading, the main benefit often seems to be of “peace” 
(freedom from excess stimulation) and “relation” (modulated feelings and 
thoughts). (36-37) 
On this basis, the cellular confinement design of older prisons might be beneficial 
from the vantage point of both prisoners and prison managers. Crucially, 
however, there is something important here about the concepts of autonomy and 
ownership, i.e. who has the power to determine when prisoners can retreat into 
private spaces and when they can interact with others, as well as the extent to 
which they understand those spaces as theirs (see Chapter Four for a full 
discussion of the autonomy concept). When those elements are achieved the 
traditional architecture itself, while originally inspired by seemingly anachronistic 
ideologies, can in fact foster more progressive management approaches.  




Prison management aims have remained remarkably consistent throughout 
modern penal history albeit prioritised with different emphases and protean 
rationales at discrete moments in time. The distinction between the general aims 
or philosophies of imprisonment and the specific aims of prison administration is 
the difference between asking what prisons are for and how prisons are run. 
While these questions are connected prison administration is primarily a 
pragmatic concern for there are certain material realities that despite shifts in 
penal ideologies remain relatively fixed. “In a very practical sense” writes Coyle 
(2003:108), “maintaining safety, security, good order and control over the prison 
population is the prison manager’s immediate objective.”. These elements are 
linked but the concept of ‘security’ in the broadest sense is foundational. In the 
first instance perimeter security must be maintained so as to prevent escape (the 
minimum and fundamental duty of any prison system), which involves the use of 
security hardware (fences, gates, bars, surveillance technology, guard posts, etc.) 
for the purpose of keeping prisoners “in”. Internal security, by contrast, is a more 
flexible concept as well as a more complicated task. In a U.S. Department of 
Justice report on Prison and Jail Security, Benton and Obenland (1975) defined it 
as, 
…the ability of an institution to control or influence behaviour within 
inside areas in a manner that is consistent with the safety of prisoners and 
staff. Therefore, this concept includes the protection of prisoners from one 
another, protection of staff and residents from one another, and control or 
prevention of riots and disturbances. (1975:40) 
In pursuit of these more prosaic management objectives, a range of correctional 
methods, broadly encompassed within a segregation paradigm - i.e. predicated on 
a logic of ‘setting apart’ – have been instituted, including (1) mechanisms to 
classify prisoners into discrete groups, i.e. on the grounds of gender, age, sentence 
length, risk categories, and behaviours, etc. (2) spatial zoning, to create separate 
regions within the prison with specific functions and purposes used to 
accommodate prisoners differentially, and (3) a range of increasingly 
sophisticated situational controls to maintain the boundaries these first two 
elements require.  
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Prison communities are fragile; as inherently coercive institutions, prisons 
function with multiple layers of tension, alleviated or aggravated by the particular 
interaction between policies, systems and cultures operative within individual 
prisons, as well as the ways in which such interactions are situated in the physical 
environment itself. Wener (2000) frames these interactions within what he terms a 
‘contextual model’, demonstrating how the physical, organisational and social  
environments, along with perceptions of the setting, together produce particular 
responses – those associated with reduced or increased risks of violence and 
disorder. From an operational perspective, the basic nature of the incarceration 
project – one set of people locking-up another – is an intrinsically precarious 
enterprise however it is organised. The interlinked tasks of maintaining external 
security, ensuring at least minimal internal security, and creating a safe 
environment is a perennial challenge. A challenge that is more or less complicated 
by a range of forces that together inform the kinds of relational dynamics that 
exist within prisons thus determining how stable a community is. These include: 
the coherence (or otherwise) of a public penal philosophy, that which bleeds 
down eventually colouring policy and practice; resource constraints especially 
staffing levels set against both general population figures and specific population 
demographics, shaped in turn by shifts in sentencing policy and cultures; general 
material conditions; and, at a more localised level, the prevalence and effects of 
specific crisis events (high profile escapes, rioting, instances of self-harm, etc.) 
and the ways in which they are publicly imbibed and responded to. These and 
other factors contribute to what King (2007) labels ‘the problem of containment’, 
described in the following terms: 
It is not that difficult to run prisons that are virtually escape proof, though 
it is very expensive. It is not that difficult to run prisons which minimize 
opportunities for riot and mayhem, though they also tend to reduce 
opportunities for everything else to a minimum and they infringe human 
rights. It is very difficult indeed to run prisons which are more or less 
escape proof, orderly and safe, which provide programmes aimed at 
changing offending behaviour and offering prospects of rehabilitation, and 
with respect to the human rights of staff and prisoners...It is a question of 




Where the general, endlessly debated and inconsistently applied aims of 
imprisonment (incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, reform etc.) are ideological 
in nature, the operational aims (security, order and protection) are practical, 
performance-driven, and reliant on routine segregation measures. Operationally, 
the balancing act to which King refers is dependent upon appropriate 
categorisation mechanisms, clear spatial zoning and effective (rather than merely 
excessive) situational controls. When these systems of segregation function 
relatively efficiently, and are implemented with basic levels of legitimacy, the 
majority of prisoners adhere to the rules and regimes imposed on them. But there 
remain a number of discrete groups that present additional management problems, 
jeopardizing in various ways the three central operational aims, and therefore 
warranting a more targeted system of special handling measures with its own 
separate sets of assessment criteria, containment spaces and specialist controls 
(see Chapter Three). Before considering both routine segregation measure in this 
chapter and specialist measures in the next, it is worth examining in more detail 
these objectives, focusing on security and order given their relevance for the 
discrete small units discussed in detail in the second half of this thesis. Viewing 
these objectives through a spatial lens, particular attention is paid to the role 
environmental factors play in how these concepts might be understood and 
applied.  
Security and Order 
Security means a system of defence, it refers most especially to the boundary, and 
to the strength of that boundary, which keeps prisoners within the confines of the 
prison. As Richard Tilt (1997:39), a former Director General of the Prison Service 
succinctly puts it, “we can assume that custody refers to containment of prisoners 
within the prison perimeter, and that security is the arrangement by which this is 
achieved.” Security then is not only an intended outcome but a means of ensuring 
prisoner containment – it is a set of “measures – physical, practical and 
procedural – to prevent escape” (King, 1997:45). ‘Security Risk’ prisoners are 
therefore those who have either attempted escape, whether successfully or not, or 
those who threaten to do so. Counterintuitively, manifestly robust external 
security measures, while effective in the short term can on occasion contribute in 
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the longer-term to a breakdown of internal security, which is to say, order, such 
that they may be experienced by prisoners as exorbitantly restrictive and to that 
extent illegitimate (Sparks et al, 1996). The obvious danger here being not a 
gradual but an abrupt intensifying of security measures in reaction, leading to 
what Morgan (1997:65) terms a ‘disorder amplification spiral’.  
Clearly connected to security but distinct from it, order is conceptually richer and 
best understood as, 
...any long-standing pattern of social relations (characterised by a 
minimum level of respect for persons) in which the expectations that 
participants have of one another are commonly met, though not 
necessarily without contestation. Order can also, in part, be defined 
negatively as the absence of violence, overt conflict or the imminent threat 
of the chaotic breakdown of social relations. (Sparks et al, 1996:119) 
Order that is established through consent, often compounded by the provision of 
programmes, appropriate incentives and, primarily, serious investment in healthy 
or at least relatively stable prisoner-staff relations, is considered ‘dynamic’ – the 
positive definitional dimension. With regards to its negative dimension, order 
may be pursued by way of more static forms of control (i.e. situational security 
hardware, physical barriers, etc.) and more rigid behavioural controls (i.e. the 
disciplinary framework), though an over-dependency on such measures tends to 
create particular kinds of climates that are more likely to breed hostile 
atmospheres with commensurate levels of prisoner resistance (see Chapter Five). 
From a strictly spatial perspective, preventing violent or assaultive behaviour 
through prison design, thus foiling disorder, has been effected customarily either 
by instituting concrete boundaries between people and spaces, e.g. walls, bars, 
cellular confinement (the traditional approach), or by “removing ‘blind spots’ 
where inmates can hide and assaults can occur out of the sight of staff” (Wener, 
2000:49) (the New Generation approach). The pessimistic view, described here 
by Wener, holds that “since prisons are violent places because they are places 
where violent people reside, it seems the main role design can play is to keep 
violent people apart, or to make their actions visible” (2000:49). More 
optimistically, Young asserts: 
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The most effective form of control is that which facilitates the voluntary 
and rational recognition of rules. The most stable forms of order are those 
in which individuals feel an obligation to rules, not ones in which 
conformity to rules is imposed by pressures external to them. (1987:111) 
Casting autonomy as the conceptual keystone, there are both sociological and 
environmental implications here – particular design frameworks as well as spatial 
approaches more broadly understood that allow for enhanced personal/group 
decision-making regarding the function and use of the spaces in which they live. 
The emphasis on the consensual component of order maintenance - on systems 
being accepted and rules being followed by choice rather than by coercion - 
necessarily requires that prisoners’ autonomy is respected, that it can be (and 
should be) actively mobilised for positive outcomes. Again moving from 
sociological to spatial analysis, this concept of personal choice-power (see 
Chapters Four and Six) and its connection to the establishment of safer, more 
ordered communities, has been richly theorised within the complimentary 
literatures of environmental criminology, urban studies and human geography, 
from which useful parallels might be drawn and applied to questions of security 
and order in prison settings.  
Just as violence and disorder in prisons has been, to some degree, attributed to the 
assumed nature of prisoners (see Wener’s comment cited above), sociological 
analyses of crime and disorder in certain urban environments similarly tend to 
stress social anomie and demographic characteristics in aetiological explanations 
of crime ‘hot spots’. But in their failure to take account of environmental/design 
factors, such theories are incomplete (Stark, 1987). Since the 1970s, there has 
been a growing recognition that there is something vital about the nature of place 
itself - the design, layout, function and social use (as well as more ideational 
aspects regarding how the environment is perceived by both its inhabitants and 
outsiders) – that informs how safe, as in the rates of crime and disorder, a place 
actually is along with how safe it is experienced as being (Newman, 1972). 
Arguably, there is some value to importing (at least aspects of) theories that 
connect crime to the design of built urban environments on the one hand, to 
96 
 
understandings of the relationship between (dis)order and the design of prison 
environments on the other.  
Routine Segregation Measures 
Spatial Zoning and Mobility  
Prison systems have evolved into a network of separate but connected parts, 
composed of different types of prisons broadly categorised according to age, 
gender and levels of security. Individual prisons within each general category 
have become increasingly delineated spaces in terms of their internal 
organisation. They have developed into complexes consisting of a number of 
differentiated regions: reception areas; residential halls where specifically 
classified groups of prisoners sleep and eat; work sheds; education, health, and 
visiting centres; outside exercise and recreation spaces; staff offices, etc. What 
distinguishes prisons from other kinds of state institutions is not the segmentation 
of space into discrete zones per se – though the design layout is perhaps more 
defined in prisons than in other settings – but the rigidity of boundaries between 
these zones, along with the close supervision with which movement amongst 
them is monitored.  
As with every other aspect of prison management, the organisation and use of 
space have come to be strictly controlled by the ‘keepers’, and in this sense the 
‘kept’ are not merely spatially and socially separated in the course of daily 
routines and regimes but overtly segregated by them. Levels of access to 
particular provisions, facilities and activities along with degrees of 
distance/proximity, of remoteness/connection rely on tight spatial and social 
controls maintained through segregation practices.  
Traditional sociological accounts of prison life have emphasised the various 
‘pains of confinement’ (Sykes, 1958) that such inflexible restrictions of 
movement, association and general personal autonomy have exacerbated. Early 
accounts also stressed the prevalence of staff abuses as part of the domination 
culture in which prisoners struggled. Continuing this theme, though taking a more 
technological perspective, Foucault (1977) argued that it is not merely the loss of 
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liberty, with all the associated psycho-social deprivations that this entails, but the 
actual institutional practices and policies of internal control that create personal 
pains. Indeed, while the systemic means by which people are regulated in penal 
spaces, as well as the disciplinary techniques and technologies applied to both 
maintain these systems and as a response measure when they are breached, may 
be motivated by (and actually increase) the drive towards efficiency, it does so at 
the cost of prisoner subjugation.  
The sheer reach of these systems – with the effect on prisoners more recently 
being described memorably in terms of ‘depth, weight and tightness’ (Crewe, 
2011) - characterises such settings as ‘total institutions’ (Goffman, 1968); they are 
sealed social worlds and thus have quite distinctive internal cultures. Subsequent 
analyses, however, have considered the subtle and more significant variations to 
how precisely social and spatial arrangements are organised and enforced within 
particular prisons; how attending regimes are implemented and therefore 
differences in how individual prisoners experience their confinement. The basic 
argument here: it makes little sense to think of the prison as a unitary institutional 
form, as if all prisons are uniformly alike; it is not a singular universe but multiple 
prison worlds (Rock, 1996). Moreover, running counter to or rather 
supplementing the argument that prisons are inherently peculiar institutions - 
albeit similar to other high control environments, e.g. asylums, military 
institutions (Goffman, 1968), and concentration or other types of labour camps 
(Sykes, 1958) - some accounts consider prisoner culture to be a distilled extension 
of the criminal sub-cultures existing in society (Irwin & Cressey, 1962). In more 
administrative terms (though the same essential argument), the modern trend in 
prisons towards social ordering through micro categorisation and spatial zoning 
might be understood as reflective of wider trends in public policy including 
especially housing, health, and education.  
Interestingly though perhaps unsurprisingly given the relatively circumscribed 
criminal code (in terms of number of offences), the prevalence of short-term over 
longer-term sentences, and related, the exorbitant cost of imprisonment, custody 
rates across both kinds of prisons plummeted in the latter decades of the 
nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth century: in England and Wales, 
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for example, the daily prisoner population fell dramatically from roughly 28,400 
in 1876 to 11,400 in 1921 (Hobhouse & Brockway, 1922:3). Population figures 
become highly relevant to the operation of segregation systems when they reach 
certain levels. The problem of overcrowding along with associated 
budgetary/resource constraints and the pressures of low staff-prisoner ratios 
affects, in operational terms, institutional allocation and subsequent transferral 
processes, cell occupancy, and provision of/access to programmes and activities. 
In terms of more general effects on the culture and climate of a prison, population 
figures are one stress factor that can inform the extent to which internal tensions 
are felt and therefore the degree of internal order that is present.  
The salience of movement in penal settings is especially pertinent; the physical 
borders demarcating prison worlds are pre-determined, largely inescapable, 
micro-managed and highly regulated. In this way penal spaces conform to what 
Zhang et al (2008) label ‘hyper-organizational spaces’ (Hancock & Jewkes, 
2011). The internal geography of prisons in general and specifically segregation 
spaces is highly differentiated. Like honeycombs, prisons are composed of 
multiple separate regions connected by walkways, corridors and passages studded 
en route by lockable doors, gateways and other kinds of physical barriers. In the 
most literal of terms the practices and policies governing how prisoners and 
prison staff move between and within these zones, along with how those journeys 
are surveilled, is one of the principal tasks of prison management.  Consequently 
and unsurprisingly questions of mobility within penal environments have 
preoccupied scholars working in the carceral geography field (see Moran, Gill & 
Conran, 2013 and Moran, 2015 for comprehensive overviews of theoretical 
positions and empirical case studies). The challenges and implications of 
movement in prisons has also been a consideration in the history of special 
handling measures in Scotland and on a number of grounds.  
First, from a management-perspective the purpose(s) of segregation are enacted 
within and facilitated by the spaces in which segregated prisoners are contained. 
In practice this means that particular environments must allow for inter alia clear 
sight lines, the use of surveillance equipment, secure access points, damage-
limitation fittings, effective observation zones, the capacity for specialist 
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provision, etc. All of which must in some way take account of prisoners’ daily 
movements (whether within a unit or between sites in the larger prison). The 
location of segregated sites within individual prisons in relation to other zones of 
the prison, those which have sometimes been required for the use of segregated 
prisons (e.g. sanitation area, visiting areas, work, educational, spiritual, recreation, 
health facilities, etc.) has impacted upon the kinds of situational security measures 
thought necessary throughout the connecting parts, as well as on the ways the rest 
of the prison are managed during those periods of movement. It has often been the 
case (and not simply in moments of general ‘lock-down’ during and after bouts of 
rioting, for example) that while segregated prisoners are moved between areas, 
the movement of mainstream prisoners is temporarily suspended. This has 
implications for the organisation of mainstream regimes as well as being 
something of a logistical inconvenience, so much so that it has oftentimes resulted 
in greater restrictions on the movement of segregated prisoners, serving to further 
consolidate a sense of isolation for those who are already denied any meaningful 
integration with other prisoners. Not incidentally, the awkward positioning of the 
first small unit in the 1950s (at Peterhead prison) given its close proximity to 
mainstream halls, was one stated reason for its closure – the feeling of prison 
managers was that this proximity exacerbated the negative influencing effect of 
‘problem’ prisoners on mainstream prisoners. Similarly the case with respect to 
arrangements for vulnerable prisoners, sex offenders in particular, who in the 
interests of their own safety, are rarely ferried between prison zones unless all 
other prisoners are stationary elsewhere.  
Secondly, predicated on this impulse to control internal borders and to rigidly 
delineate the movement across them of certain kinds of prisoners, segregation 
units (both standard punishment blocks, but more typically specialist facilities) 
have become increasingly self-sufficient through the addition of separate outside 
recreation spaces, gyms, workrooms, conference rooms, and visiting spaces 
within the units themselves, thus negating the need for segregated prisoners to 
move out of these environments at all. This produces levels of physical stasis in 
space and time, degrees of immobility, and the attending sense felt by some 
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prisoners of being semi-permanently wedged in liminal places that while 
transitory and alien remain the places to which they are very much fixed. 
Thirdly, on a less quotidian basis though still occurring frequently enough to be 
problematic, the twin issues of unit entry and unit transferral are apposite here. By 
what measures has it been thought appropriate or necessary to move some 
prisoners (and not others) to certain segregation sites (and not others)? What 
circumventing measures have there been in cases where a particular site is not 
“working” for a prisoner, or if the circumscribed period for which they are 
allowed to be kept there has elapsed (determined by both internal Rules, and legal 
parameters)? The once hugely over used (and still operative, albeit much more 
rarely) ‘merry-go-round’, ‘ghost train’, or ‘round robin’ (as one Governor I spoke 
with referred to it) whereby prisoners are continually moved back and forth 
between segregation sites is of particular concern. By contrast, what happens 
when a segregation site “works” too well, when a prisoner if not quite flourishes 
then at least copes much better compared to his experience within other sites? 
This question is more important than it may appear since built into the operating 
mantra of every kind of segregation arrangement is the eventual transferral of 
prisoners back to mainstream locations, which has been a source of much 
frustration and anxiety for prisoners in the context of parole decisions. (If a 
person can only cope in certain environments but is expected to demonstrate his 
suitability for release in the very places in which he most struggled to live 
responsibly then the situation will, of course, feel dire if not entirely hopeless). 
Movement in this third sense, then, refers to the actual geographical passage of 
prisoners from one segregation site to another as well as to their altering status as 
belonging to one or other category 
Classification  
“If prison architecture is the main ‘hardware’ of prisons” (Shalev, 2007:60) – 
including the internal spatial zoning that architectural design both produces and 
accommodates – then “classification is the software of their makeup.” Such is the 
importance of classification mechanisms that the categories into which prisoners 
are separated, and the criteria for determining who should be included within 
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each, define not only the physical outlines of the prison and the distribution of 
resources to each region, but also have a significant impact on the experience of 
incarceration for prisoners. In other words, the security category that prisoners ae 
assigned will affect the conditions of their confinement, and more generally, the 
differentiated ways they are labelled and responded to. Problems occur when 
prisoners feel trapped (literally and figuratively) in a particularly restrictive 
environment based on perceptions of their risk potential. (This theme is explored 
in more detail in Chapter Four).   
It is customary to begin a review of classification with the authoritative 
Mountbatten (1966) and Radzinowicz (1968) Reports (discussed comprehensively 
in Ditchfield, 1990; Walmsley, 1989). The first of which was established in the 
wake of a series of high profile escapes from English prisons culminating in that 
of the alleged Soviet spy George Blake.5 The second followed closely after and 
was therefore located within the same penal backdrop (see King, 2007). Although 
both Mountbatten and Radzinowicz advocated an ethos of liberalisation, it is their 
points of divergence on how to achieve this which are commonly noted, namely 
the respective divide between a concentration policy for the highest risk prisoners 
versus a dispersal policy - with the subsequent instalment of small segregation 
units across the penal estate. In the Scottish context Mountbatten’s ‘Vectis’ 
vision, that which involved the construction of a fortress like institution solely for 
the purposes of containing the most acute security-risk prisoners, was never a 
feasible option owing to the limited size of the Scottish penal estate and thus, in 
absolute terms, the small prisoner population (Bottoms & Light, 1987)6. In 
practice however, a paradoxical integration of concentration and dispersal policies 
was already operative in Scotland. That is, from the late 1950s until the late 1980s 
the majority of (perceived) high risk prisoners were concentrated either within 
Peterhead or Aberdeen prisons, which fostered an increasingly volatile and 
dangerous culture particularly given the geographical positioning of these 
institutions, i.e. in the far north of the country, miles from the urban centres from 
                                                          
5 It has been suggested that it was not the escapes in themselves that provoked uneasiness, or not 
only that, but rather the politicised nature of the high status escapees (Thomas & Pooley, 1980). 
6 As it happened Mountbatten’s ‘Vectis’ never materialised on the Isle of Wight either, as was 
advocated. Instead it was rejected in favour of Radzinowicz’s dispersal solution. 
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which many prisoners lived (and therefore where their families and communities 
were) 
The concentration of long-term prisoners in remote institutions where 
modern technology is used to isolate individuals can only lead to 
alienation, dislocation and confrontation. (Gateway Exchange, 1987: 103) 
At the same time as this concentration policy, segregation units within those, and 
dispersed amongst other, prisons were used as additional spaces of containment 
(see Adler & Longhurst, 1989, 1994; McNeill, 1988). Such sites were ostensibly 
used on punitive grounds, though not always acknowledged for that purpose. 
Later, with the abolition of the death penalty in 1965, segregation sites began to 
be used on administrative grounds and additional sites were added to this 
framework, e.g. the Inverness Unit (and the “Cages”) established in 1966.  
Whatever means of classification are employed, practical questions follow 
relating to the custody arrangements applicable to each category. This is 
especially the case for the management of high risk or otherwise problematic 
prisoners given the increased restrictions placed on them, and the higher levels of 
supervision they are deemed as requiring. Other pragmatic concerns that are 
implicated in classification decisions are financial. Shalev (2009) makes this point 
whilst demonstrating the ways such decisions are worryingly impervious to 
doubt: 
The higher security category of a prison, the more expensive it is to house 
prisoners in it. The outcome of prisoner classification, namely the number 
of prisoners allocated to each security category, plays a major role in 
budgetary projections and estimates of future need for prison beds in each 
security category. These estimates are also used in long-term projections 
of the prison system’s future construction needs. Since these projections 
are based on classificatory assignments, classification can be described as 
a circular process with built-in mechanisms for reinforcing its own 
predictions and setting in stone administrative decisions and policies. (61) 
With respect to security categorisation, if not custody arrangements, the 
Mountbatten Report exerted particular influence in Scotland.  On the 
recommendations of the Scottish Working Party on Classification, the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 1967 introduced a system of classification that was broadly 
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congruent with Mountbatten’s categories (Coyle, 1987; McNeill, 1988). This 
consisted of four levels of security7 linked to the conjoined factors of propensity 
to escape coupled with the degree of public harm that was presumed likely were 
an escape attempt to prove successful. We also see evidence in Scotland of a 
“conflation of security and control issues” (King, 2007:331) characteristic of both 
reports (particularly Radzinowicz’s). This was fomented later by the category of 
‘dangerousness’ inaugurated by the Scottish Council on Crime (1975), 
constituting a fusion between threats of escape and disruptive potential. Arguably, 
order rather than security has been and remains a far more pressing concern in the 
Scottish context - attributable in part to the incidences of disorder that have, in the 
recent past, sporadically interrupted penal operations. The connection between 
penal ‘crisis’ events and penal policy is, however, far from settled (see Scranton 
et al, 1988; Scranton et al, 1991, Thomas & Pooley, 1980). Also of consequence 
was the virtually non-existent consciousness regarding mental health during this 
time and thus the lack of meaningful provisions aimed at alleviating prisoners’ 
distress. This allowed for some highly vulnerable prisoners to be included in the 
dangerousness category and subsequently to be contained in various segregation 
settings alongside violent and subversive prisoners (McNeill, 1988). Whether 
much progress has been made in this regard is debatable. As recently as 2008, a 
Scottish Government report (Out of Sight), noted: 
Segregation or separate cells are used at times, with difficulties faced in 
making distinctions between mental health and behavioural or 
management problems. The use of segregation as a response to mental 
illness is wrong (para.14) 
The impact of the Mountbatten and Radzinowicz reports notwithstanding, there 
has been general reluctance in Scotland to adopt wholesale the policies proposed 
in England and Wales. Instead, Scotland’s penal classification system was from 
its inception infused with a somewhat crooked philosophy of welfarism, contra to 
the more risk-oriented approaches of England & Wales (McAra, 1999). This was 
a kind of philosophy that associated security/order determinations with prisoners’ 
                                                          
7 Within the most recent incarnation of the Prison (Scotland) Rules (2006), the language of 
‘security’ has been replaced with that of ‘supervision’, which says something about the changing 
rhetoric, if not practice, surrounding imprisonment. 
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‘trainability’ – a clever euphemism obfuscating a more disturbing reality (see 
Chapter Five for prisoners’ interpretations of this concept). In addition, 
relationships between Scottish penal elites and lower-level prison managers are of 
a particular nature, further marking Scotland as unique. Coyle (1987) for example 
extols the especially ‘close relationship’ between courts, policy makers and prison 
managers. Similarly, McAra (1999) emphasizes the co-operative elements of 
Scottish policy and practitioner networks, arguing that this has to a degree 
allowed Scotland to maintain its own coherent identity. By comparison McManus 
(1999) recognises a lack of cooperation in decision-making and Adler & 
Longhurst (1994:106) develop this theme further by stressing the wrangling of 
bureaucratic and professional discourses. They go as far as stating that “the SPS 
has been the site of a power struggle between groups of actors acting as the 
bearers of different ends and means discourses...” (1994: 325).8 
Trainability 
The death toll of the rehabilitative ideal in England and Wales sounded slowly, 
but perhaps its final peal came during the late 1970s when, as expressed in the 
May Report (1979: para.424), the definitive view was that rehabilitation has “had 
its day”. The rise of a more punitive and managerial agenda, characterised by 
Feeley and Simon (1992) as part of the ‘new penology’, contributed to this 
demise, yet within Scotland “underpinning these changes has been a continued 
commitment to the values of welfairsm” (McAra, 1999:373). Broadly speaking, 
this claim may stand up but with it comes the temptation to romanticise these 
values and to associate spuriously welfarism with progressiveness. Rather, 
welfarism in Scotland, possibly right up until the mid-1990s, might be better 
understood as a more complicated and not altogether positive force. Crewe’s 
(2009) incisive phrase “rehabilitation with edge” could be easily commandeered 
here – in the prison context, the pointed part relates to the concept of ‘trainability’. 
Prior to 1987, this concept was key factor in classification decisions (as evidenced 
by the explicit reference made to it within policy documents governing the 
                                                          




National Classification Board). But what exactly were prisoners being trained for, 
what were they being trained to do and be?  
The trainability system was introduced in Scotland in 1966 as a way to determine 
prison allocation, and subsequently to manage work programmes and resources. 
The criteria was as follows (Scottish Centre for Civil Liberties, 1978): 
a) Prisoners who demonstrate a willingness and ability to benefit from 
trade are sent to either: 
- Edinburgh (first-time offenders) 
- Perth (all other offenders) 
b) Prisoners who demonstrate no willingness or ability to benefit from 
trade are sent to either: 
- Peterhead (35 years of age or under) 
- Aberdeen (over 35 years of age) 
Exceptions: political prisoners of any age whatever their trainability 
potential, and first time offenders sentenced to over 15 years, sent to 
Peterhead.   
 
In effect to be ‘trainable’ meant to be compliant with the imposed strictures of 
imprisonment, to conform to the officially sanctioned behavioural norms, and to 
be willing to work whenever and however it was offered and whatever that work 
actually entailed. In McNeill’s (1988) view this amounted to something 
approaching forced labour. Trainability was therefore allied with a notion of the 
ideal prisoner-subject, related more closely to docility, passivity and compliance 
rather than with a prisoner’s willingness to engage in genuinely rehabilitative 
processes. It is salient here that education featured rather less in the Scottish 
prison system than elsewhere (Wozniak, 1987). One retired governor who I 
interviewed offered this perspective: 
Trainability was a flawed concept. We weren’t offering very much at that 
time and they [the prisoners] knew it…If you class somebody as 
something, that is what they are. They get branded…We moved the hard 
cases to Peterhead and you had this situation where a whole prison 
became notorious and they [the prisoners] took pride in causing trouble. 
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This comment speaks to processes of internalization – the phenomenon of the 
‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ – that form the core of labelling theory (Becker, 1963). 
A prisoner’s willingness to work and behave as he was instructed (along with 
other factors such as sentence length and age) determined where he was allocated 
within the prison estate. Once in the system, a prisoner’s response to work and 
general (non)compliance affected his progression from prison to prison, from site 
to site - a game of “penal snakes and ladders” (McNeill, 1988:41). This 
demonstrates the link between classification decisions – those based on 


























The challenge of how to manage the small but disproportionately disruptive 
hardcore of persistently violent prisoners is an enduring dilemma for any prison 
system. In the 1960s, when anxieties around security and order were particularly 
heightened in UK policy and prison-administrative circles, such prisoners were 
described by Lord Radzinowicz (1968) as those ‘on whom normal sanctions of 
withdrawal of privileges and loss of remission has no effect’ (para. 168). Without 
recourse to standard disciplinary measures, the challenge some prisoners posed 
required striking a balance between ameliorating the threat of escape, maintaining 
internal prison order, and doing so in ways that were humane and morally 
defensible. In Scotland specifically, the institutional response was to establish a 
unique network of small units (see Coyle, 1987), providing a number of 
alternative custody arrangements outwith the mainstream. Positioned on a 
control-treatment spectrum, each site was developed with the purpose of either 
creating temporary respite before prisoners were returned back to normal prison 
locations, or, following a more explicitly rehabilitative rationale, to address 
behavioural problems with more targeted programming.  
The development of the small units network, as well as other kinds of segregation 
arrangements, has in part been the product of the fear generated both preceding 
and subsequent to mass disorder. While often unrealised such fears have served as 
a powerful galvanising factor in approaches to ‘problem’ prisoners. General fears 
about the direction of the SPS and criminal justice system more broadly have also 
played a role in the ways prisoners have understood and therefore ‘acted-out’ 
their confinement. Fear (mostly born from a sense of powerlessness) has framed 
the often complicated and usually fragile dynamic between grade-level staff and 
prison management, who in turn have at various moments expressed frustrations 
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if not always outright fears about the decisions of their political masters. Not all 
of these anxieties have been without solid foundation.  
The abolition of the death penalty in 1965 (legislatively complete in 1969) 
fostered deep concern amongst prison officers regarding the potential increase in 
the number of recalcitrant prisoners with ‘nothing to lose’. While there is no 
evidence to support the argument that it was this change in the law which was 
causally or even partially responsible for the troubles that would later blight the 
SPS, as late as the mid-1980s a large minority of the Scottish Prison Officers 
Association (SPOA) continued to express (during their annual conference) a wish 
to re-instate this sanction. This is hardly surprising given the rising hostilities 
within Scottish prisons at the time, those which would very soon after erupt into 
full scale rioting. Such tensions were not only apparent between prisoners and the 
SPOA, but also between the union and individual prison governors; there is 
evidence to suggest relations had been strained in the decades prior to the 1980s. 
In a letter from one prison governor to his assistant governor (dated February 28th 
1971), the relationship between himself and the local branch of SPOA is 
described as ‘less than cordial’. He goes on to characterize members of the SPOA 
as ‘trouble makers’ who were involved in ‘back biting and double dealing’.   
Within this cauldron of general hostilities both amongst staff and between staff 
and prisoners were additional resentments on the side of the latter. One example 
concerns the parole system, which was viewed by some as fundamentally unfair. 
The Parole Board reported in 1969 (HMSO, 1969: 7-17) that the rate of 
applications was low, particularly from prisoners at Peterhead and Aberdeen 
prisons (where the highest security category prisoners were held). The view of the 
Board was that prisoners had a perception that their applications would not be 
granted. The Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Peterhead protests 
(Gateway Exchange, 1987) found that this perception was retained by prisoners 
up until and throughout the dark decade of the 1980s. Part of the reason for this 
was specific changes to the parole system including new restrictions on certain 
categories of life sentence prisoners (e.g. sexual offenders, and those who are 
convicted of killing law enforcement officials). The Annual Report of the Parole 
Board for Scotland includes strong criticism of these policy shifts, while prisoners 
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experienced the most adverse effects insofar as it contributed to a sense of 
hopelessness, as well as undermining trust between prisoners and the authorities. 
This is confirmed by the responses in the prisoners’ questionnaires distributed as 
part of the Independent inquiry (Gateway Exchange, 1987:58-59)   
Added to these specific fear-fueling cases, the growing size and shifting 
demographics of the prison population significantly altered both the nature of 
Scottish imprisonment and the shape of its systems of segregation. The ballooning 
of the overall population figures beginning in the late 1960s, continuing almost 
unabated until the twenty first century, led to overcrowding with associated 
problems for order maintenance. At a basic level, attending to the minimal needs 
of too many people with too few resources, requiring grown men to live like 
infants cheek-by-jowl doubled-up in cells intended for single occupancy, ignites 
all kinds of sparks that are likely to grow into something more inflammatory. And 
they did, emphatically. The rise in the number of younger, longer-sentence 
prisoners during the late 1970s and 1980s (owing in part to changes in sentencing 
policy, especially the introduction of indeterminacy), was an important factor in 
creating a small but vociferous population of men, barely out of their teens, who 
found it extremely difficult to cope with the heavy fact of their imprisonment. 
Moreover, the inadequacy of staff training, in both length and depth of content 
(until only very recently) severely limited the capacity of prison officers to 
manage this complex population. For much of the period under discussion here 
training consisted of only a six week period at Polmont training college and one 
probationary year ‘on the job’. From the records it appears that the emphasis was 
placed on mastering control and restraint techniques and other risk-oriented 
approaches rather than on more dynamic or relational methods of control. 
Whatever their private views of prisoners, many officers either did not have or 
were not provided with sufficient training and resources to adequately manage the 
volatile situations in the ways that we, the public, expected from them. A retired 
Scottish prison officer I interviewed put it like this: 
Participant (P): There wasn’t any specialist training or selection of 
officers for the segregation units. In Peterhead that meant inexperienced 
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officers were dealing with a very dangerous environment. It was like a 
little corner in the cold where sunshine doesn’t reach.  
Jessica Bird (JB): Was there additional training for officers working in 
small units? 
P: Yes, some. At the start I’m not sure how adequate it was. It wasn’t 
developed until later. The incident in Inverness [in 1972, prisoners in the 
‘Cages’ staged a protest which resulted in an officer losing an eye] shows 
how dangerous the situation was. We weren’t prepared.  
In terms of actual rebellions – activated inter alia by the factors identified above - 
throughout much of Scotland’s contemporary penal history, incidences of isolated 
disturbance, physical violence (amongst prisoners and between staff and 
prisoners), and larger-scale rioting, have scarred the penal landscape. It is not 
hyperbolic to consider aspects of the regimes of Scottish imprisonment, 
particularly during the 1950s – 1990s, as brutal (and consequently, to an extent, 
brutalising), nor to overstate the extremity of the recruscedence of prisoners’ 
protests – either within contained segregation settings, or those which may have 
begun there before spreading across mainstream locations. The content of such 
incidences is destructive enough - events included: cases of severe physical 
injury; several high-profile escape attempts, and one initially successful effort in 
1976, which caused the deaths of two staff nurses at Carstairs Secure Hospital and 
one Scottish police officer; frequent dirty protests within the most restrictive 
segregation sites, creating the kinds of environments that were in every way 
wastelands (see Chapter Five); and, as is perhaps most widely documented, the 
highly incendiary rooftop protests of 1986/7, made all the more dangerous and 
fear-inducing by the element of hostage-taking (on separate occasions, three 
prison officers were subjected to this frightening scenario).  
Some have attributed such troubles to the bad apple thesis. where sole 
responsibility is assigned to a small group of rebels. In a letter to a prison 
governor (dated 1987) a prison officer concluded that the causes of the rooftop 
protests ‘had nothing to do with physical conditions and regimes and had 
everything to do with the nature of individual prisoners’. Leaders of the SPOA 
took a similar line, as did the Secretary of State for Scotland, Malcom Rifkind. 
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A thread running through much of this patchwork history of segregation (small 
units in particular) is fear. Fear from multiple quarters that the prison system is 
not adequately constituted to perform its work and to accomplish its objectives, 
fear that prisoners will act-out, fear when prisoners actually have acted-out, and 
fear surrounding the messy consequences of that. I want to note at this point that 
during some of my more in-depth, intimate conversations with prison officers of 
long standing, I was quite moved and surprised by the degree of anxiety that they 
had experienced during their service, and by the fact that some apparently still felt 
deeply when recalling past events. 
Participant (P): The staff had been to hell and back. It was a frightening 
time. You’re in an environment where staff had been running around with 
bin lids to protect themselves from slates [during the roof top protests in 
the late 1980s]. But even after that, you were exposed every day. 
Jessica Bird (JB): So they weren’t wearing formal protective gear?  
P: They didn’t have anything; it was bin lids!  
JB: That seems extraordinary. 
P: Well I can assure you. When I’m doing presentations for younger staff 
I really hammer it home that these guys were, um, well, I wouldn’t be here 
today if it wasn’t for the bravery, the determination, and everything else of 
these folk. The system was in complete chaos. It was frightening.  
Another participant referred to this period as the ‘Battle Royale’, and to those 
prisoners who were understood as the instigators as ‘the leaders of aggression’. 
Another said this – specifically referring to the segregation unit in Peterhead 
prison:  
At that time, it was ’88 so the riots were close [reference to the series of 
rooftop riots of 1986/7], and you had people in the digger but the whole 
prison was on lockdown then. It was real lockdown. There weren’t many 
there [in the Peterhead Digger] but you could have cut the atmosphere 
with a knife. Clearly the staff were frightened. They [the prisoners] were 
the worst ones, well deemed to be the worst. They had been on the roof 
and the staff had battles with them every day. It was desperate.  
This was the fearful, antagonistic and precarious context in which the small units 
network involved in Scotland. Before addressing the details of specific units, the 
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next section addresses the conceptual frameworks that defined special segregation 
measures more broadly.  
Punitive, Protective and Administrative Frameworks 
In accordance with the amended Scottish Prison Rules (2006) specialist 
segregation is best understood as a deliberate penal strategy used in pursuit of 
administrative, punitive and/or protective ends. These three justificatory 
frameworks apply to the following types of prisoners respectively: those who 
demonstrably or perceivably pose a threat to either security (i.e. escape) or order 
(i.e. incitement to disturbance); those on disciplinary charges (for rule 
infractions); vulnerable prisoners (e.g. sex offenders, ‘grasses’, victims of 
prisoner abuse, ex-police personnel, etc.), along with those suffering severe 
mental illness and who cannot be accommodated in a secure hospital.  
Punitive (or disciplinary) – responding to specific instances of rule-breaking and 
used as one, the most severe, ‘award’ in the disciplinary arsenal.  
Protective – ensuring the safety of individual prisoners or groups of prisoners on 
the grounds of both offence and non-offence related vulnerabilities. 
Administrative – pertaining to matters of individual and prison security, applied 
to prisoners who attempt (and/or succeed) escape and to those who present 
ongoing challenges to the smooth running of the wider prison (inciting 
disturbances, persistent confrontation, perpetually undermining rules and 
procedures, though typically in ambiguous ways, etc.).  
Each of these frameworks is codified in the Prison Rules, presently under a 
number of different provisions: r.94 (1a) & (1b), r.99 (1), r.100 (1a) & (1b), and 
r.119 (1a). These give rise to specific stipulations regarding the grounds upon 
which individuals may be segregated, the length of time they may be kept in 
segregation sites, access to due process rights (e.g. legal representation, 
complaints procedures, right to management intelligence), and the conditions of 
custody that may be applied in each case.  
Within each framework there are a number of sites, practices and rules, ostensibly 
distinct, with their own timeframes and systems of oversight, intended to function 
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in clearly defined ways. Fig Three sketches the basic outlines of these special 
handling arrangements, indicating the types of prisoner to whom each form 
applies and, in Scottish prisons specifically, the range of sites that have been used 
to house them: 
Fig Three: ‘Special handling’ segregation in Scottish prisons 
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Punitive segregation as it is currently practiced is the least complicated 
framework. Once a governor has decided to segregate a prisoner in response to a 
particular infraction - which is the most extreme punishment that s/he has the 
authority to impose - there is usually only a single site in which this punishment 
can take place: the formal segregation unit. The system regulating punitive 
segregation has evolved to be fairly proscribed insofar as the timeframe, 
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transparency of decision-making, prisoners’ access to legal representation and 
complaints procedures are concerned. 
Administrative segregation is usually articulated in policy documents as ‘Good 
Order and Discipline’, though somewhat erroneously given that ‘discipline’ is 
also used in relation to punitive measures, which are expressly prohibited under 
the administrative framework. Prisoners segregated under this framework are 
contained either within their own cells on mainstream blocks and for a temporary 
period (hours rather than days or weeks), or, in more serious cases, in formal 
segregation or specialist small units. The former may fall under the policy 
purview of ‘removal from association’. In the second instance, it amounts to 
containment within the formal segregation unit or within so-called ‘special cells’, 
both of which lie outside mainstream blocks. (Glenochil prison represents an 
anomaly since its special cells are not located in the segregation unit but are 
instead distributed between the two main blocks). There is a hardcore of prisoners 
who present elevated threats to security and order and thus who have been 
segregated in alternative, specialist sites e.g. the Barlinnie Special Unit. But this 
has since been abandoned and in the present context there are no units that are 
comparable to BSU. Indeed, it is perplexing that while England & Wales have 
retained specialist sites (e.g. the system of CSC and DSPD units)9 the Scottish 
Prison Service now operates without any such measures.  
In relation to protective segregation, this functions according to a similar ‘routine’ 
and ‘special’ binary in terms of the practices and sites that are utilized. In fact, 
there is not very much difference between how administrative and protective 
segregation work in practice, despite these frameworks having entirely distinct 
justifications and demographic targets. Where this is the case with respect to 
individual prisoners there is a key difference to protective segregation as it applies 
in the collective sense. That is, groups of vulnerable prisoners may be segregated 
                                                          
9 CSC refers to ‘Close Supervision Centres’, a special system of administrative segregation 
comprising a number of high security units spread across the penal estate in England & Wales. It 
was established in 1998 on   
the recommendations of the Spurr Report (1996) and despite its many changing forms, it has 
continued to operate according to the principle of’ prisoner progression’. DSPD refers to 
‘Dangerous and Severe Personality Disordered’ used as additional sites of specialist 
administrative segregation and developed in the mid-1990s. 
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en masse in the interests of their safety in neither routine nor special sites, but 
instead may be contained in semi-autonomous units, e.g. vulnerable prisoners 
units or separate floors for sex offenders located within, or at least relatively 
connected to, mainstream prison blocks.  
Punitive arrangements (used largely on only a temporary basis) have featured in 
all carceral settings in one guise or another since the beginning of the modern 
prison as we now recognise it. In the Scottish context specifically, and with 
respect to protective segregation, approaches to the management of both offence 
and non-offence related vulnerable prisoners have evolved at something of a 
distance from, rather than in conjunction with, the network of small units. It has 
tended to involve more concentrated and collective forms of segregation, i.e. 
separate Vulnerable Prisoners (VP) halls located within local prisons, operating 
regimes similar to those in mainstream halls, as well as whole prisons designated 
as treatment facilities, i.e. for sex offenders, (e.g. Peterhead prison from the early 
1990s – 2014). Insofar as sex offenders are segregated spatially from the 
mainstream but maintain a degree of social freedom amongst themselves within 
their segregated site, there is something very interesting here about how 
segregation can create manufactured communities, and what the implications of 
this are. von Benda-Beckmann et al (2009:9), while dealing with legal 
constructions of space, are insightful on this point: “The abstraction from 
characteristics of people placed together, for instance in constructions of 
‘community’, often suggest a politically intended ‘equivalence’ while masking 
important social differentials.”   
Additionally, a range of sites of individual isolation have operated on protective 
grounds, notably Safe or Anti-Ligature Cells. These tend to be either attached to 
the segregation units of local prisons (often referred to by prisoners as 
‘punishment blocks’) or dispersed throughout mainstream halls usually positioned 
close to the officers’ station. The fact of such cells as settings to mitigate the risk 
of suicide and/or self-harm, have existed since at least as early as the 1920s (I 
came across archives in one Scottish prison from 1921 detailing such 
arrangements). The ways these cells have been designed and used, however, has 
changed substantially during this period. With respect to the English Prison 
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Service, Fairweather (2000:41) considers newer safe cell designs to have ‘a more 
ordered and stabilizing quality, and appears more supporting and calming’.   
Every element of the cell was analyzed and redesigned, with furniture and 
sanitary fittings formed of new materials such as Corian or Velstone to 
give a unifying character. These are ‘warmer’ materials than stainless 
steel, but just as tough. Cell certification standards have also been 
produced which can be consistently applied throughout the prison estate.  
In terms of function, as Fairweather suggests, this improved design has in the case 
of some prisons been adopted for all cells within mainstream halls, not merely 
specialist cells for at-risk prisoners. By contrast, during the second half of the 
twentieth century in Scottish prisons, institutions typically had only a few of these 
cells, and moreover, what distinguished them was not a sensitive design approach 
but typically increased levels of staff monitoring i.e. regular checks were made of 
the prisoner often indirectly via the spy holes carved into cell doors.  
Of these three segregation frameworks, it is administrative segregation that tends 
to have the broadest and most ethically pertinent implications from a security 
perspective, since it is often used in response to the most persistently problematic 
prisoners. Further, given that the administrative framework allows prison 
authorities to hold prisoners in segregated custody for extended periods of time, 
as well as having a vague and quite flexible set of criteria for those who may be 
included within it, this form of segregation carries legal and rights-based 
complications. 
In the last few years it appears that a significant change has occurred regarding 
not only the physical geography of special handling sites but also in the 
functionality of individual sites. That is to say, where once discrete units were 
used for discrete purposes, each seeking “to achieve very different penological 
ends, within a common security perimeter” (McNeill, 1988:46), in the 
contemporary context segregation sites now assume a multiplicity of purposes 
simultaneously. In other words, different types of prisoners (i.e. the minimally 
disobedient, the more perpetually uncontrollable, and the especially vulnerable) 
are housed in the same site but under different rule frameworks (punitive, 
administrative, and protective). This has many socio-spatial implications with 
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respect to the (in)suitability of particular spaces for the safe, secure and ethical 
management of different types of prisoners. In this way, while the distinctions 
between administrative, punitive and protective segregation are clearly defined 
within the policy documents (i.e. the Prison Rules and Standing Orders), in 
practice demarcations regarding their use is more opaque.  
The socio-spatial dynamic is significant since particular segregation sites are 
conceived of and realised in one institutional context and yet many continue to be 
used in another often for a different purpose than the space was originally 
designed for. Thus, there may be a disjuncture between how sites are used and 
experienced and how they are spatially constituted. At times there is a deep 
incompatibility between the penal architecture of segregation and its penal praxis. 
There are examples of how this might be reconciled if not by redesigned much 
less rebuilding prison spaces but rather through innovative approaches to the uses 
of space, and to who might control those decisions. The management of the 
Barlinnie Special Unit was exemplary in this way (see Chapter Six), though it was 
something of an aberration on this basis. 
The Small Units Network: Overview 
The most challenging group of problem prisoners are the hardcore, disruptive 
individuals who prove perpetually unwilling or unable to abide by prison rules. In 
the Scottish context, and according to how the concept of ‘disruptive’ is precisely 
defined, this group has been estimated to comprise between 0.2% and 5% of the 
overall prisoner population (Coyle, 1987). It was with this group in mind that the 
small units network was devised. Despite being applicable to only a small yet still 
highly influential minority of prisoners, both the anachronistic and the progressive 
units have provided the catalyst for significant prison reforms along with 
subsequent shifts in conceptions of how prisons should do business, what it means 
for prisons to “work”, and how prisons are publicly responded to. For these 
reasons, emphasising the development of small units in Scottish prisons within a 
larger study of segregation is useful to the extent that it exposes broader trends in 
Scottish penal history.  
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As early as the 1950s there were discussions in Scotland regarding management 
approaches to especially problematic prisoners. An extract from the minutes of 
the Whitley Council meeting (dated November 1956) illustrates the concern.   
Protection for Prison Officers in Scotland in the event of the ‘No Hanging’ 
Bill becoming law 
The Official Side said that they shared the Staff Side’s concern and 
accepted that there was need for a special establishment to house the 
troublesome element in Scottish prisons. This comprised not only 
murderers – and not necessarily all of them – that a hard and difficult core 
liable to resort to violence existed and they must be segregated in a 
separate unit – Rule 36 was only a temporary measure. They pointed out 
that there had always been a group of violent prisoners. As the Staff Side 
were aware a new classification system was already under discussion and 
a Working Party had been set up. It was expected that proposed changes 
would include the setting aside of an establishment with a high degree of 
security for prisoners who required special treatment. They gave assurance 
that the matter would be dealt with as expeditiously as possible.  
As well as the standard punishment blocks that have featured in prisons since 
their beginnings (where solitary confinement was the traditional modus operandi), 
in the 1950s, soon after this Whitley meeting, the first specialist administrative 
segregation unit was established in Peterhead prison to address the problem of 
violent and subversive prisoners. The nature of Peterhead prison as a site of 
concentration for the most hardened prisoners, operating the toughest regimes, 
rendered this unit both surprising and perfectly logical. Officers working in 
Peterhead were, unlike those staffing other prisons, empowered to inflict corporal 
punishment on prisoners as part of the disciplinary arsenal. This was the last 
Scottish prison to abandon such practices in 1949 (though according to records 
the use of the whip was scarce from the mid- 1930s onwards), after which time 
typical punishments included restricted diet, loss of remission (a particular burden 
for prisoners), and limited association usually consisting of a short-term period 
spent in the punishment block.  
Given Peterhead’s reputation for robust disciplinary measures, and the associated 
hostilities amongst prisoners and staff, which were of far greater intensity than in 
other Scottish prisons, this first unit represented a quite new approach to dealing 
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with violence and disorder in prison. The unit was rudimentary – it was not 
purpose-designed but located in an adapted hall partitioned-off from mainstream 
prisoners - and its lifespan was short. After a period of low use between 1954-6 it 
was finally abandoned in 1957 but its existence signifies an early adoption of the 
idea of special handling measures for certain kinds of problem prisoners. There is 
little archival material left documenting the stated purpose, specific regime, entry 
criteria and general management of this unit, but we know from subsequent 
reports that it was largely viewed, internally at any rate, as a moderate success in 
principle if not quite in practice; it prepared the ground for the more formalised 
special units – though it was not until 1968 that the next “experiment” was 
attempted (the infamous Inverness Unit, later known chillingly as The Cages). A 
Departmental Working Party on the Treatment of Certain Male Long Term 
Prisoners and Potentially Violent Prisoners noted in its 1971 report that the first 
Peterhead unit was effective to the extent it “engendered the idea that group 
isolation rather than individual isolation might be appropriate for dealing with 
certain types of inmates” (p.4, para. 16). Compared to management approaches 
south of the border, the Peterhead unit was, in this respect, ahead of its time.  
Predicated on an administrative rationale, a number of other kinds of special units 
have been tested in Scotland, operating vastly different regimes and with varying 
degrees of success set against their own stated purposes. These include: the 
Inverness Unit, opened in 1968; the Barlinnie Special Unit (BSU), 1973; the 
Individual Cell Unit (also referred to as the Hospital Unit or Block, and the 
McCulloch Unit), 1978; the 10-Cell Unit, later becoming E Hall, 1984; the Perth 
‘Time-Out’ Facility, 1989; and, the Shotts Unit, 1990. Each site was built, 
designed and/or adapted according to a different and individual rationale, housing 
prisoners with often discrete profiles (but not always), and responsive to pressures 
both across the Scottish prison estate (along with the criminal justice system more 
broadly), and with those which became more or less urgent within individual 
establishments. These arrangements were overseen and evaluated by a variety of 
internal and external mechanisms (i.e. the HM Prison Inspectorate for Scotland, 
the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, a number of SPS Working Parties, 
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independent academic studies, and judgements from other concerned audiences 
e.g. reform groups, media outlets, family members and the courts).  
Why were such units needed in the first place? What had changed in Scottish 
prisons so that this network of small units was thought necessary in the 1950s 
when it hadn’t been before? Moreover, what was it about the Scottish prison 
system that enabled a unique small units network to evolve while a similar 
approach was not, during this same period, trialed south of the border? One broad 
explanation is that by the middle of the twentieth century the problems caused by 
‘problem’ prisoners were or seemed different, and connected, the traditional 
responses to them were no longer viewed as acceptable or legitimate; they were 
no longer practically viable or legal. Another factor was the role of what I am 
terming here ‘personality politics’ (described in more detail on pp. 145-149), 
which is to say, the small size and particular institutional nature of the Scottish 
prison system allowed greater influence of key individuals over the direction of 
prison management policy. These factors are explored in the subsequent sections. 
A subsidiary question, though beyond the scope of this project: what has changed 
since the late 1990s so that small specialist units are now considered all but 
redundant where they were once viewed as essential?  
Solitary Confinement and Specialist Segregation 
Solitary confinement (SC) is a practice that has been and continues to be used in 
various kinds of segregated custody. It is not, however, synonymous with either 
routine segregation measures or specialist segregation measures; it may be a 
feature of both but more commonly it is associated with the latter. SC is defined 
as “a form of containment where prisoners are held alone in their cell for up to 24 
hours a day and are only allowed to leave it, if at all, for an hour or so for outdoor 
exercise” (Shalev, 2008:1). SC involves almost complete spatial and social 
seclusion, usually within environments that are materially sparse where sensory 
deprivations and temporal distortions are common, where opportunities for 
meaningful activities are limited or in some cases non-existent, where security 
and surveillance mechanisms are omnipresent, and where contact with the outside 
world, including with family members, is severely restricted.  
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As a penal phenomenon it emerged first in English prisons in the late eighteenth 
century, institutionalised more formally at the beginning of the nineteenth century 
through the ‘silent’ and ‘separate’ systems (Chapter Two of this thesis discusses 
these beginnings). The statement below, from a British Home Office Inspection 
Report in 1838, provides an insight into the way SC was understood during this 
early period: 
...upon the offender in his separate cell all the moral machinery of the 
system is brought to bear with as much force and effect as if the prison 
contained no other culprit but himself. His submission then must be 
immediate and complete....and he will apply himself with ardour to the 
labour of his hands as a relief from the insufferable burden of idleness and 
ennui. (Whitworth & Russell, 1838) 
Amongst other sentiments, this statement demonstrates that SC was considered 
beneficial to the extent that it was thought to aid the moral (religiously oriented) 
process of reflection and thus reformation (Ignatieff, 1978). Compare this with the 
swathe of contemporary political, legal and cultural documents, usually 
positioned within an explicitly rights discourse, that denounce the torturous and 
abusive nature of SC – although in the U.S. context, with its constitutional 
commitment to States Rights, the Supreme Court has been slower to rule against 
this practice (see Cohen, 2006). In a wider international frame, this seemingly 
dramatic if gradual U turn, from prison reform quarters at least, is not simply the 
product of an historical accumulation of scientifically robust evidence regarding 
the psychological harms of SC (see especially Haney, 1994;2003, and Kupers, 
1999), since as early as the 1790s its ill effects were observed and reported on. 
Something more complicated has occurred.  
Contemporary forms of SC in specialist segregation settings 
In the last few years there have been renewed and better informed efforts to end 
SC, especially as it applies to specific categories of prisoners i.e. juveniles (with 
some moderate success, especially in the U.S. context where it is used 
comparatively widely10). At the same time, though also for many decades prior, 
                                                          
10 In early 2016 President Obama announced an end to solitary confinement for juveniles in the 
US federal prison system. Individual states are beginning to show signs of following suit, e.g. 
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there has been a qualitative intensifying of the ways SC is practiced in some 
jurisdictions, again in the U.S. – the outlier for punitive penalty more generally. 
Some commentators argue that the use SC as part of specialist segregation 
measures has become more noxious (as an experience), and more entrenched and 
costly (as a practice) in part because of technological advancements: 
It is clear that modern technology worsens the conditions of prisoners in 
supermax prisons and greatly helps the slide to torture in this steep decline 
of decent punitive values. Prisoners are more isolated, observed and 
controlled, afforded less human contact and suffer more sensory 
deprivation than earlier dungeons. (Morris, 2000: 107) 
The arcs of the two trends – reform efforts and deeper if not more SC - are linked 
but only loosely since the movement towards technologically and operationally 
sophisticated forms of SC has been occurring since the late 1970s, largely under 
the radar and without much resistance until only very recently, as highlighted by 
Shalev (2013). In a comprehensive study of supermax prisons in the US, where 
SC is the modus operandi, Shalev argues that in addition to increasingly effective 
technologies, here has also been a series of ideological shifts regarding the 
discourses and aims of SC, of which it has become financially, politically and 
professionally expedient for a growing number of actors to embrace – most 
notably, private security companies along with prison subcontractors, and prison 
officers unions (which remain powerful forces in the U.S. penal scene).  
The entrenchment of risk oriented approaches to prison administration, beginning 
in the early 1980s (Feeley & Simon, 1993), influenced these shifts. Risk and 
security become increasingly linked concepts, both legitimized in the public 
sphere through the rhetoric of public safety. However, as Shalev contends, ‘What 
is really meant by ‘security’ in supermax terms is internal control of prisoners’ 
(2013: 111, italics in text). This is ensured through multiple ‘layers of security’ 
manifested through strengthened institutional perimeter security as well as 
segregated unit exteriors, to robust internal surveillance mechanisms and harsh 
designs of individual cells – what Shalev aptly names the ‘innermost prison’ 
                                                                                                                                                              
New York, where a bill to that effect has passed through the state legislature and is now, as of 
August 2018, awaiting the Governor’s signature before becoming state law.  
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(120). Buttressed by such security accruements, it is the processes of SC as 
opposed to the fact of it that has been adjusted.  
In places where SC is applied to far fewer people compared with the supermax 
system (which currently holds approximately 80,000 individuals) and where it 
constitutes less extreme conditions, such as the system in England and Wales, 
many of the changes that have occurred have been similarly procedural and 
technological. By contrast, the architectures of the sites where SC have continued 
to be used have remained largely rigid and sparse in their design, producing the 
same environments of low-stimulation they did previously (“the burden of 
idleness and ennui” identified in the Inspection report of 1898 cited above). They 
continue to prevent all but the most superficial access to others, even in some 
troubling instances to medical professionals and legal representatives. They 
continue to be spaces where living (and indeed dying) is hard to do. In the 
contemporary penal landscape these features are particularly apparent in the most 
extreme forms of specialist segregated custody where solitary confinement is 
practiced, i.e. the segregation cells in the Close Supervision Centres in the English 
prison system; to a far lesser degree, the standard punishment cells in segregation 
units in Scottish prisons; and, though not in the same way given the more 
circumscribed time periods involved, so-called ‘special cells’ across UK prisons, 
used to contain mentally disturbed prisoners on protective and occasionally 
administrative grounds.  
In his polemical indictment of the prison system in England and Wales, the 
former Chief Inspector of Prisons, David Ramsbotham, highlighted the disturbing 
persistence of SC in contemporary imprisonment forms. He pointed out that while 
SC within secure psychiatric hospitals settings - framed as ‘seclusion’ – ‘is used 
only as a last resort….never as a standard method of managing risk’ and it ‘can be 
authorised in response to a specific incident, but is terminated as soon as possible 
afterwards’(2003:115), this moderate approach is not equally evident with the 
prison system. 
In contrast to the intense scrutiny and supervision of patients in special hospitals 
by trained medical professionals, prisoners in the basic regime sites, as well as 
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segregation unit, at Woodhill were held in enforced total isolation in punishment 
conditions with only one hour out of cell per day. 
In view of all the experience and knowledge available in special hospitals, 
and all that the Prison Service claimed about the decency and humanity of 
its treatment of prisoners, it is scarcely credible that it could have 
introduced such a system [Close Supervision Centers, (CSC)] as late as 
1998. (116) 
This system of CSC in England is in some ways comparable to the earlier 
network of small units in Scotland, certainly with respect to both its specialist 
nature and to its prisoner-targets i.e. those who are perceived as dangerous and/or 
difficult to manage in mainstream prison locations. There the similarities end; it is 
a much more systematic, standadised and authoritarian set of arrangements, 
comprising seven discrete units within five individual prisons as well additional 
CSC cells dispersed across a further three institutions. On numerous grounds this 
system has provoked significant criticism in all three of the thematic reviews that 
the Prison Inspectorate has conducted (1999; 2006; 2015) Conditions within the 
CSC system in British prisons are demonstrably less extreme than in the U.S. 
supermax system, however the former shares many of the same hamful 
charateristics of SC, if not implemented to the same degree, e.g. restrictions to 
association, meaningful activities, family contact, and time spent out of cell more 
generally. Indicative of these privations, extracts from the most recent inspection 
are included below: 
S11 - Time out of cell varied from around two hours a day to over six in 
line with the degree of progress made… All prisoners in units could have 
at least one hour in the open air everyday but exercise yards were very 
poor. Most units lacked adequate association space and provided too few 
activities.  
S12 - The majority of prisoners said they did not have enough to do either 
in or out of their cells. Education and work were poor and opportunities to 
improve them were not taken. 
S14 - Work to support prisoners to maintain contact with their friends, 
families and children was significantly underdeveloped. Visits facilities 
lacked privacy and were often too small. Some restrictions on visiting 
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arrangements and physical contact were not clearly based on risk 
assessments. (HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2015:22) 
Whilst otherwise critical of SC, Morris (2000) concedes that it may be necessary 
in some instances, but advocates significant modifications to its use; in particular, 
he argues that it is justifiable when ‘it can be accompanied by a variety of in-cell 
activities that allow prisoners to be productive and to develop their own capacities 
without risk to the staff or other prisoners or the community’ (108). In other 
words, precisely what present incarnations of SC (in supermax and CSC systems) 
are failing to ensure. Morris’ concerns chime with elements of Jeffreys (2013) 
ethical argument against SC. Critiquing the damages wrought by this practice, 
Jeffreys adopts a spiritual rather than the more commonly assumed psychological 
perspective (e.g. Haney, 1994;2003, and Kupers, 1999). He considers creativity - 
‘the neglected dimension of human spirituality’ (2013:7) – as a fundamental 
quality of human flourishing, and one that is almost entirely obstructed in 
conditions of extreme social and material deprivation. The productivity and 
development of individual capacities to which Morris refers (and the absence of 
which Inspectors of the CSC note with concern) is crucial, on Jeffreys reading, as 
it relates to opportunities for creative channels. (Jeffreys work on the ethics of 
solitary confinement is returned to Chapter Four of this thesis). 
Shalev’s ‘three-wave’ model of solitary confinement  
Shalev (2013) traces the ‘birth of the supermax doctrine’ – a distinctly 
Foucauldian-sounding phrase – to the reclassification of Marion Prison in 1978 as 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ highest security institution. The forms of intense 
control and isolation proffered there have since been hauntingly labelled 
‘Marionization’ (Richards, 2015). Marion prison began a trend characterised as a 
‘new generation of the concentration model, designed especially for long term 
isolation’ (Shalev, 2013:22), which has clear parallels with Lord Mountbatten’s 
(1966) concentration policy recommendation in relation to the British prison 
system. Whilst there was nothing essentially “new” about isolating those 
prisoners who were considered especially problematic, Shalev provides a useful 
‘three-wave’ model for understanding the broad shifts in the underlying 
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rationales, discourses, practical mechanisms, aims, and targeted prisoners of SC. 
The “initiators” of these three movements are described in the following terms: 
The first wave was initially led by morally motivated prison reformers, 
and then taken over by prison administrators…The second way was led by 
psychologists motivated by newly developed behavioural sciences, and it 
was again taken over by prison administrators. The third wave of solitary 
confinement, as embodied in supermax prisons, has been initiated by 
prison administrators and has been accompanied by very little debate 
outside the prison system. (Shalev, 2013:23) 
The first wave (1850s) was intended to save men’s souls, it was applied to all 
prisoners – in this sense it was a routine rather than specialist measure – and it 
was experienced by prisoners both individually (the separate system) and 
collectively (the silent system). The second wave (1970s) was geared towards 
‘fixing’ men’s maladaptive minds, with the logic that ‘an environment of 
unrelenting isolation would make prisoners more susceptible to the next stage of 
the programme: ‘remoulding’ through therapy and medication’ (Shalev, 2013:17). 
The third, more amoral, wave (1990s) was a deliberate effort to all but entirely 
immobilize the troublesome prisoner - with virtually no attempt to transform his 
spirit or to modify his behaviour; the aim was incapacitation.   
How do these stages, or ‘waves’, relate to the evolution of specialist segregation 
in Scottish prisons, in particular to the network of small units? Certain 
connections can be made between individual small units and elements of the 
rationales underpinning each movement, as identified by Shalev - the logic of 
either (1) moral transformation (1850s), (2) behavioural modification (1970s) or 
(3) “total” incapacitation11 (1990s). However, what is interesting about the 
Scottish experience is that the unique character of each small unit – each wildly 
different from the other – means none conform entirely to only one of these 
frameworks, and thus the network as a whole does not correspond to the second 
wave of approaches to segregation as we might expect given the time period in 
which the network thrived – the 1970s. Fig 4 applies this wave model to the five 
                                                          
11 The term ‘“total” incapacitation’ has been used effectively in another context by Jonathan 
Simon (2012) to describe the practice and experience of life without parole in the U.S. prison 
system. See Chapter Four of this thesis for a detailed discussion.   
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most significant small units in Scottish penal history, identifying the particular 
features of each that accord with the three historical moments in Shalev’s model. I 
have employed the precise language of both her categories (in bold) and her 
descriptions of them (2013:25). While all of these small units were isolated from 
mainstream prison locations, and were architectural composed of individual 
residential cells, some units involved collective rather than individual isolation for 
large portions of the day. They may not, therefore, be considered as environments 
of pure solitary confinement, but since the first and second waves of isolation 
included similarly collective forms of segregation (though the former more 
explicitly than the latter), the use of this model remains helpful as applied to the 
Scottish small units context; it demonstrates how unusual this network was 
insomuch as parts of it were either highly anachronistic, recalling practices from 
much earlier time periods, or indeed prescient. 
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The Peterhead ‘Digger’ was Scotland’s oldest segregation site, used as a routine 
and specialist measures and for both punitive and administrative reasons. It was 
the site that most explicitly embraced the control and incapacitation doctrine that 
would later become standard practice within segregation forms across the U.S. 
and UK, as referenced above. Andrew Coyle (1994) provides a revealing 
description of the regime and conditions of the Digger at the time he assumed the 
governorship in 1988. To the extent that he identifies the spatial reality of SC (in 
this case on punitive grounds), it is a useful extract.  
The punishment unit consisted of sixteen cells on two storeys with no 
communal facilities for association. The cells were stripped of all 
furniture; only a raised concrete plinth on which the prisoner spread his 
bedding at night broke the symmetry of the rectangular box. In earlier 
years prisoners had regularly broken the strengthened glass in the cell 
windows and used broken glass as a weapon with which to attack staff. 
Management’s response had been to replace the glass by steel plates with 
drilled holes which allowed a minimum of ventilation and daylight. These 
cells were intended to be used for short periods by prisoners who were 
being punished for breaches of discipline. Most of the prisoners who were 
there in May 1988 had been in these conditions for several months, if not 
years. (96) 
The Digger also had a windowless Silent Cell, which was attached to the unit but 
in its own separate, adjoining block, providing an additional level of isolation; the 
cell contained only a mattress on a concrete plinth, prisoners were denied access 
to work, they were surveilled from above via a narrow landing (which only 
officers had access to), and they were kept in constant low-level light. The agenda 
was not to reform prisoners by providing the opportunity for reflection; its 
purpose was to entirely incapacitate individuals albeit for short bursts in an 
environment of total control. One interview participant referred to this site as ‘an 
architecture of oppression’. The conditions in the Silent Cell at the Peterhead 
Digger share similarities with the supermax system as it currently operates in the 
U.S., which is notable given that it was in use for the preceding century. The 
Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Peterhead protests 1986/7 expressed 
particular condemnation of these arrangements: 
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We see no justification for the barbarous use of cells like the silent cell at 
all and see no reason why the solitary cells should differ physically in any 
way from ordinary cells. (Bold in original text, Gateway Exchange, 
1987:85) 
The Peterhead Digger was not formally recognised as part of the small units 
network despite being the feeder site for prisoners who were transferred to many 
of the units that were later instituted. It was the first example of a segregation 
environment that used solitary confinement as a method of control rather than 
reflection or rehabilitation (however misguided that early approach was).  
The Inverness Unit, opened in 1966 amidst fears surrounding the abolition of the 
death penalty (and thus the assumption that an additional site was necessary to 
contain prisoners who would now have nothing to lose by violence and 
disruption) was similarly oriented towards an incapacitation objective. While 
Shalev identifies this a 1990s development, Scotland was unfortunately ahead of 
this curve. But the ‘Cages’, as the Inverness Unit was known colloquially on 
account of its spatial design, also adopted elements of earlier isolation practices 
and rationales. It did, for example, allow prisoners to work in limited association 
with others, recalling the silent system of the 1850s, but for the greater part of 
each day solitary confinement was imposed. This unit was among the most 
controversial within the small units network, partly due to the physical conditions 
of the space. An inspection report of IU in 1971 proposed a number of 
environmental upgrades regarding lighting, heating, cell space, staff areas and 
levels (Coyle, 1987), but this guaranteed nothing. By 1976 very little had changed 
and thus in the wake of recurring public criticism the SPS conducted an additional 
internal review in which particular concern was raised regarding the lack of social 
stimuli for prisoners and the inadequacy of work/education opportunities. During 
this time major and minor disturbances within these prisons continued unabated, 
conditions remained poor, there were issues surrounding high staff turnover and 
staff discontent in the IU (Wozniak, 1989), and therefore additional sites of 
administrative segregation were considered necessary, suggesting if not the 
failure of present arrangements then at least the inadequacy of them to manage 
especially difficult prisoners.  
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By stark contrast, the Barlinnie Special Unit (opened in 1973) provided 
significant opportunities for association, for individual and group recreation, for 
creative activities, and for flexible and unlimited contact with families (Cooke, 
1989a&b; Coyle, 1987; Whatmore, 1987; Sparks, 2002). The dominant 
functioning principles of autonomy, democracy and individuality are vividly 
attested to through the personal testimonies of Boyle (1977, 1984) and Steele 
(1992) in particular (see Chapter Six). There was some residual attachment to the 
moral and reformative agenda that was widely embraced during the first wave of 
penal isolation (1850s) though in the case of the BSU, this was largely divorced 
from its earlier religious overtones. The way this unit operated, however, involved 
an explicit rejection of both the behaviour modification (with its reliance on 
psychological treatment programming) and incapacitation frameworks – emergent 
in the 1970s and 1990s respectively. Rather; this separate environment produced 
more democratic and dynamic social relations within small, relatively 
autonomous units. As such the pioneers of the BSU demonstrated acuity about 
what would later become a fairly widespread, albeit still on the ‘progressive’ 
edges, view of effective administrative segregation. By 1984 the Control Review 
Committee in England & Wales had adopted a similar position, advocating self-
contained units and, within them, a prioritization of staff-prisoner relationships. A 
rocking of the pendulum then (though not for long), consolidated by the 
subsequent Platt report (1985) on prison design informed by the New Generation 
Architectures emergent in the US Correctional system12. King’s (1991) 
comparative study of Gartree (England) and Oak Park Heights (US) provided a 
credible evidential base to these penal stirrings. There were, however, certain 
challenges related to the liberal regime of BSU, which went some way to de-
lionizing what had been in its heyday a cause celebre.  
In terms of the effects of penal isolation, Shalev (2008) makes the point that no 
studies exist showing any positive effects of prolonged solitary confinement, but 
there are plenty that connect SC to mental disorder, feelings of distress, 
aggression, despair, hallucinations, and vaguer but equally intense feelings of 
                                                          
12 Norval Morris’ (1974) work on prison design and regimes signaled the formal beginnings of this 
new architectural emphasis.  
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hopelessness. Research has demonstrated these harms ae experienced by prisoners 
in a range of specialist segregation sites, including: ‘supermax’ facilities (Haney, 
2003); protective segregation environments (Brodsky & Scoring, 1988); and, 
special units (Hodgins & Cote, 1991). How are these sites spatially different, how 
might this affect the psychological impact of SC within them, what are the spatial 
uniformities that intensify harm and how do they manifest through the use of SC 
within segregation sites in Scottish prisons? Posing these kinds of questions 
reflects my attachment to the idea that there is something about the spatiality of 
SC segregation (according to Lefebvre’s three spatial components), which 
prohibits the genuine fulfilment of individual wellbeing, the realization of dignity 
through autonomy in particular (see Chapter Four), thus exacting serious harm. 
Something that exacerbates the very tendencies it is intended to mitigate: difficult 
and/or distressed behaviour.13 And this ‘something’ may not be the obvious and 
extreme privations of social isolation but rather the more subtle “environmental 
stressors”, e.g. heat, noise (or lack of), boredom, unpredictability (or lack of), etc. 
(Hancock & Jewkes, 2011:623). Features that are not attended to in rights 
documents with nearly the same robustness as with other concerns. 
Territoriality and Security in Small Units 
Newman’s (1972; 1990) Defensible Space Theory is particularly instructive on 
the role and value of exerting personal autonomy within and over our 
environments – it provides a framework for understanding both the harms of 
segregation sites (those which do not allow for the expression of autonomy) and 
the advantages of other kinds of sites (those which do). Grounded by the concept 
of territoriality, Newman (1972: 197) defines a defensible space (DS) community 
as "a residential environment whose physical characteristics—building layout and 
site plan—function to allow inhabitants themselves to become key agents in 
ensuring their security." Fostering a sense of spatial ownership through enhanced 
choice-power over collectively agreed norms of behaviour within that space 
creates, argues Newman, ‘zones of felt responsibility’. Members of DS 
                                                          
13 In England and Wales there is some evidence that suicide occurs disproportionately in 
segregation units (Liebling, 2007:432). A meta-analysis of suicide studies in Scotland would be a 
useful exercise for this project. 
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communities are therefore sufficiently invested so as to effectively police 
themselves as well as providing informal surveillance which serves to effectively 
police outsiders. The general outcome, this theory asserts, is a safer and more 
ordered urban environment. There are particularly significant resonances on this 
point with the prisoner-centered approach to conflict resolution that was adopted 
in the Barlinnie Special Unit (see Chapter Six).  While defensible space theory is 
open to challenge primarily on the basis of its nebulous, somewhat ambiguous 
concepts and consequently the lack of strong, consistent empirical support 
(Hillier, 1973; Mayhew, 1977; Taylor et al. 1980; Hillier & Shu, 2000), it does 
prove conceptually fruitful in terms of providing a clear framework for thinking 
spatially, for expanding fields of vision by developing what Soja calls a ‘spatial 
consciousness’, and most especially for stressing the importance of personal 
autonomy in how individuals inhabit and engage with their environments. This 
way of approaching prison worlds has been somewhat neglected in the prison 
sociology literature – though more recently it is being pursued with interesting 
results within the emerging sub-discipline of carceral geography (for a 
comprehensive overview, see especially Moran, 2015)   
The crucial agency component as it relates to order in space has two essential 
elements: (1) the power to choose how collective space is used, how it functions 
and is organised; and relatedly, (2) the power of ownership over personal space, 
where individuals may assert some autonomy over their degree of privacy and/or 
association. In this way the spatial and social boundaries that might be instituted 
are chosen or at least collectively agreed upon; particular areas and people are 
voluntarily separated rather than coercively segregated. How might this relate to 
order and security maintenance in prison settings? 
In the Scottish context, one discrete example of these principles in practice is the 
Barlinnie Special Unit (BSU). This small, self-contained unit – housed in an 
adjacent block of Glasgow’s Victorian colossus, Barlinnie prison – operated 
according to a democratic, participatory model of management. Prisoners not only 
had a stake in deciding who would be admitted to the community and the regime 
within it, but also, and connected, in how the space would function, what kinds of 
activities would occur within them, what kinds of provisions the space facilitated 
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and how prisoners might use them. Additionally, each prisoner had control over 
access to their own cells, they were given choice over who could be admitted and 
for how long. A seemingly small though powerful detail, they were also given the 
freedom to decorate and manipulate the aesthetics of space in their own ways (for 
example, prisoners with an artistic bent could – and did – paint murals on their 
walls). These environmental freedoms might be termed, I suggest, spatial 
autonomy, the praxis of which enables a rebuilding of the dignity some prisoners 
felt had been dismantled in typically restrictive segregation settings (see Chapter 
Six). 
Newman’s concept of territoriality has clear resonances here. While the BSU was 
not purpose-built – its physical design a relic of Victorian penal architecture – the 
relevant point is how the space was actually engaged with in the context of its 
prefixed material structure. This illustrates that it is not (only) the physical design 
of an environment that determines the stability of a community but the broader 
social interactions that are made possible through particular approaches to that 
space. It should be noted, however, that as an especially innovative, experimental 
special handling setting, housing repeatedly disruptive prisoners, this unit is not 
representative of Scottish segregation sites more generally. Yet the very fact it 
housed this type of prisoner, who were in other contexts demonstrably violent, but 
in this setting interacted with one another and with staff with very low levels of 
disorder and a negligible number of assaultive incidences, says something about 
the importance of the management of and approach to space for how ordered a 
community might be – it also serves to undermine arguments that reductively link 
disorder to personal pathology.  
Weakening Authority Structures, the Decline of the Conformist Prisoner, 
and the Rise of Prison Disorder 
Early twentieth century prisons in Britain were uniformly inflexible, grueling 
places. Regimes were arduous, often crushingly monotonous (for both prisoners 
and staff), accommodation was basic, standards of personalised care were 
negligible, and if not quite actual violence then certainly the threat of it simmered 
beneath most surfaces. Scotland’s prisons were no exception. In places such as 
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these where authoritarianism was the guiding management philosophy, and thus 
where hierarchies between prisoners and staff were sharply defined, tensions and 
conflicts may have been omnipresent but large-scale disturbances were far from 
commonplace. Even localised violence was mostly containable – responded to 
with the firmest grip of control tactics. Individual isolation (aka solitary 
confinement) remained a primary “award” in the disciplinary toolbox, ubiquitous 
in use and a source of dread amongst prisoners. However, as the century wore on, 
a confluence of factors in the post-war period gave rise to problems of disorder 
that were different in kind from previous eras; a more rebellious type of prisoner 
was entering the system (sentenced to increasingly longer periods) with a less 
submissive attitude towards authority.  
By the 1960s the authority of the prison system, and those who administered it, 
was challenged with growing brio by a prisoner population that was ever more 
emboldened. To an extent this reflected attitudinal shifts to establishment 
authority in wider society. The culture of deference and conformity to tradition 
began to wane, leading to a more energised demos, which manifested across 
political, social, and industrial spheres 
In the political sphere, for example, a Labour government won power in the 1964 
general election on a popular platform of increased workers’ rights and union 
representation. Under the leadership of Harold Wilson – a man described in a 
BBC news report as ‘the embodiment of meritocracy’ - this Labour win ended a 
thirteen year stretch of Conservative Party rule – only the second Labour 
government since 1935. Extracts from the Labour manifesto of that year, titled “A 
New Britain”, capture the mood of the time: 
The starting point is our belief that the community must equip itself to 
take charge of its own destiny…It is within the personal power of every 
man and woman with a vote to guarantee that the British again become the 
go-ahead people with a sense of national purpose, thriving in an 
expanding community where social justice is seen to prevail. 
This rhetoric proved appealing to the electorate partly to the extent that its 
emphasis on communities ‘taking charge’ and on ‘personal power’ mirrored a 
cultural shift in relations between the rulers and the ruled in society.  
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In the legislative arena, a number of new laws had the effect of liberalising social 
relations particularly with respect to gender and sexual politics e.g. the 
decriminalization of both abortion and homosexuality in 1967. Regarding 
industrial relations, efforts to curtail the growing power of the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) were now met with successful resistance, e.g. the defeat in 1968 
of measures to restrict industrial strikes, proposed by Labour’s Employment 
Minister, Barbara Castle, largely as a result of powerful union pressure. Further, 
ideological tensions on matters of social and economic (in)equality were 
intensifying, best exemplified during this period by the strong Conservative 
challenges to the anti-discrimination Race Relations Bill 1968 proposed by 
Labour. This was most starkly contested by Enoch Powell in his popularized and 
divisive ‘Rivers of Blood’ address to the Conservative Party conference that same 
year. Together these shifts in power relations ushered in a period of social and 
political instability, leading to mass strikes in the 1970s (including strikes by coal 
miners, health professionals, teachers, and local government civil servants) and 
riots in the late 1970s and early 1980s, of which the Notting Hill Carnival Riots 
1976 and the Brixton Riots 1981 were the most significant.  
Such far-reaching and substantial upheavals in British society led to open 
challenge of structures of power across many governmental institutions, including 
the prison system. Indeed, it was during this period that the problem of disorder in 
prison intensified (see Fig Five) and thus became a principal priority of penal 
policy-makers and administrators. By way of response, in 1966 the government 
commissioned Lord Mountbatten to conduct a review of prison security 
(ostensibly to examine the systemic weaknesses that were exposed by a series of 
high profile escapes, especially that of former Soviet spy, George Blake). This 
report made comprehensive recommendations about the management of problem 
prisoners that centered on a concentration policy. Following two years later, the 
Radzinowicz Report (1968) was published, which advocated a, alternative 
dispersal policy (this was favoured and subsequently implemented across the UK 
prison estate). Figure Five gives a sense of the variety of incidences that occurred 
across prisons in England and Scotland during this period of strife: 
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Figure Five: Major escapes and prison disturbances in England and Wales and 
throughout the prison estate in Scotland (1964-1990)  
Date Prison Duration Key Features 
1968 Durham  Successful escape 
1969 Parkhurst Oct 24th Barricades, hostage-taking, 
numerous staff and prisoner 
injuries 
1972 Albany Aug 26th-29th Fires, extensive damage to prison 
property (limited injuries) 
 Peterhead 
(Scotland) 






 Albany Nov ?? The prisoners involved in the 
August riot barricaded themselves 
in the segregation unit 
 Gartree Nov 26th-27th Violence on two wings, rooftop 




Dec 28th Violence in segregation unit 
(several officers stabbed and one 
lost an eye) 
1976 Hull Aug 31st-Sep 
3rd 
Barricades, damage to property (11 
injured) 
1978 Gartree Oct 5th-6th Violence – missiles launched, 
hostages-taken, damage to property 
1979 Parkhurst March 22nd Roof-top protest 
 Hull April 11th Damage to property 
 Woormwood 
Scrubs 
Aug 31st Extensive violence and damage to 
property involving nearly 200 














 Albany May 20th-
25th 
Roof-top protest, property damage, 
MUFTI squads brought in 
 Wormwood 
Scrubs 
June 16th  
1984 Peterhead 
(Scotland) 
Jan 9th-10th  
 Gartree Feb 3rd-4th  
1985 Peterhead 
(Scotland) 
March 14th  
 Albany March 16th  
 Gartree April 19th  
 Peterhead 
(Scotland) 
Nov 2nd  




Leves, Northeye  
April 29th-
May 2nd 
Riots in 40 prisons led to 45 
prisoner escapes, mass violence 
and property damage. Situation 
occurred against background of 
industrial action by POA 
 Peterhead 
(Scotland) 
Oct 9th-13th  
 Edinburgh 
(Scotland) 
Oct 27th-30th  
1987 Barlinnie 
(Scotland) 






 Perth (Scotland) Oct 4th-6th  
 
A more refractory prisoner population and a general weakening of legitimacy 
around state authority, coupled with cultural and legislative amendments to the 
treatment of prisoners meant that the SPS was ill-equipped to manage the age old 
problem of disorder without recourse to the age old methods of force that it had 
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once relied upon. This explains in part both the over-reliance of segregation sites 
such as the Peterhead Digger, but also the evolution of additional, less 
authoritarian sites such as the Barlinnie Special Unit. Joy Cameron, in her study 
of Scottish prisons (the last sweeping penal history published in Scotland), 
describes the disconnect between shifting cultures (both inside and outside of the 
prison) and the ways prison function internally: 
Penal practice and attitudes tend to develop by way of haphazard reaction 
to particular problems which may persist indefinitely, or become either 
more or less demanding, or later disappear altogether to be replaced by 
new ones. Neither practice nor attitudes will necessarily keep abreast of 
these changing considerations, and indeed some time lag is usually 
inevitable so that, more particularly in a rapidly changing society, the 
penal system may be said to be continually out of date. (Cameron, 
1983:184) 
There was a sense that while the attitude of prisoners towards prison authority 
was changing, the practices of prison management remained stuck in older, more 
traditional patterns. An extract from an interview transcript crystallises this point:  
Participant: in the 80s prisoners started to say this is not acceptable. My 
own view is that we were still trying to manage prisoners based on 1950s 
philosophies with an emphasis on deference amnd discipline but it didn’t 
fare so well in the late 70s and 80s. The prisoners were reacted badly to 
this. They were rebelling […] Nobody was really interested in looking 
ahead, we’re a demand led service, our job was just to manage prisoners 
on a day to day basis and younger governors were starting to challenge 
that, which was another pressure, they didn’t want to do things in the same 
tired ways as before. it was a perfect storm. 
These frustrations and attitudinal shifts (of both prisoners and the younger 
generation of prison managers), contributed to growing hostilities across the 
prison estate, but especially within Peterhead prison. To offer some sense of how 
these tensions manifested, the following list presents a far from exhaustive 
snapshot of the serious and varied nature of incidents that occurred in Peterhead 
during the 1970s. Details and quotes are taken from private letters (mainly 
between the Governor or Deputy Governor and the Director of prisons), as well as 
from prisoners’ files: 
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- August 1972. A rooftop, sit-down protest was staged on the hospital 
block by 171 prisoners. It lasted two day (30th-31st). It was “non-
aggressive” – prisoners “sang and chanted” - and therefore, “owing to 
the fact that no trouble was being caused by the prisoners, and that 
such a large number were involved, it was decided not to use force to 
remove them from the roof.” No injuries were sustained by either 
prisoners or officers. The only structural damage consisted of a few 
slates being removed from a section of the roof.  
- September 1972. An escape attempt was made by two prisoner via the 
roof of the tailors shed, which had not been correctly reinforced with 
wire. 
- October 1972. A mass if temporary hunger strike was organised 
beginning on the 2nd, which involved all prisoners refusing breakfast 
and lunch. In a letter to the Director at the end of the first day, the 
Governor states: “It is thought the hunger strike is intended to be a 
gesture of contempt against authority and some information has been 
received from prisoners to the effect that this will probably be a two 
day event.” 
- February 1973. During a confrontation between two prisoners, a (one 
sided) physical fight broke-out that left one prisoner, along with one 
officer, badly injured – both required urgent medical attention. 
According to the records, the perpetrator “has committed 77 breaches 
of the Rules [including nine serious assaults on staff] since he first 
came to Peterhead [in 1969] and has forfeited a total of 475 days 
remission.” 
- March 1973. An officer was violently assaulted by a prisoner causing 
permanent facial disfigurement. There are few details surrounding the 
precise nature and context of this incident which makes it all the more 
intriguing. An almost quaint sign of the times: in a letter to the 
Director, the Deputy Governor writes of this incident, “One other 
point I would make. In view of the evidence to be given by officer X, 
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it would probably be better that no ladies be members of the sub-
committee on this occasion.” 
- March 1973. A prisoner in the punishment block started a fire in his 
cell. He was removed from the cell, seen by a medical officer and a 
psychiatrist, then following their instruction he was placed on strict 
suicide observation in the hospital wing. It is noted that “outside 
treatment was not considered necessary”.  
- August 1973. Letters were intercepted from one prisoner to an ex-
prisoner containing information regarding a location in Scotland of a 
store of explosives which, the prisoner claimed, was property of the 
IRA. There was also reference to a ‘det’, of which the prisoner was 
requesting access to. He later claimed this meant ‘detector’, which 
referred to an aluminum paste used to block the electronic geophone 
system. Staff were concerned this in fact meant ‘detonator’. A full 
search of the prison was duly undertaken – as far as the records show, 
no evidence of this was found. 
As well as these incidents, particularly concerning to the SPS and especially to 
the Scottish Prison Officers’ Association (SPOA), was the steadily rising number 
of assaults on prison officers (see Fig Six). By the 1980s, as one officer I spoke 
with put it “the SPS was on its knees”, but the metaphor did not exaggerate for in 
some cases the roof really did come off (see Gateway Exchange, 1987, for a 
prisoner-centered analysis of the prison riots). It was not the fact of such turbulent 
incidences nor even their frequency which is important here, but the extremity of 
them together with the apparent inability of the SPS to quell the rising tides of 
revolt in a meaningful and sustainable way. The Baguio of disorder during the 
latter half of the Twentieth Century, culminating in the chaos of the late 1980s is 
suggestive of the basic reality that something was very wrong not merely in but 
with Scottish prisons.  
Fig Six: Assaults on Staff (Scottish Home and Health Department) 
Year Total no. assaults on With a sharp weapon 
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officers (adult and under 
21s) 
1961 36 6 
1962 46 6 
1963 26 3 
1964 36 2 
1965 38 3 
1966 35 1 
1967 30 2 
1968 38 3 
1969 44 8 
1970 46 6 
1971 48 3 
1972 46 8 
1973 40 - 
1974 62 3 
1975 51 - 
1976 53 3 
1977 51 3 
  
Staff Brutality 
Allegations of staff brutality during the period between 1960 -1990 are recorded 
in often intense detail within prisoners’ autobiographies. There is reason to be 
cautious about accepting wholesale the accounts offered in these testimonies 
given the range of (legitimate) complaints these men had of the prison system 
more generally, as well as the inevitable problems with memory (see Chapter 
One). Such allegations, however, are also documented in a number of inquiries, 
reports, and academic studies, specifically those investigating the circumstances 
around the protests and riots in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. McMillan, 1971; 
Gateway Exchange, 1987). Several reports published by the Scottish Inspectorate 
also make reference to abuses, though they do so in a more circumscribed 
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manner, stressing the unconfirmed status of many of the prisoners’ complaints. 
The Independent Committee of Inquiry into the Peterhead protests note that 71% 
or the prisoners who responded to their questionnaires reported direct experience 
of physical brutality (Gateway Exchange, 1987:102), with many suggesting that 
abuse occurs primarily in the separate cells (i.e. the segregation unit – the 
Digger). The report documents prisoners’ frustration that such abuses are 
collectively justified by officers as last-resort and fair responses to excessively 
violent prisoners. Whilst cognizant of the grounds for skepticism, the Committee 
do note the following: 
The sheer volume of instances recounted to us (of brutality) are such that 
they cannot all be liars. Indeed, we find it incredulous that over the years, 
politicians, prison officials, and Governor/Prison Officer Associations 
have consistently denied any brutality whatsoever. (Gateway Exchange, 
1987: 92) 
Several of the individuals I interviewed for this research made mention of isolated 
cases of staff abuse against prisoners. I was surprised by the candour of some of 
their recollections. Included below is an extended extract from one such interview 
transcript:  
JB: During that time [1988] were the staff still wearing protective gear on 
the mainstream halls? 
P: Yes, we were still on lockdown. It was a very very controlled 
environment. The problem was convincing staff they were safe. They 
hadn’t forgotten.  
JB: How did you persuade staff to trust prisoners without wearing 
protective gear? 
P: By being there. By being at the front when the doors were opened.  By 
honestly leading from the front. I wasn’t that old then, and privately 
they’re thinking ‘well if she can do it, so can I.’ 
JB: What was the situation like for staff managing the segregation unit [in 
Barlinnie prison]? Was it similarly fraught between staff and prisoners? 
P: It was completely barren. If I’m being completely honest…it was 
shocking. We didn’t go into the orderly room. One day a guy came in to 
talk to the governor. I was doing an observation because I was still quite 
new, and he was covered in black and blue marks on his face, and the 
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Governor said ‘what happened to you?’ ‘I fell against a wall.’ Now he 
knew damn fine well he’d been assaulted by staff, he knew that, and the 
feeling was ‘oh alright then’. I was shocked. This wannae even one of the 
most difficult prisoners. This was somebody one of the officers decided to 
give it to that day. I did nae know everything that went on in there. I was 
shocked.  
The evolution of small units network in Scotland must be seen against the 
backdrop of these noxious internal relations and incendiary disturbances, though 
it is too much of a stretch to label the introduction of the first small units as only 
reactionary, or more generously as solely pragmatic responses, as if they were 
intended as merely quick-fix solutions to the immediate management problems 
that, nevertheless, preceded them. The notion of small, specialist units to manage 
both recalcitrant and especially vulnerable prisoners had been experimented with 
in Scotland at least as early as the 1950s. However, it was not until the 
rhetorically significant though never fully translated ‘Opportunity and 
Responsibility’ policy report in 1990 that a theoretically coherent strategy for 
small units was compiled. Before that point, the special handling measures of 
segregation were somewhat extemporaneous; uneven in concept, design, practice 
and consequences, but not in every case without sound, sometimes innovative 
justification (or effect).  
‘Personality Politics’ 
The variations between how each site “worked”, and many did so simultaneously 
with multiple sites operating within the same prison (Peterhead is the singular 
example of this), may also be attributable to the size and nature of the Scottish 
penal estate. Scotland is a small, contained country and whilst its proportional 
prison population rate is relatively high (measured against European standards), 
the actual number of people in prison is low (ranging from around 4000 to 8000 
people in the post war period). The number of separate penal institutions has also, 
therefore, remained small (between 14 and 17 during the ). With a relatively 
limited number of individual prisons across the estate, along with the propensity 
of the SPS to transfer senior prison managers between establishments over the 
course of their careers (see Sparks, 2002), key placed individuals were able to 
exert increased influence in realising their personal agendas, despite being 
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potentially at odds with the general direction of the SPS. This might be termed 
‘personality politics’. Part of the explanation for the influence individual players 
had was the chaotic context of the period. The middle part of the middle decades 
of the twentieth century was ‘a very dynamic period’ as stated by one interview 
participant. He goes on:  
Sometimes conflict can be constructive, it did blow the system apart and 
we did have a lot of casualties and not just physical causalities but 
casualties of staff including senior management. People left the service, 
new people came in with new ideas. There was a sense of a lot of change 
at the top. A new director came in with tremendous enthusiasm and 
personality which none of his predecessors had. He was able to make 
significant changes.  
The organisational structure of the SPS may also have contributed to this 
phenomenon since, until it came under the auspices of the Scottish Government, it 
was managed by a separate faction of the UK Government’s Scottish Home and 
Health Department headed by the Secretary of State for Scotland. As well as a 
lack of geographical proximity (this department was largely based in 
Westminster), the job of overseeing Scottish prisons was one of “low 
prestige…nobody in English politics really wanted to do it” (retired Scottish 
Governor - interview data). This lack of status often translated into a lack of 
committed leadership and coherent policy from Westminster, which in turn 
allowed more scope for individual prison officials in Scotland to take the reins 
and to lead the horses in their own direction. 
A particularly striking example of this – personality policies – is the processes by 
which Barlinnie Special Unit came into being and evolved. This was an entirely 
innovative site governed by a participatory model of internal relations whereby 
prisoners had an active stake in decision-making and in how the space itself was 
used (see Chapter Six). Not a therapeutic community as such, in the way we 
might typically understand that concept (e.g. in the mode of Grendon Underwood 
Prison in England), but still, the BSU contained several features more closely 
allied with rehabilitative rather than with strictly punitive or control-based 
philosophies. This highly unusual site - where prisoners were allowed to paint 
murals on their walls, where internal doors were unlocked (except at night), 
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where prisoners cooked and played table tennis according to their own fancy, 
where at one time the outside courtyard was used as an open-air sculpture studio, 
and (most controversially of all) where visiting relatives and friends were 
permitted longer periods of association including (the real rub) access to 
prisoners’ cells (see Sparks, 2002) – was extravagantly unusual, not just to 
Scottish imprisonment trends but also peculiar to international prison norms. As 
an aside, for all its enlightened practices and genuinely progressive outcomes for 
its inhabitants (and we ought to feel deeply encouraged and very much proud of 
what was achieved there), the positive effect of the BSU on other parts of the 
prison estate was hardly evident, if discernible at all. Refer to Figure Six: the 
actual number of assault incidences runs counter to comments made by the 
Director of Scottish prisons at the time, who claimed in a ‘meet the press’ day in 
1974 that assaults across the Scottish prison estate had decreased noticeably since 
the opening of the BSU.  
Returning to the previous point, it is instructive that such an oddity was brought 
into being and to a large degree was retained precisely because of the resolute, 
persistent and inspiring passions of only two or three central players.  
Participant (P): Enormous amount of complacency when I arrived in the 
70s. As a new recruit, an enormous amount of deference […] 1975 was a 
dramatic year, there was no co-ordinating vision, it was left very much to 
the governors of individual establishments to decide policy and 
philosophy. 
Jessica Bird (JB): So the BSU came about because of the commitment of 
certain key individuals? 
P: That was a factor, yes. At that time there was room for innovation and a 
certain amount of freedom if you were prepared to take a risk.   
It could perhaps only have been that way given the initial and very much lasting 
reluctance of many SPS officials and grade staff to accept the BSU. The 
uncomfortable, byzantine politics involved in maintaining the situation is a 
recurrent theme within the BSU records. Personal and private correspondence 
between SPS managers, for example, are quite clear in expressing downright 
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resentment towards this unit – a feeling also vociferously articulated in many of 
the interviews I conducted. 
It [the BSU] was seen as just pandering to bad behaviour appeasing 
prisoners and that would extend right through the unit from the visitors 
coming in to all interactions. It was just seen as an absolute disgrace 
particularly after what the staff had been through. It was just not condoned. 
I mean there was all this stuff about visits all day long and nobody knew 
what was going on. There were artists and all that. At the time it was 
absolutely….I wouldn’t use the word ‘despised’ but it was just frowned 
upon. 
The power of the ‘Big Personality’ related to prisoners as much as it did to certain 
SPS officials. Aspects of the evolution of the small units network – the kinds of 
spaces that were envisioned as well as the ways those environments were 
managed and responded to – were significantly affected by the actions, but more 
especially by the swollen reputations of individual prisoners. These were 
prisoners who demonstrated exorbitant violence (Jimmy Boyle, Johnny Steele, 
Hugh Collins, Tommy Campbell – whose published autobiographies are engaged 
with in Chapters Five and Six), or prisoners who later ‘made [some form of] 
good’, producing artworks and poetry, for example, that received considerable 
public attention (Jimmy Boyle, Larry Winters), or prisoners who seemed to 
perpetually and publicly challenge the system, most successfully by mounting 
high-profile legal contests against the SPS (notably, Ricardo Blanco and Andrew 
Somerville). About such prisoners, numerous and often sensationalist media 
narratives abounded. The public loves drama, and these men whether cast as 
anti/heroes or villains certainly provided that. Within the prison system itself such 
personalities were mythologised, celebrated (by some prisoners), feared and 
loathed (by some officers), and above all known – which was a product of the size 
of the prison estate as well as an effect of personal charisma. Without wishing to 
overplay the impact of specific individuals (this is not a Great Man version of 
history), it is pertinent that many of the internal documents that helped shape the 
nature and development of special handling measures refer to a handful of 
particular prisoners and the problems they present. The policies and practices that 
sometimes emanated from such documents outlasted the prison lifespan of the 
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prisoners for whom they seemed originally intended and, subsequently, were 
applied to many more prisoners for whom such arrangements were perhaps 
inappropriate.  
The BSU was a clear anomaly but it was not the only one. There were enough 
seemingly aberrant units to support an assessment of the small units network as 
characteristically experimental – a series of separate experiments within a larger 
special handling framework. Paradoxically, the BSU’s uniqueness in design, 
regime and reputation, is what makes it similar to other sites in the small units 
network. The ‘range of graduations in terms of ‘enriched’ segregation [forms]’ 
(retired Scottish prison officer, interview data), actually meant in practice that the 
different ways discrete units operated was not the product, not initially at least, of 
each unit serving a different purpose yet, crucially, positioned at one or other 
graded level of the same coherent policy, but more a case of multiple units (some 
serving the exact same stated purpose and, pertinently, accommodating the exact 
same profiled prisoners), operating different regimes according to their own quite 
sealed, often inward looking rationales. The overall pattern that emerges of the 
Scottish approach to special handling measures is of a jerry-built patchwork of 
small units, each piece loosely stitched together but ultimately incongruous with 
each other. 
On what grounds were some problem prisoners transferred to the BSU while 
other very similar types of prisoners were transferred to the Inverness Unit? What 
considerations factored into decisions to reconstitute the Peterhead 10 Cell Unit in 
the late 1980s when the intended scope of the Shotts Unit, plans for which were 
well under way by then, was so strikingly similar? Why was it thought necessary 
to establish a further unit at Perth prison, intended to function as a ‘time-out’ 
facility (i.e. for short burst of respite) when that appears to have been one of the 
key internally legitimizing arguments for the administrative use of routine 
segregation units (especially the Peterhead Digger). Most importantly, how did 
prisoners experience these units, especially those positioned at either end of the 










Where Chapters Two and Three discussed the broad outlines and procedural 
details of segregation in prisons, as well as provided historical context for the 
evolution of specialist measures in Scotland, particularly with respect to the 
network of small units, this chapter offers a more philosophical discussion of the 
concept of dignity. This is a necessary precursor for exploring (in Chapters Five 
and Six) the phenomenological elements of discrete segregation units in Scotland, 
especially the Peterhead Digger, the Inverness Cages, and the Barlinnie Special 
Unit. This chapter has two principal objectives: (1) to establish the connection 
between segregated confinement (not merely solitary confinement) and indignity; 
and (2) to present a conceptual framework for understanding the meanings of 
human dignity more generally.  
Dignity is ambiguous and difficult to define. It represents a profound moral 
greyness when thinking about what it means, what has to happen in order to have 
it, to be denied it, and what the struggle involves to live up to its seemingly 
impossible demands. Dignity features within various discourses (notably, rights) 
in largely abstract terms; it is metaphysical, associated with and bound by a 
further set of abstract ideas e.g. personal autonomy, individual identity, 
self/respect, and moral value. Its imported nature becomes something “almost 
mystical” (Oliver, 2011:95). Within the conceptual dignity-mix, several sub-
concepts merge: a conviction in the innateness of human worth, linked to both 
notions of self-esteem and also used to justify the inclusion of all human beings 
within a single moral community; our capacity for self-control and self-
destruction, often understood in terms of Stoic-like countenance in the face of 
suffering; the reality of shame (and shaming); our primal instinct for freedom; and, 
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the grail of psychological and bodily integrity. These same ideas permeate the 
stories prisoners tell when they talk about and justify their violent, subversive 
behaviour in segregation sites (particularly regarding dirty protests – see Chapter 
Five). Indeed, the struggle for self-ownership, the desire to express identity in 
concrete ways, or what Scarry (1985) terms “material self-extension”; the 
authentic valuing of oneself (and being valued by others); and, the ability to retain 
self-possession in spite of and especially within conditions that threaten these 
powerful human cravings, together run like arteries through prisoners’ 
testimonies.  
Nevertheless, the various ideas that inform particular conceptions of dignity are 
so intimately connected to experiences of segregated confinement (both for the 
keepers and the kept) that any analysis of this form of imprisonment must also 
include discussion of it. The next section outlines various attempts to incorporate 
a dignity frame into investigations of deep incarceration, including but not limited 
to segregation. In the later sections, I sketch the specific parameters of dignity that 
are applied in the final two chapters.  
The Moral Harms of Segregation 
Cohen (2006) identifies two distinct ways of assessing the effects of what he 
terms ‘penal isolation’: the human rights approach, and the empirical approach 
The first deals with questions that intersect at the point of what is legal and what 
is moral, while the latter is more psychologically oriented, rooted in the 
observerable consequences of this form of incarceration on the bodies and minds 
of those who suffer it. This second approach also has purchase within a more 
pragmatic, security-oriented approach since the individual behavioural outcomes 
of segregation have implications for questions of prison order and security 
maintenance. This thesis incorporates elements of both approaches: Chapters Two 
and Three address the more practical, procedural, and administrative elements of 
segregation, and suggest some of the hostilities and tensions that have arisen as a 
result – though more at an institutional rather than an individual level. By 
contrast, Chapters Five and Six adopt a distinctly ethical framework for 
152 
 
understanding the experiential dimensions of segregation and does so through a 
dignity frame. 
Cohen understands penal isolation as a matter of degrees, with ‘first degree’ 
isolation involving total solitary confinement (conditions in supermax prisons for 
example) while ‘second degree’ isolation ‘conveys a set of circumstances beyond 
life in a single, quiet cell’ (297). This definitionally looser category of segregation 
includes: 
deprivations of many of life’s most basic components that link one to 
social intercourse, the rudimentary sights and sounds of life, and basic 
decision-making in life’s most mundane choices. As one moves from such 
isolation to the still deprived world of ordinary prison conditions, we pass 
an uncertain line that divides isolation form the mere harsh conditions of 
penal confinement. The critical factors in this divide would be out-of-cell 
time, congregate activity, exercise or “yard time”, and access to work and 
available programs. Put another way, the greater the social isolation and 
sensory deprivation, the more eligible the unit is to be labeled as penal 
isolation. (Cohen, 2006:297-298) 
The small units that operated in Scotland in the period under investigation all 
conform to one or other of Cohen’s isolation categories – even the Barlinnie 
Special Unit, which may have involved collective and participatory segregation 
but remained very much isolated from the main prison and from the mainstream 
methods of management. The argument presented in relation to it (in Chapter Six) 
slightly deviates from Cohen’s position cited above in that it is not so much the 
degree of stimulation and variety of resources offered to prisoners which amounts 
to the ‘critical factors’ (or ethical content) of isolation environments, and much 
more a matter of who has control over those environmental conditions. The power 
to decide one’s engagement with various stimuli and activities is arguably of 
greater importance from a dignity perspective than the range and quality of those 
stimuli, as will be demonstrated below. Notwithstanding this foundational point, 
there remain important moral distinctions between the different levels of access to 
resources, social stimuli, programmes and activites. In his ethical analysis of ‘first 
degree’ isolation (i.e. solitary confinement), Jeffreys (2013) argues that there are 
two main harms exacted by segregation, both of which relate to necessary 
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elements of spiritual wellbeing and to that extent constitute moral suffering: 
distorted experiences of the temporal sphere, and limited channels for creative 
expression.  
On the former: the excessive social and spatial restrictions of solitary conditions, 
he argues, serve to deform prisoners’ relationship to time, resulting in feelings of 
apathy or hopelessness. Without a clear sense of time, captured through our 
acknowledgment of the passing moments of the present, ‘time becomes a hostile 
force destroying our identities’ (Jeffreys, 2013:17). This process is compounded 
when prisoners have few means to capture and acknowledge temporal units i.e. 
the minutes, hours, days and weeks. In the absence of clocks, calendars, evidence 
of the movements between day and night (often segregated cells are bathed in 
artificial lights for 24 hours a day, or shrouded in darkness, or they are 
windowless), the succession of time is lost. Individuals in these circumstances are 
forced to exist in a perpetual present but since it is an impoverished and literally 
empty present over which the prisoner has little control, he becomes hopeless 
there, hopelessly unable to imagine a future or through his own effort to actually 
realise an alternative future beyond the box within which he is now trapped. 
Jeffreys connection between this frozen temporality on the one hand and identity 
construction on the other is rooted in the assumption that human beings require a 
bank of past associations as well as an image of future possibilities in order to 
create a meaningful present; a meaningful self. In more practical terms, without 
the ability to ‘count the days’ (before release, for example, or family visits, or 
parole hearings, etc.) this temporal confusion may result in a feeling of 
unbounded, limitless abjection. The capacity to chart when something began and 
when it will end through temporal measures, provides boundaries to experiences 
which are all the more crucial when the nature of that experience is or feels 
damaging. According to Jeffreys argument, then, extreme segregation 
environments are morally harmful because they remove these temporal signifiers 
so that the negative experience of segregation begins to seem endless just as the 
self begins to feel formless. This in turn has consequences for the exercise of 
personal dignity insofar as one is no longer recognised by others (and by oneself) 
as a person.  
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Human dignity is in some sense a generalization from the egocentric 
predicament: human beings have ontological heft because each of us is an 
‘I’, and I have ontological heft. For others to treat me as though I have 
none fundamentally denigrates my status in the world. It amounts to a 
form of humiliation that violates my human dignity. (Luban, 2007:71, 
quoted in Simon, 2012:288) 
On Jeffreys second point (relating to creativity): the ontological ‘I’ is similarly 
threatened within segregated environments though the dearth of expressive 
channels through which the prisoner is able to create. The human need to 
creatively engage with the world in concert with others as part of a social 
community is impeded, Jeffreys suggests, by the almost total social isolation 
characteristic of such diminishing penal environments. This is a fundamental 
deprivation since creative products ‘illustrate the person’s capacity to unit 
physical and spiritual realities’ (2013:11), the absence of which, therefore, leads 
to a fracturing of self since a person’s ‘spiritual transcendence and self-
possession’ (2013:12) are profoundly undermined. Interestingly, Jeffreys 
develops this analysis by linking creativity to power; it ‘becomes the locus of a 
power struggle between inmates and their captors’ (2013:7). In Chapter Five of 
this thesis I explore a similar argument in relation to the methods of resistance 
Scottish prisoners deployed and how they themselves interpreted them. Dirty 
protests in particular were understood by these men as not merely violent means 
of reasserting their dignity but as a channel for creativity itself (e.g. murals were 
painted on walls in faeces, games were played with ‘shit bombs’ between the bars 
of cell windows, poems were written in blood on cell walls). In lieu of other 
means for creative expression, the body – its physical waste products – were used, 
which once analysed through a dignity fame appear rather less perverse and 
extreme than such otherwise debasing action might seem in less restricted 
settings.   
Together, the temporal dislocation and prohibitions on creative expression that are 
experienced within segregation sites constitute, for Jeffreys (2013:6), ‘spiritual 
damage as distinct from psychological harm’, rendering these incarceration forms 
ethically problematic. The ways in which both these elements relate specifically 
to conceptions of dignity are explained in more detail in the following sections 
155 
 
and exemplified through the personal testimonies of Scottish prisoners in the next 
chapter. One final point Jeffreys makes well is his stated commitment to engaging 
the accounts of prisoners, arguing that it is “baffling” when social scientists fail to 
take such testimonies seriously. Sharing that view, I have chosen to draw heavily 
on prisoners’ autobiographies in Chapters Five and Six, and since they offer a 
very particular phenomenological interpretation of their experiences within small 
units – one that is coloured by conceptions of in/dignity – including this more 
philosophical discussion seemed not only appropriate but conceptually necessary.  
In/Dignity, Risk, and Otherization 
In his critique of Life Without Parole (LWOP) in the U.S., Simon (2012:296) 
argues for a reintroduction of ‘a discourse of morality and justice into talk about 
punishment’. Such efforts, he argues,  
will have their greatest effect when they can draw parallels with 
developments in our social and legal culture in which risk and dignity are 
being reconfigured to place fear under a stronger value than dignity’ 
(296).  
In the context of imprisonment specifically, he goes on to advocate that ‘for 
prisons to embrace this goal it is necessary to make explicit and reject the view of 
prisons aimed at degrading the dignity of the individual’ (298). Simon’s concern 
with these parallel concepts of dignity and degradation stems from a particular 
reading of LWOP – one that identifies this practice as the epitome of punitivenss 
in American penality. While Simon’s analysis does not provide an in-depth study 
of the dignity concept itself, it does offer a useful basis of comparison between 
elements of the driving forces behind LWOP and those related to some of the 
more authoritarian small units in the Scottish network. These forces relate to risk, 
institutional insecurity, fears surrounding ‘contagion’ and its connection to 
processes of otherization – all of which in various ways produce levels of 
indignity for prisoners held in segregated environments.     
According to Simon, LWOP is ‘a punishment that offers no promise of letup, 
regardless of how much the prisoner repents or is rehabilitated’, and compared 
with the ultimate sanction of capital punishment, this sentence more generally 
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amounts to ‘a totalizing promise of prison incapacitation extended to the very 
limits of life, and unmediated by further consideration of the prisoner as a distinct 
human being’ (italics added, 2012:282). Applied to the Silent Cell in the 
Peterhead Digger, or to the Inverness Cages, this description would be similarly 
apt.  
If incapacitation generally is the idea that the distribution and length of 
imprisonment should represent, at least in part, the degree of risk that the 
particular offender or class of offenders pose to the community, total 
incapacitation could be defined as the idea that imprisonment is 
appropriate whenever an offender poses any degree of risk to the 
community (Simon, 2012:293) 
Apparently devoid of moral considerations, decisions to place Scottish prisoners 
in the Digger or the Cages during the 1960s and 1970s were rationalized 
according to this same incapacitation argument. Such was the risk to the prison 
community that problem prisoners were thought to pose, these specialist 
segregation sites – involving total incapacitation (in their conditions if not the 
time frame of use) – were viewed as justified. It mattered little what particular 
rationale or set of discourses one is marshalling to legitimize or even to determine 
procedural nuances of either punitive or administrative segregation; as long as 
prisoners were held in broadly the same conditions, and in some cases within the 
same physical sites, the experience was, for them, harmful (or helpful) in both 
cases. In other words, ‘the harm of extended isolation does not correlate with 
intent to punish versus intent to preserve security’ (Cohen, 2006:300 
LWOP as an ‘extreme variant of incapacitation’, as Simon argues,  
goes beyond exploiting the crime prevention capacity of imprisonment to 
a notion of contamination, one anchored in the distinctive historical 
patterns of the 1970s and the fear of violent crime in the new suburbs […] 
The absence of dignity and logic of incapacitation play into each other’ 
(304).  
He was referring specifically to the cultural and legal history of California, but 
connections can be made here to the situation in Scotland during this same period, 
given the anxiety surrounding penality in the wake of the riots, protests and 
general disorder that characterised Scottish prisons at this time, and thus the 
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presumed need to isolate this small group of extremely violent men. The ‘extreme 
risk rationality about crime’ ascribed to the practice of LWOP by Simon is 
equally applicable to the invention of the small units network in Scotland.  
While Simon suggests that in the U.S. case the degradation of LWOP was 
rendered possible (and indeed tolerated) because of ‘the absence historically of a 
strong conception of dignity in our public law’ (2012:282), the same argument 
cannot be made with respect to Scotland – if one accepts Simon’s analysis at least. 
Simon (2012:289) identifies a ‘dignity difference’ between European and 
American legal and political systems, where the former included a concept of 
dignity in public law and manifested in public services, in a way the latter does 
not. Drawing heavily on Whitman’s (2005) comparative study of punishment in 
America and Europe, Simon concludes that the reasons the dignity concept has 
not embedded within US public law are constitutional and historical. The lack of 
aristocratic status structures (those which formerly defined the criteria for dignity 
assignations), coupled with the system of slavery upon which the country was 
built contributed to a failure to recognise the dignity concept, and as a corollary, a 
higher acceptance of if not quite appetite for degrading practices, especially 
within the penal sphere. Whilst this might certainly be a valid assessment of the 
US, it implies a greater degree of attachment to dignity with penal law and 
practice in the UK, specifically the Scottish context, than has been the case. There 
is a rights tradition dating back to the Magna Carta and more recently expressed 
in the Human Rights Act 1998, but the extent to which this has at its core dignity 
as a moral concept (rather than political and legal concepts related to liberty and 
equality for example) is questionable. Certainly it is difficult to make the case that 
Scottish approaches to risk and security in prisons (in the middle part of the 
twentieth century) – even factoring in the tradition of welfarism – were based on 
discourses that incorporated a dignity frame. In fact, this alliance between risk 
and a tolerance of degradation far better represents the situation.  
Further, the reference to fears surrounding ‘contamination’, cited in Simon’s 
above quote, those which helped to legitimize LWOP, also feature in the archival 
record relating to the early development of the small units network (see Chapter 
Three). There is a sense that prison officials were able to justify brutalizing places 
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such as the Digger and the Cages, as well as expand the network more generally 
(even if that evolution occurred in ways that were sometimes far more progressive 
and dignity-promoting than many were comfortable with, i.e. the BSU) precisely 
because they connected danger with contagion. Consequently, a process of 
dehumanization was required to support this set of beliefs. In other words, to 
justify segregation as a means of mitigating risk, there must also be a diminishing 
of moral respect for the people who cause the violence – those who provoke the 
fear. This dehumanization is partly ensured linguistically i.e. via the language of 
‘the worst of the worst’, which very definitely sets apart these prisoners first from 
other prisoners and secondly from the larger moral community of human beings. 
They are made distinctly ‘other’.  
In her study of cruelty, Kathleen Taylor (2009:7-8) examines what she terms the 
‘continuum of otherization’, which ‘expresses the sense of creating an 
increasingly impassable social gulf between Us and Them’. It becomes easier to 
otherize the prisoners against whom we impose excessively restrictive segregation 
measures if we view their violent recalcitrance not only through a pragmatic 
security lens but also through a moral lens. In other words, when we understand 
their behaviour – and by extension them – as deliberately immoral rather than 
simply administratively disruptive, our fearful and hostile responses to them 
become more seemingly legitimate. We can then rationalize almost any treatment. 
If we infuse the violence of some prisoners with the motive of cruelty, as we 
appear to do when we considering ‘the worst of the worst’, we may ourselves fall 
into spirals of callousness entirely of our making.    
The essence trap is psychologically satisfying. It keeps out the dirt and the 
danger, preserving our pleasant self-image as justified people who act 
from reasonable motives. The downside, of course, is that the dirt and the 
danger are conceptualized as a malevolent, unchangeable agent: a devil 
whose only purpose is to destroy. This shuts down any attempt at 
understanding, presenting cruelty as something other than human, an 
essentially evil force on which our explanations can get no purchase. 
Viewing cruelty as part of an unchangeable human nature leaves us with 




In the Scottish context (as well as in the case of LWOP), the removal of 
‘problem’ prisoners from general circulation (or the permanent incapacitation of 
offenders from public circulation) by way of segregated housing is in part 
justified through a similar ‘bad apple’ thesis, one that essentialises such prisoners 
as morally bad, as human abnormalities requiring specialist management, which 
often amounted to inhuman treatment. This thesis, argues King (1985), is ‘partial 
and self-defeating’; it fosters the resentments that may, in some cases, generate 
more violence, more resistance, more disorder.  
The partiality of the ‘essence trap’ was especially well examined in a report by 
the Gateway exchange (1987)14 examining the causes of the late 1980s roof-top 
protests at Peterhead prison. The authors of that report made the case that this 
series of extreme disruption was a product of a particular environmental and 
relational culture, rather than a question of personal pathology.  
Violence in regimes such as Peterhead is not an irrational response to a 
peaceful and calm situation or an aberration in an otherwise smooth-
running system. It is an inevitable and rational reaction to a violent and 
repressive regime. (p.30) 
Whilst a welcome counterpunch to the more hostile and essentialising analyses 
offered by some commentators, especially within the media, there are grounds to 
question the inevitability of such a response to the extent that such an idea 
fundamentally destroys any notion of human autonomy. If external forces and 
conditions can wholly determine a person’s behaviour, in spite of himself, this is 
incompatible with self-possession, much less the notion of the spirit, as 
conceptualised by Jeffreys. In any case, the material fact that not all prisoners 
kept in these repressive conditions rebelled is evidence enough that human will is 
more complicated than the inevitability argument maintains. The rational 
component of Gateway Exchange’s analyses is, by contrast, persuasive. It accords 
with how prisoners themselves understand and interpret their subversive actions 
(see Chapter 4). Moreover, the process of otherization is equally evident 
regarding how prisoners view their captors and, connected, in how they justify 
                                                          
14 A Glasgow-based project set up by former Scottish prison Jimmy Boyle and his wife Sarah, 
aimed primarily.at supporting people away from drug addiction.  
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their often violent behaviour towards them. As quoted in the Gateway Exchange 
report, taken from prisoners’ questionnaires, “some [officers] are just pure dogs” 
(p.74). Revealingly, another prisoner wrote in a letter after he had been informed 
that his sanction of reduced privileges had been extended due to an administrative 
error,  “I just decided to go on a [dirty] protest as I’d been treated like excreta so 
that’s what I’d given them” (p.83). 
Since isolated prisoners have little interaction with others, their 
deterioration may go unobserved. Even when prisoners ‘act-out’ or 
completely shut off psychologically, they are more likely to be viewed by 
guards and, more worrying, by prison medical professionals, as 
malingering, or being ‘bad’ rather than ‘mad’. (Shalev, 2011:198) 
 
An Attempt at Defining Dignity 
While dignity is marshalled widely in academic, public and legal arenas, its 
precise, substantive content and scope are rarely identified much less examined 
(beyond the world of academic philosophy), which in turn undermines its 
credibility in the face of the challenges that might be made against it, and also 
creates a sort of conceptual vacuum. It is not enough to merely name dignity 
when interrogating questionable practices or interpreting particular perspectives 
without also identifying and, crucially, justifying its parameters. Such a task is 
necessary not least because specific formulations of dignity – and, despite the 
appearance of consensus there remain important distinctions – contain their own 
ideological assumptions with attending and differentiated implications for policy 
and practice. Further, given the many critiques and variations throughout history 
and into the present, spanning religious, political and philosophical terrains, 
dignity ought to be more fully articulated in each case where it is used.  
The underlying premise of dignity which my analysis assumes is that it is 
something that must be self-realised rather than simply possessed by default. This 
is a challenge to codified and internationally recognised conceptions of it, which 
uniformly emphasize the foundational aspects of dignity – the bedrock upon 
which all rights are grounded, etc. – and also, crucially, frame it as something 
intrinsic to the human condition. This conception is best illustrated in the opening 
161 
 
lines of the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1945), 
which states, “Whereas the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal 
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice, and peace in the world…” An obvious problem here is one of 
facts: material realities across time and space stand as testament to the repeated, 
quotidian and ruthless manner in which the dignity of individuals (and often 
whole communities too) is not only minimally disrespected but brutally violated. 
That human beings can have their dignity violated at all should alert us to the fact 
that our dignity is itself conditional, thus undermining the “inalienability” 
argument. Pollmann (2005; 2011) asserts that it is precisely because human 
beings do not have equal human dignity (understood as an inviolable value) that 
necessitates a framework of equal human rights. This argument is persuasive and 
one that my analysis conforms to.  
Within the European rights tradition in particular the dignity concept has come to 
assume a central position. Dignity is culturally potent and ubiquitous: it is 
codified by international and regional human rights instruments as well as in 
national case law; it is employed in legal judgements; it features in political 
speeches and people’s movements; it is mobilised in myriad discourses as a 
barometer-value, a sovereign concept against which action is measured; it is a 
cultural motif for caring, progressive institutions and societies. In such ways, 
dignity is variously understood and applied as a legal principle, a rhetorical device, 
a morally charged crowd-pleaser, a conceptual bulwark against powers that are 
perceived as unjust, illegitimate or degrading, and, as a core value underlying 
‘best practice’ models.  
With reference to key philosophical versions of dignity, charting its foremost 
determinants of Attribute, Status and Behaviour, my aim here is to settle on a 
relatively sealed and derivative understanding of the dignity concept, that which 
counters each of the three concerns above. Dignity is defined here as 1. the 
realisation of the autonomy potential, 2. the expression of identity, and 3. the 
experience of (self)respect i.e. the mutually determining dynamic between our 
sense of moral worth and the moral worth conferred by others through their 
treatment of us. On this basis, the seemingly nebulous concept becomes precise. 
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Each component part is shown to be necessary but insufficient – if dignity means 
autonomy alone then we would have to limit, or deny altogether, the dignity of 
individuals’ whose agency is impaired – and, each feeds into and is a reflection of 
the core idea of human freedom. Freedom is not reductively understood as merely 
choice-between-options but rather it is understood in the Hegelian sense of a 
shading together of choice, moral will and the required external conditions within 
which such freedom may be realised. With respect to moral will, there are also 
clear parallels with the Kantian conception of internal moral law or ‘conscience’. 
Finally, the extent to which dignity may be re-appropriated is rendered negligible; 
it would have to be rejected out of hand in favour of another concept entirely.  
In deciding what we do (autonomy), who we are (identity), and the moral worth 
we attach to ourselves and that which is ascribed to us by others (self-respect and 
respect from others), we have dignity. Outside coercion and constraints, at both 
individual and institutional levels, bear down on dignity, limiting the 
circumstances for its free expression in ways that may be beyond our control. 
However, according to radical existentialism, our particular state of mind is 
always and necessarily our own. Yet, if the fullness of dignity is self-realised then 
it is fragile because human beings are fragile. We are vulnerable to every kind of 
harm, self-inflicted and externally imposed, we have a unique weakness to suffer 
(and commit) acts of humiliation (Rorty, 1989), our bodies are frail and our minds 
even more so. In the face of all this potential suffering, we are susceptible to 
Sartre’s dreaded state of ‘bad faith’ – a denial of our ability to choose how we 
respond to it. The burden of responsibility is heavy and would seem to suggest a 
troubling blame-element, that a stripping of one’s dignity is attributable to one’s 
own failures. To avoid the full and dubious implications of this, a qualified form 
of existentialism is required here since might there be some experiences, which, 
given their qualitative intensity, overpower the will and thus absolve us of total 
blame in situations of dignity violation? The Norwegian philosopher Vetlesen 
contends that there is. Considering pain, he asserts, “when we are really seized by 
something, this means that we are moved, not that we move” (2009:48). His 
argument is that in situations of physical and physic pain, particularly when they 
are in extremis and enduring, the experience is immersive, “characterized by its 
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lack of distance, by its directness: my pain fills me, marks me, with an immediacy 
that is in stark contrast to Sartre’s analysis (of choice and freedom)” (Vetlesen, 
2009:73). This is important because if pain is affective, and if impediments to the 
freedom of realising dignity are most pronounced in situations of pain, then in the 
short term at least we are controlled by pain, to a greater or lesser extent. Total 
self-determination in terms of our attitudes and responses (and thus complete 
blame) is thereby restricted. Given that experiences of dirty protests tend to occur 
in contexts of pain, Vetlesen’s insights become relevant.  
 
However, while his argument is convincing the second premise here is more open 
to question than the first since not all pain may be considered harmful and 
therefore not all pain may be considered a threat against dignity.  Within a 
specifically phenomenological frame, certain kinds of pain, namely anxiety 
(Angst) as distinct from fear, are considered generative of authenticity 
(Eigentlichkeit) – a quality of experience that characterises dignity. In Being and 
Time, for instance, Heidegger (1962) maintains that reflecting earnestly on 
mortality in a detached manner – an activity bound to produce the fundamental 
‘attunement’ of anxiety, although also a mood of calm - breaks us from the habit 
of unthinking conformity (a blindness to consciousness), from living un-free, and 
does so by creating the very entry point we require in order to achieve a more 
authentic engagement with our being-in-the-world (and our inevitable not-being). 
Interpreting Heidegger, McKenzie calls this “an ontological emancipation from 
the ideologies of finitude’s forgetting of itself” (2008:573).  
 
To qualify Vetlesen’s position then we might follow insights from Mill’s On 
Liberty, by marking a distinction between pain and harm. The latter category he 
considers an obstruction to self-development and therefore ‘individuality’ – a 
concept Mill considered a primary good, imagined in terms not dissimilar to the 
Aristotelian notion of eudemonia. Therefore, we might agree that not all pain 
constitutes harm but still assert that all harm constitutes pain. The significance of 
this point is that the dignity concept (as a lived experience and as a topic for 
intellectual debate) dominates the scene only in situations where it is most 
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vulnerable to violation. And, in such cases, including for instance, rape, torture, 
forced labour, certain forms of imprisonment, etc. the harms exacted are always 
associated with pain, of one sort or another. So, while we may hold that dignity is 
a universal human potential, an intrinsic possibility, we must also acknowledge 
that it is not an inevitable reality. Not only does this undermine arguments of 
inviolability, but it also releases the harmed from the total weight of blame when 
their dignity is felt to be lost. This is not to say that removing blame diminishes 
all responsibility for what happens next.  Blame is a blunt and malignant concept; 
it’s a stop-sign, an end-point, an immobilising state that at its worst prevents 
change. But, if dignity is self-realised then after the fact of its violation it may be 
reclaimed from within. That individuals have the potential to do so may bestow 
upon them the responsibility for actually doing so, which signifies empowerment 
as much as it implies burden. Demanding though this is, it is an essential 
ingredient of freedom and dignity. What is really interesting here, for the purpose 
of exploring dirty protests in particular, is how people who are in pain, those who 
have been harmed, attempt to reassert their dignity. The manner of those attempts 
reveals something about what dignity is, the myriad ways its abuse may be 
countered, and the curious distance that is sometimes evident between acts that 
are dignified and the struggle to attain dignity. In other words, not all dignity 
struggles may be considered dignified. The following sections explore in more 
detail the three aforementioned dignity components. This constitutes the prelude 
to a discussion of the precise ways that dignity may (and may not) manifest 
through dirty protests, or more precisely, through the stories people tell about 
them.  
Dignity as Attribute (the Autonomy Potential) 
At its most basic autonomy means self-authorship. It means thinking, feeling and, 
of most significance, acting in ways that are self-determined. It means choosing 
to perform a particular action when one could have chosen otherwise. This is the 
simplest basis of free agency, which, in a rather reductive and superficial manner, 
Sartre considers inescapable: “What is not possible is not to choose. I can always 
choose, but ought to know that if I do not choose, I am still choosing.” 
(E&HE:41). Professions of this sort imply total, absolute freedom and, therefore, 
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full autonomy in every instance of human experience. Hence, the extent to which 
the autonomy-potential is realised (or accepted) is entirely dependent on the 
individual. I am choosing to adapt this position and to embrace instead more 
nuanced and layered interpretations of autonomy. The first and undisputed 
premise of it is that the processes by which we are able to think and act for 
ourselves emerge from, and are embedded in, rational subjective consciousness. 
Autonomy, therefore, is a power as much as an attribute: the attribute of Reason; 
the power to exercise it. Pascal put it like this: 
Thought constitutes the greatness of man (346)....Man is but a reed, the 
most feeble thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed...All our dignity 
consists then in thought. By it we must elevate ourselves, and not by space 
and time which we cannot fill (347)...It is not by space that I must seek my 
dignity, but from the government of my thought (348). (Pascal, trans. by 
Trotter, 1909, Section VI) 
Lingering on this passage at least two questions present themselves: first, if 
reason is an intrinsic and necessary condition of being human – and it matters 
little whether it is understood as gifted from God (Aquinas) or merely a 
prerequisite of existence (Sartre) - then in what sense can autonomy be 
understood as a potentiality as opposed to a reality-by-default? Secondly, the 
reference to ‘elevating oneself’ seems to suggest a moral component, that it is 
good and right to exercise free thought, that autonomy is morally valuable. The 
question is, how exactly is morality connected to agency? In addressing the first 
of these problems, we could look to Hegel, who offers a useful qualification by 
separating out the form and content of reason. Form, he argues, “is reason as 
speculative knowing, and content is reason as the substantial essence of actuality, 
whether ethical or natural” (PR Preface). This follows Hegel’s suggestion that 
“every individual is a child of his time” - we are situated in the present so that 
what fills our thought (reason’s content) is produced by the objective world, 
shaped by external variables and made subjective through the form of reasoning. 
The implication of this, which Hegel precedes to examine, is that self-will alone, 
or the basic formulation of freedom-to-choose, is an arbitrary freedom. Rather, 
thinking (and acting) autonomously in the fullest sense, i.e. in the freest sense, 
requires a “(release) from every relation of dependence on anything else” (PR, 
166 
 
S.23), that is to say, thinking independently of the particulars of objective nature 
that constitute reason’s content.  
Thus, the movement from the potential for autonomy to its fullest actual 
expression is the difference between having a capability to think, in the first 
instance, and, in the second, both thinking in a particular way – i.e. independently 
of nature’s variables – whilst also having the capacity to act accordingly. Here 
questions of morality and ethics surface. Hegel takes us from the simple will-to-
choose to the more superior moral will, which entails exercising will with a 
conception of its own ‘Right’ in so doing. Hegel calls this, “free will which wills 
the free will” (PR S.23), meaning that moral will is a profound recognition of 
one’s own subjectivity so that I can be held explicitly responsible for my actions 
only when they are deliberate and accord to my own self-acknowledged 
intentions. There are echoes of Kantian thought in this analysis insofar as 
‘intention’ may be allied with the notion of ‘conscience’, which in turn may be 
understood as internal ‘moral law’. In this way, according to Kant, rational 
consciousness and the attending “autonomy of the will”, is both the foundation of 
moral law itself and the means by which we are able to enact it as a duty. It 
reveals the Categorical Imperative because, whilst knowledge of duty is accessed 
internally, that duty can be universalized – I need not burrow too far into this 
aspect of Kantian philosophy. Kant says this of autonomy (the ‘law’ he speaks of 
is that which is internal): 
Nothing can have a worth other than that which the law determines for it. 
But the law giving itself, which determines all worth, must for that reason 
have a dignity, that is, an unconditional, incomparable worth; and the 
word respect alone provides a becoming expression for the estimate of it 
that a rational being must give. Autonomy is therefore the ground of the 
dignity of human nature and of every rational nature (Ak 4:436).  
 
Autonomy is thus bound to moral agency, the dignity of which, as an “inner 
value”, is not merely about making choices but about making the right choices. 
Such choices are determined by adherence to internal moral law as an expression 
of the moral will. This is a duty. “In duty” writes Hegel, “the individual finds his 
liberation...In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom” (PR, III:149). 
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Hegel more than Kant extends this point further by introducing the concept of an 
‘ethical life’, the leading of which requires particular kinds of social and political 
institutions in order to ensure the full exercise of freedom. This he calls the 
‘system of right’...“the realm of freedom made actual” (PR). Simply following the 
laws or customs of a particular society, without question, may constitutes 
rectitude, but crucially for Hegel this concept is distinguishable from morality, 
indeed it is “something comparatively inferior, something beyond which still 
higher demands must be made on oneself and others” (PR, III:150). In addressing 
how to live an ethical life through the exercise of autonomy Hegel quotes 
Pythagoras: “Make him a citizen of a state with good laws” (PR, III:153).  An 
inevitable dilemma here relates to how one should live an ethical life in a state 
with bad laws, or those which are perceived to be so.  
How might these insights about autonomy be applied to a study of dignity and 
prisoner resistance? One response is that by understanding the distinction between 
autonomy-potential and autonomy-capacity (i.e. the realisation of it) questions 
subsequently emerge regarding the legitimacy of external arrangements, those 
which might be considered illegitimate insofar as they restrict the capacity for 
autonomous action. Following this, we might consider forms of resistance against 
such arrangements as a pursuit of dignity and not merely a reactionary product of 
frustration or bitterness. In his slim but valuable survey of dignity, Rosen 
(2012:101) asks, “what does it mean to deprive someone of dignity?...What might 
it mean to “exercise” (or be prevented from exercising)” our dignity? A pertinent 
question when reflecting on the objectively degrading penal environments that 
often contextualise dirty protests. Contained in segregated spaces and in pain, 
prisoner X might refuse to relinquish his power for autonomy (as a Hegelian 
Right), he might insist upon exerting it against the prohibitions that seem to limit 
it, even perhaps with violent force and, moreover, he may do so in ways that 
contravene not just the system in which he is kept but also his own moral law. 
The fight is dirty. But, in failing to exercise moral will in favour of the inferior 
will-to-choose, as in, choosing action precisely because it violates that which is 
allowed (throwing shit bombs for instance), does this automatically negate the 
dignity aspect of his action? Another question from Rosen worth considering: 
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“Does the state’s duty to protect ‘the dignity of the human person’ entail that it 
has the right to prohibit people from choosing to behave in undignified ways?” 
(2011:69).  
Suppose the same prisoner passively accepts the arrangements that he maintains 
are illegitimate. What if he chooses to ‘not choose’ autonomous resistance? Is it 
possible this would be experienced as a dignity waiver, as a self-created un-
freedom? Yes. Commenting on instances of staff brutality Campbell says this: 
The pain, the physical pain is intense sure enough, constant and seeming 
to go for all eternity but the emotional pain of life in the acceptance of the 
alternative is by far more the greater. I would rather die a thousand deaths 
then live one single day without protest. Suppression of the outrage I feel 
brings pain in equal measure. Constant exposure to such pain of such a life 
threatening quality brings its own kind of insanity to survive in an 
environment where one has to go half mad to stay half sane. (Campbell, 
2002:49-50) 
However, is it not also possible that prisoner X might choose to reject both 
positions above and instead express his full autonomy by refusing to internalize 
the indignities heaped upon him whilst at the same time refusing to hurl 
indignities at those who shame him? The fight may be clean. Would this be a 
different kind of resistance, one that is not merely acting for dignity but also 
acting in dignity? The sense of authentic, fully realised self and the moral clarity 
that might be achieved in that case is staggering, yet by insisting that this and only 
this may constitute a dignity struggle are we asking too much of people, 
particularly given what has been said above regarding the dynamic between 
human vulnerability and the immersive quality of pain?  
Autonomy may be considered the principal component of dignity since it 
functions to enable its two other parts, at least minimally: identity and 
(self)respect. As such it is owed the greatest emphasis. But this is not to suggest 
that autonomy alone is sufficient for dignity for if it can be held that the exercise 
of autonomy is in some ways contingent on unchosen factors, both external and 
internal, and I maintain that it can, then the importance of other values are vital if 
dignity is to be truly realised. It is not only how we project into the world through 
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action which secures our dignity but also how we are treated by others, and 
indeed how we understand ourselves. These elements are necessarily linked.  
Dignity as Status (Identity) 
Personal identity represents self-hood, the criterion of which seems to amount to 
individual permutations of: bodily recognition; exposure to particular social 
worlds; membership among the places and people of our lives; the bank of 
memories from which we draw, sometimes subconsciously; and, awareness of 
(and how we project) our internal emotional landscapes. The variables that help to 
shape personal identity are many: There is a physical aspect, i.e. physiological 
signifiers of who we are, our genes, our brains, the colour of our skin, etc. – some 
reductionists would argue that this is all identity really means (see Parfit, 1971); 
there is a socio-cultural aspect i.e. alignment to sets of values and attitudes 
entrenched in particular political/social/economic contexts and at every level of 
‘community’ (family, workplace, city, state, etc.); intimately linked, there is also a 
behavioural aspect, i.e. how we choose to perform our identity given our material 
and cultural situation. Our sense of self-hood may be internally constructed via 
each of these variables but the manner in which identity is formed, enacted, and 
bestowed, is not independent of them. Rather, identity is contingent upon, and 
manifests through, recognizable characteristics and external factors, only some of 
which are self-determined. Yet dependence on these variables may not preclude 
the possibility of expressing personal identity, elements of it at least, in ways that 
we ourselves choose. This is important when thinking about how we fully realise 
dignity and indeed about how it may be denied to us. 
If our sense of identity is rooted in a notion of self-hood, however that may be 
constructed, then how important is the relationship between my identity and your 
identity? Is there a relationship insofar as one serves to inform the other?  
Referencing Robert Kegan’s (1982) ideas in The Evolving Self, Donna Hicks, a 
practitioner in conflict resolution with a particular interest in the dignity concept, 
suggests that,  
Throughout our lives, our inner worlds are dominated by a struggle 
between the ontological drives to individuate, to become who we are, 
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separate from all others, and to integrate, to remain connected, to belong, 
to be a part of something greater than ourselves. (2011:35) 
This modern and now commonplace view has its roots in Hegel’s work 
Phenomenology of the Spirit, where, and perhaps for the first time, individual 
self-consciousness was understood in terms of an encounter between the I and the 
self-consciousness of the Other. On Hegel’s reading, initially this encounter 
collapses into a relationship of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ (the title of the section 
exploring these ideas), or what is more popularly referred to as the Master/Slave 
dialectic. Without going into detail, the relevant point here is that self-
consciousness, and the connotative sense of self-hood (identity at its most 
fundamental), is relational. Owing much to this idea, Heidegger develops the 
ontological concept of Dasein – the Being of Persons as opposed to the Being of 
Objects – and maintains that Dasein exists in relation to, and through interaction 
with, others. Sartre too, with his focus on ‘intersubjectivity’, pursues this idea, 
though in a different way. We might then consider identity formation and its 
performance as a sort of feedback loop, absorbing and reacting back onto the 
identity of others - both the projection of their own identities and the projection of 
how they understand ours. A hall of mirrors. With respect to dirty protests this 
claim has a bearing when considering how prisoners and those who guard them 
seem to create each other, how they seem to construct the identity of the other and 
how this then shapes their own. Often this dynamic is fueled by mis-perceptions 
and faulty assumptions nurturing repetitive and cancerous hostilities, each party 
fighting to be Master not Slave. A shame dimension might also be introduced 
here via Sartre’s concept of ‘the look’, whereby a sense of one’s own self-hood 
and identity may inspire shame through others’ perception of it: “The other is the 
indispensable mediator between myself and me. I am ashamed of myself as I 
appear to the other” (EHE:246).  
If dignity entails being true to who you understand yourself as being, not 
acquiescing to how others identify you, then trapped within an identity not 
entirely chosen and one that may engender shame, the violence committed by 
both prisoners and prison officers might be understood as an ignorance of self, an 
alienated self where identity is realised only partially – the part that does not 
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accord to one’s own moral will. Winning looks a lot like losing, self-harm by 
another name, call it strength, honour, respect, a distinct brand of muscular, 
masculine heroism, but we’ll come to that.  
In terms of identity as a status, it seems that an important facet of personal 
identity is its insistence on the apparent uniqueness of human beings - our 
difference in relation to other individuals and in relation to all other species. 
Cicero believed that our distinction in the animal world is one basis of our dignity 
and, therefore, in the broadest possible sense identity may be taken as the status of 
being human. Here we might re-introduce the idea of rational self-consciousness 
and from there draw a link between human identity and personhood. In Hegel’s 
words:  
‘Person’ is essentially different from ‘subject’, since ‘subject’ is only the 
possibility of personality; every living thing of any sort is a subject. A 
person, then, is a subject aware of this subjectivity, since in personality it 
is of myself alone that I am aware” (PR, I:35). 
 In contemporary societies this larger notion of species-order is translated into 
social hierarchies, very much based on public and personal identities and largely a 
product of erroneous and bigoted reasoning. Waldron (2013:27) defines status, 
albeit as it manifests within law, as “a particular package of rights, powers, 
disabilities, duties, privileges, immunities, and liabilities accruing to a person by 
virtue of the condition or situation they are in” (see also Waldron 2012). The 
positioning of particular identities within structures of power is time and context 
specific yet in every case there is a formula of Identity-Status-Dignity. That to 
say, certain identities are assigned a particular status, they are subsequently 
invested with varying degrees of social value (and dignity), and often with a 
disturbing if not moronic arbitrary logic. At a broader and more formal level, the 
historically eminent status of particular social identities (that of being wealthy, 
aristocratic, occupationally successful, etc.), has been the fundamental grounds of 
dignity. The very language is telling; that such persons are labelled ‘dignitaries’ 
symbolises a much deeper historical connection between social identity status and 
dignity. Status then was the first premise of dignity so that however such people 
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acted their behaviour might be deemed dignified simply by reference to the 
authority that their raised social position (and identity) bestowed.  
In summary, the dignity aspect of identity is having both the means to create 
individuality and also to express difference. In this sense then identity, or 
personhood, entails the exercise of autonomy – the realisation of the reason-
giving autonomy potential – since “reason is purposive activity” (Hegel, PR). But 
it also requires enabling external conditions. Namely, that we are free to be who 
we understand ourselves as being (and to perform acts to express this), and that 
we are protected from the imposition of hierarchical social ordering, that which 
values the dignity of specific identities in ways that are discriminatory. Dignity-
as-Status in the sense of social/class distinctions has become redundant, at least 
comparatively, but assignations of status more broadly defined in terms of 
physical, cultural and behavioural identities remain apparent. Linking the points 
made above regarding identity as relational and identity as deserving (or not) of 
dignity, Pinker says this: 
Dignity is a phenomenon of human perception. Certain signals from the 
world trigger an attribution in the mind of a perceiver...Certain features in 
another human being trigger ascriptions of worth. These features include 
signs of composure, cleanliness, maturity, attractiveness and control of the 
body. The perception of dignity in turn elicits a response in the 
perceiver...the appearance of dignity triggers a desire to esteem and 
respect the dignified person. (2008:5) 
Neatly, this takes us to the final dignity component, that of (self)respect.  
Dignity as Behaviour (Self/Respect) 
Self-respect is another name for self-love, a deep-rooted sense of personal moral 
worth, its physical expression is a standing tall in the world as opposed to a 
shrinking posture, cowering apologetically. It is reminiscent of Kant’s notion of 
pride, distinct from egotism or vanity, explained in the following terms, 
(Arrogance) differs from pride proper...which is love of honour that is a 
concern to yield nothing of one’s dignity in comparison with others (so 
that the adjective ‘noble’ is usually added to ‘pride’); for arrogance 
demands from others a respect it denies them. (AK 6:465) 
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To experience (self)respect, two core dynamics are operative: the first is between 
the interior and exterior self, bringing to mind the question of whether self-respect 
is constituted by our thinking and feeling in particular ways subsequently 
translated into behaviour, or by our behaviour translated into how we think and 
feel. It has been argued that this dynamic is the foundation of dignity (see 
Margalit, 1996). The second is the relationship between self-respect and the 
respect we both receive and offer to others, which Kant’s above quote makes 
plain. With regard to the former, Kant has more to say: 
From our capacity for internal law-giving and from the (natural) man 
feeling himself compelled to revere the (moral) man within his own 
person, at the same time there comes exaltation and the highest self-
esteem, the feeling of his inner worth…in terms of which he is above any 
price…and possesses an inalienable dignity…which instils in him respect 
for himself. (AK 6:436) 
Following Pollmann (2005), I would challenge this last claim, asserting instead 
that (wo)man possesses inherent potential for dignity. Maintaining that something 
is inherent is not the same as claiming its inviolability for dignity can be taken 
away from and given away by the possessor without necessarily undermining 
claims of its innateness. In any case, this movement from self-respect in the first 
instance to respect received and offered to others in the second is perhaps a more 
convincing position. Kuch frames it like this: 
While self-respect refers to an internal relation of a person to herself, 
dignity is the external “lived” embodiment of self-respect. Respect for 
others is the necessary source of the possibility to gain a normative 
relation towards oneself, not just in the sense of a feeling of self-worth but 
also in the sense of self-respect. (2011:42-43) 
According to this reading, humiliation (and the dignity violation it entails) is, 
argues Kuch (2011:44), a “radical loss of recognition that may be effected 
through practices of exclusion”. Such practices may amount to feelings of shame, 
that one’s honour and thus one’s self-respect is threatened. Where the lack of 
recognition is most pronounced, the disrespect most extreme, and the shame of 
this most fully internalised, a person’s sense of self-worth and honour hangs 
perilously. A series of choices must be made. How can and do people react in this 
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situation? Lynd (1958) considers that death may be preferable to a life of shame, 
which, in the penal context, has particular resonances in relation to deaths in 
custody. But for those who choose life – and from prisoners’ testimonies the 
struggle is often perceived in life and death terms, bodily and psychically, 
however melodramatic that might appear from the outside – what does it mean to 
reassert one’s honour and by extension one’s dignity?  An entire discussion could 
be had about the nature of this honour concept, specifically within penal settings. 
Here it is enough to say that honour is often a primary concern amongst prisoners, 
one that is emphasised through various rituals of behaviour linked to risk-taking 
and demonstrations of defiance, especially violence. It is also a concept that is 
tightly-bound to individual self-worth and therefore self-respect. For some 
prisoners (certainly those whose testimonies I am using here), “proving” oneself 
as honourable, as self-respecting, often involves behaving as the Hardman – an 
identity profoundly entrenched within certain prison cultures and within the 
places from which many prisoners come. In this sense claiming (self)respect 
conforms to the formulation of dignity as Behaviour. Reflecting on past research 
in certain spaces of Scottish penal segregation Sparks offers some foundational 
insights that are valuable here and worth quoting in full. What is ironic, he asserts, 
is, 
the fact that that those who undertake some of the most extreme forms of 
violence (as in hostage taking for example) or of apparent self-abasement 
(‘dirty protests’, hunger strikes) are precisely those most likely to see their 
own actions in a chivalric language of honour and integrity. It is very 
difficult for us (and how much more so for the guards who can actually 
smell the consequences of their own regimes and who, moreover, know 
that it is an act of hostility against them) to contemplate the prospect of a 
man smeared in his own faeces as an assertion of self-esteem. But I think 
it can only be really so understood. It is perhaps simply this which makes 
cycles of opposition so intractable, namely that the prisoner regards 
himself – his self – as under attack. (2002:561) 
 
This assault against the person threatens to cast a veil of powerlessness over him, 
rendering the self invisible to others, or worse, obstructing self-access. As we 
shall see, prisoners who use DPs make themselves utterly, shockingly visible and 
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in the most visceral of way. In so doing some prisoners who use DPs create a 
version of themselves of which they feel they can be proud. The attainment of 
moral worth – or “self-esteem” – is far more complex than it might appear and the 
root of contradiction is captured uniquely well in Sparks’ above quote. Deploying 
one’s bodily substances as a method of resistance communicates, amongst other 
things, “This is me! I am present...all over the walls, all over you!” Bodily 
excretions demand total attention: sensory attention, emotional attention, 
cognitive attention. My body is your focus. “I” am your focus. Behaviour of this 
kind commands a particular kind of recognition from others; it’s a performance 
requiring an audience, provoking a reaction. Yet in addition to the relational 
dynamic between the I and the Other in securing this recognition, there is also an 
internal relationship of self-recognition, whereby my behaviour is rendered visible 
and valuable to me. As a counterpoint to narratives of honour  in suffering (self-
attached to dirty actions) there is also the Stoic belief in the dignity of suffering 
with countenance, that ‘still, small voice’ within enabling fortitude under attack 
and so reinforcing the integrity of the self to the self in triumph over one’s 
attacker and over one’s own weakness.  This may constitute a morally superior 
experience which provides a fuller and more sustaining realisation of dignity. 
That we have an internal moral will and that our capacity to adhere to its precepts 
allows us to withstand certain impulses without surrendering to them, exposes 
where (and how) dignity as an attribute operates in tandem with dignity as both 
status and behaviour. To respect a person, including oneself, means to recognise 
as valuable individual capacity to choose (autonomy), individual qualities of self-
hood (identity) and the concrete means that individuals employ to make them real, 
i.e. how they behave.  
Of course it is possible to reject and reprimand certain kinds of choices, identities 
and behaviours, on the grounds of harmfulness for instance, and to do so within a 
context of respect as well as of legitimacy. It is in this vein that justifications are 
deployed by penal authorities for the repression of rebellious behaviour and for 
subsequent punishment of prisoners. From a Hegelian perspective that 
containment (and the censure it occasions) represents a return to moral good for 
“to penalise the criminal is to annul the crime and to restore the right” (PR, I:99). 
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From a dignity perspective – and Hegel does connect dignity to the Right – such 
censure acknowledges a person’s failure to claim their own dignity to the possible 
detriment of others’ and thus formal reprimand re-establishes something of what 
was lost, it is intended as the first premise of dignity-reclamation. While Hegel 
maintains that “the state is the actuality of the ethical Idea” (PR, III:257), i.e. the 
structure within which an ethical life is made possible, this does not necessarily 
mean that all practices of state censure or repression conform to the Law of Right. 
Hegel concedes that “there may be a discrepancy between the content of the law 
and the principle of rightness” (PR, III:212). Indeed, the evidence of history 
illustrates just how far and how low state force has been exercised, so 
undermining the ‘respect’ element in particular, and the Right more generally, of 
the control exerted over others. More broadly, it should be noted as a point of 
repeated concern that criminal justice systems in the real word rarely meet their 
own aspirations in this regard; in fact, more commonly they do the reverse, and 
how could they not given what we task them with? But that is a much larger 
question. 
To end this brief dignity tour, the central argument I am proposing - that which 
underpins the final chapters of this work - is that morally inferior behaviour does 
not exclude all possibility of that behaviour containing dignity, nor is it 
necessarily associated with regressive moral development. Dignity is not an 
inviolable possession-by-default and therefore we need not consider it a binary 
state; rather, it might manifest in degrees in the same way that all ideal values 
do15. Secondly, the mere fact of striving for a value represents a personal 
commitment to it. The individual believes in the worth of his own dignity, he 
fights against what he perceives as the efforts of others to violate it. He might do 
so in ways that both fail to reclaim it absolutely and serve to infringe the dignity 
of others (his perceived attacker). But this may speak to the extent of suffering 
that he understands himself as inhabiting (and his human fragility in the face of it) 
and also it might say something about the intractability of the conflict to which 
Sparks refers; both sides trapped in an intense battle, both arguably seeking the 
                                                          
15 I use the term ‘value’ instead of ‘virtue’ (though the two share important constitutive features) 
in order to avoid questions relating to Aristotle’s doctrine of the Mean, e.g.  if dignity is a virtue, 
at what point does an individual have too much dignity? 
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same value, both ultimately failing to “win”. Far from being ‘animalistic’, which 
is really just another word for amoral behaviour fueled by instinct alone, this un-
won struggle represents a rational desire for personal moral development. And, 
far from being ‘heroic’, meaning selfless, self-sacrificing mastery over fear, the 
very fact that this struggle is un-won represents the all too human propensity to 
reach for what seems beyond our grasp. Continuing the effort albeit with other 
and better methods is the only direction of moral development 
Autonomy and Desistance 
Whilst dignity contains the three connected components described above, it is 
autonomy which should be considered the master concept such that it enables the 
full expression of both self/respect and identity. Just as a denial of autonomy 
equates to an often crippling indignity (examples of which the next chapter 
discusses in detail), a full recognition of autonomy allows for the positive 
realisation of dignity. This reverse dynamic is especially pertinent when exploring 
the small units in Scotland which approached the autonomy of prisoners in such a 
way (i.e. within the BSU). What then becomes relevant is the precise ways in 
which autonomy has been respected within segregation sites, and the effects this 
has had. The argument advanced in Chapter Six in relation the BSU consider how 
autonomy was manifested spatially, and identifies this as the central explanation 
for the unit’s success at engendering positive change. To the extent that this 
segregation environment instigated a process of desistance from prison-based 
offending, an introduction to the relationship between autonomy and desistance is 
offered here.    
Within desistance research the concept of agency (rather than autonomy) is 
routinely employed to describe the extent to which individuals feel in control of 
and, therefore, both responsible for past actions and hopeful for future prospects. 
Indeed, to ‘engage agentically’ (Paternoster & Pogarsky, 2009) is increasingly 
understood as a significant factor for desistance processes. There are, however, at 
least two central theoretical divides within the literature: (1) theories that 
primarily stress the importance of agency independent of external variables 
(Paternoster & Bushway, 2009), versus those which stress pro-social structural 
178 
 
factors, what Sampson & Laub (1993: 2003) label ‘turning points’, with a 
modified version integrating the two - the ‘subjective-social’ model (LeBel et al, 
2008). (2) For those theorists who place a clear value on individual agency, the 
divide is between whether it is changing social contexts and processes that trigger 
desistance-enabling changes to subjectivity - see for example the ‘theory of 
cognitive transformations’ (Giordano et al, 2002) which depends on external 
‘hooks for change’ - or whether, as Paternoster et al (2015:215) maintain ‘identity 
change comes first in the causal sequence’. Drawing on research within the wider 
field of social theory, what each of these positions appear to share is a general 
definition of agency – in some cases implied rather than stated explicitly – which 
considers agentic action to contain some combination of ‘selfhood, motivation, 
will, purposiveness, intentionality, choice, initiative, freedom, and creativity’ 
(Emirbayer & Mische, 1998:962). In essence, human agency is understood as 
action which is deliberate, of which the individual is at least minimally self-
aware. Beyond that there tends to be less conceptual precision.  
By contrast, philosophical inquiry attends more closely to the ontological 
dimensions of the human will and, by extension, to the moral implications of 
exercising it (or not). The focus is shifted away from untangling the causal 
relationships between purposive human action, along with how it is socially 
situated, and changed behaviour (in this instance with respect to desistance from 
crime), and instead is directed towards what it means for human dignity, 
authenticity and integrity to both express and be denied one’s autonomy. In 
philosophical terms, a person may not be held morally accountable for actions 
that are heteronomous even if they are, in practical terms, agentic; the extent of 
moral (if not legal) culpability is linked to the degree of autonomy a person has 
when acting. Autonomy is distinct from merely deliberate human action, choice-
power, or what social scientists call agency, since a person may voluntarily 
relinquish this power, accept certain restrictions to it, and thereby autonomously 
consent to diminished choice if not responsibility. Put another way, we may 
choose to allow others to limit our choices, but in order for that forfeiture to be 
morally justifiable, it meets the demands of autonomy only when our externally 
determined actions are (a) consented to, albeit minimally, and (b) accord with 
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either our own internal values, or ‘conscience’ as Kant might frame it. Dworkin 
(1981:211) offers the example of Odysseus to illustrate this point: 
Not wanting to be lured by the sirens onto the rocks, he commands his 
men to tie him to the mast and refuse his anticipated later order to be set 
free. He wants to have his freedom limited so that he can survive. Under 
these circumstances why should we regard his autonomy as violated?  
Incorporating Dworkin’s theory, it is possible to hold that a person may have his 
agency restricted, in the sense that his capacity to make decisions is constrained 
by external forces, yet still maintain that he is autonomous if he ‘identifies with 
the influences that motivate him, assimilates them to himself, views himself as the 
kind of person who wishes to be moved in particular ways’ (1981:211). Applied 
in penal contexts, this arrangement is vital if prisons are to operate as safe, 
efficient and morally justifiable environments. To avoid internal tumult as well as 
external challenge, prisons require the daily consent of their captives to conform 
to the systems of the institution (See Sparks, Bottoms & Hay, 1996). Most 
prisoners forfeit their agency on a quotidian basis, ceding control to the 
authorities of a range of minute-by-minute decisions regarding routine matters 
such as food, clothing, timetables, daily activities, and interactions. Individuals 
may waive their power to determine these matters because it is in their self-
interest to do so, or because to resist them would mean acting in ways that do not 
accord with their own values, goals or motivations. In this way surrendering to the 
system of rules and regulations the prison system imposes may limit their agency 
but does not undermine their autonomy.   
If, on the contrary, a person resents being motivated in certain ways, is 
alienated from these influences, would prefer to be the kind of person who 
is motivated in different ways, then these influences, which may be 
causally effective are not viewed by him as ‘his’. (Dworkin, 1981:211).  
Within philosophical debates, contests over the source of the moral norms which 
motivate human action are grounded by a dualism between a priori autonomy, 
where judgments are independent from all external considerations and instead 
rely on principles that are internally dictated, by, for instance, pure moral 
reasoning (the Kantian view), and a posteriori autonomy, which situates 
deliberate action within larger political, social and legal structures, to which 
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individual decision-making is responsive, though emphatically not merely 
reactive (the Aristotelian view). The contemporary philosopher, May (1994), 
refers to this conceptual split in terms of autonomy as ‘self-sufficiency’ (or 
autarkeia) and autonomy as ‘self-rule’. This division may appear similar to, but it 
remains distinct from, the problem of ‘the “chicken and egg” of subjective and 
social factors in desistance from crime’ (Lebel et al, 2008), since, as May 
(1994:141) clarifies, evoking Aristotle’s famous metaphor, even in the more 
flexible case of autonomy as self-rule, ‘external influences do not cause action, 
but rather provide information that the agent, as “helmsmen” then steers 
according to’. This stands in direct opposition to certain strands of desistance 
theory, those which either consider behaviour to be almost entirely the product of 
external forces, whereby subjective changes occur almost by default (Sampson & 
Laub, 1993:2003), or those which consider agentic action to be ‘highly 
contexualised by structure’ (King, 2012:232), that is, not only responsive to 
certain external social forces but in some ways dependent on them (Giodarno et 
al, 2003).   
The starkest parallel between philosophical readings of autonomy and 
criminological readings of agency can be found within Paternoster and 
Bushway’s (2009) ‘Identity Theory of Desistance’. They argue that the ‘act of 
intentional self-change’ prefigures any positive benefits that may be derived from 
changed social circumstances, therefore offenders ‘must first decide to change’ 
(2009:1105-06), or in Aristotelian terms, the individual must be the helmsman. 
Yet, this deviates from philosophical accounts in important respects, chiefly by 
the particular formulation of rational choice theory it adopts, that which is 
underpinned by an explicitly consequentialist rather than a deontological ethic. 
Paternoster & Bushway (2009) argue that offenders are motivated to change via a 
cost-benefit analysis whereby the disadvantages of their past behaviour, along 
with anxieties about the person they would become if they continued on their 
present path (the “feared self”), begin to outweigh the advantages they at one time 
presumably felt. According to this account, agency is very much associated with 
identity, which stands as a secondary deviation from philosophical conceptions of 
autonomy. This coupling of identity and agency is a common feature within the 
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desistance literature, whether informed by rational choice theory, or the 
‘replacement self’ constructed through symbolic interaction (Giordano et al, 
2002), or the ‘rewritten self’ understood in the context of narrative theories 
(Maruna, 2001). This latter version, however, does not necessarily involve the 
substitution of one identity for another; it may instead allow for a ‘continuation’ 
of self, albeit reimagined in a different way. In any case, what is absent from most 
agency accounts, but fundamental to autonomy accounts, is the interweaving of 
free will with human dignity. On questions of the self, the focus is not so much 
oriented towards the subjective and social phenomenon of personal identity, but is 
instead focused on universalized notions of personhood. As intimately bound 
concepts, the practical exercise of free will involves the realisation of human 
dignity. They are mutually determining so that the latter may not be experienced 
in the absence of the former. By this association, the rational mind is not merely 
the source and means of forward (or backward) looking calculation in the manner 
Paternoster & Bushway (2009) suggest but rather it is in rational thought. 
In Pains of Confinement, Sykes (1968) identified the ‘loss of autonomy’ as one of 
the most significant privations suffered by prisoners. He suggested that this loss 
‘does not represent a grant or power freely given by the ruled to the rulers for a 
limited and specific end.’ This formulation of autonomy assumes that when 
individual action is constrained by external structures of power it is the imposition 
of those structures without consent which threatens personal autonomy, as 
opposed to the constraints in themselves. In this way autonomy and authority are 
not necessarily incompatible; rather, it is illegitimate power structures, defined by 
lack of consent (see Sparks et al, 1996), that undermine autonomy. In a similar 
vein, Young (1987:111) argues, ‘The most effective form of control is that which 
facilitates the voluntary and rational recognition of rules…not ones in which 
conformity to rules is imposed by pressures external to them’. Further, Sykes 
argues that ‘the nominal objectives of the custodians are not, in general, the 
objectives of the prisoners’ (1958:68), which implies that action may only be 
autonomous when it accords to an individual’s internal goals and motivations. 
This chimes with Dworkin’s account, cited above. From an ontological 
standpoint, then, autonomy may be considered intrinsically right, to the extent its 
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expression is the central pillar of human dignity, whilst at the same time and in 
certain circumstances it may be instrumentally problematic, potentially leading to 
negative outcomes.  
Prisoners’ subjective notions of honour and integrity are linked to their exercise 
of autonomy in the sense they that considered their resistance to the prison regime 
as a reassertion of their personhood, that which the system, as they viewed it, 
sought to infantilise if not wholly to destroy.  Given this denial of autonomy, 
prisoners were able to justify their often excessively violent defiance. Prior to 
being transferred to the BSU, their deviancy represented not merely agentic 
action, but rather autonomous action from which they felt profoundly gratified. 
As referenced above, according to Paternoster and Bushway (2009), the first step 
towards desistance is a powerful fear of who a person may become if they 
continue offending – the “feared self”. In the case of the first cohort of BSU 
prisoners, however, there is an inversion of this logic. The stories these prisoners 
tell suggest that part of why they understood rule-breaking as necessary was 
because they feared who they would become, they feared what it would mean for 

















Segregation and Prisoner Resistance: Dirty Protests in the Peterhead ‘Digger 





This is both a descriptive and an interpretive account of dirty protests in prisons 
drawn from a range of testimonies written by Scottish prisoners in the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s. While dirty protests in mainstream prison locations were and 
remain relatively rare occurrences within mainstream locations, this type of 
behaviour was a persistent and common feature of certain segregation units within 
the Scottish prison estate. Dirty protests are discussed (often in numerous 
passages) in all five of the autobiographical testimonies of Scottish prisoners 
engaged with in this thesis, as well as points of discussion in the interview data. 
The decision to offer a detailed analysis of DPs was made on the following 
grounds: 
- Dirty protests tended to occur in the most repressive segregation sites. 
They were, it is argued in prisoners’ testimonies, partly a response to the 
spatial and social deprivations experienced as unjust by prisoners in such 
environments, and partly a default method of resistance given the lack of 
options in impoverished environments. (It is revealing that dirty protests 
were virtually non-existence in other, more liberal small units during this 
same period). Therefore, as a way to discuss the phenomenological 
aspects of these sites, as well as the ways violence and disobedience are 
spatially situated, dirty protests provide a useful entry-point.  
- Dirty protests as an extreme and otherwise extremely undignified form of 
behavior speak to the degree of indignity prisoners testify as having 
suffered. On that basis, in seeking to examine how the concepts of dignity 
and autonomy manifest in segregation settings, dirty protests offer a 
concentrated example of what these concepts mean in experiential terms.  
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- Statistical data on dirty protests for the post-war period is scant, but there 
has been an observable decline of dirty protests in the last decade of the 
twentieth century across the Scottish prison estate, including within 
segregation sites. Compared with their former prevalence, this decline is 
arguably one consequence of the spatial improvements and management 
reforms made to special handling units.  In terms of the basic material 
conditions of segregation sites, the period between the early 1960s and the 
late 1990 saw steady and reasonably linear progress. Examining the 
spatial, social and administrative context of dirty protests in earlier 
decades helps to explain some of the reasons for their increasing rarity in 
later decades and up to the present.  
- From a more theoretical stance, since dirty protests in prison are typically 
associated with political action in the Northern Irish context, the inclusion 
of a chapter in this thesis specifically dealing with the Scottish context and 
with a conceptually nuanced discussion of this type of behaviour serves to 
expand the topic beyond those boundaries.  
The texts engaged with in this chapter include autobiographies, diary extracts, 
poetry and other kinds of personal writing. From these sources two central 
analytical threads emerge: First, dirty protests are a broad and complex 
phenomenon made up of multiple behavioural forms, serving myriad purposes. 
Therefore, examining in isolation the factors that might be said to stimulate dirty 
protests – typically understood as either political dissent, mental illness or basic 
intransigence - is conceptually inadequate and also neglects the material 
distinctions of such acts. Instead a more nuanced mapping exercise is required. 
Secondly, the intersecting point between different narratives of dirty protests, 
those which ascribe a reductive ‘animal’, ‘hero’ and/or ‘victim’ status to the 
prisoners who use them (either self- or externally-imposed), is the concept of 
dignity: dignity struggled for, dignity realised, dignity lost. By way of 
interrogating the dignity concept through a phenomenological lens, this analysis 
explores how, whether and on what basis certain forms of dirty protest manifest 




Analyses about dirty protests (DPs) have tended towards the narrow. The focus is 
often limited and in a number of respects, including: to singular forms of DPs, 
particularly those which have incendiary political implications and/or represent an 
immediate and acute management problem i.e. those which are explicitly violent; 
to DPs that are motivated by overt ideological dissent and are restricted to 
particular geographical settings, namely DPs conducted in Northern Ireland by 
Republican prisoners in the H Block at Long Kesh/Maze prison16 (see Coogan, 
1980; Lyons, 1996; O’Keefe, 2012; Yuill, 2007; McKeown, 2001); and, to DPs 
that are viewed through the specific lens of sanitation, where analysis seeks to 
explore the nexus of cleanliness, order and power (see Benjamin, 1999; Feldman, 
1991; Inglis, 2002). Such analyses, often synthesising these three components, are 
over-represented and consequently particular forms of DPs receive 
disproportionate scrutiny at the expense of critical engagement with others. The 
danger being that more obscure forms, along with other ways of seeing, evade 
inspection. One of the reasons for this silo-approach beyond the obvious issues of 
political expediency and popular appetites is, I think, definitional. I am defining 
DPs in an expanded and loose fashion as the strategic use of bodily fluids and 
other organic substances in subversive ways within penal settings. This stands in 
contrast to the comparatively closed official definitions, which rely on a protest-
illness binary, focus solely on the misuse of faeces and urine, and tend to regard 
such acts as a demonstration of either violence, vandalism or simple madness. 
Exemplifying this approach is the definition provided in a recent policy document 
concerning segregation at HMP Wormwood Scrubs.  
A dirty protest is where a prisoner has chosen to either defecate or urinate 
in a cell or a room without using the facilities provided.  In virtually all 
cases the walls, floor or ceiling are affected.  Some prisoners may choose 
to cover their clothing and their body with faecal waste.  Although these 
actions may be undertaken as a protest, they may also be as a result of 
mental health problems. (HM Prison Service, May 2011) 
 
                                                          
16 Long Kesh was the name previously used for what became HMP, the Maze, marking the change 
in practical usage (and ideology) from an internment camp to a ‘criminal’ prison in the more 
traditional sense. Predictably the former term is often preferred by prisoners while the latter term 
tends to be adopted by the authorities. (McAtackney, 2006) 
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However, it is not only faecal matter and urine that are utilized in DPs, but also 
food slops (often left to mould), vomit, blood (including menstrual) and drain 
water. These substances are employed in numerous ways: they can be smeared on 
bodies like armour, or on walls, they can be used to transmit written messages to 
future cell incumbents or as means of personal expression, they can be 
weaponized - thrown at others or made into ‘bombs’, they can be used in game-
playing, they can be used to flood cells and halls, or they can be used in more 
prosaic ways to cover window grilles and block light or, in rare instances, to keep 
warm. With respect to the Prison Service definition, two further points are worth 
highlighting. First, in some instances the provision of particular “facilities”, 
however inadequate they might prove to be, is precisely the means through which 
DPs are enacted i.e. slop-buckets are used for their intended purpose before being 
put to work for another. In others, DPs are conducted precisely because the 
required facilities have not been provided.17 Secondly, and this point is made with 
some caution, there is an embedded relational aspect of DPs which official 
definitions conceal via their singular emphasis on prisoners. This extends not only 
to the general dynamic between prisoners and prison officers, and the battle 
psychology that both appear to inhabit, but also to a more direct form of 
reciprocity whereby officers’ themselves use waste substances in subversive 
ways. Within prisoners’ testimonies repeated examples are offered of staff misuse 
of organic substances, e.g. contaminating prisoners’ food, defecating in cells 
before they are occupied by prisoners, throwing the contents of slop-buckets at 
prisoners, spitting at prisoners etc. There may be good reason to doubt the full 
veracity of these claims, or at least to question the extremity and frequency of 
them, and certainly they cannot be verified in official documentation. But the fact 
that similar descriptions of these practices feature in numerous testimonies does at 
least suggest an element of truth and one therefore that is worth some attention. 
Additionally, of course, these allegations might represent a kind of truth-claim 
irrespective of whether they happened exactly in the way, or to the extent, they 
                                                          
17 We see this in the case of prisoners kept in certain kinds of segregation sites – both in Scotland, 
where appropriate access to sanitary facilities was often restricted, and in the case of Northern 
Ireland after the political status of Republican prisoners was rescinded, precipitating near total 
solitary confinement in response to prisoners who refused to wear prison uniforms. 
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are described; they offer an insight into how prisoners understand the power 
dynamics in which they are participating. 
What remains the case in every DP is the literal embodiment of the act: the body 
is not just the source or site of particular action but it becomes the object of action 
itself (shit bomb, shit game, shit message, etc.). The multiplicity of DP forms, 
only some of which are identified above, reflects the diversity of intents and 
purposes that animate DPs, embodying at different moments and in different 
circumstances examples of resistance, identity reclamation, self-defence, play, 
group solidarity, boredom, communication, imaginary escape and, of course, 
violence. To some degree this belies the term dirty ‘protest’ since not all forms of 
DP assume a clear political character. DPs are not merely a reaction against 
something; they can be a creative action for something. Part of this project 
therefore involves identifying different types of DPs, the forms they take, the 
factors that motivate them, and teasing out the discrepancies and commonalities 
between them. (see Part Two) 
DPs occur relatively infrequently and are used by very few prisoners in 
proportion to the general population. The known rate of incidence appears to have 
declined in the last few decades, at least as an organised, ongoing and collective 
form of activity. However, on a practical level, documentation of DPs is scant – 
comprehensive statistical data have not been published consistently and where 
DPs are noted in official records they tend to feature peripherally in discussions of 
other kinds e.g. where the emphasis is on mental illness, incidences of assaults 
and riots or disorder more generally. In effect, DPs are subsumed within these 
categories and often without much qualification. Together these factors give the 
impression that DPs, as a stand-alone form of behaviour, have been conceptually 
de-problematized both at the level of penal management and at the level of 
academic discourse. While I am concentrating on DPs experienced during the 
1960s, 70s and 80s (and in Scottish prison), this present lack of overt attention 
suggests a longer lineage of disregard for the sheer complexity of what DPs are 
and for what they might represent. But there is also a paradox in play since 
throughout the recent past, where DPs have been discussed the talk is often loud. 
Disgust is a common theme, expressed noisily and evidenced particularly within 
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media-led discourses, of which certain influential sections serve to exacerbate a 
fundamental empathy-gap. Other, more sympathetic though equally emotive, 
counter-narratives offer a similarly distorting view. Films and literature in 
particular tend to valorise DP prisoners, casting them in the role of dramatic hero 
(e.g. Hunger, 2008; A Sense of Freedom, 1979), whilst there is tendency amongst 
activist commentators to locate DP prisoners within a context of victimhood set 
against unremitting and illegitimate domination (see Gateway Exchange, 1987). 
The tone is frequently crude and characterised by a combination of outrage and 
pity. These strong, emotive and sometimes prejudiced responses are perhaps 
inevitable given the extreme nature of DPs and the extent to which they transgress 
social and cultural norms surrounding human waste. Nevertheless, cumulatively 
these factors render analyses of DPs few in numbers and for those that do exist 
the focus tends to be targeted and in that sense limited.  
In terms of analysis, it is true that DPs are discrete, unrepresentative and 
anomalous phenomena, yet caution is required since it is these novel aspects 
which serve to generate a number of analytical hazards, including: an unmitigated 
‘othering’ of DP prisoners; a conceptual reductionism whereby the nuances of 
DPs and DP prisoners in terms of forms, circumstances and intentions are 
ignored; a failure to recognise the processes involved and the spatial contexts in 
which DPs occur; and, an inability or unwillingness to take DP prisoners’ own 
accounts seriously and to integrate them into analyses.  
Key distinctions should be made at the outset regarding the relationship between 
mental illness and rational intent. That is to say, in some instances DPs are 
unambiguously the product of severe mental illness (Hail, 1997) - disorders which 
either manifest prior to extreme confinement, although likely to be exacerbated by 
it, or those which are solely connected to the conditions of imprisonment (for 
studies on the psychological impact of segregation see Scharff-Smith, 2004; 
Benjamin & Lux, 1977; Grassian, 1983; Brodsky & Scogin, 1988; Haney 1993). 
In such cases, there is a somewhat banal though no less disturbing core element of 
irrationality to the subversive use of bodily fluids. This account is not a 
psychological assessment of prisoners who fall into this category and those who, 
as a direct and uncontested symptom of illness, engage in DPs. Rather, I am 
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concerned with forms of DPs that involve a predominant element of rational 
motivation. I am interested to explore the intentions that underpin DPs when they 
are employed self-consciously, the ways in which they are understood by those 
who engage in them, and to consider seriously what ‘reasons’ prisoners might 
have to subvert behavioural conventions in relation to human waste. Separating 
out these two kinds of DPs on the basis of rational agency is not to deny the role 
that degrees of mental distress might play in the exercise of all DPs, almost by 
definition. But, from prisoners’ testimonies it is clear that recognition is being 
sought not only for the physical and mental harms exacted by certain forms of 
containment, but also that this should not be cause enough to dismiss the 
deliberate calculations that some DP prisoners understand themselves as making 
when they act. To do so would amount to secondary indignity; it would 
undermine what power they feel they have as autonomous beings. However, there 
are difficulties with the concept of ‘mental illness’ and the extent to which 
rational intention may be skewed as a result. As well as being vague and highly 
contestable in any arena, what it means to be mentally healthy is rendered even 
less clear when thinking about people who exist in often abject conditions of 
imprisonment – and, it is within these kinds of spatial and psycho-social settings 
that the DPs I am chiefly concerned with typically occur. Notwithstanding this 
difficulty, I am choosing to leave unexamined both the clear and the boundary 
cases of DPs which adhere to mono-aetiological explanations on the basis of 
mental illness alone, which as it happens appears to represent a minority of cases 
of DPs. 
As indicated above, there are understandable reasons why DPs inspire general 
repulsion based not only on the taboo status of human waste but also on the 
challenge it presents to deeply entrenched behavioural norms. Human waste is 
shrouded in secrecy, both in practice and in common and intellectual discourses. 
Bodily fluids are secret substances; defecating is a secretive activity - we do it in 
private, we build walls around cubicles to render it invisible to others and we 
construct increasingly sophisticated devices to render it invisible to ourselves. 
Yuill (2007:5.10) argues that this removal from public view is a distinct feature of 
modernity, requiring as a condition of ‘civilised society’ that excrement be 
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“consigned into a strict toiletry habitus”. (Although, I am not entirely convinced 
that toiletry seclusion is necessarily a ‘modern’ phenomenon.) Exceptions to this 
silent treatment involve children, the elderly and the mentally ill. Thus, human 
waste is associated with the infantile; it is connected to vulnerability, irrationality, 
illness and to the ridiculous. For those who do not fit easily into these categories a 
distance gathers between Us and Them. They are not weak but feral; they are not 
vulnerable but dangerous. The ‘Dangerousness of Dirt’ to use Mary Douglas’ 
famous phrase, is not so much a biological fact but rather a sociological 
construction: dirt, and especially shit as its most potent manifestation, has 
artificial not essential meanings, those which are associated with shame (see 
Inglis & Holmes, 2000; Inglis, 2002). Moreover, supported by powerful religious 
and cultural traditions, the objective filth of dirt becomes synonymous with 
impurity so that shit is not just physically unhygienic but the people who cover 
themselves in it are morally unclean too. On this basis, it is difficult to accept 
(though we no doubt should) the assertion made by the Greek poet Terrence that 
“anything humans do is not alien to me.”  
This connection between human waste and (moral) disease, and the assumptions 
made that those who engage in deviant activity involving waste are not just 
inherently uncivilised, undignified and/or animalistic but also, that they are 
dangerously anarchic too, is partly rooted in a cultural attachment to sanitary 
order. As Mary Douglas argued, “...dirt is essentially disorder. Dirt offends 
against order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to 
organize the environment” (Douglas, 1966). At the level of the individual prisoner, 
this same impulse to exert control through sanitary order is arguably one method 
by which autonomy and identity may be demonstrated in otherwise highly 
restricted environments (Sloan, 2012). An interesting question is whether and 
how this same impulse might be satisfied through the deliberate manipulation of 
dirt. Not merely as a means of resistance, as an “effective oppositional force” 
(Benjamin, 1999:78), but also, at a deeper level, as an attempt to reclaim aspects 
of one’s own dignity. Engaging the dignity concept enriches analysis of DPs 
insofar as the focus shifts from the relationship between sanitary conditions and 
power to that between dirt and moral development – a puzzling and at times 
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paradoxical conceptual manoeuvre which I hope to make clear as we go along. At 
the level of penal authority, however, manufacturing sanitary order is clearly a 
response to the managerial (as well as primitive) desire for protection, of which 
disgust is a powerful signifier. Together, these assumptions and attitudes establish 
a compelling and flawed impression of what DPs must mean and what kind of 
people DP prisoners must be.  
In addition, these connections and attitudes are no less potent in more sensitive 
readings since the apparently uncivilised and wretched nature of DPs is reinforced 
albeit explained in terms of desperation: their thesis proposes that dehumanizing 
conditions create dehumanized persons; brutalising conditions create brutal 
human beings. While there may be some truth in this there is reason to suggest 
that it is not the whole story. Nevertheless, the living reality of shit always stinks 
and therefore it may appear an implausible approach, perverse even, to locate DPs 
within a dignity framework, as I intend to do here. One might ask, incredulously, 
dignity through dirty protests? The question mark is significant, and so too is the 
precise wording. It is dignity through dirty protests and not the dignity of dirty 
protests in order to denote the processes of expressing, maintaining or acquiring 
whatever components may be said to constitute the ‘having’ of dignity, rather 
than making claims about whether dirty acts are in themselves dignified. That 
DPs may not be dignified does not preclude the possibility that such acts might 
both represent the desire for dignity and signify the struggle to actually attain it. 
By way of response to the original question I mean to offer a series of 
inconclusive reflections based primarily on prisoners’ own accounts in order to 
explore how or whether dignity features as part of this dirty story.  
Superficially, these two subjects (dignity and dirty protests) seem incompatible 
such is the apparent nobility of the former and the unquestionable grimness of the 
latter. Dignity feels grand and pure, whereas DPs are filthy, they pollute, they 
smell. Yet even a cursory reading of prisoners’ testimonies reveals the 
connections between the two, if only because the issues at stake are the same as 
those which have preoccupied historical and contemporary debates surrounding 
the meanings of dignity. It is amidst experiences of suffering that questions of 
dignity and its opposite assume a greater sense of urgency. What it means to 
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suffer and how people retain self-worth in the face of it is at the core of the 
dignity struggle and peppered throughout prisoners’ testimonies are common 
descriptions of this struggle. In turn this provokes fundamental dignity-questions: 
is dignity something we have by default or is it something we must acquire? Is it 
how we act or don’t act? Is it the way we are treated or perceived by others? Or, is 
it some combination of all these elements? 
Within the context of shame scenarios there might be a distinction between 
possessing (by default) and expressing (by intention) human dignity. On this basis, 
it may not be just that DPs manifest shame in the negative sense, that they are 
reactionary and are representative of indignity, but also perhaps DPs might be 
considered as proactive means through which the goal of dignity might be 
positively achieved or at least struggled for. In essence this line of thought is a 
distillation of what this entire project is seeking to explore. Unlike the historical 
trajectory of dignity where the concept itself has been disembodied from the 
subject (Oliver, 2011:95), by contrast prisoners’ testimonies of their DP 
experiences register a profound sense of the physicality of imprisonment and, by 
the same token, they set their action to it within an intensely visceral context. 
Prison has been (and is still in certain regions and respects) an appallingly 
intimate physical experience, one in which strip and cavity searches were ordered, 
where ablutions were monitored and worse, actively watched, where bodies were 
beaten, and where cells were stinking (even before DPs occurred). Feldman not so 
flippantly terms this body colonization as “colon-ization” (1991:174). It is a grim 
and perhaps inevitable irony that within such conditions it is the body’s rejected 
substances (those which it literally ejects) that are actively mobilised in response. 
Integrating prisoners’ accounts into analysis as a way to make sense of dignity 
and how/whether it might be expressed through DPs, must therefore entail 
explicit bodily recognition. 
If dignity is embodied, then it is inclusive of pleasure and suffering, beauty 
and disease, strength and vulnerability, life and death. If dignity is 
embodied, then it is local as well as universal; always situated, it cannot be 
understood as distinct from the individual who carries it, and any defence 
of dignity must acknowledge and recognise the specificity of its 
circumstance. To respect the embodied dignity of a person, therefore, is 
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first and foremost an act of recognition: to recognise as human every 
aspect of their experience, however abject or foreign it may seem, to 
acknowledge the specificity of their person, and by doing so to affirm the 
place of the other alongside the self within the human community. (Oliver, 
2011: 95-96)  
Exploring whether dignity might be embodied through DPs necessitates a close 
reading of prisoners’ subjectivity. It also requires contextual background 
regarding the precise spatial and psycho-social settings that these prisoners 
inhabit. To this end, I have relied heavily on prisoners’ own descriptions of their 
environments, augmented by additional information about relevant penal policies 
and management frameworks where useful. However, in terms of evidential 
validity there are several difficulties here. First, the gap between how things are in 
objective reality and how things both appear to be and are remembered by 
prisoners sometimes swallows whole important details: the facts of space and 
time are not always accurately remembered or articulated. In other words, there is 
a difference between testimonial and documentary evidence. Secondly, given the 
tiny proportion of prisoners who actually use DPs and the smaller number still 
who go on to write about it, the sample size is unavoidably limited and self-
selecting. It might be the case that those people who have the inclination and 
aptitude to write about their experiences of DPs are also those who are well-
equipped to rationalise their experiences after the fact, thus conferring an illusion 
of authority. Finally, given my interpretative approach, this account does not 
apply a rigid method of linguistic or literary analysis. It is an exploratory, 
prisoner-centred narrative which attempts to describe and make sense of 
prisoners’ memories of their DP experiences.  
“Memory mediums” writes Tumblety (2013:11) have the ability to “convey the 
emotional rawness and humanity of lived experience in the past.” It is this aspect 
of prisoners’ testimonies – this rawness - which I am most interested in. But 
sometimes the stories prisoners tell are fragmented and messy. Like every story 
each one is always and must be partial. Often they are contradictory and display 
varying degrees of self-awareness. In places the emotional charge is intense, 
penetrating and distressing. In others, and more disconcerting still, there is a cool 
sense of detachment to the clinical descriptions of violence committed by and 
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against prisoners. These stories are sometimes self-congratulatory which comes 
across as performative as if the author is affecting convictions not entirely his 
own - the ‘con’ in self-confidence. Some are difficult to like, others are 
impossible not to admire. All their stories are rich, vivid and moving in spite of 
disparities in fluency. Most of these men had life sentences to contend with - an 
unimaginable period of time. Most had histories of routine crime and everyday 
experiences of standard violence. These are men with complex interior lives and 
rich literary and cultural tastes – Jimmy Boyle, for example, embraced the 
Russian Masters18, Larry Winters was a voracious reader of Edgar Allen Poe, 
Nietzsche and the beat poets19, Hugh Collins absorbed sepia Westerns, littering 
his prose with references to High Noon and Robin Hood inspired tales, Tommy 
Campbell weaves the lyrics of Pink Floyd into his account. This is more 
significant than it may appear; it helps to paint over the easy animal caricatures 
lazily drawn of so-called “problem” prisoners. Almost without exception these 
men come from variations of the old, creaking tenements of Victorian inner cities, 
especially Glasgow - areas of economic deprivation surrounded by walls literally 
crumbling (many of the prisoners’ childhood homes and neighbourhoods have 
since been demolished)... “Where the grease-stained paper blows/Where the filthy 
gutters flow/Hear a police-whistle blow/In an ally” (Winters, 1979)20. Slum-
dwellings followed by Approved Schools followed by Borstal followed by Adult 
Prison....a tragedy of predictability. Into the “deepest places – ends-of-the-lines; 
holes; termini” (Sparks, 2002:559) their lives form cracks, slowly gathering 
weeds like abandoned buildings. Men, still boys, in ‘iron lungs’, ‘dungeons’, 
‘cages’, ‘tombs’, ‘the land of the lost’, ‘coffins’, ‘the void’21, imagery of death 
within life where they rage and fight and sing and shit....The Silent Scream. This 
                                                          
18 In Sense of Freedom (1977:171), Boyle recounts his particular attachment to Dostoyevsky’s 
descriptions of pain. 
19 Daphne Brooke, a friend of and frequent visitor to Larry Winters during his time in the 
Barlinnie Special Unit, offers a wonderful portrait of the range of authors and artists that he read 
and absorbed, detailed in the introduction to The Silent Scream (1979).  
20 Lines from Winters’ poem ‘A Nod Aloud & Keep Moving’ – part of his collected works in The 
Silent Scream 
21 These are only some of the terms prisoners use to describe certain penal environments in which 
they live. It is less important whether these colloquialisms represent distorted spatial perceptions; 
what is important is how prisoners’ experience and understand their environments, how they 




is what the authors of these stories demand their readers know and it’s not easy to 
forget. Johnny Steel, a Scottish prisoner in the 1980s noted in his autobiography, 
rather poignantly, “I always seemed to see the best in life through a window” 
(Steele, 1992:255). This sense of being trapped, being locked-in, literally and 
metaphorically, unable to reach the ‘best’ of life and condemned to experience its 
‘worst’, blows like a storm across all the testimonies I have used here. It is an 
atmosphere that should contextualize any interpretation of DPs since how and 
why people act in this kind of climate - and that they act at all instead of simply 
collapsing under the pressure - is indicative of the sheer force of the human will. 
Whatever the consequences, there is perhaps an irrefutable albeit very basic kind 
of dignity in that.   
Situating these personal stories within a dignity-framework does, to some extent, 
impose meaning onto them. ‘It is more of a job to interpret the interpretations then 
to interpret the things’, cautioned Montaigne, ‘and there are more books about 
books than about any other subject.’ Yet, prisoners’ books are generally given 
less critical attention than official discourses (Sparks, 2001) – or, sometimes 
ignored altogether - and, this is doubly the case with respect to DPs which tend to 
be viewed from the perspectives of either the psych-disciplines or through 
security/disorder lenses. This dignity concept is, I think, a useful framework for 
taking seriously prisoners’ testimonies without collapsing analysis into simplistic 
scripts of debasement, heroism or victimhood.  
Interpreting Dirty Protests 
 
Each author I have engaged with here was considered by the penal authority as a 
problem prisoner. Underpinned by systems of classification and buttressed by a 
variety of formal rules and procedures, an extensive web of segregation sites was 
instituted. Operating simultaneously, such arrangements were used for the 
purpose of containing problem-prisoners in ways that were intended to control 
and mitigate the risks that they were perceived as carrying. In the Scottish context 
many of these segregation sites have since become infamous owing to their 
distinct spatial characteristics, the regimes adopted therein and the significant 
legal, managerial, political and humanitarian implications that, in most cases, 
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ultimately led to their closure. Before exploring how, why and when DPs are 
exercised by prisoners, it is first necessary to examine where they were conducted 
and, most especially, the manner in which prisoners themselves understood those 
environments. The discussion then moves forward to reflect on the violent, 
defensive and creative aspects of DPs. Along with the battle psychology that both 
prisoners and officers seem to inhabit, there are also more playful and 
communitive elements to DPs whereby such actions are used as a means of 
expression, a way to stem boredom (both situative and the more profound 
existential kind) as well as a mechanism for solidarity. Given the general nature 
of this thesis, however, which, based on prisoners’ testimonies, tends towards the 
more overtly resistance-oriented behaviours, these last two aspects are not, in this 
work, given the critical attention they warrant.22 
 
The Wasteland: Segregated spaces in Scottish prisons 
 
Prior to the late 1960s, the segregation unit at Peterhead prison was a primary site 
for the containment of problem prisoners, although sites in Perth and Barlinnie 
prisons were also used routinely. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s a number of 
building projects were undertaken, establishing additional segregation 
arrangements at Peterhead, both purpose built sites and adaptations to existing 
structures. Projects included the construction of an Individual Cell unit (1976), an 
extra 10-cell unit (1982), and what was known as B-hall unit (1984). The 
proliferation of segregation sites at Peterhead alone indicates that during this time 
there was considerable anxiety about how to manage problem-prisoners, against 
whom increasingly extreme forms of containment appeared to be the most 
suitable, or at least the most popular, response. Such fear and the need to “do 
something” was perhaps inevitable given the seemingly perpetual explosions of 
internal disturbances, riots, assaults and ‘protests’ that scarred the penal landscape 
at this time. A period described to me by one long-serving officer as “basically 
carnage”. In any case, it was to Peterhead prison, and most especially to the 
                                                          
22 This chapter is a considerably abridged version of a much more detailed and comprehensive 
study of dirty protests, which I am currently developing with future publication in mind (possibly 
as a monograph). 
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Digger, that many problem-prisoners were sent. Campbell calls it ‘Hell Block Sol 
Con’ and ‘the arsehole of the universe’. Collins calls it ‘the dungeon’. Boyle calls 
it ‘the land of the lost’, signifying perhaps not merely the internal spatial and 
social isolation experienced within its depths, and indeed the lengthy period of 
time that this often entailed, but also the geographical isolation of the prison itself 
– stranded on the edge of land, facing the fierce elements of the North Sea and 
miles away from the places (and people) prisoners were familiar with. It is no 
coincidence that there were virtually no successful escape attempts from 
Peterhead prison. Steele offers this description of the Digger: 
 
The cellblock was their pride and joy, and if anyone stepped out of line 
they were sent there. Some guys were terrified because of its reputation. It 
stood on its own, a two-storey granite building with cells on only one side, 
eight cells on each floor. Prisoners weren’t allowed to mix with anyone – 
solitary confinement was the main part of the punishment. It was a prison 
within a prison. It was rumoured that blood was coated on the walls from 
the beatings handed out there. (1992:211-212) 
 
On arrival into the system and after initial classification procedures, prisoners 
considered high-risk and those who lacked ‘trainability’ potential, on account of 
perceived recalcitrance, were sent to Peterhead. (Older prisoners who were 
similarly categorised were sent to Aberdeen). From prisoners’ perspectives (at 
least those whose testimonies I am using here) conforming to the trainability 
criteria had serious implications for their sense of self and thus, their capacity to 
claim dignity. Boyle’s comments make this explicit: 
 
The only alternative [to violent defiance] was to be an arse-licker to the 
screws, losing my own personality and individuality, and being their pet 
lion. The one they had tamed. The rewards being the occasional pat on the 
head...The one thing that I could hold onto is the fact that I was me. I felt 
that I mustn’t give this up or all would be lost. (1977:191) 
 
Hegelian echoes sound here: “I possess my life and my body, like other things, 
only in so far as my will is in them” (PR, I:47). Many of the prisoners who were 
kept in the Digger, particularly those who were transferred from other prisons, 
were contained under the procedural auspices of ‘administrative’ segregation, 
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which was framed as a necessary measure for the maintenance of security rather 
than for strictly punitive purposes following a disciplinary breech. However, as 
prisoners saw it this distinction was largely worthless; instead many viewed the 
Digger as the very apex of punishment and, moreover, they understood 
themselves not merely as ‘security-risk’ prisoners (as the system marked them) 
but as something akin to crusaders. Campbell puts it like this with not a little 
swagger: 
 
Peterhell is where they send the men deemed to be the most dangerous, 
the rebels, the ones too bright and spirited to accept a soul destroying 
regime...The men who invented the dirty protest stripping themselves 
naked and smearing themselves in their shit. The men who wouldn’t lie 
down to the boot but fought back. The men who took over the jails and 
protested from the rooftops. The men the system feared and wanted to 
bury. Peterhell – that’s where they sent TC Campbell. (2002:21-22) 
 
Though a single entity, the Digger allowed for a plurality of containment 
‘options’: cells with different spatial features; cells for different kinds of 
prisoners; cells within which different regimes and conditions applied. The ‘iron 
lung’ is one cell of note which Steele describes as “only seven foot long and if 
you stood in the middle of the floor you could touch the walls on either side, and 
the ceiling” (1992:203). Its name a product of the cloying heat resulting from a 
lack of ventilation, which some prisoners came to almost enjoy as a respite from 
the arctic conditions of most other Peterhead cells. For security-risk prisoners 
(those who were deemed potential ‘escapees’) dim lights might be kept on in the 
cell throughout the night all the better to monitor its inhabitant, while his clothes 
and shoes were required to be taken off before lock-up and left outside the cell 
door. This may have aided the night staff in identifying members of the ‘security 
party’; it may also have mitigated the risk of such items being used in harmful 
ways. A reasonable measure then. Still, there is something profoundly sad about 
that detail. 
 
In 1966 an additional segregation site was opened at Porterfield prison, Inverness, 
subsequently named ‘the Cages’ on account of its aesthetics: a series of large steel 
cages within individual prison cells. Following the abolition of the death penalty 
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in 1965 (though the legislation did not come into force until 1969), the Cages 
assumed greater importance and were used more frequently by penal mangers. 
Questions of accountability, the treatment of prisoners and the working conditions 
for staff slowly gathered pace (see Wozniak, 1989), though initially at least the 
Cages appeared to function without much in the way of rigorous external 
monitoring. “They were thought of” writes Steels (1992:272) “as a miniature 
Carstairs for crazy prisoners, a place for degrading men the system couldn’t 
control.” Once safely out of the Cages, Ben Conroy, another prisoner, recorded in 
the Glasgow Herald (November 10th 1978) that returning there would have 
“destroyed” him. In the same paper Paddy Meehan described his experience in 
this environment as “a totally de-humanising ordeal”. Quite apart from the 
psychological impact of living behind bars (quite literally) the spatial dimensions 
of the Cages involved significant physical restriction (the inner caged area was 
about 7 sq. meters) and even greater restrictions of privacy than were experienced 
in the Digger – in fact after a spell in the Cages some prisoners recount their time 
in Peterhead almost wistfully. Steele offers a particularly detailed description of 
this environment: 
 
The Cages are in a separate block, away from the other halls and fenced 
off by a twenty-foot fence, topped with razor-wire. Six warders were 
waiting for me – the ratio per prisoner in the Cages. The main corridor 
was L-shaped – the long part having three cages and a silent cell, and the 




I was stripped of all my clothes, and then taken inside a brilliantly lit 
‘cage’. It was a cell that had been divided into two with steel bars so as to 
make a cage within the cell. The wooden bed had been bolted to the 
concrete floor; the window had a frosted glass sheet over it to stop me 
looking out and others looking in, and it couldn’t be opened. The 
ventilation system was a metal grille on the wall below the window. The 
walls were painted pink, the heavy bars a dark green, and the bed a 
mustardy brown. (1992:280) 
 
The emptiness of this sparsely designed environment was reinforced by certain 
management practices that involved further constraints e.g. mattresses and 
bedding were allowed only in the evenings; light, heat and ventilation were 
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controlled via mechanisms in the service area, which staff could (and according to 
prisoners did) manipulate in a malicious, off-the-record manner. In 1968, or 
thereabouts (precise details regarding dates are not always clearly stated in 
prisoners testimonies or easily verified) Boyle began a nineteen month stretch in 
the Cages, which he remembers made him feel like “one of the living dead as I 
had been there three times longer than the maximum period stated in the rules. It 
looked as though they would keep me here forever” (1977:185). Later, after a 
series of disturbances and one particularly violent encounter with officers of 
which Boyle played a leading role he was returned to the Cages for a six month 
confinement. Cumulatively, this was enough for him to conclude that, “Inverness 
was the prison that I felt most helpless in...Being inside a cage, inside a cell in the 
solitary block which was only part of the prison as a whole, made me feel that I 
was at the very core of isolation” (1977:220). This chimes with his designation of 
Inverness as a ‘Siberia Prison’. 
Another site forming the backdrop of DPs is the iniquitous Silent Cell, distributed 
across the penal estate but typically housed within those segregation units that 
were specifically reserved for the most troublesome prisoners. Though it hardly 
seems possible that spaces can be even more barren than those previously 
described, the Silent Cell might win that ignoble honour. Descriptions of it vary 
across prisoners’ testimonies and, curiously, it receives less attention than other 
segregation sites – possibly a consequence of the comparatively shorter periods of 
time spent in such cells, or perhaps due to a more general tendency amongst these 
authors to take for granted how complex segregation arrangements appear to 
outsiders and how unfamiliar they are with them. However, where Silent Cells are 
mentioned what is uniformly emphasized is the additional level of isolation to 
which the prisoner descends. Spatially, these cells tend to be located at a distance 
from other cells in the unit, thus limiting the possibility of communication 
between prisoners (via the many ingenious methods they cultivate), they tend to 
have virtually nothing in them, except perhaps a wooden or concrete plinth 
intended for sleeping, and they tend to restrict prisoners’ visual world in that they 
are often kept in semi-darkness and where there is a window at all it is usually 
built high into the wall so inhibiting any access to it. The regime is meagre with 
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little or no variation to a routine of nothing. Exceptions include very limited 
access to washing facilities and to the exercise “pens”, although from prisoners’ 
accounts this is by no means assured. Ostensibly such cells are used to provide a 
space for ‘cooling-off’ following aggressive or disruptive behaviour by individual 
prisoners – the timeframe of use is more proscribed compared to other sites. And, 
to that end, they are sometimes effective; a number of prisoners relay how, within 
the Silent Cell, the drama of rage does indeed dissipate; it turns inward instead, 
morphing into something darker, more insidious and itself silent, buried deep 
within and mounting like trapped toxins waiting to explode. As prisoners see it, 
this appears to be the better case scenario; the other involves a retreat into 
depression leading to various dependencies and at worst a final withdrawal. In 
these whitewashed, tiny spaces there is fear too, the kind that persists in memory, 
remnants of which linger long after the location changes. Nightmares of the Silent 
Cell returned to Steele while he was ensconced in a safe house during one of his 
successful escape attempts. Surrounded by the newly emulsioned glean of a 
stranger’s living room in daylight, he panicked, paranoid he was back in that 
special cell. His recollection of this experience (see Steele, 1992:265) suggests 
both the power of spatial memory to provide an immediate opening into the 
presence of the past – it is transportive rather than a process of retrieval – and also 
the degree of anguish that could be experienced within this kind of space. The 
first of these points has implications when considering the long and growing roll 
of penal memories that most of these prisoners have from years of imprisonment. 
Left in solitary conditions for long periods at a time, with an absence of 
meaningful activities, memory performs a vital function - it becomes an overt part 
of daily living and this works both ways: memories of life before prison are often 
romanticised, memories of life after prison often take on an additional severity. 
(This is explored in more detail in a later section). 
A number of other sites and practices are referenced in prisoners’ testimonies that 
have an indirect bearing on DPs to the extent that they create the texture of  
imprisonment, weaving impressions in prisoners’ minds about what this life 
involves, how ‘the system’ views them, and what strategies might be deployed for 
coping. Issues relating to food, family visits, medical facilities, complaints 
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procedures, etc. are documented repeatedly as points of frustration, feeding 
resentments and serving as further self-justifications for transgressive behaviour. 
Of particular significance is the movement dimension within prison, the 
standardised as well as “special” processes of transfer within individual prisons as 
well as across the penal estate. The penal practice of “ghosting” is worth 
mentioning, which involved the quasi-official passage of problem-prisoners from 
one segregation site to another on the basis of informal agreements between 
prison governors. In effect this allowed for circumvention of the official rules and 
legal parameters regarding the timeframes for length of stay in segregated 
environments. As well as the Ghost Train (sometimes referred to by prisoners as 
the ‘magic roundabout’) a more general and standardised progression mechanism 
was operative, whereby all prisoners within the system were shuffled, in stages, 
through the penal estate according to their completion of certain work targets and 
behavioural expectations. Predictably, this became a source of much antipathy 
between prisoners, along with their families, and the penal authorities. Often there 
is a jagged and irregular flow to prisoners’ narratives where the story darts from 
one site to another and where the chronology is sometimes disjointed. This creates 
a sense of spatial insecurity, of rootlessness, reflecting the continual movement of 
prisoners often at short notice and in ways that are apparently not always made 
clear to them. It is as if the authors are constantly honing in and out of particular 
sections of a canvas, the whole image made intelligible as the details mount up.  
A striking feature of every account I have studied is that all contain a detailed 
description of the so-called Dog Box - a temporary holding space in the reception 
area of prisons with wire mesh walls where prisoners would wait often in twos or 
threes for their turn to be ‘processed’. “There was a piece of wood nailed to the 
wall meant for us to sit on but there was only room enough for one”, writes Boyle 
(1977:85), “(t)he box was about three feet by three feet in size and about eight 
feet in height. These are what are known as the “dog boxes” and that’s just what 
they’re like.” Collins offers this description: 
I was put into a tiny room the size of a cupboard, which they call the Dog 
Box, and told to strip off all my clothes...I read all the names scratched on 
the walls and then the door swung back and the warder in a white medical 
coat told me to go and see the doctor. ‘Name? Religion? Ever had crabs? 
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Okay, bend over.’ I felt like a slave on auction with this bastard poking 
and prodding, but I kept my face expressionless, so already I was winning. 
(1997:36) 
Introductions are clearly important. As an entry point to the prison environment 
containment in the Dog Box sets a tone, one that defines the nature of many 
prisoners’ subsequent experiences.  
Stench warfare: A battle psychology 
Perhaps the most overt, certainly the most analytically uncomplicated, form of 
DPs are those which contain an explicit violent component. Not just the Body as 
Weapon (Feldman, 1991) but the body’s waste as weapon. The assaultive use of 
bodily substances as a means of direct attack feeds into a narrative of prisoners 
and officers ‘at war’ - a story that undergrids most prisoners’ memories of DPs. 
And this is unsurprising given that penal segregation environments in Scotland 
during the 1960s 70s and 80s were very much like battlegrounds. Indeed, at a 
structural level the war analogy was semi-literal on account of the quasi-military 
hierarchies operative in the prison, and additionally, the fact that up until the 
middle of the Twentieth Century many officers were ex-military, drawn from the 
ranks of local troops (see Cameron, 1983). Metaphorically, the war analogy 
referenced in numerous testimonies is apt; the parallels are stark. Clear divisions 
between enemy camps - prisoners versus officers, Hardmen versus snitches, and 
to a lesser extent, ‘custodial’ versus ‘reformative’ officers; territories marked for 
combat; camaraderie; strategizing; stores of weaponry; short sharp spells of 
fighting followed by long empty periods where wounds were laid bare; a siege 
mentality; distance from family; small victories and immense defeats; plans made, 
tears shed, blood, ‘the fear’; a sense of purpose and a sense of futility.  
Boyle describes one incidence of rioting in the Digger, where DPs accompanied 
tactics of considerable property damage, as “an Alamo”, a battle he remembers 
experiencing as “a proud achievement”. The self-righteousness of these small 
triumphs stems, I think, from a belief that the war is justified, one in which the 
enemy is made monster and the self is cast as a valiant soldier, a Freedom Fighter. 
This identity is literally the case with respect to the Republican ‘no wash’ 
prisoners in the H Block of Northern Ireland. Their war was public, political, 
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rooted in historical antecedents of civil strife; it was a situation of dirty politics as 
well as a dirty war. Imagery within Bobby Sands’ verse speaks of the storming of 
the “old Bastille”, of the noble “Fenian dead”, of “hunted rebels”, of “The blood! 
and death!”, of ‘Bold MacKillen’ who knew “Tis the time to fight or the time to 
die.”23 But, there are also echoes of this feeling of struggle against oppression in 
the way Scottish prisoners understood their worlds and their (dirty) actions in it: 
struggle or surrender. What kind of freedom did they think they were fighting for 
and how did they justify the violence? “I was always revolted by violence when 
the recipient collapsed in on himself” writes Collins, but he goes on: 
It was different when a guy was ready and wanted to challenge me. Then I 
felt victorious when I beat him, and no remorse. I’ve got to equate that 
with the reaction in war: after a battle, a man doesn’t suddenly turn around 
and say. ‘Oh, I took a liberty there’. He feels that same sense of victory I 
felt when someone was tooled up to meet me and I made a worse mess of 
him than he made of me.” (1997:59) 
In prisoners’ accounts bodily substances are used as missiles, sometimes faecal 
matter is fashioned into bombs using rags from bedding and hurled at officers in 
large amounts for maximum impact; sometimes the contents of pissposts are 
thrown at officers; sometimes prisoners attempt to smear handfuls of raw waste 
over officer’s exposed skin - no simple task given that many staff-prisoner 
encounters in segregation sites involved both a ratio of staff to prisoners stacked 
in favour of the former and staff in heavy riot gear, including helmets. Between 
two enemy camps, sometimes shit was the weapon of choice for both. 
There was shit in my cage and I knew it wasn’t mine...I knew that one of 
the bastards outside had done it. I picked it up intending to rub it on to the 
bars and walls along with my own shit – it would help stink out the cage 
even more badly since it was fresh, and as long as those bastards suffered I 
didn’t care. I had in my hand when [the officer] opened the door, and the 
grin on his face made me sicker than the shit in my hand...I wanted to grab 
hold of him and ram the shit down his throat, but the way he was standing 
suggested that he’d be able to close the door rather too quickly. I could 
feel the hate surging up inside me. I asked him which one of them had shat 
in my cage...I halved the shit with my bare hands...threw half of it at 
him...I don’t know if it hit him, but he was screaming at me from outside 
the cell door. (Steele, 1992:325) 
                                                          
23 From the poems “The Rhythm of Time” (p.177), “The Union Man” (p.179), and “The Bold 
MacKillen” (p.189) collected in Bobby Sands’ prison writings (1998). 
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These acts are explicitly offensive but there is also a defensive element too: waste 
substances are sometimes ‘worn’ by prisoners as armour, a deliberate and quite 
rational calculation to protect the body from physical beating. The aesthetics (and 
the smell!) of a naked man covered in shit serves as an effective shield against 
enemy advances. Sometimes this was an unintended but welcome consequence.  
We were concerned what to do when the screws came back, and we felt 
pretty helpless. I did a shit in the middle of the floor and started rubbing it 
all over my arms and body and face. I thought that if they were going to 
come in then I was going to jump on them and grab them so that they 
would get shit all over them. They did come back and saw what I had 
done and backed out as I positioned myself to throw my whole body 
amongst them...The screws obviously thought I was insane but I wasn’t 
going to lie there naked and helpless while they beat me up...I didn’t want 
the authorities to start doing what they wanted with me. I was prepared to 
go to certain lengths to combat this. (Boyle, 1977:134) 
What is apparent here is that the war being waged is experienced as existential, 
recognised in binary terms of struggle or surrender; claim power or be rendered 
helpless. “I knew that the shit and the slops were necessary weapons, the only 
weapons at my disposal and an important part of my survival”, remembers Boyle 
(1977: 183). Imagining the sparseness of the spaces these men lived in and the 
critical lack of ammunition at their disposal (as they saw it, the fight was certainly 
not fair), it seems more rational, not to say reasonable, rather than merely 
transgressive that waste substances formed a key part of their arsenal. Moreover, 
in a life lived according to the daily routines specified by anyone but oneself, DPs 
might be understood, in this sense, as an elemental expression of a man’s capacity 
for basic autonomy, along with perhaps his apparently inexhaustible creative 
resources for ingenuity. When everything else is unchosen, DPs are a choice. Yet, 
an associative degree of cognitive dissonance is often present in that choice, 
evident too in the shifting sands of responsibility bound up in all war scenarios; a 
feeling that the use of certain methods and certain tools and rules of engagement 
are necessary to win the noble fight, but that they cause such damage to others’ 
(and to oneself), and that they may exceed the bounds of personal moral 
justification, is viewed as the fault of the enemy against whom they are deployed. 
‘He made me do it, he deserved it, and I hate him for it.’ Indeed, however 
comfortable, relatively speaking, prisoners became with using and being in close 
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contact with waste substances, they remained attached to the cultural (and 
instinctive?) value of cleanliness. We see this in the way Boyle kept parts of his 
cell un-soiled, spaces in which he exercised and slept, we see this in the way 
Steele created stepping-stones in his cell to navigate a comparatively clean 
passage through, and we see this in the way many of the prisoners took pride in 
painting their cell walls (when given the opportunity) even while, at the same 
time, they continued to smear shit, blood and piss on others. That these men 
retained a commitment to order through cleanliness, that they were not 
impervious to the civilising desire for hygiene demonstrates their belief that a 
dirty world is not an ideal environment; these men never became mere animals. 
Clearly then, DPs were deliberate, well-thought out acts with contingency plans 
built into the calculation. That being the case, what should we make of prisoners’ 
decisions to engage in DPs? Might they represent a despair-tactic, a last ditch 
attempt at struggle when all other options have failed? 
It is tempting to inhabit a simplistic, undemanding discourse of desperation here 
but I don’t think we should, not least because that is not the story many prisoners 
tell. Rather, DPs are sometimes deployed proactively, rather than with reactionary 
finality, precisely because of their instrumental function to bolster the status of the 
prisoner, to embolden him against his opponents and to distinguish him amongst 
his peers. “There’s a certain power attached to all this”, writes Collins (1997:109), 
“the more security, the more powerful I become. I’m being treated as someone 
who needs to be chained, watched, guarded, as the most dangerous man in the 
prison, as the most dangerous prisoner in Scotland.” This strikes me as an 
example of deep self-awareness and speaks to questions of honour and power and 
what one feels they have to do in order to achieve that status, what one feels is 
necessary in order to create a self-identity one can be proud of. Revealingly, in 
virtually all prisoners’ testimonies this same ‘most dangerous...’ label is claimed 
and embodied and usually with heady bravado. It stands as one of the most 
intriguing contradictions of DPs (and for that matter of war too): to be understood 
by others as the “worst” - and engaging in DPs certainly aids this process - is to 
understand oneself as the “best”, yet at the same time this is experienced as a 
shattering human indignity insofar as it creates an external identity that is not 
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internally authentic. In other words, for all the opportunities for autonomy, the 
construction of identity and for recognition by others that the Hardman - “most 
dangerous” - identity facilitates, it also blocks access to the deeper caverns of 
moral will; it traps people in the one-dimensional Master/Slave fight to which the 
Hardman cannot easily escape with pride intact. Perhaps the most moving, heart-
breaking and hopeful extract from any of the testimonies I have engaged with 
comes from Steele, who exposes what lies beneath the Hardman exterior and what 
is possible between two enemy combatants when the carapace is removed. 
A warder came into my cell to try to persuade me to stop my rebellion. He 
said I was only degrading myself living this way.  He stood in the cell 
among all the shit: he didn’t even bother to use the stepping-stones I had 
made from some granite bricks I’d removed from the wall. He was crying 
as he told me that when he went home he had to change his clothes in the 
garage, and that his family could smell the shit, which humiliated him. I 
cried as well, not because of what he’d told me, but because I saw him for 
a brief moment as a fellow human being, and I began to feel that I’d taken 
a liberty with him. I promised him that I wouldn’t throw my shit at him 
and he thanked me. (1992: 329-330) 
Encounters of this kind are depressingly rare within the pages of prisoners’ 
testimonies. More commonly descriptions of how prisoners view officers, along 
with the kinds of treatment they remember experiencing at their hands, follow this 
pattern: 
...still I live here in this box on the dark side of the moon with only my 
torturers clunk-clicking in their armour beyond the double-barrelled caged 
gate and steel door of my vault. I could hear the furnaces of Hell Block in 
constant roar amid the clunk-clicking of cockroaches. I could smell the 
decaying flesh of corpses. So powerful the stench that I could picture the 
teeming maggots...Am I imagining this? No! The creepy crawlies are real, 
teeming over my battered body like the minions of hell arisen...[officers] 
gassed my chamber with poisonous insecticides, blasting billows of toxic 
gas with their pump guns. Cockroaches revenge...They know I am 
paralysed. Spine broken in two places under their jack boots and zipped 
from dick to navel from ruptured gut. They know it’s toxic gas. They wore 
masks as they filled the chamber with it as they backed out the door. So 
what next?...Will I be found hanged like so many lost and forgotten souls 
before me...No matter what you do to me ya bastards, I shall live and I 
shall stand to fight again. (Campbell, 2002:27-28) 
This is an important passage, representative of a number of features that appear in 
most prisoners’ testimonies: it exposes the extent and intensity of ‘othering’ that 
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is going on - officers as ‘cockroaches’; it evokes the sensory experience of filth – 
even prisoners who did not participate directly in DPs were subject to their 
lingering effects since remnants of years of dirt encrusted the space; it identifies 
the ‘creepy crawlies’ that were inevitable companions in such polluted 
environments – maggots are referenced in every account; it reveals the tactics 
deployed by the authorities to mitigate the filth, and not unreasonably some might 
argue (fumigation and water jets) and how prisoners experienced these measures 
(gas chamber); and finally, it demonstrates the very stark choice that many 
prisoners understand themselves as faced with – death by hanging or life by 
fighting. A passage from Collins reinforces these impressions: 
The screws on the ground floor are very menacing; they spit in my face, 
growling, ‘You fucking scum! You’re a fucking animal! But no one 
physically assaults me. The escort rushes me down the spiral staircase and 
into the dungeon. I’m in the hole in the ground, totally breathless but 
somehow relieved. The cell looks worse than before; there is shit all over 
the floor and the smell is terrible. Images of people and events are flashing 
through my brain: a screw on his knees pissing on the polished floor, his 
whimpers as I stab him again and again...Have I killed him? Should I feel 
some sort of remorse? The fact is that I have enjoyed stabbing him, every 
blow sheer pleasure. (1997:190) 
This also feed into notions of the Hardman identity and it’s perceived opposite. 
There is honour and self-respect (and thus dignity) bestowed to those who fight, 
attached to the thick childhood mythologies that permeate into adulthood. The 
heroism of battle. In so many prisoners’ accounts the opening chapters, describing 
life before prison in tenement neighbourhoods, reference and celebrate local, 
notorious Hardmen: the boxers, the safe-blowers, the gang-leaders, the men who 
run the rackets, the men who square-up, tool-up to the ‘Polis’. By contrast, for 
those who ‘take it’, for those who withdraw altogether (not necessarily via suicide 
but via incapacitating drug dependencies) and worst of all for those who work 
both sides (the ‘grasses’, the ‘snitches’), a special kind of contempt is reserved. 
They are, writes Boyle (1977:197), the “lowest of the low...they are treated like 
shit by all of us, screws and prisoners alike”. With these kinds of cultural 
associations many prisoners understand the inaction of those who withdraw (non-
choice), along with the misdeeds of those who fight for the other side (wrong 
choice), as indicative of self-relinquished dignity much more than their own DPs 
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signify, however apparently debased or extreme the latter may appear from the 
outside.  
A horrible irony here is that for the most part men from both sides (prisoners and 
officers) belong to the same cultural milieu, which may be a core reason 
explaining the markedly similar notions of masculine honour, along with the 
types of behaviour that manifest this, which both groups embody. And yet, both 
groups employ what Taylor (2009:11), in her review of cruelty, calls “the tools of 
otherizing foes”, namely: “generalization, misdirection and obfuscation”. Further, 
both groups fall prey to the ‘fundamental attribution error’ whereby the 
questionable acts of the other (despite being analogous to one’s own) are 
understood as characteristic of essentially ‘evil’, ‘hateful’, ‘corrupted’ people 
rather than as situated responses to a given set of circumstances. In this way my 
side, my action, “me”, are worthy and necessary in this situation while your side, 
your action, “you”, are innately bad to the core. That prisoners and officers often 
share cultural and behavioural traditions might explain their identity-insecurity, 
their lack of solidity in differentiating themselves from the other. Consequently, 
as attackers they tend to over-compensate through extreme forms of violence, 
whilst also at the same time they tend to profoundly internalise shame when they 
are the recipients under attack. In her section on Twentieth Century Scottish 
prisons, Cameron’s analysis is suggestive of these points: 
Basic-grade prison officers and their charges are almost always of 
working-class background and probably with some experience of poverty, 
and both are of limited education. But the former represent the law, the 
latter the opposite, and the officers therefore instinctively try to stress their 
superiority, reinforced by the knowledge that they are members, however 
lowly, of the uniformed hierarchy, and attitude which must intensify the 
prisoners’ sense of humiliation and personal insignificance. (1983:194) 
 
Final remarks 
Descriptions of prisoners’ DP memories are upsetting and challenging; they 
expose how stressful and appalling the reality of such acts can be. Extreme 
imprisonment – barren, segregated spaces, long periods in solitary confinement, 
routine body searches, violence, etc. – is harmful for all concerned. Everyone’s 
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dignity is compromised, everyone puts up a fight. This may be the most important 
aspect of dignity; it always involves a struggle, both to claim and to violate it. 
That struggle is rarely clean and it is mostly with oneself. As with all obvious 
truths, this one is sometimes overlooked.  What I have attempted to demonstrate 
here is first, dirty protests are complex forms of human behaviour, they are often 
hard to read; they mean different things according to one’s gaze. Identifying the 
many ways in which dirty protests are deployed and the variety of intentions that 
seem to underpin them highlights this ambiguity. Secondly, the gaze of prisoners, 
its own web of complexity and contradictions, is the lesser known. Focusing on 
how prisoners understand dirty protests, what kinds of stories they tell about 
them, serves to enrich the discussion and to widen the view.  Finally, exploring 
the fullness of the dignity concept and subsequently applying it to interpretations 
of dirty protests not only moves the concept from mighty abstraction to embodied 
experience, but also reveals a striking and I think crucial paradox: sometimes the 
dignity struggle manifests through undignified means. This does not necessarily 
negate the dignity aspect; rather, it highlights both the fragility of it and the 
perilous nature of its realisation. The actions of both prisoners and prison officers 
attest to this.  
I have interpreted DPs as part of a deliberate and rational exercise to reclaim 
dignity lost; to assert one’s autonomy, to shape one’s identity and to experience 
(self)respect. As indicated above, within some prisoner cultures (and indeed some 
prison-officer cultures too), it is acts of suicide and other less final acts of 
withdrawal (e.g. the descent into drug-dependence as an escape route) that 
amount to dignity self-relinquished much more than DPs do, however apparently 
debased or extreme the latter may appear from the outside. Yet, despite the many 
horrors of extreme imprisonment, for all the courage (if not heroism) required to 
resist its deadening effects, dirty protests make people sick. Trapped and defiant 
Jimmy Boyle shits in the middle of a cell he is sharing temporarily with Ben 
Conroy. “At first Ben was reluctant (to follow suit)” but “he did so after 
vomiting” (Boyle, 1977:134). I have tried to avoid the scatological romanticism 
that is a danger here, strange and perverse such as it is, but I have also tried to 
convey the extent to which dignity is being sought through the filth. Nevertheless 
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dirty protests remain a method and a choice that damage people and by their own 
accounts. Freedom’s force to smash through the unbearable constraints of 
confinement can make a man wild. Learning (under duress) to live without others 
can turn a man into an impenetrable island, suspicious of all invaders. Mastering 
the art of war leaves the skill of peace un-practiced. Talking shit fluently makes it 
harder to speak other languages. The prisoner might feel the victory of battle, he 
might claim authentically “in a strange sort of way we had been set free”, that 
there was “an unpretentious naked truth and dignity in that cage” (Boyle, 1977:8), 
and further he might recognise, “there is no doubt about it that I owed a lot to 
shit” (Boyle, 1977:161). He might be right in all these assertions – he survived the 
experience and there is dignity in that, but at what cost?  
When Jimmy Boyle left the noxious atmosphere of the Digger for comparatively 
safer space of the Barlinnie Special Unit, he wrote a book and titled it revealingly 
The Pain of Confinement. When viewed from this unfamiliar vantage point, the 
Sense of Freedom felt in the bowels of Peterhead and Inverness prisons 
diminished as the distance to real liberty, to full dignity, suddenly grew. All his 
work was still ahead of him. Shedding the ugly parts, un-soiling himself of the 
filth of former cells, of the stench of warfare, to a state in which he could rebuild 
himself post-conflict was, he writes, “the period of torment and discovery” 
(Boyle, 1977:146). Only within the conditions of the BSU where the harmful 
effects of violence, isolation, brutality and waste were, in part, mitigated by the 
lived principles of personal autonomy (and thus responsibility), positive sense of 
self and a valuing of oneself and others could dignity be reclaimed, not merely 
strived for. The fight could be clean. But it remained a struggle, and a bitter one. 
(He who increases [self]knowledge increases sorrow).24 In Hugh Collins’ words:  
I did try to change but it was a long, painful process. My emotions were 
like monsters ripping me apart; everything was always so confusing. At 
times I didn’t know if I could get through it all or if I really wanted to. 
What would I have left if I didn’t have my feelings, whether they were 
rage or hatred? The pressure was always with me: the hopelessness of my 
situation. The life sentence – it was a nightmare. (1997:122) 
                                                          
24 Ecclesiastes 1:18 
212 
 
This place [BSU] is my life now. I’ll paint, draw and write, write about 
everything – Jimmy’s right. I have to fight back this way. (1997:132) 
A perspective most famously brought to fruition by Jimmy Boyle, who 
remembers: “Rather than lie passively and wish my life away, I decided that I 
would continue the fight to stay alive; this time, my tools would be used in a 
creative and constructive manner” (Boyle, 1984:22). This was a struggle both for 
dignity and in dignity. 
I think of the sky and the bird, symbols of my future...Unlike the past, that 
dark menacing shadow, I take responsibility for creating the future from 
this moment onwards. I look at the wispy cloud as it fades in the distance 
– going in my direction. I want to follow it, to run on air and see the height 
and breadth of land, to look as far as the eye can see without walls 
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I would take the very strong view that one of the major priorities of the 
prison system should be based on the whole question of adapting into a 
situation where staff right from the top to the bottom should be in the 
business of trying to change folks behaviour. That’s a key fact. 
(Ken Murray – one of the architects of the BSU – speaking on The 
Saturday Connection, BBC Radio Scotland, 10th October 1987) 
We seem divided between an urge to override our senses and numb 
ourselves to our settings and a contradictory impulse to acknowledge the 
extent to which our identities are indelibly connected to, and will shift 
along with, our locations. 
(Alain de Botton in The Architecture of Happiness, 2006:12) 
 
Introduction 
Beyond the straightforward incapacitation objective, some small units across the 
SPS estate have been invested with a longer-term corrective function. Whether as 
a stated goal or as more of an implicit intention, certain specialist units carry with 
it the hope of behavioural adjustment25. The units so far examined attempted to do 
this chiefly by restricting prisoners’ autonomy through increasingly tight spatial 
and social controls. Chapter Five discussed the dirty methods some segregated 
men have utilised in response to such measures, i.e. by way of regaining the 
dignity they perceived was under threat, prisoners demonstrated autonomous 
action through the often violent subversion of rule-based norms, thus representing 
a dangerous challenge to authority. Such actions might be understood as the ‘dark 
side of agency’ (Lindegaard & Jacques, 2014: 86) though as suggested in Chapter 
Five, those cases are perhaps more nuanced given the positive - albeit 
unsustainable (and often unsavoury) - benefits of pursuing such avenues to which 
some prisoners have testified. In a similar vein, this chapter explores individual 
autonomy in the context of the spatial constraints and possibilities of a closed 
                                                          




segregation environment. However, unlike other small units (as opposed to all 
other ‘therapeutic communities’), the nature of the Barlinnie Special Unit - its 
underlying ethos as well as the manner of its operative regimes - both supported 
and encouraged the responsibilisation of prisoners by recognising their full 
autonomy, and it did so to an extraordinary degree. It is this pre-requisite 
autonomy component, rather than its more explicitly 'therapeutic' elements, which 
stands as the Unit's defining and differentiating characteristic.  
This chapter provides a general biography of the BSU but does so specifically 
through a close reading of this autonomy component, demonstrating how it was 
this fundamental lynch-pin concept which made possible the many other aspects 
of the Unit, those which are commonly counted amongst its unique features, 
including the unstructured regime; the personalisation of individual and collective 
space; the community spirit; a seemingly modest though extremely powerful 
commitment to oral communication, to ‘talking things through’; and, the high 
levels of trust which served to create a more humane, horizontal relational 
dynamic between staff and prisoners. Further, it is suggested that the Unit’s 
agency-promoting desistance potential was influenced in part by the uses and 
approaches to the spatial environment itself. The precise ways in which prisoners 
were granted the freedom to exert agency in and through the space are 
documented, so too are the implications this had for positive, in some cases 
astonishing, attitudinal shifts if not quite transformations. Questions are posed as 
to whether and to what extent individuals might begin to adjust their self-image 
specifically within carceral settings, particularly exploring the under-theorised 
role of spatial factors in that process. The value of a spatial analysis of change 
processes derives from the contention that by paying closer attention to the 
precise design and uses of carceral space, our understanding of how the 
‘subjective-social’ model of desistance (LeBel et al, 2008) spatially manifests 
within prisonscapes might be enriched. The central argument running through this 
chapter has two core threads: 
1. Positive attitudinal shifts, those which are necessary for sustainable 
desistance processes (in this case from rule-breaking within the prison as 
opposed to criminal activities within the community - though the two are 
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linked) require as a first premise the exercise of individual autonomy. 
Environments that restrict this potential tend to be counterproductive (and 
somewhat counterintuitive). Innumerable past examples show that far from 
rendering prisoners passive and/or compliant, heavily controlled 
environments that impede personal autonomy tend to provoke, almost 
proportional to levels of restriction, higher incidences of, and certainly more 
extreme, rule-breaking. This is particularly the case in relation to problem 
prisoners who, for various though often unclear reasons, tend to place a high 
value on their own choice-power, and conversely tend to forcefully resist any 
attempts that undermine it (questions of perceived emasculation, honour 
narratives, and attachments to the ‘Hardman’ identity are pertinent here). By 
contrast, environments that allow increased personal autonomy, those which 
place greater levels of trust in prisoners to make their own decisions, are 
more likely to produce better outcomes for both individual prisoners and 
staff.  
2. Self-determination is expressed through how individuals engage with the 
spaces in which they live. Since we are fundamentally and temporally fixed 
in physical environments, the extent to which we determine those 
environments is not only the means by which we exercise our practical 
agency but becomes paramount to how (and whether) we make healthy, 
positive and morally defensible choices.   
Why a Special Unit? 
As quoted (in conversation) by a former Unit Governor, the BSU was established 
“in response to a set of problems”, chief among them, “the abolition of the death 
penalty and fears around the consequences of that, and at the same time there 
were lots of men serving very long sentences – it was a combination of factors.” 
The confluence of these and other anxieties (discussed comprehensively in 
Chapter Two) may have contextualised the BSU, providing the necessary and 
more general conditions for alternative approaches to develop. But the Unit 
should not be regarded as merely reactive, as only a hurried, knee-jerk response to 
a broad range of problems and predicaments evident within the penal system 
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during that time. Rather, there appears to be two more specific reasons which fed-
into decisions not just to open an alternative unit but to create an environment 
which came to operate in such distinctive and divergent ways. These were: (1) the 
perceived character and specific behaviours of no more than a handful of Scottish 
prisoners who were understood as the very ‘worst of the worst’, and in some 
undiscernible way different from earlier problem prisoners, and (2) the passion, 
commitment and foresight of certain key individuals who had sufficient influence 
and opportunity so as to bring the Unit into being. The same former governor 
cited above expresses these points: 
You had two prisoners, Jimmy Boyle and Larry Winters, who were feared 
up and down the country. Something had to be done with them and the old 
approach wasn’t working. The driving force was a few pioneering guys, 
visionary guys on the Working Committee who had the ability to get 
things done. Not just a talking-vision, but a doing-vision. That’s how 
things started.  
It is not clear what exactly marked this crop of problem prisoners as essentially 
distinct from the scores of others who had come before - who similarly 
demonstrated violent and repeated intransigence - but what is apparent, and seems 
especially pertinent, is that these prisoners shared an almost pathological desire 
for self-determination – the personal often blazing testimonies examined in 
Chapter Three offer concrete evidence of this. The human need for autonomy (at 
some level and to some extent) is an intrinsic and universal aspect of the human 
condition, yet an inexorable meta-feature of imprisonment is the restricting of a 
person’s capacity for autonomy, the limiting of their choice-power, which 
permeates every aspect of prison life so that what happens in the course of daily 
prison life, happens to but rarely with and (less common still), because of 
prisoners themselves. For a number of reasons, not all of them easy to unpack26, 
there were a number of men in Scottish prisons during the late 60s early 70s and 
right up until the early 90s who manifestly could not or would not accept that 
state of affairs. Their defiant retaliations attest to this. That being the case it is 
reasonable they were viewed with deep caution. Given the almost complete 
                                                          
26 Untangling the complex and distinct psychological profiles of the most problematic of Scottish 
prisoners, and indeed exploring the intersections between personal psychology and structural 
factors, is beyond the purview of this work, however. 
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reversal in attitudes towards prisoners in the BSU (and mindful of the serious 
threat many of these prisoners posed to SPS staff) we learn a great deal about the 
insight, courage and humility of the BSU’s staff and of its primary architects – 
those who advanced both a “talking-vision and a doing-vision” - that they would 
interact with such prisoners in the ways they did. In this light, and given the 
criticisms which dogged the Unit throughout its lifespan, it is remarkable the BSU 
remained “non-punitive and based on a presumption of enhanced levels of trust 
and internal self-government” (Sparks, 2002:562).   
Spatial Autonomy and Personal Change 
What I am concerned with here is the ways some of these previously highly 
dangerous prisoners underwent significant changes once transferred to the Unit, 
not only in terms of their approaches to imprisonment but also related to how they 
understood themselves, their talents, their capacities, and their expectations for 
the future. This, I argue, was facilitated primarily by the considerable value that 
was placed on their individual autonomy – a source of power they did not need to 
battle the system in order to gain. From the moment of their arrival in the Unit, 
prisoners were given a meaningful stake in how the unit functioned, how the 
space was ordered, the kinds of activities that would be engaged with, what 
behaviours would be accepted (along with how unacceptable behaviours would be 
managed), how they could dress, what and where they would eat, who could visit 
and for how long, and they even had input, though to a lesser degree, into 
decisions concerning security and admissions. In a ‘meet the press’ day eighteen 
months after the Unit opened (a relatively common occurrence in the Unit’s early 
life and itself another departure from typical SPS practice) the Director of Prisons 
made this surprisingly candid comment: 
The men [in the BSU] are once more controlling their own destiny. 
Normal prison life can dehumanise a man and will eventually turn him 
into a vegetable. But we are now returning the decision-making processes 
to these men, and they are being made to face-up to themselves again. 
(Evening Times, 25th August 1974) 
Operating on that basis, daily life in the Unit conferred obvious privileges and 
opportunities to prisoners. This fuelled interior tensions within the SPS grounded 
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ostensibly in versions of the less eligibility argument – as if it was quite absurd to 
assume that prisoners either deserved or were equipped to manage the 
responsibilities they were entrusted with as key decision-makers. The Unit culture 
was certainly demanding, and it is this very fact which should (but didn’t) 
undermine any notion that it was a ‘soft option’. A member of the first prisoner 
cohort made that point well in a press interview: 
In many ways it’s harder in the unit that it is in ordinary prison life. There 
you don’t have to think for yourself. You obey orders and that’s it. You 
don’t have to consider anyone else or how they think, or feel, or regard 
you. Here you soon learn there’s much more responsibility thrust on you. 
You’ve got to take decisions. You’ve got to get on with your fellow 
prisoners and with staff. If you don’t your mates will soon let you know 
you’ve stepped out of line. (Courier, 25th July 1974) 
Acclimatising to those conditions, where certain freedoms were granted at the 
outset, was unlike the circumstances of any other custody arrangement in the SPS. 
The emphasis on the consequences of one’s free choices, particularly the effect it 
had on others, was also perhaps unlike the ways of life within the communities 
from which many men had come prior to their imprisonment. Not all prisoners 
could cope in this climate. Some voluntarily elected to be transferred out of the 
Unit, others were moved on disciplinary grounds, and in one especially tragic 
case, a prisoner took his own life while in the Unit. In spite of the persistent 
hostilities directed at the Unit concerning its role as a reward for bad behaviour, 
the struggle involved to actually flourish within it given the pains (as well as 
pleasures) of living-out the autonomy principle, proved insurmountable for some. 
This fact alone should eliminate any sense that the Unit was an easy place to live, 
much less an environment in which to work towards change. It is revealing that 
Jimmy Boyle (the BSU’s most famous inhabitant) chose to call the second 
instalment of his autobiography, which focused on his experiences in the Unit, 
The Pain of Confinement (1984). More telling still is the title he gave to the first 
of his books, A Sense of Freedom (1977), since this work documented his often 
harrowing experiences in more typically authoritarian segregation spaces (e.g. the 
Peterhead Digger and the Inverness Cages). This hints at a larger point about (1) 
the paradoxical if only quasi liberation prisoners felt in highly restrictive 
environments where the battle lines were clearly drawn and therefore places 
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where they could fight the familiar fight, thereby deriving power from it, and (2) 
how perilous it seemed to some prisoners, and how raw the psychological 
vulnerabilities were, of living within an entirely alien environment where a richer, 
more authentic and healthier concept of autonomy was practiced. This was no less 
arduous. With respect to one of the Unit’s most troubled and fragile men - who 
died in the Unit in 1977 from a drug overdose and who, from the files, seemed to 
oscillate between fraught bouts of rage and, more worrying, dense blankets of 
melancholy - Jimmy Boyle writes:  
He often made it clear than what he didn’t like about it [the BSU] was that 
it took away the only weapon he had had in the old system, the power that 
he could wield through the use of fear…The difficulty was in getting 
Larry to have some belief in his own talents as he was an exceptionally 
intelligent man and a gifted poet and musician. (1984:40) 
What became central to the Unit’s early philosophy, crucial to its ongoing 
success, and one of its proudest testaments to the value of humane penal 
management, was its commitment to raising prisoners’ self-esteem. At the very 
heart of this, without which nothing significant could have been achieved, was the 
autonomy principle. It was by allowing prisoners to make decisions about their 
environment, what they would do within it, and about who they were and wanted 
to be, that confidence was both built and sustained. Indeed, this sense of 
hopefulness fostered within the BSU was made possible by creating an 
environment that allowed prisoners to choose change. During its twenty-one year 
lifespan (1973-1994), both operational and relational changes occurred within the 
BSU, some unwelcome admittedly, but this principle of self-determination, a 
recognition that it is prisoners themselves who must make decisions on their own 
behalf remained constant in spite of myriad external and internal shifts.  
This Unit was revolutionary not because it was a purpose-designed space (it 
patently was not, as described below), or because it offered particularly radical 
programmes and/or activities, nor even or solely because it created a palpable 
sense of community, a feeling of togetherness best illustrated by the regular group 
meetings; rather, it was revolutionary in its desistance-promoting effects primarily 
because the management approach to who controlled the environment (and how) 
was a significant departure from typical modes of prison administration elsewhere 
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in the system. Crucially, it mattered less what the BSU actually looked like, how 
it was arranged and what was contained within it; what mattered much more was 
the degree of personal control prisoners had over it.  
‘Forward to the Past’ or ‘Back to the Future’? 
By firmly embedding the autonomy principle into all aspects of Unit life and 
operation, the BSU is rightly understood as innovative, as representative of a 
“new” approach. But there is also something more nuanced going on. The BSU 
appears to have incorporated and redefined elements of each historical movement 
in rehabilitation trends that were responsive to ‘problem’ prisoners. From early 
penal traditions, the BSU embraced the notion of spiritual rather than merely the 
more narrow understanding of behavioural reformation. It did so by detaching this 
idea from its original roots in religious doctrine and instead applying it in a 
distinctly secular context (the commitment to art therapy, for example, was one 
method through which prisoners explored themes such as guilt, redemption, 
forgiveness, and raising questions of the still loftier ‘higher purpose’ order). “In 
the classic manner of liberal reformist penology” writes Sparks (2002:563), “the 
Special Unit’s small history of hard won and fragile successes, had been elevated 
to the status of magic. There was something numinous there - something about 
sculpture, something about psychiatry.” From the interwar period before the 
collapse of the rehabilitative ideal, this second element – though rapidly 
becoming less significant – inspired the original treatment-oriented agenda. And 
from the future, the BSU promoted a set of principles that have in very recent 
years been explicated by desistance theorists, and consequently have been 
partially realised through prison (and probation) praxis.  
By re-appropriating early penal trends and by anticipating those that were to 
come, we might consider the Unit to have travelled both ‘forward to the past’ and 
‘back to the future’. The BSU is reasonably understood, then, as if not quite 
timeless then certainly out of sequence with the dominant rehabilitation narrative 
of its time. It was not only countercultural in the context of contemporaneous 
penal management norms but also, more interestingly, it both reimagined 
outdated ideas about spiritual change and, with extraordinary prescience, it 
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cultivated a set of practices underpinned by a general ethos which has 
subsequently become highly fashionable within SPS policy circles, i.e. the lauded 
Desistance Agenda. Intriguingly, it appears to have done so largely by accident. 
The BSU functioned without a prescriptive set of operating procedures; it adopted 
no singular model of practice; and, its underlying principles were sufficiently 
loose so as to allow the unit the freedom to evolve naturally rather than by rigid 
design. In other words, it was truly experimental and not merely because it was an 
innovative approach, but because its rehabilitative outcomes were unpredictable. 
As much as this was an ongoing source of unease and scepticism (to some degree 
justifiably), it also seemed to be a crucial part of its success.  
The BSU advanced a primarily idealistic rather than a consequentialist approach – 
for that reason it was closer to traditional rather than contemporary modes of 
penal management; it pursued certain ideals as ends in themselves, rather than 
simply pragmatic tools to achieve desirable outcomes. And yet, those outcomes 
proved more common within the BSU compared to other small units, those which 
were by contrast far more formulaic and systematically focused on planned and 
measurable ‘effectiveness’ (e.g. the Shotts unit). If that was the central story of 
the BSU in its halcyon period (probably only lasting the first 10 years), then the 
narrative changed towards the end of its operation. The buoyancy of promise on 
which it previously sailed high began to deflate, it lost the glamour of its youth so 
that media interest in it faded (except when allegations occasionally surfaced 
regarding conjugal visits, that is), key individuals (both influential prisoners and 
staff) were transferred, reassigned or simply left, contributing to the growing 
sense of lethargy that replaced the dynamism the Unit had once thrived on, and 
ultimately, its uniqueness became at best nostalgic and at worst irrelevant. The 
Inspectorate commented in its last formal report on the Unit that, 
The Barlinnie Special Unit has increasingly run the risk, which it has not 
altogether avoided, of becoming fossilised, a victim of its own impressive 
mythology and thus apparently unable to move forward in ways which 
might seem appropriate to the 1990s because it is still embalmed in the 




The Unit initially represented an isolated, virtuous paradigm of alternative penal 
management inside a mostly failing and muscularly austere prison system. After 
the wider prison experience became itself increasingly virtuous (and it did, 
especially following the reforms of the 1990s), the BSU was rendered 
superfluous. It was an irritant, a reminder of how badly wrong the system had 
been (that a Unit such as this was required at all). It appeared now as a dull if still 
unusually rare “fossil” rather than the shiny diamond it had once seemed.  
Closure 
At its inception, throughout its middle period and during its dying days, the BSU 
was anomalous to other small units in the wider specialist network. It was always 
different and it was always special. Where its specialness - even given the 
opprobrium this sometimes inspired - had once been a source of pride to the SPS 
(albeit qualified), as something of a cause celebre, it was this special quality that 
eventually proved part of its undoing. By the 1990s, a range of organisational and 
philosophical shifts occurred in penal along with wider criminal justice arenas. 
The professionalization ushered in by managerialism including the requirements 
of performance indicators, regular evaluative systems, standardisation of practices 
and procedures, and in general a risk-oriented mentality applied to all aspects of 
prison administration, together almost entirely negated the possibility for original 
or divergent approaches to any one part of the prison system.  The concept much 
less the reality of "experiments" was then reframed as either something overly 
risky, unprofessional in its inevitable haphazardness, naive, or as simply 
embarrassing. Such narratives were applied to the BSU long before its final 
closure, with all manner of political machinations feeding into the particular 
versions discrete actors adopted. Whilst stated openly in private correspondence 
between SPS policy makers, the clear movement towards Unit shut-down 
remained largely concealed from public view, often in ways that were 
disingenuous, sometimes with flagrant denials of what insiders knew to be the 
case - this had the effect of creating unnecessary resentments amongst prisoners 
and staff when the decision was finally made public to close the Unit. The record 
shows that unlike the fanfare surrounding its opening, the BSU ended exactly as 
Eliot's perfect cliché dictates: with a whimper not a bang – though for those who 
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were most affected by this decision (the present Unit prisoners especially) 
confusions, disappointments, and fears were felt keenly.  
The BSU's legacy tends to be framed as merely a colourful quirk interrupting the 
chronology of contemporary Scottish penal history, as if it were a freakish 
operational blip, as if its successes in reforming otherwise unmanageable men 
was somehow a fluke, or if not that then imbued with a certain fuzziness in which 
the potential risks far outweighed the demonstrable benefits. This chapter 
attempts to re-state the lessons this "blip" teaches us about what operationally 
effective and ethically sound  prison management has looked like, i.e. it is more 
not less autonomy, particularly granted to prisoners who are considered the most 
problematic, which produces the desired effect. And moreover, it is less not more 
institutional structure that best enables this.  
Structure & Sources 
At a broad, theoretical level, Part One explores the relationship between 
autonomy and behavioural change, or what is now more fashionably termed 
‘personal development’. Providing a compelling case study in which to root these 
ideas, Parts Two and Three demonstrate how the autonomy concept manifested in 
the BSU. First a discussion is offered as to the circumstances surrounding the 
Unit’s establishment - its initial aims and tensions, issues regarding its placement 
and internal design, along with how it was publicly framed and responded to by 
policy makers, SPS administrators, grade-level staff and prisoners. Secondly, a 
more micro analysis is presented documenting how the Unit actually “worked”, 
what it entailed as a lived experience, and how it evolved. Two central categories 
are discussed in detail: (1) the personalisation of space, exploring how spatial 
agency informed the routines, regimes, and the aesthetics of the Unit, and (2) the 
community component, generating a range of questions regarding: the role of 
group decision-making especially on matters of internal order; the recruitment 
and eligibility of staff; and, the increasingly insulated position the BSU assumed 
within the wider SPS estate, which while originally advantageous in terms of 




Material for this chapter is drawn from a range of archival sources including SPS 
policy documents, internal Instructions, Inspectorate Reports, minutes from 
relevant Parliamentary debates, and commentary from other external sources 
(media archives for example). To capture the lived experience of prisoners and 
staff, I have selectively engaged with the body of published prisoner testimonies, 
augmented by interview data from conversations with SPS staff. In the course of 
the fieldwork I was encouraged to find that records relating to the BSU were 
significantly more extensive than those pertaining to other small units. This was 
especially the case in relation to prisoners' personal files, of which many from the 
early period have been retained. I was also able to access other kinds of internal 
SPS documentation, particularly private correspondence – confidential letters 
between key individuals, many offering personal responses to the five BSU 
inspection reports, and later documents surrounding the Unit’s closure. For the 
most part I have identified people only by their position and status rather than by 
name. Despite the significantly more abundant store of data relating to this unit 
compared to others in Scottish penal history, the archives are still rather patchy; 
many have been preserved by individuals in their personal collections, which I 
was fortunate to stumble upon (and be given permission to document). At an 
institutional level, however, the general lack of comprehensive archiving meant 
that in piecing together how the Unit came into being, how it operated throughout 
its lifespan, how it was perceived and experienced, and explanations for its 
closure, certain crucial moments in (and aspects of) the Unit’s story are left 
unrecorded. To fill the gaps, I relied on inferences, personal recollections, and a 
degree of creative interpretation that is both an inevitable hazard and a potentially 
fertile advantage of historical analysis.  
Part One 
The Role of Autonomy in Processes of Behavioural Change: Lessons from 
Desistance Theory 
 
The preceding chapters explored the potential effects of hopelessness in prison 
through the lens of dirty protests, riots and other violent activities. In terms of 
management responses, descriptions of the old style methods of close control and 
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constraint, manifested spatially through isolating, austere environments, were 
offered, supported by often painful prisoner testimonies. Conversely, here I am 
concerned with the theme of hope. What might that mean for prisoners? How 
might it be fostered and sustained at an institutional level by way of creating 
certain kinds of environments? And, where that is possible, what might be the 
implications for behaviour in the context of individual desistance from disruptive, 
violent and other subversive activities? The following sections introduce a set of 
themes central to desistance theory, those which underpinned much of the Unit’s 
success - remarkably, before the language or literature of desistance had emerged 
(we might speculate that had the Unit been supported by an accepted and admired 
theoretical framework, it may have been more difficult close it.) 
Mobilising the rubric of desistance is useful here for a number of reasons. Within 
prison communities, the complex process of moving away from rebellious and 
damaging behaviours - often involving high levels of violence and interpersonal 
conflict - to some degree mirrors that of broader processes of moving away from 
a criminal lifestyle once liberated from prison, those which are the primary 
concern of desistance research. For some individuals, these two processes are 
quite often intimately linked, part of the same larger shift in attitude, self-
identification, and lifestyle. Moreover, by way of exploring these processes 
desistance theory offers rich and diverse accounts of agency and structure, along 
with descriptions (more than complete explanations) of the possible interactions 
between the two. It provides a theoretical basis for understanding how personal 
autonomy is expressed through and supported by strong community bonds; in this 
way it helps to reconcile the often opposing concepts of the individual versus the 
collective. These strands of desistance theory are useful when scrutinising the role 
that spatial factors might play. Before exploring these ideas, here follows a very 
brief summary of the penal approaches to prisoner management that preceded, 
and informed, the arrival of the desistance agenda.  




In penal management terms (but also reflecting practice norms across the wider 
criminal justice sphere) traditional approaches to personal change have typically 
advanced a backward-looking, correction-based strategy where the objective has 
been to address the personal defects of individuals based on their past behaviours 
and attitudes. This kind of approach manifested first through a religious agenda of 
reformation which required prisoners to reflect on their past sins. The processes of 
atonement involved extreme forms of segregation (i.e. solitary confinement) so as 
to ensure the silence and solitude necessary for establishing proximity to God; 
educative provisions strictly limited to bible readings; human contact limited to 
interactions with chaplains and custody officers; and, work regimes consisting of 
hard, menial labour. Punitive practices such as these were fuelled by the hope of 
reformation on the grounds that there is an inherent connection between the 
retributive and restorative functions of prisons. In other words, where brutal 
practices enable brutal confrontations with one’s own spiritual failures, the 
possibility of repentance, and therefore spiritual change, is increased. While this 
approach was eventually supplanted by a treatment-based agenda, the view of 
human nature was no less suspicious and the strategy no less backward-looking. 
The movement was from ridding the prisoner of spiritual evil to curing him of 
mental sickness; from the reformation of afflicted souls to the rehabilitation of 
troubled minds. The more explicitly punitive dimensions of prison were 
eventually abandoned (though never entirely), replaced by a range of targeted 
interventions, including the proliferation of behavioural programmes, intended to 
isolate the causes and triggers of deviant activity, but mostly to mitigate the 
psychological deficiencies of prisoners themselves.  
Broadly speaking, von Hirsch (1998:1) helpfully defines rehabilitation as, “the 
idea of ‘curing’ an offender of his or her criminal tendencies. It consists, more 
precisely, of changing an offender’s personality, outlook, habits, or opportunities 
so as to make him or her less inclined to commit crimes.” In brief, the 
development of rehabilitation theories has included several shifts, first in the 
1970s from a psycho-medical approach focused on abnormal somatic features, i.e. 
pathological psychology, to a behaviourist model in the 1980s with a strong focus 
on CBT in the 1990s (Barker & Morgan, 1993). This was followed by an era of 
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accreditation in the wake of the influential Woolf Report in 1991, which 
recommended the standardization of treatment programmes based on robust 
principles of “what works” (Maguire & Priestley, 1995). Underpinning these 
models is the assumption that “if we can fix the person, we have fixed the 
problem”.  
More recently, another crucial development has occurred influenced by the 
growing body of desistance research. In programmatic terms, a desistance 
approach asks: what resources does this person have which might lead them 
towards non-criminality? What are their strengths? How might we facilitate the 
building of those capacities? The larger question is not ‘what works?’ but ‘how 
does it work?’ (see, Maruna & Immarigeon, 2004; Maruna & LeBel, 2010), with 
a more concentrated focus on differing learning styles (Day & Howles, 2002). In 
terms of practice, the re-framing of these questions has informed the development 
of new treatment models including, most notably, the Risk-Need-Responsitivity 
model (see Andrews & Bonta, 2003) and later by the Good Lives model (see 
Ward & Stewart). Such models represent a movement, albeit slow, from a sole 
emphasis on individual offenders, which has been challenged on the basis that it 
fails to account for the importance of social and relational contexts that both 
shape individual lives and facilitate change (Magnami and Wray, 2006:159). 
Rather, desistance theory has insisted on the important role families can play in 
the rehabilitative process (Ward & Marshall, 2004; Shapiro and DiZerega, 2010). 
As Maruna and Lebel (2010:720) argue, change does not begin “with existing 
expert models of crime reduction, but rather should begin with an understanding 
of the organic or normative processes that seem to impact offending patterns over 
the life course.” Typically, desistance is understood as a process of self-change 
informed by the multifarious factors that influence the choices and opportunities 
that individuals encounter. It is argued, therefore, that effective rehabilitation 
happens in the context of wider societal relationships (Raynor & Robinson, 2005).  
Desistance research has shown that successful change processes occur outside the 
interventions of the criminal justice system (Farrall, 1995:56) and, therefore, 
desistance models are positioned apart from, yet operate in relation to, 
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professional interventionist models (McNeill, 2006). Yet desistance theory has 
exerted significant influence over both probationary practice and, pertinently, if 
more surprisingly, prison practice. Indeed, desistance theory has become 
increasingly popular amongst penal managers, particularly in Scotland where the 
SPS’ most recent Organisational Review (published in 2013) presented a vision of 
practice explicitly underpinned by the findings of desistance theory. The title of 
the review demonstrates how central a strengths-based model of offender 
management has become, rhetorically at least: Unlocking Potential; Transforming 
Lives. This evolution in rehabilitative penal trends has led to a more positive 
reading of human nature, a more future-oriented approach to personal 
development, and a recognition of the relationship between internal and external 
factors in processes of change. If this is the current institutional position in the 
second decade of the twenty first century, then we begin to see how progressive 
the BSU was in 1973 (and therefore how threatening to the Old Guard it must 
have seemed) since, as examined below, each of these elements infused the way 
the Unit operated.  
In summary, then, and defined in the most basic terms, desistance is the study of 
the processes that allow people to move away from criminal activity; it is a 
theoretical framework within which explanations are offered as to how and why 
people begin and maintain the process of ceasing to live in one way in order to 
live successfully in another. The focus is on the ways people stop, rather than the 
reasons people start, committing crime. By emphasising what has to happen to, 
for and, crucially, by a person enabling positive change to occur, theories of 
desistance are inherently forward-looking; they are inherently hopeful.  
Desistance and Hope 
The 'having' of hope consists of two vital ingredients: (1) a deep desire for 
change, and; (2) a recognition that, given certain conditions, change is possible. 
Hope is not synonymous with the concept of faith since blind belief in an 
imagined future tends to limit our capacity to bring about that future; it obscures 
the personal effort required to effect change by propagating the faulty assumption 
that change is somehow pre-ordained. In this sense, uncritical faith in a particular 
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end-point shuts down the positive action necessary to take steps towards that 
larger goal. Hope is hard work precisely because the longed-for change we desire 
is in no way inevitable, and in many cases it is highly improbable hence the often 
extraordinary degree of effort required to achieve it. If hope means more than 
merely wishful thinking, then realism is the only hopeful position – a position that 
holds the following: 
I want things to change and given X, Y, and X that might actually be possible.  
The relationship between this position and desistance is rooted first in correct 
determinations of what constitutes those X's Y's Z's (structure) and secondly, in 
personal actions that bring them into being (agency).  The work of desistance 
theory is to unmask those variables and to provide analysis of the myriad 
resources that might best serve them, the avenues one would have to take in order 
to do so, and how one might mitigate the various barriers encountered along the 
way.   
At the unofficial public launch of the BSU eighteen months after it first opened, 
the Controller of Operations was right to select his words carefully; he was 
perceptive in expressing both the realism of hope, and its future-orientation: 
I don’t think this unit is going to give us all the answers to prison 
treatment but it might help us formulate the right questions. We tend to 
ask why a prisoner is violent. Should we not be looking for the situation 
that avoids violence altogether? (The Guardian, 25th July, 1974) 
Structure and Agency 
Desistance processes rely on interactions between subjective factors (i.e. 
motivation, attitudes, self-discipline, personal beliefs, etc.) and structural factors 
(i.e., social contexts, opportunities, material conditions, etc.) - although the 
mechanisms underlying that precise interaction remain contested. In spite of the 
prominence of interactionist theories, a dichotomy is still often presented between 
these elements of structure and agency, as if the influence of one negates the 
importance of the other. It is possible, however, to maintain this essential 
relationship whilst at the time asserting the centrality of individual autonomy. 
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That is the position I take here informed by the actual practices, ethos and effects 
of the BSU.  
Autonomy is our conduit of choice-power, sometimes a dangerous power 
especially when used defensively as a weapon. When deviant choices are made, it 
is circumstance that load the gun but it is agency which pulls the trigger. To argue 
otherwise would be to critically disempower individuals, and in terms of 
interventions, it would mean pursuing a one-way pedagogical exercise, where 
external control is assumed over an individual’s choices and, importantly, their 
self-defined life-narratives – this is often where rehabilitative programmes have 
gone wrong. Indeed, rehabilitative approaches have tended to adopt what 
Zimbardo calls a ‘dispositional bias’,  where the subject (the offender) is being 
taught something of supposed value by the professional statutory agent that they 
are compelled to engage with, as a way to facilitate ‘change’. Conversely, a 
relational, desistance-inspired approach is a two-way learning process where the 
experiences, capabilities and resources of all those involved are exchanged on an 
equal footing. As Freedon argues, “intervention in others need not be an intrusion; 
it can contribute to their capacity to function physically, mentally, emotionally 
and morally” (1991:71). But that dynamic can only work if the centrality of 
individual autonomy to action is recognised. This, however, does not neglect the 
power of circumstances to affect choices since in cases where troubled 
circumstances are compound, we are not only more likely to shoot but the damage 
caused is likely to be greater. Yet choosing to fire is not inevitable - if it were then 
every marginalised person would be a career criminal (and every privileged 
person would be a model citizen). When the odds are stacked so heavily against 
so many, it is less notable that some are criminally deviant and significantly more 
surprising that it is so few. And moreover, once locked into a deviant cycle 
(which contact with the criminal justice system tends to consolidate) it is 
impressive that anyone manages to desist at all. The fact that some do is testament 
to the power of autonomy.  
Personal autonomy is, then, both the beginning and the end point of action. The 
structures that define the conditions in which we live form the layers (or barriers) 
in between. In certain respects (choosing to get married for example) “subjective 
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changes may precede life-changing structural events and, to that extent, 
individuals can act as agents of their own change” (LeBel et al, 2008:155), yet in 
others, societal meta-structures (economic disenfranchisement for example) may 
be pre-determined by forces beyond our individual control. But agency remains 
both the “upfront work” (Pashnoster and Bushway, 2009:1152, borrowed from 
Giordano et al, 2001:992), and also the ‘backstage work’ since the choices we 
make not only, at times, partially create the circumstances we are in, but more 
commonly they are responsive to the stage that has already been set.  
Confronting honestly the self-evident centrality of autonomy to human action is 
politically problematic (for those on the Left in particular) because if we have the 
autonomy to transcend poor circumstances and thereby to act in ways that defy 
probabilities then what follows is the tendency to connect agency with 
responsibility through a reductive manoeuvre of blame-apportioning. This seems 
to be the irresistible conclusion arrived at by some (especially those on the Right). 
However, when autonomy is not placed at the heart of change processes, there is 
danger of descending into an authoritarian logic of ‘we, the experts, know what is 
best for you, the offender’. Desistance theory helps to close that gap partly by 
insisting that change is a non-linear process rather than a singular event – thus 
allowing for the near inevitability of set-backs (which are understood as learning 
curves more than condemnation end-points) – and partly because it places the 
individual at the centre of their own lives. This does not, however, negate the 
importance of others, particularly families, friends and wider social communities, 
in the successful desistance of the individual. In fact a crucial contribution 
desistance theory has made is its reconciling of the power (and attending 
responsibility) of the individual and that of the collective. Indeed, the literature 
identifies social capital, support networks, and positive, pro-social activities and 
relationships as key features to the desistance process (see, O’Connor & Bogue, 
2010; Stenson & Watt, 1999). If positive behavioural change requires some 
degree of (re)integration into law-abiding communities then, it is worth 
remembering, as Weaver and McNeill (2010:7-8) put it, that “no one can integrate 
themselves into a community or social group; integration necessarily involves the 
receiving community as much as the offender.”  
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Desistance theories in general are underscored by a liberal communitarian 
perspective which understands individuals as “essentially interacting rather than 
atomistically discrete” (Freedon, 1991:69-70). In this way, the contractual 
arrangement of state interventions (prior, post and during punishment processes) 
is replaced by the more nuanced practice of ‘mutual cooperation’ and 
‘interdependence’. But the stability and health of that interdependence relies on 
according each individual within the communities he/she lives sufficient 
autonomy so as to avoid hierarchical relationships where one group imposes onto 
another. The most valuable feature of desistance theory is, then, its promotion of a 
shift from formal, structured interventions to an emphasis on allowing individuals 
much more autonomy within a democratic community structure - to (1) define 
their own self-narratives, and (2) make their own choices about how best to 
pursue their personal goals. In order to create the kinds of relationships and 
conditions that make pro-social choices possible, the work of external others 
(state agencies, voluntary organisations, business leaders, families, and wider 
communities) is re-framed as a bundle of negative duties, i.e. to not penalise 
disenfranchised groups, to not erect social, political and, crucially, economic 
barriers that restrict the choices individuals are able to make, to not withhold 
support from certain people or to deny their entry into particular social groupings, 
and especially to not stigmatise ex/offenders by perpetuating fixed images of the 
wrong-doer that serve only to cage people in a criminal identity that makes it very 
difficult to choose alternative pathways. One of the primary reasons the BSU 
proved to be an effective desistance-promoting environment is not that it 
introduced new rehabilitative provisions but that it removed old criminogenic 
barriers, and it did so by establishing a strong sense of community sustained by a 
consensus model of democratic participation.  
Identity 
Scholars argue that part of this process of choosing change requires a series of 
‘cognitive shifts’ (Giordano et al, 2002), if not a wholesale identity shift. This 
involves a re-scripting of one's personal narrative whereby former negative labels 
and the attending self-images they contain might be shed, replaced by positive, 
pro-social and non-offending self-constructions (see especially Maruna's notion of 
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the 'redemption script', 2001). Re-imagining personal identity might be positive to 
the extent it diffuses the shame of one’s past self (Maruna, 2001) as well as 
negating the fear of one’s future self if the individual continues on his/her current 
trajectory (Paternoster & Bushway, 2009). Yet both these apparent benefits are 
predicated on the tacit assumption that the advantages of an individual’s past and 
future criminal identities are outweighed by the costs. From the perspective of 
problem prisoners, however, a dilemma arises since there is, as they might view 
it, concrete value attached to maintaining their deviant identities in prisons (in 
terms of their status amongst peers, and their own sense of personal dignity), 
whereas becoming more compliant to a system they understand as illegitimate 
potentially incurs an unacceptable personal cost given the simpering almost 
robotic passivity that such a position would involve. It is on that basis that many 
prisoners experienced an often considerable struggle when first entering the BSU. 
From their initial difficulties, and later their means of overcoming them, we are 
given clear examples of the complexities of identity work, but also of how 
important that work is for desistance.  
They collectively hint at the habituated nature of identity and of the routines of 
behaviour that support it. Put another way, identities that are considered 
institutionally deviant and experienced as personally damaging, might still be 
perversely comforting in their constancy – engendering feelings contributing to 
what Giddens (1984; 1991) frames as ‘ontological security’. By contrast, penal 
environments that disrupt norms of behaviour (prisoners’ own and those of the 
people guarding them) can be frightening in their unfamiliarity. (This is also the 
case in community settings.) In every environmental and relational context, a 
different set of associations must be made and altered identities must be forged. 
The default emotional responses with which a person (inhabiting a particular 
identity) might have become comfortable may no longer apply.  
With savage specificity, prisoners have documented what this has meant for them. 
After transferral to the Unit – a place where the power dynamics were more subtle 
and ambiguous than in other penal settings, where hierarchies were for the most 
part diffused on horizontal rather than vertical lines, where the same rules simply 
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did not apply - one prisoner describes the tectonic struggle he experienced when 
he could no longer fall-back on more familiar identity terrain: 
I did try to change but it was a long, painful process. My emotions were 
like monsters ripping me apart; everything was always so confusing. At 
times I didn’t know if I could get through it all or if I really wanted to. 
What would I have left if I didn’t have my feelings, whether they were 
rage or hatred? The pressure was always with me: the hopelessness of my 
situation. The life sentence – it was a nightmare. (Collins, 1997:122) 
The confusion here lies partly in the inner turmoil created when there are two (or 
more) opposing identities, each positioned in their own emotional landscapes with 
the self, the “I”, somehow navigating between them. That the BSU granted 
prisoners significant freedoms and did so by establishing a relationship of 
astonishing trust was often, initially at least, experienced by prisoners as a terrible 
burden, as a threat to the violent, raging ‘problem’ identity they had in many 
cases spent years honing. By allowing prisoners to literally shape how the Unit 
was run, and how they would live within it, an environment and community was 
created in which each individual was expected to (re)create their own self-image. 
The unravelling of prior identities was the necessary first step and a turbulent one, 
as the Hugh Collins’ quote makes clear. This is perhaps why the word 
‘transformation’ (often used to describe the effect of the BSU) feels inappropriate; 
not only is it suggestive of an extremity of turn, but it also smacks of its 
suddenness, as if identity shifts result from some crystal-sharp epiphany of self-
aware vision. To understand the extent to which any degree of cognitive or 
identity shift is possible, or at least rendered more likely, we return again to the 
structure-agency relationship since a synergy between the myriad external factors 
that determine the scope of a person's material reality and the individual choices 
they feel able to make within that reality, affect how (and whether) identity can be 
re-imagined.  
If criminogenic structures impede positive identity shifts, thus making it more 
difficult for individuals to desist from crime - in spite of whether they have the 
pre-requisite motivation to do so (see Farrall, 2002) – then similarly, life 
circumstances (or events) with fewer criminogenic forces and more protective 
factors facilitate processes of change. Desistance research has identified many of 
235 
 
the elements that constitute both these environmental contexts. What has been 
less well examined is the role of spatial factors in that process, i.e. the effect of 
the exigencies of particular physical environments on the ways people construct 
their personal narratives and make choices accordingly. How might spatial 
factors, those which are explicitly related to the design, function, features and 
ideational aspects of physical environments, inform, enable and/or preclude 
internal identity or attitudinal shifts? This is to ask more than merely what an 
environment looks like, feels like, what the space does or does not contain, who it 
is shared with, and whether it is suitable to meet its functional objectives (though 
all those questions are relevant). It is also to ask who makes those decisions and 
how?  
Pertinently, in all prisoners’ autobiographical accounts frequent and detailed 
descriptions are offered of the prison spaces in which they lived. They write of the 
fabric of the building (often disdainfully), of the severity and sparseness of their 
visual environments, they chronicle the lack of light or its surfeit, as well as both 
the freezing cold winds which the inadequate heating systems could not mitigate 
and, in the summer months, the heavy, sweltering heat the ventilation systems 
could not militate against. They document the dirt and the insalubrious odours of 
the prison, along with the sensations created by the din of men crying-out or 
banging on cell doors. In this way prisoners’ testimonies are often powerfully 
visceral, a sensuality that is very much rooted in the physical conditions of their 
imprisonment. Since certain spatial features provide cues to behaviour (Rapoport, 
1976), the connections made between that spatial reality and who prisoners 
understand themselves as being is informed by what those spaces represent about 
how others view them. What do we keep in small, guarded cages but animals? 
Who do we permit to live in squalor but the despised poor? What category of 
person do we shut-away without possessions in over (or under) lit spaces where 
they cannot hurt themselves but lunatics? Attempting to escape the negative 
connotations of those kinds of externally imposed identities becomes a mammoth 




Material comfort, however, is only one aspect of the struggle – a beautifully 
gilded cage is still a prison if one has not chosen it just as the shabbiest home is 
still a sanctuary if one has. Which group of people do we routinely (by default) 
regiment in space, denying full spatial ownership to, but children? If, then, the 
meanings and impact of spatial cues is the first issue, the second more pressing 
issue is how they are controlled and by whom. There is a correlative link between 
institutional environments that permit greater spatialized agency and those which 
provide the conditions for more successful behavioural outcomes. In other words, 
positive change is rendered more likely when individuals are afforded increased 
decision-making power over the spaces in which they live – a power that extends 
to ownership of the seemingly inconsequential and therefore often overlooked, 
spatial features that help define our experiences in given environments. As a 
subsidiary argument, it might also be the case that in some sense exercising 
choice-power is like stretching a bodily muscle; the more it is practiced the better 
it functions. Qualities of repetition and incrementalism are important here. With 
respect to spatial autonomy in particular, and following that reasoning, we might 
draw a link between quotidian expressions of everyday autonomy in space (e.g. 
the seeming minutiae of what colour to paint a wall, what uses discrete spaces 
would be put to, where visits would be conducted, etc.) and deeper expressions of 
moral autonomy, those which concern decisions about the proper treatment of 
others, the construction and practice of personal values, and not least, the way 
personal identity is understood and embodied.  
You cannot ask a person to make grand decisions about things of considerable 
importance and expect them to make responsible choices if at the same time and 
in every other circumstance you limit a person's capacity to make even minor 
choices. In many segregation spaces throughout Scottish penal history, prisoners 
were unable to control the temperature of their cells. They could not decide when 
to be shrouded in dark, when to be visible and under what conditions. They were 
unable to determine the contours of their own privacy, when and for how long 
they would be with others, and where. They could not decorate walls or choose 
the personal possession with which to surround themselves. They could not 
decide when to listen to music, or watch television, and when to enjoy silence. 
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And yet prisoners chose to make decisions about all those aspects but they did so 
without institutional authority. They did so in ways that proved progressively 
more (morally) untenable, compounding the offending identities that were already 
(spatially) assumed of them, thereby presenting increased security risks to 
management. John Steele writes of his time in the Inverness Cages: 
Because there was no heating in the cells I had to light fires to keep me 
warm (p.299)…a huge steel sheet covered the entire window, blocking out 
the daylight (p.304)…In front of the light bulb was a sheet of Perspex to 
stop me from getting at the bulb. Some tiny holes had been drilled in the 
steel grille, but I covered them with food slops and shit till no light got in 
at all…I was in one helluva mess, and in my ‘cave’ I could shed tears 
without fear of being seen (p.305).” 
This was hardly the worst of it. Officers also had to contend with the smashing of 
windows, the scratching and smearing of walls with human waste and blood, 
fixtures ripped from walls and made into weapons, the organised cacophony of 
barks and insults. Consequently, more spatial constraints were imposed and fewer 
freedoms granted, and by way of counter-response, more excessive deviance was 
the result. In that kind of negative cyclical arrangement, there could be very little 
possibility of establishing trust between prisoners and officers – which spatialized 
agency both depends on and (re)produces. In these circumstances, spatial 
restrictions did not serve to dampen spatialized agency; they limited the choices 
through which it could be expressed leading to destructive rather than creative 
environmental impulses.  
The BSU was a radically different proposition despite being environmentally 
comparable, even worse in some respects, to other penal spaces.  It was small, 
cold in the winter, claustrophobic in the summer. The fabric of the building was 
similar to the rest of Barlinnie prison, the same grey stone, the same narrow 
corridors, the same locks and steel doors. And yet it became a home and a 
sanctuary to some of the prisoners who lived there because through its gated 
entrance, inside its barbed walls, prisoners decided what the Unit looked like, 
what the space contained and how it was used. These choices represented who 
they were or wanted to be no more or less than the vandalised cells of other more 
spatially constricted sites represented the identities of those who inhabited them. 
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Compare the two pictures below, one is of the mural painted by prisoners in the 
BSU’s communal hallway, the other is of one of Barlinnie prison’s communal 
halls during the fraught 1980s when bouts of rioting following (and followed by) 
periods of total lock-down became the disturbing norm. 
‘The Wall of Despair’ – Barlinnie Special Unit, circa 1975 
 




The final point to make here before moving on to the chronology of the Unit’s 
story, concerns the relationship between spatialized and other kinds of agency. 
Very rarely is it possible to exert ownership of a space and to express autonomy 
within it, if at the same time we do not also have the power to determine the 
routines and regimes of our daily lives. The BSU gave prisoners the freedom to 
decide what to do with the space because they were also given the freedom to 
choose what to do in it. Part Three offers a detailed account of what that actually 
meant in practice. By way of introduction Fig Five below identifies the specific 
categories of everyday experience that prisoners had direct decision-making 
powers in shaping. It illustrates the range and extent of control prisoners had over 
their environment and the degree to which that was (and remained) spectacularly 
unusual. As stated in the first of the Unit’s inspection reports, “Compared with 
remand, short-term and other long-term inmates those in the Unit have a quality 
of life and opportunities for decision making which are quite remarkable within a  
penal environment” (HMIPS, 1982: para. 2.3.). 
It was this aspect of the Unit, this valuing of personal autonomy (made possible 
by trusting relationships) that served to both promote individual wellbeing, and to 
facilitate the construction of positive identities. Given the extent this approach 
operated from what is now understood as a strengths-based model, the BSU might 
be viewed as an early prototype for desistance oriented penal practice.  
Fig Seven: Prisoners’ Control in the BSU 
Spatial Control Control over Routines 
& Procedures 
Other 
The uses of space  
The functional 
designation of particular 
areas, and the ways they 
would be shared  
Personal time 
management  
How much or how little 
time would be spent 
alone or associating with 
others.  
Clothing  
Prisoners were permitted 
to wear their own attire, 
brought-in by relatives 
and friend). 
The contents of 
communal spaces 
What kinds of material 
provisions spaces would 
Meaningful activities 
Individually-defined 
work, education, creative 
and exercise activities. 
Food  
Provisions could be 
brought in by relatives 
and friends to supplement 
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contain (though not all 
requests were met), 
along with how they 
would be decorated. 
standard prison rations. 
Cells  
The layout, aesthetics 
and contents of cells. 
Prisoners could decorate 
their personal space; they 
could bring furniture and 
other personal items 
from home. 
Kitchen facilities  
Prisoners could cook and 
eat at their preferred time 
in their cells or in 
communal areas. 
Correspondence 
With the exception of the 
initial induction period, 
all mail was unrestricted 
and uncensored.  
 
Visits  
Where they could take 
place in the unit i.e. in 
prisoners cells, the 
meeting room, the 
outside courtyard or 
other communal areas. 
Visits 
The community agreed 
on who could visit, 
particularly in relation to 
the media and other 
interested parties, while 
individual prisoners had 
control over frequency 








The Barlinnie Special Unit; A Spatial History of Change 
 
In policy terms, the discernible source of the BSU was the set of 
recommendations made by a Departmental Working Party in a key report 
published in 1971: The Treatment of Certain Long Term Prisoners and 
Potentially Violent Prisoners. This Working Party was established following 
discussions in May 1970 between representatives of the SPOA and the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, in which the issue of staff safety was 
chief on the agenda. Amongst issues foreshadowing these discussions was a 
growing anxiety within the SPS regarding the increasing extremity, if not the 
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frequency, of prison disturbances. 1962 marked the first major prison incident in 
recent times (at Perth prison), signalling movement towards organised and 
widespread prisoner rebellion - as opposed to a continuation of more isolated and 
containable incidences. In conjunction with the changing prisoner demographics, 
the increase in the length of sentences given to prisoners, and, not least, the 'no 
hanging' bill introduced in 1965, such movements created an atmosphere of 
disquiet amongst staff resulting in greater policy (as well as public) attention as to 
the proper management of long term prisoners. As detailed in Chapter Two, a 
specialist unit had operated in Peterhead prison during the 1950s, but this was a 
singular arrangement without clarity or precision in terms of a formally stated 
objective, and without a set of officially-defined procedures. It was not until the 
1960s that a more carefully designed system of alternative custody arrangements 
was thought necessary, one in which, "it was felt that there was a need for 
segregation facilities away from the main centres of prison trouble” i.e. Peterhead 
(Working Party on Alternative Regimes, July 1985, para.1.2). By 1970 the 
embryonic small units network consisted of the Inverness Unit (opened in 1966) 
along with a number of routine segregation units (or punishment blocks) scattered 
across the prison estate and used for administrative as well as short-term punitive 
purposes.  
Prisoner Profiles 
BSU prisoners tended to be older than those contained in other small units. At the 
time of the first inspection report in 1982, the age range was between 28 – 41 
years. By 1993, when the first (and only) external evaluation was conducted the 
present cohort “were on aggregate very slightly older than their predecessors” 
(Bottomley, Sparks, Liebling, 1993:16). They tended to be serving either life 
sentences, very long sentences (extended in some cases due to crimes committed 
whilst in prison), or, later, indeterminate sentences. Most had spent significant 
periods of time in other segregation spaces, notably in the Peterhead ‘Digger’ and 
the Inverness ‘Cages’. Regarding personal characteristics, prisoners inevitably 
displayed a diversity of traits, though certain personality types (or at least the 
impressions they left) appear typical. Given the historical and general lack of 
careful archiving within the SPS, it is odd that the personal files of many of the 
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original BSU prisoners have been comprehensively retained. Files relating to 
more recent BSU prisoners, however, were completely missing from the archival 
record (or I was unable to locate them at least).  
These stored archives, along with private correspondence between prison 
governors and the Secretary of State (who was tasked with approving all transfers 
to the Unit), reveal disturbing details of the sheer magnitude of the management 
problem the SPS faced. One representative prisoner, for example, had a 
disciplinary record with 62 separate misconduct reports – including, 11 for 
assaulting staff, 6 for violent altercations with other prisoners, and 27 reports for 
property destruction. A serious challenge by any standards. Another prisoner had 
attempted escape three times and while none of those attempts involved violence 
they did cause significant ripple effects across the SPS by way of undermining the 
security systems currently in place - thus making staff understandably nervous 
and leaving prisoners bolstered. Within the files, common descriptions of 
personality traits conjure the extent of the psychological strains experienced by 
these men, and by the officers who were required to control them. Iterations of 
words such as “paranoid”, “notorious”, “evasive”, “threatening”, “highly 
intelligent”, “violent”, “ volatile”, “disruptive”, and “unpredictable” so routinely 
feature that it becomes difficult to distinguish one prisoner from another. Indeed, 
this homogeneity of assessment led to a uniformity of treatment which inevitably 
negated the importance of the individual. Compounding the tragic impression this 
leaves (particularly when reading multiple files in succession) such descriptions 
tend to be accompanied by stark sentences that throb with pathos like a broken 
heart: “He seems to live a life of permanent misery and is very much a lonely 
person.” It was these kinds of men for whom hopelessness was a familiar and 
deeply-felt reality; it was these kinds of prisoners who were transferred to the 
BSU.  
Reading their files leaves one with a slightly jarring feeling of grave, 
uncomfortable respect. There is qualified respect too for the beleaguered officers 
who were forced, on a routine basis, to confront the real dangers of that obstinacy, 
often equally unmoored, unmanned by a petulance matching that of prisoners’, 
and to do so handcuffed within increasingly tight guidelines, tasked with a job 
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few people dream of and doing it mostly without public support. The following 
passages from one prisoner’s autobiography gives a sense of what it felt like to 
make that transition to the Unit, and how stubborn the suspicions were; how 
wedded to the possibility of violence these men continued to be and consequently 
how threatening they must have rightfully seemed to those who had to manage 
them: 
The Chief Warder began by telling me that they had read about me in the 
prison files, but they wanted to hear my side of it. There was a lot of talk 
of the Special Unit and how it worked, about the trust that would be 
placed on me and the responsibilities I’d have as an individual and as a 
member of the community…They told me that I could escape from the 
Unit but they hoped I wouldn’t…There was no brutality, no governor’s 
report, no violence of any kind. For me to be told this was weird – and, 
even though I thought it might well be true, I wasn’t so sure that I wanted 
the punishments stopped or the violence to end. But I listened to their 
talking about my stepping into another part of the system which was 
geared to helping me rather than destroying me. I didn’t want to trust them 
or to like them or to stop rebelling, yet somewhere inside I wanted to do 
all these things. (Steele, 1992:360) 
Ten days passed and I heard nothing…I could only assume they had 
decided not to take me…How could I have trusted the bastards? How 
could I have allowed myself to think they wanted to help me? 
[…] 
On the nineteenth day after their visit the warder in charge of me came 
into my cell. He stood looking at me for a while, and then he said, 
‘There’s a team coming from Barlinnie in a couple of hours to collect 
you.’ I didn’t believe him, and yet I wanted to. I still had a one-inch piece 
of hacksaw blade hidden up my arse in a small sheath to stop it from 
cutting me: it was the only comfort I had, and wherever the bastards were 
taking me, it was coming with me. (Steele, 1992:361-2) 
Of the original five men who constituted the first BSU cohort, Graham Maclean, a 
reporter for The Sun, provides caricatures, useful to the extent they tell us 
something about the ways they were perceived based on the crimes they had 
committed before entering the Unit. They also suggest something more important 
about the re-imagined identities that these men assumed after transferral to the 
Unit:  
THE BIRDMAN, who breeds budgerigars. He strangled his girlfriend in a 
frenzied crime of passion. 
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THE SCULPTOR, an artist of rare talent, convicted of murder and feared 
throughout the prison underworld. 
THE PAINTER, who deals in landscapes because of his love for wide 
open spaces. He stabbed a man to death. 
THE MUSIC MAN, who strums his beloved guitar hour after hour every 
day. He is serving a life sentence for murder and other crimes. 
THE COOK, an expert at curries and sauces. He qualified for the 
community by using violence inside and outside prison. 
The five are notorious. Noted in jail as “top dogs” and troublemakers. Yet, 
under the 18 month experiment they now work together, play together and 
have gradually become better people. (The Sun, 25th July 1974) 
This final comment makes a bold claim which is hardly possible to quantify. 
However, it is deeply encouraging that a unit offering extended personal freedoms 
to men with these kinds of profiles was not only authorised in the first instance 
but also that its methods proved minimally effective in many cases and close to 
transformative in others.  
N.B. Access to prisoners’ files was granted by the SPS Director of Research. 
These documents were stored in a SPS HQ and in Peterhead Prison. They were 
not marked ‘confidential’ (see Chapter One p.28).  
Initial Aims & Enduring Tensions 
The remit of the Working Party was to examine the operational effectiveness of 
the Inverness Unit but also to consider wider containment options for difficult 
prisoners, primarily those serving very long sentences. In the course of this 
exercise members of the group visited a number of specialist custody sites both in 
Scotland and south of the border, including the segregated "C" Wing in Parkhurst 
prison, Grendon Underwood Prison (the first and only prison in England and 
Wales to operate solely on the basis of a 'therapeutic community' model), and the 
two secure hospitals, Broadmoor and Carstairs. In addition, the Chairman of the 
Working Party visited Denmark to report on its divergent approaches to the 
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management of difficult, long term prisoners. Elements of the philosophies and 
practices of these alternative arrangements fed into the recommendations the 
Working Party made regarding the establishment of an additional special unit in 
Scotland, becoming the basis for how the BSU operated and indeed for aspects of 
how it continued to be managed throughout its lifespan. From Grendon 
Underwood lessons were drawn from its explicit therapeutic orientation and its 
emphasis on discussion between prisoners and staff supported through a variety of 
regular group meetings. From Parkhurst “C” Unit, the general belief in the 
efficacy of a self-contained unit was validated since, as the Working Party 
observed, “An essential feature of the unit is its complete segregation from the 
rest of the prison" (para.25). And, from Broadmoor and Carstairs, the Working 
Party imbibed two separate streams of thought which they attempted to channel 
back into the new Scottish unit:  
1. “…the opinion was expressed that over emphasis on physical perimeter 
security rendered the staff more liable to attack. Where the perimeter 
appeared impregnable staff were seen as the weak and vulnerable link in 
the security chain and therefore could become the target” (para.38). 
2. “In both hospitals one of the cardinal features in treatment was the 
provision of abundant and interesting occupation and worthwhile use of 
leisure” (para.40). 
Despite these gestures towards more progressive cultures surrounding, in 
particular, relationships and communication, the Working Party was nevertheless 
cautious about the design and internal conditions of the Unit, concerned to limit 
the perceived (and actual) attractiveness of accommodation: 
In providing a new purpose-built unit, especially one which is to be 
"treatment" oriented, there is always the tendency not only to try new 
concepts but also to raise the standard of accommodation - and when we 
consider our present standards it would be impossible not to do this. What 
we are proposing is a unit within the penal system for treating those 
inmates who by their behaviour or potential behaviour cannot be 
contained by traditional methods. The new unit must therefore not be so 
attractive that inmates will behave badly so that they may be sent to the 
special unit. While we accept that the standard of accommodation will be 
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higher we feel that such increase in standard should be kept to a minimum. 
(para.59) 
This entrenched position is an offshoot of the age old ‘less eligibility argument’ – 
and argument originally espoused by Bentham in the Panopticon (1843) and later 
engaged with most comprehensively by Rusche & Kirchheimer (1939), and Sieh 
(1989) - and while initially framed as a matter of material comfort, it quickly 
expanded to the question of prisoners’ extended freedoms. The autonomous 
control prisoners had over the Unit was felt by some to be an unjust capitulation 
to manifestly violent men who were regarded as hardly deserving of such 
liberties. Almost from the very beginning, there was a feeling amongst some SPS 
staff that the BSU was a ‘soft option’, a view which appeared to be a response to 
the liberal ways prisoners were responded to and managed – the nomenclature 
surrounding the Unit is telling, with ‘Nutcracker Suite’ and ‘The Wendy House’ 
being among the most popular colloquialisms. Conversations with former grade 
officers confirmed this position, one of whom commented: 
They were treated very well in that place [the BSU] and remember some 
of those people had caused chaos in the system. They were responsible for 
spreading violence…we had to deal with that every day. It was seen as a 
reward…that’s why we weren’t happy with the situation.  
More formally, as early as September 1974 the SPOA voiced criticism of the Unit 
despite initially expressing support for it. The concern was that the Unit “had 
been allowed to go beyond the recommendations of the Working Party” (quoted 
in an internal paper at the request of the Working Party on Alternative Regimes, 
1985: para.2.4.).  Part of that ‘going beyond’ was connected specifically to the 
expansion of prisoners’ freedoms, another part implied a ‘moving away’ from the 
Unit’s initial aims as specified in the 1971 report. At its genesis, a psychiatric 
dimension was considered vital, indeed the BSU was envisioned primarily as a 
treatment facility, which this Circular Instruction 73/1972 issued prior to the 
opening of the Unit makes clear: 
The purpose of the Unit will be to treat those inmates whose potential for 
violence stems from some degree of mental instability or whose length of 
sentence gives rise to difficulties in their being treated and contained 
within normal institutional routines. 
This treatment-oriented agenda was also reflected in the staffing requirements 
247 
 
proposed by the Working Party: 
We feel that the role of the officer should be much more involved in the 
training and treatment of inmates and to this end the appointment of 
officers on the group system should be extended. (SPS, 1971: para.59) 
Instead of the traditional officer/inmate relationship there may well be a 
therapist/patient relationship. (SPS, 1971: Para. 66) 
Further, it was suggested that the Unit Governor should be supported by an in-
house consultant psychiatrist (working on a part-time basis), that the senior staff 
member should be a Chief Nurse Officer, that there should be two additional 
Principal Officers and Senior Officers “each of whom should be nurse trained”, 
and lastly, that all staff should receive supplementary training on how to manage 
mentally disordered prisoners i.e. they should have opportunities to visit Carstairs 
and possibly Broadmoor and Grendon too. Prison officers were recruited from 
mainstream locations on a voluntary basis. There were, therefore, a self-selecting 
group who presumably had either a particular interest in alternative forms of 
prison management, or who wanted additional experience. Once individuals had 
elected to move to the Unit they were approved by the Unit Governor in concert 
with the Governor of their original establishment. I did not find evidence 
suggesting that any volunteers failed to be approved. Unit Governors similarly 
volunteered for the position, or were recommended by senior officials. The 
approval process was decided by senior members of SPS officials, along with 
input from the outgoing Governor, and members of the BSU staff.  
All these recommendations and yet prisoners with clinically-assessed disorders 
and/or those who had acute (or known) drug dependencies were thought 
unsuitable for the BSU. The lines here are disconcertingly blurry. A few years 
into the Unit’s operation, however, and this treatment orientation had all but 
vanished. While a ‘therapeutic’ dimension still directed practice, it became almost 
entirely disconnected from its former ‘psychological’ or (worse, as prisoners saw 
it) ‘psychiatric’ element.27 Those working and living in the Unit considered this 
                                                          
27 Despite maintaining a general mistrust for psychiatry (along with the psych disciplines more 
broadly) BSU prisoners were unusually supportive of the Unit’s resistant psychiatrist, Peter 
Whatmore, though this favourable response seemed to be a reaction to the man rather than the 
profession he represented. Additionally, from prisoners’ perspectives, the mental health 
professionals that worked in the BSU themselves appeared to adapt their practice approach in the 
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an improvement (and they would since they orchestrated it), but so too did some 
in the Department. Comments in a private letter written in 1977 from a 
representative of the Department to the Secretary of the SPOA are suggestive of 
this point: 
In practice the Unit has not turned out exactly as the Working Party 
envisaged it. It has been smaller and less psychiatrically orientated than 
was originally foreseen. The number of volunteers with Nurse Officer 
training who have come forward is very small, and the nursing staff is 
already lower than was originally expected. Experience does not suggest 
that this has caused great difficulty. 
By the 1980s, this was a point of little contention. Almost as an aside, the 
Inspectorate notes in its 1986 Report, without further discussion, “the regime has 
evolved from the original medical/therapeutic ethos towards a more sociological 
stance” (para.4.5.).  If this was the reality on the ground, the miasmic myth of the 
Unit as some form of psychiatric facility continued to serve a useful control 
purpose to frontline officers, and was therefore perpetuated. “The idea it 
functioned with a psychiatric bent was encouraged by some staff”, commented 
one retired SPS official in conversation. It was, he said, “used to threaten 
prisoners in some cases. The message was, ‘misbehave and we’ll send you to the 
Special Unit, only a skip away from the nuthouse.’” 
In retrospect, the adaptive quality of the BSU – its ability to change, to reinvent 
itself as its inhabitants did – was one aspect that made it “work”. A more 
prescriptive or rigidly-defined set of standardised procedures would have 
prevented the full expression of individual choice, a principle which underwrote 
many of the Unit’s most celebrated success stories. During the years of its 
operation, however, policy officials (ever susceptible to the public mood) were 
nervous about the implications of this shape-shifting unit. The idea that it was an 
evolving entity, resistant to classification or to penal systems that were tried and 
tested (however defective the result), was viewed with suspicion. Its 
unpredictability was suggestive of a lack of credibility more than it was 
considered a necessary requirement for innovation. On these grounds, scepticism 
                                                                                                                                                              
Unit in ways that were consistent with the Unit’s norms and ethos. This had the effect of softening 
prisoners’ initially hostile impressions of the work they did.  
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levied against the Unit only increased as the effects of wider shifts in penal 
management (i.e. bureaucratisation, managerialism, close accounting procedures 
etc.) began to properly embed. For at least the first few years of the Unit’s life, it 
was publically supported by the Scottish Home and Health Department, but as 
time passed efforts to champion the Unit (and to provide reassurance of its 
continued operation) become more noticeably tempered by concern. Consider the 
chronology of the following public statements: 
STATEMENT ONE - January 1975: 
…in an experimental unit, still subject to change, it is far too early to 
attempt to draw conclusions from what has been achieved so far. The 
success of the Unit has still to be fully tested by the behaviour of former 
inmates on return to other penal establishments and on eventual release. 
(Departmental Statement, January 1975, quoted by the Working Party on 
Alternative Regimes, July 1985: para.2.5.) 
Not incidentally, the final Inspection Report published in 1993 recommends 
dispensing with the words ‘experimental’ and ‘special’ altogether, not because 
those terms no longer represented the Unit but precisely because they did. In 
retaining both those components the Unit had become too much of an outlier, too 
different from other segregation arrangements in the system, simply too special. 
In the view of the Inspectorate “the Unit must cease living in the past” (HMIPS, 
1993: para.10.6). 
STATEMENT TWO - December 1979: 
Cited in the same internal paper, the Secretary of State gave the following 
response to a Written Answer: 
I have already made it clear on a number of occasions that it is the 
government’s intention that the Special Unit should continue to operate as 
it has in the past and in the way that was intended when it was first set up. 
(para 2.13. italics added). 
With the barely veiled implication that it had deviated from its original aims.  
STATEMENT THREE – February 1980 
Seven years after the BSU was opened, the Department conceded publically that 
the Unit “had developed apart from rather than as part of the system”, with the in-
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built assumption that this must be an undesirable outcome. This statement goes on 
to define the Unit in more provocative language as “an illegitimate child within 
the prison system”. The reproaches become progressively unequivocal: 
Some of the objectives identified by the Working Party have not been 
achieved and a number of the original recommendations, which were 
considered essential at the beginning, have with experience proved to be 
unnecessary. Notwithstanding the gradually developing and changing 
concepts of the Unit, many members of staff remain convinced that it is 
“psychiatrically oriented” – which it is not…The fact that a number of 
inmates have spent many years in the Unit has not convinced some 
members of staff of the effectiveness of its treatment and training regimes. 
In 1973 it was anticipated that a period in the Unit might be in the order of 
2-4 years and that a long-tern inmate might return to the Unit during his 
sentence. It was not envisaged that an inmate – reported to be making 
good progress – should remain in the Unit for as long as 7 years. (para. 
2.14) 
This brings us neatly to another set of tensions: the more effective the BSU was in 
facilitating prisoners to transform their attitudes and behaviours, the more 
attached those prisoners became to remaining in the Unit (not unreasonably), and 
therefore the further away from achieving a core objective of small units – the 
impermanence imperative – the Unit moved. In this sense broad-scale and quite 
profound success (from prisoners’ perspectives) necessarily involved somewhat 
arbitrary but no less meaningful failure (from an institutional perspective). The 
next section examines this predicament in more detail.   
The Impermanence Imperative 
It is certainly the case, as stated in an SPS Occasional Paper (the only external 
evaluation of the Unit28) that, “by accident or design, BSU has always had more 
than one kind of aim attributed to it, and which of these is taken to be most 
important depends on the vantage point from which it is seen” (Bottomley, 
Liebling & Sparks, 1994:14). Yet one aim that was central, fixed, and appears to 
have generated unanimity within SPS policy circles, was that all small units were 
to varying degrees conceived of as stop-gaps; places of short and medium-term 
                                                          
28 This report was comprehensive to the extent it offered a deep assessment of the Unit as it 
operated in 1993 at the time the study was conducted. However, it was limited to merely a 
“snapshot”, as the authors of the report themselves concede; its restricted terms of reference 
precluded discussion of both the historical and comparative dimensions of the Unit, which the 
authors identified as areas of future research in need of closer attention and documentation.  
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containment intended to address behavioural problems in order that prisoners 
could be successfully re-integrated back into mainstream prison communities. 
This was a key objective of the BSU when it was first opened in 1973, and it 
remained one of the core aims of all specialist units within the small unit network 
after attempts were made in the 1990s to draw the disparate parts under one 
coherent strategic umbrella. The idea of liberating prisoners directly from the 
BSU (or any other small unit) despite the progress an individual might have made 
within that environment, was never entertained as a serious proposition. As 
identified in the Opportunity and Responsibility document published in 1990, a 
goal of specialist units is, “To return prisoners to the mainstream better able to 
cope and to make progress towards release” (SPS, 1990:59). From the initial 
Working Party’s 1971 Report and throughout the entirety of the Unit’s lifespan 
the tension between the efficacy of the Unit, from prisoners’ perspectives, and the 
institutional imperative to funnel prisoners back into mainstream locations 
remained unresolved, or perhaps unresolvable, fuelling feelings of insecurity 
amongst prisoners and uncertainty (the kind that tend to erupt into something 
more threatening). 
A revealing comment was made by one Governor in a letter to the SPS Director, 
dated 6th December 1972 (a few months prior to the opening of the BSU): 
It is understood that there is a possibility that the Special Unit could have 
an inmate in the Unit for the rest of his natural life. However, it is the 
Unit’s aim to make the inmate not necessarily a better citizen but a better 
prisoner and therefore feedback all successful inmates into the prison 
system.  
This unguarded statement, not intended for a public audience, represents a narrow 
view shared by some SPS officials of the BSU as having a quite limited purpose. 
The distinction between a model ‘prisoner’ and a model ‘citizen’ is instructive - 
the fact it was understood by those living and working within the Unit in the exact 
opposite way is one of the reasons confusions about the central purpose of the 
Unit, and indeed criticisms about its methods, persisted. In the first issue of the 
BSU’s in-unit magazine, The Key, an unnamed contributor stated: “the aims of 
the unit follow the official line whereby the inmates are helped to become better 
CITIZENS and not better PRISONERS. Readers will appreciate the subtle 
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contrast of these terms” (The Key, 1975). The extent to which that was in fact 
official practice, rather than merely the ‘official line’, is debatable given the 
imperative to transfer Unit prisoners to mainstream locations before any parole 
decisions would be made. Ken Murray, formerly the Chief Nurse Officer of the 
BSU, explains the model prisoner versus model citizen binary from a contrasting 
perspective to the above quoted letter-writer: 
The former being a fellow who comes in, does his time, yes sir, no sir, and 
it is fairly easy to work with a fellow like that. But I have known 
thousands of model prisoners who get liberty from prison and simply 
explode and they come back very rapidly…they behave terribly to people 
on the outside. The prison system should be in the business not of 
identifying those who are model prisoners and live with them but we 
should be able to try to do something positive to try and change someone’s 
behaviour to become a model citizen. That distinction has got to be 
made.” (The Saturday Connection, BBC Radio Scotland, 10th October, 
1987).  
This exasperated statement was made fifteen years after the BSU was opened, and 
following a particularly incendiary set of disturbances across Scottish prisons, 
demonstrates that consensus had yet to be reached as to the question of how to 
change individual’s destructive behaviours in a genuinely positive and sustainable 
manner, more than simply how to render those people compliant and manageable. 
A desistance framework is again useful here since part of successful changes 
processes, the theory holds, is a commitment to conventional values or goals so 
that individual behaviour conforms to socially acceptable norms and is exercised 
within legal boundaries (Serin & Lloyd, 2009).  Difficulties sometimes arose for 
BSU when re-adjusting to mainstream locations. The obvious danger was the 
potential for prisoners to revert back to their former ‘problem’ personas, if not 
necessarily demonstrated through the kinds of violent excesses they might have 
previously extolled.  
I think if I had been released straight from the Unit, I wouldn’t have felt as 
bitter or had so much rage inside. After eight or ten years [in the BSU] I 
could have been gradually fed back into the world…I wouldn’t have been 
a threat to the public. The violent part of my life had ended. The next eight 
years [after leaving the BSU] really twisted me inside. Although I’d 
mentally accepted that I would serve the next fifteen years to appease 
society’s need for revenge, those final years actually put society in danger 
again, creating a time-bomb just waiting to go off. They ruined all the 
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work that had to be done in the Special Unit, where I’d developed into a 
reasonable sort of person. (Collins, 1997:171) 
There is, argue some, a comfort to sustaining (or in this case returning to) 
habituated ways of thinking and behaving (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) even if 
those habits prove destructive for personal wellbeing.  In best case scenarios, 
prisoners might find ways to adapt their behaviour, moulding their new if fragile 
identities so they fit within the confines of mainstream prison walls. In that sense 
they are inhabiting what Turner (1970) calls the ‘liminal’; they are positioned 
(stuck?) between two distinct institutional worlds attempting to balance and 
maintain the gains they might have made in one social context (the BSU) with the 
demands and severe limitations of another (mainstream prison locations). The 
uncertainties of this positioning is not only a liminality of identity – between the 
‘offender’ and the ‘non-offender’ – or what has been termed ‘liminal desistance’ 
(Healy & O’Donnell, 2008), but is also a more literal spatial liminality, whereby a 
prisoner is compelled to move across the threshold of distinct institutional 
locations. Moreover, to satisfy the expectations of Parole Boards, for instance, he 
is required to prove himself rule-abiding in both environments, despite the 
markedly different parameters within each milieu. Obituarising the BSU, Richard 
Sparks (author of its only external evaluation in 1993) writes, 
(W)hat was also notable and perhaps unrepeatably creative in the Scottish 
case was that for at least some part of its 21 years of existence (1973-
1994), the Special Unit represented a feasible way out, one which 
enhanced and did not break the honour of the combatant…The genius of 
the Scottish solution was to have created a place beyond the terminus – a 
place of resort beyond the last resort of permanent segregation…To move 
from one to the other [i.e. from the traditional segregation units to the 
Special Unit] was in some sense to have escaped, yet to remain in prison. 
(Sparks, 2002:561) 
The impermanence of an individual’s stay in this ‘get out of prison’ prison 
(though many prisoners remained in the Unit far longer than was originally 
anticipated) must have consolidated the pains of liminality prisoners felt when 
transferred to other prison locations.29  The Unit may have seemed like a special 
                                                          
29 Of the 35 prisoners who had been through the Unit by 1993, all but three had moved on to other 
locations: one died, two were liberated, two requested to return to mainstream,, 11 were 
transferred to other establishments as part of planned moves, 10 were downgraded, and one was 
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“terminus”, a hopeful end-point to the kinds of dejecting, traumatic prison 
experiences these men had previously endured, an environment that could, 
however trite we might find the terminology, provide a ‘new beginning’. But this 
genius stroke was unintended; it was a wonderful accident. The Unit was only 
ever intended as a resting place. To that extent, and viewed in the longer span of 
an individual’s imprisonment story, the BSU was another stop on the segregation 
Ghost Train.  On this point the SPS was unambiguous – a view also shared by the 
Inspectorate: 
…it should not be allowed to become a safe haven for long-term prisoners 
who have encountered serious difficulties in coming to grips with their 
sentence in the mainstream [why not?]. Permanence, in our view, breeds 
complacency and lethargy. Almost worse still, it is very discouraging for 
other prisoners in the system, who might well have benefited from a spell 
in the Unit, if they became aware that there is little likelihood of a vacancy 
occurring” (HMIPS, 1993: para. 10.6) 
Since the former vitality of the Unit had been sapped to the point of sluggishness 
(the days of the dazzling art exhibitions and press invitations had long since 
passed) the second argument here is more persuasive than the first. The issue that 
gave rise to prisoners’ discernible ennui, however, seemed not to be permanence 
so much as a lack of clarity relating to the exact parameters of the impermanence 
– a point recognised in Sparks’1993 evaluation: 
The impending situation, therefore, is one in which a group of men doing, 
as one prisoner put it, ‘heavy, heavy, heavy porridge find little prospect 
and few incentives for moving on from the Unit. The implications of this 
tend to preoccupy all concerned. For managers and staff this is registered 
as a concern about the felt lack of viable options to offer prisoners. For the 
prisoners concerned it takes the form of a persistent anxiety about where 
they might be called upon to move to, when and under what conditions. 
For some on both sides, its singular effect lies in a growing sense of 
marking time, standing still, even of ‘stagnation’ within the Unit. (1993: 
17)   
Despite these uncertainties, and irrespective of the Unit’s increasingly lethargic 
mood, in the majority of cases, once ensconced in the Unit prisoners were 
resistant to being transferred out of it. This remained the case right up until the 
Unit closed. In the final Inspection Report of 1993 it is noted that,  
                                                                                                                                                              
transferred to Carstairs. The other 8 prisoners remained in the Unit until it eventually closed the 
following year.   
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…the prisoners unanimously favoured the present unstructured 
arrangement. They attached great importance to being allowed to do their 
own thing and were appreciative of the support without coercion which 
they received both from their peer group, especially through the weekly 
community meeting, and from uniformed and non-uniformed staff alike, 
including all those who helped in one way or another with the Unit’s 
regime. Perhaps not surprisingly none of the prisoners showed any 
enthusiasm for moving elsewhere in the system” (HMIPS, 1993: 
para.6.12).  
A full ten years into its tenure only twenty one prisoners had been though the 
Unit, by 1986 six of the eight prisoners contained in the Unit had spent between 
3-6 years there, and by 1993, after twenty years of operation, a decidedly small 
total of thirty five prisoners had been housed in the BSU. The mere fact that 
prisoners tended to spend numerous years in the Unit is a testament to its success 
as an environment that problem prisoners could cope with and wanted to remain 
within. But it also denotes its failure as a medium-term, transitory space before re-
entry back into mainstream locations. An additional worry for staff was that 
however stagnant the Unit became it was still preferable (in prisoners’ minds) to 
mainstream locations and to other small units. It was on these grounds that staff 
claimed “prisoners in other establishments were committing acts of violence in 
order to gain transfer to the unit”, as reported in an internal paper prepared at the 
request of the Working Party on Alternative Regimes (SPS, 1985: para.2.4). That 
claim is difficult to assess accurately. Measured narrowly on the number of staff 
assaults, there was a steady increase in incidents during the late 1970s, though 
attributing this to the BSU would be highly speculative.  
Siting the BSU: The Relationship Between Location, Objectives and Internal 
Practices 
Notably, not all the Working Party's sixteen recommendations were either 
initially adopted or later retained. This was partly a consequence of prosaic 
factors, particularly those connected to spatial constraints. Originally the Working 
Party suggested “E” Hall at Perth prison (part of South Inch House) as a suitable 
location for the Special Unit, stating that, "we think at that institution the 
necessary psychiatric services can be provided." (para.59). However, in addition 
to the treatment aspect, the Working Party still appeared to be attached to the 
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more traditional management objectives related to discipline and control, which 
also fed into considerations regarding the siting of the Unit. The Working Party 
recommended that the Unit should have a maximum capacity of 20 places with a 
further 4 places for isolation (i.e. punishment cells) and 5 observation (or ‘safe’) 
cells. In the event, finding a location that would allow for the combination of both 
these treatment and control objectives proved difficult. After initial investigations, 
Perth was found unfeasible due to architectural considerations – although details 
of what that actually meant are scarce in the archival record.  Eventually the 
former women’s block at Barlinnie Prison was settled on as a viable albeit still 
less than desirable alternative. This was a self-contained, two-storey building 
completed in 1955 which comprised 10 single cells (5 on each floor), a number of 
offices, a kitchen, a central reception area, and a small outside courtyard. But in 
terms of capacity, “because of the limited facilities within the Unit it is necessary 
to use two of the cells for purposes other than inmate accommodation, thereby 
reducing the effective maximum population to 8” (HMIPS, 1982: para.5.1.).  
Whatever the initial intentions of the Working Party the actual layout and 
dimensions of this space prohibited the old ways of doing business. The smallness 
of the Unit – which to an extent facilitated the development of a close community 
– along with the impossibility of instituting spaces of internal segregation – which 
necessitated more creative approaches to discipline and protection - was the 
inadvertent product of spatial limitations rather than the result of intentional 
design. From the outset, then, the space itself, while perceived as far from ideal 
given the age of the building and its restricted size therefore precluding the 
necessary space for suitable provisions, proved far more conducive to the kind of 
ethos the BSU went on to establish. In spite of these accidental benefits, however, 
locating the Unit within Barlinnie prison generated some concern amongst unit 
staff. In an internal paper requested by the Working Party on Alternative 
Regimes, it was noted that by May 1973,  
Unit staff asked that consideration be given to moving the unit to Carrick 
House at Polmont where there would be more space and where the borstal 




More emphatically, this paper went on to document a meeting between 
Departmental representatives and unit staff in June 1973 where they “were 
warned that the treatment being received at the hands of Barlinnie staff and 
criticisms throughout the service had created a crisis within the unit” (para.2.3.). 
The tone here might be unduly hyperbolic, nevertheless siting the Unit within the 
boundaries of Barlinnie prison – Scotland’s largest and one of its oldest, most 
notorious establishments – heightened the sense staff had of being under attack 
from their colleagues across the SPS estate. A situation that was only aggravated 
by the incongruity of placing this unusual and innovative unit in such close 
proximity to a prison which was known at the time for its traditional (some would 
say brutal) control measures, its poor material conditions, and the incidences of 
violence and disorder that occasionally erupted. One officer I spoke with, who 
worked in Barlinnie prison as a new recruit in the early 1980s, commented: 
We would walk past it [the BSU] and not know what was going on in 
there…some people got very angry…we were on different sides and there 
wasn’t much mixing when I was there…we would see reports in the 
papers and people would be coming in and out of the unit. That was 
distracting for staff in the prison. It wasn’t good for prisoners either.  
Another remembered, “people were starry-eyed [about the Special Unit] but some 
of us knew it was a sham.” In other words, there was a feeling amongst some 
prison officers in mainstream locations that the positive effects the BSU was 
assumed as having on otherwise highly violent men, was indicative of a 
fraudulent arrangement on the part of prisoners, who were playing the system in 
order to get the maximum freedoms and privileges without deserving them. This 
was a view that was repeated to me in numerous interviews, as well as 
documented in the often hostile tone of personal letters from the period. Such 
tensions may have been the result of a complex array of complaints regarding 
perceptions of the internal operation of the unit (i.e. that it was overly permissive) 
some of which were fueled by hearsay more than rooted in fact, but certainly this 
initial placement decision did nothing to stem those doubts. If there were any 
welcome consequences of the external antipathy, or at best the neglect, that 
characterised responses to the BSU (and towards the staff who managed it) it was 
the internal solidarity it inspired; outside criticism further strengthened the 
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community spirit that developed between staff and prisoners fostering a sense of 
‘all in it together’. In terms of closing this widening gap between staff working 
outside and those working within the BSU, the SPS made few concerted efforts in 
mitigation. There seemed to be a sense of merely leaving the Unit to get on with 
things, which served to consolidate the Unit’s institutionally isolated position 
despite its geographical location within the belly of Scotland’s central urban 
prison. Reflecting on early memories, a former governor of the BSU said this: 
A lot of people were embarrassed by it. One of the junior ministers would 
have closed the unit, a Labour minister. There was no love for prisons in 
those days, from Left or Right, people tried not to talk about it. When I 
went there in the 1980s I was invited to a meeting with the then Under 
Secretary and I went along expecting to get a full briefing on the role of 
the unit, what I was expected to do, the developments of the unit, etc. And 
nothing like that. I just got told, ‘we wish you well, if you come out of the 
unit with your reputation intact you’ll have done better than most.  
With respect to the Unit’s internal spatial features and the impact they had on the 
development of both aims and practices, the 1982 Inspection Report observed 
that, “the limited facilities make it impossible to operate a structured regime and a 
formal programme would, in the opinion of staff and inmates, be detrimental to 
the basic concepts of the unit” (HMIPS, 1982 Para. 7.1.). This stands in contrast 
to the original, official aims of the Unit which, in emphasising the role of 
treatment and psychiatrically focused programmes, advocated a full and at least 
semi-structured regime through which that agenda could be achieved. We might 
conclude, then, that by the early 1980s, what had come to be understood as the 
Unit’s ‘basic concepts’, those which were considered essential to its success – 
chief among them being self-determination and democratic participation in 
decision making - did not exist a priori to the Unit; these principles evolved over 
time and were to a degree enabled by the specificities of the spatial environment 
itself. In the absence of designated work sheds and other kinds of programme-
related facilities, for example, there was greater latitude to determine the content 
of meaningful activities based on what the space could facilitate and, crucially, on 
what prisoners themselves wanted to engage in. Moreover, since the Unit was an 
adaptation to its earlier function as a women’s unit rather than purpose-built, this 
meant there was flexibility in terms of modifications to the precise functions of 
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space – and by extension to operative regimes – that could be responsive to the 
needs and interests of the prisoners who were contained there at any given time. 
The small outside courtyard was variously used as an open-air sculpture studio, a 
gardening space (a greenhouse was subsequently introduced), and to house a 
pigeon loft. Internally, one of the extra cells used as an additional storage space 
was re-appropriated first as a make-shift gym and later as a quiet space for 
reading and study. Another cell was used as a small laundry. And, without a 
formal visitors centre and given the cramped size of the communal rooms, the 
highly contentious decision to allow family visits in cells seems rather more like a 
practical solution to spatial limitations rather than only a radical luxury.  
These examples suggest that the progressive agenda advanced in the Unit, 
underpinned by seemingly extraordinary levels of trust, did not develop in spite of 
spatial boundaries but rather it was certain spatial factors that actually produced 
or at least rendered more likely the extended freedoms the BSU community 
enjoyed, and its propensity for reinvention.. Maturing in tandem, the uses of space 
and the emerging ethos together contributed to the Unit’s attempts to “develop a 
non-criminal culture in order to enable members of the community to escape from 
traditional roles and loyalties” (Coyle, Conference Paper New York, 1985 p.5). If 
the Unit had had clearly delineated zones in the manner of subsequent small units 
(such as the facility instituted at Shotts prisons) designed with specific activities 
in mind, this kind of flexibility in determining how the space would be used 
would have been much more difficult to effect. Ironically, it was the perceived 
unsuitability of the space – its material constraints – that promoted the autonomy 
concept, that which would later come to define the Unit, constituting its most 
basic principle.  
Beyond the spatial dimension, the broader operational latitude BSU staff and 
prisoners were afforded to define routines, regimes and relationships was also 
partially the result of a lack of close external evaluation and a paucity of 
comprehensive record-keeping. On this last point, all four of the official 
inspections conducted by HMIPS during the BSU’s tenure identified this as a key 
concern – and they did so with growing exasperation. These aspects led inevitably 
to deviations in practice from the Working Party’s original recommendations. Of 
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particular relevance here are (1) the gradual movement away from its treatment-
based beginnings to a looser understanding of ‘therapy’, (2) a recalibration of 
relational dynamics from prisoner/officer to patient/therapist and (3) a more 
horizontal power structure where prisoners and staff were on something of an 
equal footing. This parity manifested through group decision making, including 
on matters of considerable importance i.e. security and control issues, visitation 
procedures, transfers in and out of the Unit, etc. But again the space itself also 
contributed to this sense of equality in the Unit. A notable example: the lack of 
sufficient work, recreation and especially toilet facilities meant that staff, 
prisoners, and visitors had to share amenities. This was a highly unusual 
arrangement, a quite radical use of space. We get a sense of how untenable this 
had become through statements made in an SPS report on small units published in 
1994 – a document that was to prefigure the closing of the BSU. The importance 
of spatial function was stressed with a set of recommendations that were simply 
irreconcilable with the BSU’s practices: “…certain physical features are essential 
to any small unit if it is to be run successfully.” This must include, the report 
states, 
Designated staff specific areas to which prisoners have no access, in order 
that staff can retain their identity as staff members of the community and 
so that staff training and those meetings which are staff specific can take 
place without impinging on prisoner activities. 
The physical unsuitability of the Unit, particularly its cramped facilities, had been 
an issue since the Working Party made its initial recommendations in 1971. It was 
not only the regime or ethos that was considered experimental but the space itself 
that was similarly cast and continued to be thought of as make-shift, un-tested and 
temporary. It was not until the mid-1980s, however, that serious consideration 
was given to transferring the Unit to a more spatially appropriate location. This 
was partially the result of wider factors affecting Barlinnie prison, and the prison 
estate more generally. As the prison population continued to expand creating 
additional stresses on the system, not least overcrowding, the SPS introduced the 
Fresh Start agenda, which amongst other objectives set-out a strategy of prison 
building and design modification. In this context the spatial limitations of the 
BSU were brought into sharper focus. That point was made in a conference paper 
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presented by the Chairman of the Scottish Prison Governors Committee at the 
115th Annual Congress of the American Correctional Association in New York: 
Long-term development plans are in the course of being drawn up for 
Barlinnie. There is a particular need to provide additional visiting facilities 
and to extend the reception. The Special Unit is situated between these 2 
areas. No decision has yet been taken but it may be some thought will 
have to be given to constructing a purpose-built unit in another location 
which will both overcome the present problem of restricted facilities in the 
Unit and will also allow facilities in the prison to expand." (15th August, 
1985: para.6.3.) 
In retrospect, this public statement is significant. It represents not only the 
tenuous comparted position of the BSU - its lack of insulation against broader 
changes that were occurring within the penal system – but stands as an early 
portent of things to come. At this point the concept of the Unit may not have been 
under immediate threat but its physical location certainly was. Given the lack of 
malleability “purpose-built” units tend to have in bending and evolving to the 
discrete needs of its changing inhabitants, siting the BSU elsewhere would have 
inevitably impacted on the nature of the Unit’s operation. The fact that consensus 
was beginning to form around the wisdom of re-siting the BSU might be viewed, 
then, as the first step towards dismantling, or at least re-configuring in a 
fundamental way the nature of the Unit itself. 
Evaluation 
Yet another incredible feature in the life of the BSU is that until 1993 the SPS had 
not engaged the services of any external evaluators. Monitoring and oversight 
were mostly exercised by the independent Inspectorate, which (after its 
establishment in 1981) conducted five inspections of the Unit during its operation. 
Whilst regular and insightful (if incomplete) scrutiny of the Unit was submitted 
by the range of visitors who paraded through the Unit during its early life (e.g. 
newspaper journalists, film documentarians, artists, administrators from other 
prison systems, celebrities, politicians, and academics) there was no targeted, 
comprehensive evaluation in which outside researchers were given full and 
extended access. Moreover, in terms of having the means to further assess the 
effectiveness of the Unit, internal systems of monitoring were also curiously 
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limited. For example, there were few mechanisms to track the progress of BSU 
prisoners once they had been transferred to other locations. As early as November 
1976, the present BSU Governor asked the Department to rectify this but from the 
records it appears nothing concrete was done by way of response. In our current 
climate of excessive institutional measurement these evaluative omissions seem 
astonishing, but even in the context of its time, where the seeds had been sown for 
what has now became a near obsession with performance indicators and targets, it 
is difficult to make sense of the reasons why this didn’t happen in the case of the 
BSU. In the same conference paper cited above, Andrew Coyle notes: 
What has been absent from all units is any attempt to assess whether they 
are achieving the purpose for which they were set up or indeed whether 
that purpose has changed. This lack was first pointed out to the 
Department with regard to the Barlinnie Unit in 1974. In the early years 
the Department argued that it was too early to assess the unit. In 1977 it 
stated that the unit was being reviewed but there is no record of such a 
review being completed. The Working Party on Alternative Regimes 
should recommend that a clear statement should be made as to the purpose 
of each existing and future projected alternative unit and that a continuous 
and regular assessment of each unit should be built-in to procedures. (15th 
August, 1985: para.8.5) 
In 1975 the Department issued a statement defending its decision to resist calls for 
external evaluation: 
A formal study of the Unit, inevitably involving outside researchers, 
would however, be premature. The handling of inmates in the Unit still 
presents delicate problems, and intrusions from outside could have a 
seriously unsettling effect. Moreover in an experimental unit, still subject 
to change, it is far too early to attempt to draw conclusions from what has 
been achieved so far. The success of the Unit has still to be fully tested by 
the behaviour of former inmates on return to other penal establishments 
and on eventual release. (Quoted in an internal paper requested by the 
Working Party on Alternative Regimes, 1985: para. 2.5) 
Those two arguments might be generally sound, but in this case the statement 
was, one suspects, partially disingenuous given the timing of its issue. Two years 
after the Unit was opened, the Unit may have remained “experimental” but it is 
hardly reasonable to have understood it as sufficiently undeveloped so as to 
render any study of it entirely arbitrary or unworkable. On the second point, only 
six months prior to this utterance a ‘meet the press’ day had been formally 
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sanctioned – a smart move as it happened owing to the almost unanimously (and 
breathlessly) positive write-ups. Given this fact, it is difficult to argue 
convincingly that the effect of a small number of professional academic 
researchers would have had any more of an “unsettling” effect than a pack of 
journalists (a profession not immediately associated with unobtrusiveness or 
temperance).  
Towards the end of the 1970s the Department had agreed formally to conduct an 
internal review of the Unit, thus minimally assuaging the repeated calls for 
evaluation from the SPOA, the Scottish Prison Governor’s Committee, Unit staff 
and others. By the early 1980s, however, the Department admitted: “the review of 
the Unit, being undertaken at the Department, is continuing but it will be some 
time yet before this is completed, and I am afraid we have nothing in writing, 
arising out of it”. A comment made by a senior psychologist working in the BSU 
represents the generous view of this institutional tardiness: “In retrospect one 
feels that such an important unit…should have had an ongoing research 
programme…in-built from the start.” (Working Party on Alternative Regimes, 
internal paper, 1985 para. 2.4). Others were less charitable: 
I am concerned there is a lot of evidence to show that the Department in 
the Scottish Office are reluctant to carry out any form of total 
research…They refuse point blank to allow independent research to come 
into the [BS] unit. I think that is unethical. I think it is certainly 
unprofessional. (Ken Murray, The Saturday Connection, BBC Radio 
Scotland, 10th August 1987) 
Clearly this issue stirred passionate emotions. We should be cautious, however, 
about framing this as a battle between Unit staff (who actively desired external 
evaluation, as Murray’s comments make plain) and the Departmental overlords 
(who were apparently resistant to it). Any evaluation would have required access 
to and careful study of internal records – documents that detailed, for example, 
property transactions (i.e. items brought in and taken out by visitors), changes to 
activities, financial records relating to prisoners wages and accounts, internal 
incidences, etc. The systems of recording such matters, those which Unit staff 
were themselves responsible for, were scant at best. The first Inspectorate Report 
flags the poor record-keeping as a key issue, though this is ascribed largely to the 
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Unit’s strong emphasis on oral communication, which inspectors were broadly 
supportive of. The second of these inspections (published in 1986), however, is 
particularly emphatic in its criticism both of internal record-keeping and external 
monitoring, stating that, “an in-house evaluation of the Unit be undertaken as a 
matter of urgency” (HMIPS, 1986: para. 2.96) 
Responding to the publication of this report, the governor of the BSU wrote a 
private letter to the SPS Director (marked ‘confidential’ in capital letters), in 
which he offers a persuasive defence of the Unit’s approach to record-keeping – 
though he does so by deflecting the issue somewhat.  
It must be considered in the context of an environment of trust and 
responsibility. Implicit also in recording and monitoring are searching of 
prisoners, visitors and their belongings. This is in direct opposition to the 
philosophy of individual trust and community responsibility. I make no 
value judgment on the Inspectorate’s recommendation in these respects 




The ‘Specialness’ of the BSU 
 
To further clarify just how different the Special Unit was, comparisons with other 
contemporaneous small units are apposite. Richard Sparks suggests that, 
the [Peterhead] Digger and the Special Unit were probably the two places 
of greatest symbolic significance in the Scottish Prison Service, as well as 
in the individual prison biographies of prisoners whom I met in the 
Barlinnie Special Unit. They were two poles of a single axis. One orbited 
another, (2002:559).  
By the mid-1990s, and in terms of pure symbolism, this may be an accurate 
assessment. However, whilst the Digger and the BSU are similarly potent in the 
penal imaginary, it is the Inverness Unit which provides a much more revealing 
set of contrasts, at least in the early life of the BSU, and for a number of reasons: 
- When the Special Unit opened in 1973, the IU was the only other 
designated small unit in the system - the Digger was used frequently to 
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contain prisoners on R36 (i.e. administrative segregation) but this was 
subsidiary to its primary function as a routine isolation block for 
mainstream prisoners - those who were held punitively for disciplinary 
infractions along with those who were segregated on protective grounds. 
The Digger was neither intended nor actually used as a specialist 
environment for the management of troublesome, long-term prisoners, 
whereas the IU was. That was its sole purpose in fact.  
- Five out of the eight prisoners who constituted the first BSU cohort were 
transferred directly from the IU. In terms of their lived experience, then, it 
was between the IU and the Special Unit that initial comparisons were 
drawn.  
- With respect to public perception, it was the image of the Inverness Cages, 
which had increased in visibility following the particularly violent and 
widely reported disturbance that occurred there in 1972, which tended to 
be juxtaposed with the BSU. At this time, before the amphetamic progress 
of media diversification, newspaper outlets monopolised the flow of 
public information; the narratives about Scottish small units they 
propagated and disseminated often contrasted on the page literal images of 
locks and bars (representing the Cages) with those of colourful murals and 
jaunty personalised cells (representing the Special Unit).  
For these reasons it is the specific divergences from the IU, rather than the 
Digger, which best illustrate the unique qualities of the BSU. Fig Eight details the 
contrast. 
Fig Eight: Comparison between the Barlinnie Special Unit and the Inverness Unit 
 The BSU The IU 
Staff-prisoner relations Participatory and 
democratic model of 
internal relations based 
on mutual trust. 
Authoritarian and 
hierarchical model of 
internal relations based 
on mutual suspicion. 
Communication Regular and diverse kinds 





where open, honest and 
thorough conversation 
was supported and 
expected.  
staff and prisoners; 




Disciplinary measures No internal isolation or 
‘punishment’ cells; 
compliance with agreed 
Unit rules was 
community-policed. 
Additional isolation cells 
(e.g. Silent Cells) used 
for punitive as well as 
administrative purposes. 
Personalisation of space Decorating cells (and 
communal spaces) with 
pictures, furniture, 
personal items, painted 
walls etc. was 
encouraged. Materials 
were provided by the SPS 
– and brought in by 
family & friends. 
Spartan accommodation; 
no decoration or personal 
items permissible.   
Control of Spatial 
Features 
Heating, ventilation and 
light could be controlled 
by prisoners (as far as 
possible). Windows and 
doors could be left open 
or closed according to 
prisoners will; portable 
heaters could be 
introduced to cells. 
Heating, light and 
ventilation was controlled 
centrally. In Doors were 
permanently locked; 
windows were covered 
with steel sheets; Perspex 
covered light sources.  
Movement Freedom of movement 
within the boundaries of 




confinement for 23 hrs 
per day*, no interaction 
between prisoners. 
Visits Extended visiting periods 
(lasting most of the day). 
Prisoners could decide 
who was admitted, for 
how long, and where 
visits would take place 
(i.e. in cells). Visitors 
were not 
comprehensively 
searched on entry or exit.  
Heavily restricted visits 
conducted in designated 
spaces and closely 
supervised by officers. 
Visitors were searched.  
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Regime & Routines Unstructured regime; 
resources for ‘meaningful 
activities’ was provided 
on an ad hoc basis 
according to the needs, 
interests and desires of 
individual prisoners. 
Daily routines were 
largely decided by 
prisoners themselves. 
Structured regime with 
fixed daily routines 
determining eating, 
sleeping, ablutions, work, 
exercise periods. Activity 
provision minimal. 
Prisoners had no input as 
to what the content of 
those activities would be. 
 
*In the early years of the IU prisoners were unlocked during work periods which were 
conducted as a collective exercise thereby allowing limited association. By the early 
1970s, however, after a violent incident during one period of association, it was decided 
that all work activities would take place in cells, and the one hour exercise period would 
be managed on an individual basis (in caged outside pens).  
Personalisation of Space: Aesthetics, Regime & Visits 
Externally, the Unit was very much like any other prison. The Unit had its own 
secure perimeter wall and much like every other dividing apparatus it came with 
the standard set of security accruements. Through the gates, however, “the 
personalisation went further than is found anywhere in mainstream prisoner 
accommodation and, but for the lockable doors, it would have been easy to forget 
that this was a penal establishment” (HMIPS, 1993: para 5.3.).  A description 
supplied by Jim Hewiston, a local reporter evoked this atmospheric juxtaposition: 
Stepping through the green door in the thick concrete wall which separates 
the Unit from the rest of the prison my feeling was very much one of close 
confinement, doubtless inspired by the 100ft long courtyard with black-
brown walls stretching for the sky. An impossible 20ft away, the top of the 
wall was fringed with barbed wire. Sturdy doors, bars, and the eager eye 
of the monitor camera sweeping the exercise yard from a high vantage 
point were ominously apparent. But once inside the building itself 
preconceived ideas were swept away. Something very unusual was surely 
happening within these walls. Instead of the tension I expected to feel, a 
relaxed, hospitable atmosphere dominated. (Glasgow Herald, 25th July, 
1974) 
The next sections explore in more detail what that “something very different” was 




The BSU was an environment that could be – and was – done up, done over, 
pygmailioned numerous times to fit the styles and moods of whoever happened to 
inhabit it. That was the point. The often subtle, slowly remodelling of the Unit’s 
practices was visually mirrored in the less subtle redecorations of the Unit’s 
space. That colourful, surface-level changes to the physical environment were 
encouraged is suggestive of the Unit’s adaptability to deeper-level changes. In 
terms of pure aesthetics, the Inspectorate noted in their first report: 
The basic cellular accommodation is typical of that which exists in most 
of the older establishments but there the similarity ends. Inmates are free 
to decorate and furnish their cells as they wish. Individual preferences and 
interest are reflected in the variety of wall coverings, curtains, carets, rugs 
and bed covers in individual cells. (HMIPS, 1982: Para. 7.2.) 
How a man chooses to decorate his personal space is always fascinating – part 
performance (how he wants others to see him) but mostly it reveals who he 
actually is when no one is looking. What is equally intriguing though more 
surprising is the prison that allows him the freedom to do so. Below is a 
photograph of one BSU prisoner in his cell, which he chose to decorate with a 
colourful mural with paints provided by Unit staff and hanging fishnets brought in 
by relatives. The image offers a stark illustration of how prisoners were able to 
interact in and with the space in ways that expressed their individuality. We see a 




In The Architecture of Happiness, Alain de Botton writes: 
If one room can alter how we feel, if our happiness can hang on the colour 
of the walls or the shape of a door, what will happen to us in most of the 
places we are forced to look at and inhabit? What will we experience in a 
house with prison-like windows, stained carpet tiles and plastic curtains? 
(2006:13)  
There are two issues here, both of which connect to psychological wellbeing: 
spatial beauty (or otherwise) and spatial ownership (and its opposite). These 
concepts are inexorably, necessarily bound. Beauty is affective and meaningful 
because it is experienced subjectively, its specificity for the individual denotes 
personal possession of it, or at least an appreciation that comes from an 
autonomous ideal of beauty. Ideals that are generated and imposed externally are 
always less satisfying because they are not authentically ours. Prison spaces that 
are intentionally designed with attractiveness in mind might be appealing to the 
prisoner who is trapped there but they cannot be beautiful (with all the positive 
experiential effects that implies) unless the space conforms to that prisoner’s own 
beauty ideal.  
270 
 
In the BSU, the self-designed decoration of personal cell space served as a 
wordless vehicle of communication to declare who one is, how one thinks, and 
what one considers beautiful. At a basic material level, prisoners enjoyed greater 
comfort because they lived in attractive spaces where greying walls were replaced 
by vibrant paintings, and where institutional fittings and features (barred 
windows, metal locks, heavy steel doors, etc.) were disguised by homely 
furnishings, fabrics and personal possessions. In this way personal space was 
rendered subjectively beautiful rather than generically uninviting as most penal 
environments tend to be. The decorating of cells was an expression of one’s 
identity as well as a promise of one’s potential. But it was also a statement of 
ownership via the literal making of one’s mark. It conveyed the explicit message: 
‘this is my space’. With respect to communal spaces these same dimensions of 
beauty and ownership manifested through the group murals jointly realised in the 
shared corridor, as well as in the many changeable ‘exhibitions’ of prisoners 
artwork which lined the Unit’s walls. The valuing of individual personalities 
demonstrated through these numerous symbols of personal and collective creative 
flair was paramount to the Unit – to the way it looked and to the ethos it 
promoted; it was its literal wallpaper. Rather than being “forced to look at and 
inhabit” the anodyne, soulless, sparse, and in some instances quite brutal places 
that many of these prisoners had previously been contained in, now in the BSU 
they could inhabit places they were more comfortable in, places that visually 
appealed to them. Moreover, in terms of identity, this freedom of aesthetic 
expression and ownership enabled diverse constructions of those identities; 
prisoners could be more creative in exploring multiple and nuanced aspects of 
themselves that lay beyond the rigid, masculine ideal of the Hardman, which 
seemed the only permissible identity in physical environments that restricted 
spatial expression. In those spaces prisoners still exerted spatialized agency but 
they did so by personalising the space in largely transgressive ways.  
As explored in detail in Chapter Five, such transgressions included: simple 
vandalism, the smearing of walls with faeces, the smashing of windows, the 
dismantling of door frames, etc. And while rationalised after the fact as acts of 
resistance displaying masculine notions of strength, bravery and resilience – 
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concepts that feed-into the honour discourses that have pervaded prisoner 
subcultures throughout penal history - these spatially-manifested acts were also 
framed in terms of individuation. They were actions serving to express the “I” in 
defiance of an institutional structure and environment that aimed, as they saw it, 
to homogenise prisoners by regulating behaviour according to a set of highly 
restrictive and immutable behavioural norms. The imposition of rules required to 
establish that conformity was experienced by these prisoners as infantilising and 
to that extent an intolerable offense to their constructions of ‘manhood’. They 
were also experienced as attempts to purge the individuality of prisoners, which 
was spatially reflected through the uniform sparseness of many segregation units. 
Such environments were not only materially empty (in the absence of features, 
fittings, furniture even) but prisoners were denied all personal possessions; the 
space they occupied was not only objectively ugly but it was, more importantly, 
in no sense theirs.  
In this regard, the BSU was profoundly special by comparison. There was not, 
however, an underlying psychology of aesthetics in the Unit, much less some 
grandiose philosophy of beauty informing the practices that enabled such self-
expression. As with most aspects of the Unit, the ways prisoners chose to spatially 
inhabit it (the manner of their aesthetic engagement) evolved naturally rather than 
predictably. The Unit’s operating model may have been imprecise but the 
principles upon which it was based were definitive, chief among them the 
autonomy principle, which necessitated a certain looseness of practice. This value 
clearly applied to how prisoners exerted themselves on the space but it also 
extended to the activities they pursued within it. The next section considers this 
component of Unit life: its daily rhythms.  
Regime 
There was no formal employment or programme requirement within the Unit. 
Prisoners pursued their own interests, which included: woodwork, craft projects 
(toy-making and chess board-making were popular at one time), gardening, bird-
keeping, higher education, and music – provisions of which were agreed upon in 
community meetings. Other recreational activities included snooker, darts, cards, 
272 
 
the use of a colour television, and weightlifting. Books could be brought in by 
visitors, or requested from the main prison library. Educational programmes were 
provided on an individual basis; there was little need for the standardised 
educative programmes (basic literacy and numeracy for example) that are 
routinely rolled-out across mainstream prisons since most BSU prisoners were 
noted as having above average levels of intelligence. The meaning in ‘meaningful 
activities’ – a phrase interchangeable with ‘purposeful activities’ and widely 
embraced within prison management literatures – was designed, derived and 
experienced by the individual choices prisoners made about how they would 
spend their time.   
The flexibility of the regime which permits free choice of action 
throughout the day clearly has many attractions, not least of which is the 
option of being as active or inactive as one wishes. During the day, when 
staff is limited to parole, inmates are confined to the secure 
accommodation area of the Unit but have access to each other’s cells and 
to the facilities within that area. (HMIPS, 1982: para. 7.14) 
There are obvious benefits of this regime approach, which one BSU prisoner 
makes clear in the following newspaper interview: 
In other prisons your life is planned for you, and you are told what to do 
from the moment you wake up until ‘lock-up’…Here you don’t try to 
buck the system because the system is of your own making. (Daily 
Telegraph, 25th July 1974) 
For at least the first decades of its life, art-related activities, sculpture and painting 
in particular, played an important role in the Unit.  
The relevance of art therapy, in all its forms, within the regime of the Unit, 
is now recognised and the standard of completed projects on display 
testifies to the encouraging results which can be achieved by individual 
inmates. (HMIPS, 1982: para.6.6.) 
Evidence of the centrality of art to the lives of individuals as well as to the greater 
community is provided by the increasingly significant position the part-time art 
therapist assumed within the Unit. She attended all Tuesday Meetings, she 
contributed to community decision-making, she wrote articles for the in-unit 
magazine, and in general she formed close bonds with the prisoners. With respect 
to the impact of artistic pursuits on individuals, many prisoners have written of its 
effects, of which Jimmy Boyle’s testimony is perhaps most famous:  
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I worked hard and thoroughly enjoyed it. This carving really has a hold on 
me at the moment…Prison ceases to exist and more to the point I become 
a whole person…All the petty niggles that the mind uses to occupy itself 
in the fragmented person disappear. I get the most fantastic feeling of 
being alive. The experience is exactly what I need and want (Boyle, 
1984:112-113) 
That feeling of being “whole”, of “being alive” – whether demonstrated through 
creative or any other kind of expression – is predicated on the exercise of free 
choice. It was not only Boyle who experienced the benefits, however. Hugh 
Collins, another BSU prisoner writes: 
I develop a routine over the next six years that demands sixteen to 
eighteen hours’ work a day. I write diaries, draw and paint. I take-up 
stone-carving. I explore every aspect of my inner world and my external 
environment through the eyes of an artist. For once people are quite 
impressed with my achievements… (Collins, 1997:135) 
Both these quotes evoke a sense of the transcendence (if not quite the numinous). 
The “inner world” being explored through art, the often obscured and 
incommunicable emotional landscapes within, full of scars and ghosts, were 
brought to the surface, confronted and turned over in paintings and sculptures. 
The transcending quality of art is twofold: (1) the things we make we leave 
behind, they exist apart from us and remain after we go; (2) art’s products 
represent an idealised beauty of our deepest pains and joys and in the process of 
actually making we paradoxically both escape the world and are brought closer to 
it through a proximity to our deeper emotional selves. It is not difficult to 
understand why art is used as therapy even if it is extremely difficult to 
understand (and especially to quantify) exactly why and how it heals.  
In many mainstream locations, along with most other small units – those which 
operated along more traditional lines - prisoners often talk of losing their 
personality (more of a theft as some prisoners seemed to understand it) – art, by 
contrast, allowed them to develop those personalities. But it was not so much a 
total erasure of self as a gradually enclosing set of walls, pushing the person into a 
smaller and tighter spot at the centre until, with mounting pressure, invariably the 
fullness of the man would explode – often in bursts of ultra-violence. That 
hyperbolic image seems less of an overstatement after reading prisoners’ diaries, 
many of which present almost triumphant descriptions, seething with expletives, 
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of what they had done or wanted to do to prison officers – people whom they 
considered more than deserving of their rage. This a way to regain control of both 
their environments and their selves. It was also a way to be recognised, a way to 
be The Big Man. The Unit, however, presented an alternative way of achieving all 
these objectives; a way most of all to renegotiate their relationships (including 
with themselves) through, amongst other things, the purpose they could derive not 
only (but chiefly) from art but from each of the daily activities they would chose 
to engage in. A passage from one BSU prisoner’s autobiography evokes these 
ideas particularly vividly: 
In prison I kidded myself on that I had control of the whole jail. I had to 
run the hall, know everything that was going on, dominate everything – 
that was my form of security. Actually the prison was controlling me, 
determining my daily behaviour. One of my fears was that I’d be lost in 
the population, a bam pot with no identity, just another daft lifer. I think 
that same fear drove me to the stone-carving and drawing in the first 
place. That same violent energy lent itself to that drive that need to be 
somebody, even in jail. Stone-carving is a macho thing to do. 
[…] 
In the Unit I had to learn to deal with that fear, and the stone-carving 
helped in many ways. It gave me the old sense of power, of being macho 
and all that. I developed a disciplined routine – exercising, working, 
communicating, educating myself – but there was a falseness in it. Deep 
inside I was still like a frightened wee boy in a man’s world. (Collins, 
1997:173-4) 
If art was a central activity in the early life of the Unit, interest in it did wane over 
time, as one might expect with the changing prisoner demographics. There were 
other reasons too which contributed to the diminishing of the role of art in the 
Unit, most notably the period of extended absence taken by the art therapist - 
another example of the importance of certain individuals to act as change-agents. 
Later, a Project and Programmes Sub-Group was established in the Unit 
(composed of prisoners, staff, managers and members of SACRO) to discuss 
alternative activities, which demonstrates how actively engaged the Unit 
community was in shaping its own regime agenda. This engagement, however, 
also waxed and waned. By the time of the final inspection report, there were 
serious concerns about the lack of activity (rather than the content of them, which 
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had been a criticism of the Unit in the very early years – not everyone accepted 
the value of art).  
It was clear that prisoners were left very much to do whatever they pleased 
and that their activities ranged from keeping themselves busy on 
individual pursuits to hanging around the Unit doing little more than 
passing the time. In our opinion what is now needed is a more vigorous 
injection of physical and mental stimuli. (HMIPS, 1993: para. 6.5) 
And later in that same report: 
In too many respects we were left with the impression that there was 
insufficient activity and movement…Each of the 8 prisoners does his own 
thing which many amount to anything from frenzied activity to almost 
complete lethargy. (HMIPS, 1993: para. 10.5.) 
This was a view that had been cooking for a while. Seven years previously, the 
sense of ennui was flagged in the second of the Unit’s formal inspection, which it 
understood as detrimental to the Unit’s community ethos:  
We were surprised to find that outwith formal meetings, co-operation 
between inmates was not very evident….meals are usually prepared and 
eaten alone, inmates watch television in their cells and creative or craft 
work is often carried out individually. There is in our view a need to foster 
community activities if the stated purpose of re-socialisation is to be 
achieved. (HMIPS, 1986: 5.12) 
The specious assumption here is that “re-socialisation” always (& must) mean 
collectivism, which fails to recognise that the need for privacy, for one’s own 
space, for self-defined boundaries is part of what we all require for personal 
wellbeing. 
The desire for privacy is the desire for obtaining freedom from various 
stimuli…In the social sphere, various stimuli are apt to involve other 
persons whose behaviour invades into our psychological or physical 
activity or who demands responses that are alien to me. (Toch, 1992: 28) 
It is not merely the fact of isolation in prison that is important (though as a lived 
reality it can certainly be damaging enough) but that prisoners have no agency in 
deciding when, how, why, where, and for how long they are either in company 
with or apart from others. This is a crucial distinction. In any case, and whilst still 
accepting the clear stagnancy that had developed compared with the fullness and 
dynamism of the Unit’s early regime (largely sustained through art), community 
activities did still feature but often on a more ad hoc, less formalised, and 
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therefore unrecorded basis. Moreover, the number, frequency and quality of visits 
helped to sustain a unique group identity, though with caveats, as discussed 
below.  
Visits 
Within the desistance literature there is a burgeoning sub-field focused on the role 
of prisoners’ families in change processes; it offers robust findings in support of 
greater contact between those on the inside and the people on the outside who 
care about them. This, it is argued, mitigates the severing of ties and helps to 
curtail a more general diminishing of what is popularly, albeit vaguely, termed 
‘social capital’. Apparently more than any other custody arrangement, the BSU 
was utterly serious about the importance of this idea (long before there was a 
strong evidence base to provide formal validation, or institutional cover).  
There is no restriction on the number of visits. Visitors must be approved 
by the community. After the early supervised period visits may be taken in 
individual cells. Visitors are allowed to bring in small amounts of food, 
tobacco and cash. (Working Party on Alternative Regimes, internal paper, 
1985: para 2.17) 
This approach was extremely generous. Visiting periods were between 9 – 11 
a.m., 1.45 – 4.30, and 6.45 – 8.30 on weekdays, and the same at weekends with 
the exception of the evening session. Relevant for our purposes, there was also an 
important spatial element to how family visits were conducted and managed. 
Prisoners chose where visits would take place, and naturally many opted for their 
cells. Although there was a requirement for doors to be left open so that patrolling 
officers could supervise these encounters, in practice this did not always happen. 
Predictably, within certain quarters especially within the media, this produced 
shock, outrage, horror, ridicule, or some combination of all these emotive 
reactions.  
What has been less well documented is the positive implications of this 
spatialized agency, which speaks most of all to questions of identity. If we accept 
the premise that the nature of human interactions is in some way influenced by 
the environments in which those encounters occur, then in a process of reverse-
stigmatisation, the fact of hosting family members in places that prisoners had 
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made home-like, places that were very much theirs (filled with their own 
possessions, walls painted to their own design, etc.) meant that it was the person 
more than the prisoner who visitors met. This was in stark contrast to the manner 
of visits conducted in the sterile, heavily supervised and shared spaces of the 
standard visiting centres. Some prisoners talk about not wanting their families, 
their children in particular, to see them inside, as if the image of the numbered 
man in bland prison issue clothing, and perpetually watched by the gaze of 
uniformed guards, is not only infantilising but somehow de-humanising too. In 
the BSU a naturalness of contact enabled through the personalisation of space was 
made possible in a way that no other penal space had managed to achieve before 
or since (despite the considerable improvements that have since been made to 
visiting arrangements - the introduction of family rooms for example).  
Initially large sections of the media seemed celebratory about these liberal visiting 
arrangements – and why wouldn’t they be they were since they were beneficiaries 
of it. They were supportive until they weren’t. In the late 1970s, reports that sex 
workers were being brought into the Unit began to surface in local newspapers. 
Jimmy Boyle records in his diary an occasion when he was informed by the 
Barlinnie governor that based on such rumours a detective sergeant had made 
inquiries with the SPOA regarding these allegations (Boyle’s recollection of this 
meeting is beyond verification, however). From this point on the relationship the 
media had to the Unit was at best ambivalent – supportive or scathing in equal 
measure. Nowhere is this more apparent that in the media response to the 
publication of the 1994 external evaluation, which seized on one particular 
paragraph that appeared to confirm officially, or at least authoritatively, the 
allegations that one suspects newspaper editors with pound signs flashing in their 
eyes (and any others with their own separate agendas) were desperate to be true: 
Naturally it is an open secret that one aspect of privacy is sex. For some 
staff and most prisoners this is in any case regarded as a benefit. For 
others if privacy is itself a value, so be it and since intimate contact is part 
of the process of reconstructing relationships this is inevitable. Besides, 
few feel that this alone has the centrality sometimes attributed to it in the 
prurient maunderings of the tabloid press (who have in all probability now 
largely lost interest in the unit). The challenge to central decision makers 
is to determine whether they feel there are really any arguments of 
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principle against the unit’s visiting arrangements which are so important 
as to cancel their other benefits or to risk jeopardizing other aspects of its 
work – or else whether the real motor of misgivings has historically been 
the fear of short-term public embarrassment. (Bottomley et al, 1994: 27) 
Reflecting on this nearly a decade after the event, the author of that report writes: 
Although accompanied by only a blandly factual press release, the 
following day every Scottish newspaper had located the one paragraph in 
a 70-page document that made reference to private nature of visits in the 
Special Unit. I leave it to the reader to infer how the journalists so rapidly 
and unanimously found their way to the relevant passage. The headlines 
were blunt and require little elaboration. (Sparks, 2002: 576) 
The most flamboyant of the headlines noted by Sparks came from The Sun, which 
spun in its typical web of alliterative moralising the asinine line:  RAGE AS 
PRISON BARS ALLOW NOOKIE IN THE NICK. 
Moving beyond the issue of private visits, there was also a communal aspect to 
the Unit’s visiting arrangement, which is less written about, certainly less sexy, 
but which was arguably just as important in terms of its impact on individual 
prisoners. Some visitors became regular fixtures of the Unit (particularly those 
who were Glasgow-based, as many were), to the extent they were considered part 
of the Unit community. They were familiar to staff and, on the whole, welcomed 
by other prisoners. The influence of outside visitors, people who were neither 
prisoners or staff or indeed one’s own family, helped to create a more ‘normal’ 
human environment – one which was vastly better suited to promoting the values 
of active citizenship (as opposed to passive prisonership). The fact that visitors, 
like prisoners, had relative freedom to wonder the Unit space allowed many more 
interactions than would otherwise have occurred. In some cases, the impact was 
significant: 
My attitude to women certainly altered in many ways. Once the women in 
my life had been there to provide sex or carry knives, that sort of thing. 
Some of the visitors to the Unit challenged that attitude, and for the first 
time in my life I had friends who were women, people who just happened 
to be female. The Unit encouraged communication, people talking, having 
discussions. That was all new to me…My only conversations in prison 
had been with other criminals, talking about who’d been stabbed or who’d 
robbed what bank. It was another world. (Collins, 1997:172) 
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While the Unit’s approach to visiting – who could be admitted, for how long and 
where - established a cordial set of internal relations and, not least, made the 
experience of prisoners’ families far more pleasant than those which most families 
encountered in the SPS, there were associated challenges. These came to a head 
(there were many others) following the 1986 Inspection Report. Beyond the 
allegation of conjugal visits, it was the general matter of security breaches, and 
the more specific question of smuggling contraband, that generated most anxiety 
amongst senior managers and policy makers. Inspectors were critical of the lack 
of robust search and supervision procedures applied to both prisoners and visitors. 
A letter from the Director of Operations to the SPS Director – marked at the top 
IN CONFIDENCE – illustrates these anxieties: 
The Inspectorate is clearly worried by the attitude of the BSU staff to the 
existing Instructions. It was described as an example of the “King’s 
invisible clothes” – it was simply assumed that “trust” would ensure that 
no one would try to escape or to breach security…The vague nature of 
searches and supervision of visits was stressed.  
A representative of the Secretary of State writing to the SPS Director following 
the publication of the Inspectorate’s Report wrote, “He [the Secretary] is 
concerned that the Governor of the Special Unit has taken such a defensive 
position in reacting to the HMIPS report.” Regarding the question of search 
procedures (covered in Circular Instruction 19), the document goes on, 
…it is unreasonable to expect any community of people to be entirely self-
policing; all groups need some form of rule for smooth running…If there 
is an erosion of discipline within the Unit, whether self-discipline or 
imposed from the outside, then there is a danger that embarrassing events 
might occur in the future. When a calamity happened Ministers would 
look absurd, since all they would say was that they had Instructions, but 
that they had condoned the governor’s decision not to implement them. 
There were other serious challenges to the BSU’s visiting arrangements. Not all 
prisoners enjoyed the number, consistency or diversity of visits that others had. To 
mitigate feelings of resentment or increased loneliness for those men whose 
isolation was more pronounced the Inspectorate sensibly recommended in 1993 
that visiting hours be reduced (to its credit it made no recommendation regarding 
the suitability or otherwise regarding in-cell visits). This was not implemented. 
We see evidence here of the unequal aspects which inevitably stem from the 
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realisation of the autonomy potential. For every Jimmy Boyle and Johnny Steele 
there was more than a trickle of others who did not receive lines of visitors, nor 
capture the imaginations of the art-minded public, nor channel their energy into 
learning a new craft/skill. Some men lacked specialised talents, others simply 
lacked motivation. Equality of opportunity is not the same as equality of 
experience and this was sometimes a source of interior tension within the Unit.  
I dread having visits, especially now that I’m not taking any substances to 
give me confidence. It’s a struggle to hold a conversation…He [Collins’ 
father] hates the fact I’ve become friendly with the staff and involve 
myself in the progress of the place. Meeting new people is worse: my 
conversation is limited to talking about my past and internal politics – it’s 
embarrassing. I feel tense and drained after almost every visit. (Collins, 
1997:131)  
Staffing 
Staff were drawn from volunteers. Many who chose to work in the Unit were 
relatively new to the service (having served fewer than 2 years), which meant 
many had not yet been inculcated to the norms of traditional penal management 
styles. But this relative inexperience presented problems too, as outlined by the 
Inspectorate: 
A staff which is comparatively junior in length and restricted in breadth of 
service….There is a clear need to induct senior staff into the new duties, 
particularly in those areas with a management and supervisory element 
which has not been experienced in lower grades. (HMIPS, 1986: para. 
4.8.) 
By this time there was not an additional training programme for BSU staff (as 
there had been at the very beginning), so throughout an individual’s Unit service, 
he was essentially ‘learning on the job’. A seemingly undesirable situation given 
the specialist nature of the Unit but it did at least require staff to shift their own 
attitudes, and adjust to working in more instinctive ways. The fact that staff were 
given the freedom to use their professional initiative30 carried many advantages in 
terms of cementing trusting relationships and in advancing particular projects that 
staff/prisoners were interested in. Moreover, by virtue of this voluntary 
                                                          
30 I might have used the word ‘discretion’ here but in the world of prisons that word is overloaded 
with negative connotations, more associated with the personal abuses, rather than with the 
collective benefits, sometimes resulting from the exercise of individual power. 
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component those who worked in the BSU were necessarily a self-selecting group 
– the kind composed of confident men who were modest enough to be amenable 
to ideas that might radically challenge them, those which “fall beyond or outside 
the routines and expectations of the negotiated order of penal normality” (Sparks, 
2002:561), and bold enough to face the hostility from colleagues (and within the 
Unit) they must have known they would meet. In other words, many BSU staff 
proved to be extraordinary men. About one prominent Unit staff member (who 
untypically was of long-standing service) prisoners said this: “He’d been a bastard 
in the traditional system, but he was brilliant in the Special Unit; he got really 
caught up in it” (Collins, 1997:12), and, “most of us had known him for years in 
Peterhead Prison where he was looked on as an old traditionalist. It was 
interesting to watch a man of his service and rigidity try to break into the way of 
the Unit” (Boyle, 1984:21). That process of ‘breaking-in’ was not instant, 
however. The Director of Operations admitted in an early press interview: 
(B)ringing together the most dangerous prisoners in the system would, we 
thought, take time before the men adjusted themselves to the working of 
the Unit. They have, in fact, adapted more quickly than the staff. (Daily 
Telegraph, 25th July 1974).  
The autonomy of staff, as much as that of prisoners’ (and equally restricted in 
typical prison settings) was extended, tested, and had consequences. In 
community meetings, for example, officers could face “violent verbal 
confrontation”. 
…an officer can on occasion be confronted with verbal abuse which, in 
the mainstream situation would lead to the inmates being placed on report. 
That facility is not available to an officer in the Special Unit but has to be 
dealt with in the meeting. An officer who has volunteered for service in 
the Unit is much more likely to accept this situation than an officer who 
has found himself in the Unit as a result of compulsory transfer. (Letter 
from the BSU Governor to the Director, 17th September 1986) 
Given these kinds of confrontations, “the cramped rather limited accommodation 
in the Special Unit, together with the introspective nature of the regime, tends to 
create a rather claustrophobic atmosphere” (HMIPS, 1986: para.4.18). For all the 
benefits of (brutally) honest and regular community, and of the trusting 
staff/prisoner relationships that made such interactions possible, the demands on 
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staff were great. They might expect and would certainly require time and space to 
decompress, neither of which they got in the Unit. The Inspectorate report 
continues: “Staff have no appropriate area within the Unit where they can 
withdraw to have their meals, to do administrative work or to merely gather their 
thoughts as events unfold around them (HMIPS, 1986: para.4.18). This spatial 
constraint had its advantageous as previously suggested but clearly it was 
problematic too. 
A broader challenge of recruiting staff from a pool of volunteers, granting them 
an increased degree of autonomy and thereby creating the conditions for change-
agents – individuals whose personal influence in and on the Unit was great – was 
that once those people left the Unit, the impact on the community was equally 
pronounced. For example, there was a period in the early 1980s when by 
coincidence the Unit governor was absent (on extended sick leave) at the same 
time the Chief Officer post became vacant. The effect of losing these two key 
individuals meant, as the 1986 Inspectorate Report notes, “morale was at a low 
ebb” (HMIPS, 1986: para.4.22). This was one of the reasons it was suggested in 
the 1971 Report that continuity of staff should be the norm. To that end the 
Working Party recommended that on the matter of staff replacements there should 
be no more than two transfers at any one time.   
Community Spirit and Group Decision-Making 
The term ‘community’ is an appealing buzzword. It denotes inclusion, 
participation, a degree of shared identity (necessary to foster group loyalty and a 
real sense of belonging), and a minimal commitment from all members to 
advancing the interests of the whole. The demographic complexity and sheer 
numerical and/or geographical size of many communities means other terms have 
been considered more appropriate, e.g. ‘social networks’ (Kemshall, 2003). With 
respect to the BSU, however, it was not just a ‘community’ but, as the Director of 
Operations defined it in a 1974 press interview, it was “a total community, where 
everyone has an equal say and involvement in its running” (italics added. Director 
of Operations, quoted in The Evening News, 25th July 1974). There are 
uncomfortable resonances here with Goffman’s notion of the ‘total institution’, 
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which evokes images of an insulated, regimented and homogenised organisation 
ruled by officialdom; a place defined by its inescapability. The BSU may have 
shared this sealed component, but the community that evolved within it was 
‘total’ in the sense that it relied on absolute consensus rather than absolute 
compliance. In cases of dissent from agreed norms (which there was, inevitably) 
it was the community itself that determined the response rather than a system of 
punitive rules dictated by one group of people within the community (i.e. the 
keepers) and imposed onto another (i.e. the kept). In this way the lines of power 
were horizontally structured creating a communitarian rather than an authoritarian 
(or even representative) process of democratic decision-making. Unlike in typical 
prisons, generally prisoner subcultures did not emerge in the Unit, which was 
partially a consequence of its size but mostly a product of this communitarian 
aspect. This should not indicate an altogether harmonious environment; 
disagreements were not uncommon, there was a times a volatile and pressurised 
atmosphere – an unavoidable and, in part, generative consequence of full and 
frank dialogue. This deeper level of community engagement created a more 
secure set of internal relations, akin to Kemshall’s (2003), ‘safe cities’ model, 
which stresses active citizenship as a key ingredient for success. 
Strong, stable communities depend upon the positive relationships that exist 
between its members. The development of such relationships is particularly 
important with respect to those people who are typically subject to the greatest 
degree of social isolation and who pose singular or especially pronounced risks. 
Given that “a community consists of and is nothing apart from its members” 
(Milne, 1986:39), what a community is (and what it is not) is taken as context 
specific. The form, nature, structure and actions of a specific community, 
therefore, are dependent upon the types of relationships and interactions that exist 
between and within it. The profile of many BSU prisoners, and the roll of 
negative past penal experiences, meant that some were highly suspicious of this 
community concept on entry into the Unit. John Kerr reported this initial 
scepticism in an article for The Guardian: 
The Chef thought when he arrived that the others were “nuts”, that they 
had been taken in by staff. In eight years at Peterhead prison he had never 
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spoken to an officer. Now he would be prepared to call some of the 
Special Unit staff his friends. The Sculptor was suspicious about his move 
from Inverness in case it might be ‘a stepping stone to the state hospital at 
Carstairs’…He said, ‘the point about this community is they treat you like 
a human being. In the jungle I was living in it was soon going to be the 
case that I would be dead or somebody else would be dead.” (The 
Guardian, 25th July 1974) 
“(A)ny notion of community” writes Freeden (1991:76) “must come to be 
adopted by the individuals who constitute it”. Here there is a reconciling of the 
individual and the collective, between personal autonomy and group participation 
since the community is at its strongest and healthiest when the needs, interests 
and capabilities of its individuals are realised. Expressions of individual 
autonomy – upon which personhood relies - are universally located within the 
context of relationships. Tutu (2000) says it best, “I am a person because I 
belong”.  Indeed, belonging is a core determinant of personhood, to the extent that 
we seek inclusion as a vital source of identity construction and an enabling means 
of co-operation and moral conformity (Hirschi, 1969). Where we don’t belong - 
in relationships and situations of exclusion - not only do we lose the support 
frameworks necessary to fulfil our promise as human beings but, crucially, we 
lose the means by which we can be held accountable to others. Consequently, the 
capacity to make healthy choices as well as to enable and respect the choices of 
others is significantly diminished. “One is constantly challenged by others, 
practically, to achieve self-fulfilment through a set of collective social ideals.” 
(Mokgoro, 1998:21)  
The community feeling that was created within the Unit was sustained precisely 
because of the paradoxical weight given to individual agency. That prisoners 
chose to be a part of the community (a choice that had to be perpetually reasserted 
via daily adherence to group-agreed rules and standards) fomented group 
solidarity. It is not, then, the community spirit itself that distinguished the BSU 
from other small units since prisoners in highly controlled and restrictive 
segregation environments shared a similar sense of collectivism, possibly even 
greater - bound in resistance against a perceived common enemy - but the strength 
of the community voice that was established through the legitimating of each 
individual voice within it. This was sustained by the norms of active participation 
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in group decision-making, relationships of trust between all members of the 
community (thus enabling robust forms of communication) and, in more prosaic 
terms, the frequent and diverse range of community meetings, borrowed from the 
‘therapeutic community’ model but adapted to fit the needs of the Unit.   
Community Meetings 
Once a week the community gathered for its so-called Tuesday Meeting, chaired 
by a member of the community (appointed from either the prisoner or staff 
contingents). Such meetings were semi-formal - minutes were taken31 - and 
attendance was compulsory. Discussions primarily revolved around domestic 
matters and general management issues, where “the decisions reached are 
implemented even if the Governor does not share the view of the majority” 
(HMIPS, 1982 para. 2.10). Although, there were two central issues where, while 
prisoners’ views were sought, final authority remained with senior administrators: 
(1) serious security-related questions, and (2) admissions. On this second matter, 
rumours persisted within the SPS (seized on by certain sections of the media) that 
prisoners had undue control over such decisions. This was essentially fallacious 
although discussions were had between the Unit Selection Team and the Unit 
community regarding potential new entrants. In some cases, where prisoners 
expressed particular concern – usually regarding past ‘beefs’ – these issues were 
taken seriously by managers, as evidenced in several of the early prisoner profiles 
sent to the Secretary of State for Unit consideration, in which the intelligence 
gathered in community meetings was highlighted. Among the first decisions 
reached by the community in the Tuesday Meeting related to the function of the 
additional cell accommodation. Contra to the Working Party’s initial 
recommendation, the community voted to remove the door from what might have 
served as a ‘Silent Cell’ and instead it was decided that the space would be used 
as a weights room. This example of spatial re-appropriation demonstrates the 
wider shift away from punitiveness that characterised many other secure 
segregation environments.  
                                                          
31 Despite significant digging through various archival sources, I was unable to find any record of 
these minutes apart from a few scraps of faded handwritten notes that were difficult to decipher.  
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In addition to these formal weekly meetings, which remained central to 
supporting the community’s ethos and interests, there were a number of other 
kinds of meetings in the Unit, including: 
- Special or “crisis” meetings if and when a particular issue arises requiring 
immediate attention (these were group occasions and could be called by 
anyone) 
- Informal group meetings, where participation was voluntary. 
- Four-Group meetings in which two staff members and two prisoners 
would meet more intimately (these were intended for new BSU transfers 
to help familiarise them with the Unit’s culture in a less intimidating 
setting). 
- One-on-one meetings, which could be either formal or informal depending 
on the nature of what was being discussed.    
This variety illustrates first the status afforded to discussion and dialogue and 
secondly, the attention paid to accommodating different styles of personal 
communication. The point was to create the conditions whereby BSU prisoners 
became accustomed to talking things through, to sharing their concerns and 
finding ways to address them through negotiations (rather than violence) at a 
group level as well as on an individual basis. The dialogic nature of the Unit also 
served another function:  
To the extent this discursivity was by design, its genius lay in the Unit’s 
mimicry of the mundane gossipiness of everyday life and its studied 
avoidance of the more obvious trappings and routines that are customary 
in prisons. (Sparks, 2002:567) 
As discussed above, it was not only the normalising of space (through personal 
ownership) that helped to create better citizens, or at least more pro-social 
identities, but the normalising of human interactions. However, while this manner 
of engagement fostered improved internal relations and problem-solving, it was 
not without difficulties, as observed in the first inspection report: 
A considerable part of each day is taken up by visits, meetings of one kind 
or another and informal but constructive discussions with individual 
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members of staff and inmates. The constant questioning of personal 
opinions and attitudes create pressures with which some inmates find 
difficulty in the early stages. (italics added, HMIPS, 1982: para.7.15) 
A passage from Hugh Collins’ autobiography expresses these struggles:  
I don’t like the place one bit; it drives me mad with its community 
meetings, crisis meetings, discussion groups, visitors and more visitors. I 
have no say here, no real power. Jimmy keeps telling me to confront 
situation, find out what happened, rebuild relationships. People talk about 
the healing power of community. Just let go of negativity, be constructive, 
be positive. Sounds great doesn’t it? Wave the wand! The prisoner is 
transformed; he’s totally reformed, a new man, no problem. What’s to be 
changed? I ask. What’s there to heal? What’s the point – to prove to a 
society that I’m not an animal? I don’t care what society thinks: I am a 
fucking animal. I enjoy violence, don’t I? I liked stabbing screws, every 
moment of it. Who wouldn’t? (Collins, 1997:19) 
Not all prisoners were necessarily comfortable with articulating their views in the 
context of the formal weekly meeting since it could be a highly intimidating 
experience, particularly given the fact they often involved intense scrutiny of one 
another’s behaviour. This also extended to staff and, at times, to outside visitors 
who could be subjected to similar personal examinations. For example, during the 
fieldwork process for the external Unit evaluation, Sparks remembers the Tuesday 
Meeting as the “longest and most rigorous interview I have had” (2002:565). 
Levels of scrutiny became profoundly daunting in cases where group censure of 
unwelcome behaviour was more pronounced. Without a formal punishment 
system, extreme breaches of discipline tended to result in prisoners being 
transferred out of the Unit, but for lower-level breaches, the offending prisoner 
would face the community in the Tuesday Meeting, and the group would agree on 
how the offence would be responded to. As one prisoner commented: 
If someone does something detrimental to the community, he has to 
answer to the community. It is no secret that the ‘hot seat’ can be, and is, a 
harrowing experience, and is much more effective than any Governor’s 
punishment (a BSU prisoner quoted in The Guardian, 25th July 1974). 
The lack of traditional disciplinary measures did not altogether eradicate serious 
incidences in the Unit, some of which had a deeply destabilising effect. In March 
1976, for example, one prisoner stabbed another thirteen times – the offender was 
later transferred to another location and sentenced to a further six years 
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imprisonment. The next serious incident occurred on September 11th 1977, when 
Larry Winters died after a drug overdose (the substances were brought into the 
Unit as contraband). There was also a host of less serious though still disturbing 
(and potentially very dangerous) incidences as one might expect given the 
propensities and former behavioural habits of BSU prisoners. What is interesting 
here is the input prisoners had in diffusing such confrontations, which illustrates 
not only the trust placed in prisoners but also the efficacy of developing and 
actually practicing personal negotiation skills, even in hot-blooded and extremely 
precarious situations. Jimmy Boyle describes one such occasion (only a few 
months after the Unit opened) that might, in another unit, have rapidly descended 
into ultra-violence:  
We all ran through to the cell to find Larry standing with a pair of scissors 
at the throat of a member of staff…There was a whole series of on-the-
spot decisions taken here that resolved the matter without physical injury. 
On seeing Larry threatening a colleague, the staff didn’t go for their 
batons and rush in, but stopped, and allowed Ben and me to handle it. Had 
they drawn their batons then we would have turned on them as a group. 
By doing what they did, they brought out the best in us. (Boyle, 1984: 13)   
This example illustrates the volatility of relations within the Unit. What happened 
in the aftermath is even more instructive first, in demonstrating how central a role 
community meetings played, and secondly, the manner in which the participatory 
model of democratic penal management was a ‘lived’ model - how it evolved 
through circumstance rather than something which was a priori imposed. 
In another prison Larry would have been locked up. It was decided that a 
staff/prisoner meeting should be held immediately, so everyone assembled 
in the meeting room. The atmosphere was very heated…He admitted that 
he shouldn’t have gone for the staff member and apologised. There 
followed from this a general discussion on staff/prisoner relationships and 
it was agreed by everyone that there should be no restrictions placed on 
disagreements being aired verbally but that physical violence must be 
forbidden in this Unit…We had redefined ‘punishment’ as we knew 
it…The very fact that we had to sit with Larry, expressing our views on 
what he did, meant that we were committing ourselves to the Unit and, 
beyond this, accepting responsibility for our own and other people’s 
behaviour. (Boyle, 1984;13-14) 
Often elevated to the uncomfortable and unhelpful point of sainthood, Jimmy 
Boyle himself testifies to the terrible struggle of living within (much less 
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changing because of) the Unit. That he succeeded was never inevitable. In a series 
of miscommunications, misinterpretations and what appears to be the bungled 
management response of SPS managers working outside the Unit, Boyle was 
accused of a low-level breach of prison regulations, involving a piqued letter he 
was thought to have sent to the editor of the Sunday Mail. His response tells us 
something of the demons he continued to face long after he entered the Unit (and 
the sheer strength of will it must have taken to resist reverting to assumed type, to 
avoid acting in ways that would have jeopardised his place amongst the Unit’s 
community): 
There is no doubt about it, these bastards are trying to destroy me 
mentally…Retaliation is called for. This violent typewriter shouts bloody 
anger. Punching holes in the fucking enemy with each tap of the key. 
Fingers filled with fire and vengeance as they press each lettered key – 
hatehatehatehatehate. Fuckers causing mental anguish. I HATE YOU. 
They would like to see it. Oh God, they would like to see it. If I were to 
strike out and hit one of them. ‘See!’ They would say. ‘Look the bastard is 
an animal.’…What the fucking hell am I doing sitting here suppressing all 
this natural anger and keeping it under the surface. Does this make me any 
more civilised? I’m supposed to sit here like some vegetable with a 
mandarin smile accepting it all. (Boyle, 1984:103) 
Given these kinds of interior monologues, along with the numerous set-backs 
individuals and the community as a whole experienced (through continued if less 
extreme forms of deviancy), it is extraordinary that the Unit had the institutional 
freedom to remain committed to the community meeting model and to the 
principle of deep communication. If this was how the Unit operated for the first 
decade or so of its existence, as time passed the degree of community spirit 
maintained through the particular nature and diversity of meetings began to 
diminish. The Tuesday Meeting remained but other kinds of meetings became 
less common, which together with the growing regime inertia (i.e. the lower 
levels of engagement with group and individual activities) undermined the 
community concept.  This was a concern identified in the 1986 Inspection; it was 
understood as an impediment to effective processes of re-socialisation. This, 
however, may be too reductive a conclusion since for (re)socialisation to be 
meaningful it must involve not only harmonious social relations but, perhaps even 
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more significantly, conformity to agreed social norms that prevail outside the 
prison community.  
Here then is my one great revelatory finding about the Special Unit. There 
was nothing really special about the Special Unit except talk. It was a 
place where people talked so much that they nearly sometimes forgot they 
were in prison. It was there that people who had been denied talk or 
forgone it in the uncanny, hostile silence of the Digger and other termini 
talked…By the time I came there the Unit collectively was a tired place – 
tired but still talkative. With rare exceptions, such as my interview, the 
community meeting was no longer the crucible of ideological debate and 
crackling personal tensions it reputedly once had been (italics added, 
Sparks, 2002:567). 
It is this aspect of forgetting that one is a prisoner – made possible by ordinary 
forms of interaction (and spatial contexts) redolent of dynamics on the ‘outside’ 
(though highly abnormal on the ‘inside’) – which allowed prisoners to shed 
former offending identities. The fact the Unit had become a “tired place” by the 
mid-1990s certainly suggested the need for an injection of renewed attention and 
investment (in terms of its regime in particular) but it also indicates its success as 
a secure, comfortable and, crucially, a normalised social environment; a place 
where communication is taken for granted, where the norms of everyday 
interactions are simply commonplace rather than understood as something 
revolutionary (as had once been the case). 
Closure 
Given the illustrious reputation of the Unit (within certain quarters and at certain 
moments), given its unmatched achievements at tempering the otherwise violent 
impulses of a highly problematic prisoner population, and not least, given the 
high-profile, often high-drama success stories of some of its most famous 
inhabitants (type 'Jimmy Boyle' into any search engine and you'll see what I 
mean), how are we to explain the Unit’s closure? One generous explanation 
would be that the decision to close the BSU may have been the product of a well-
intentioned effort to create a more coherent system of small units. This point is 
nuanced, however, since both the BSU and the Shotts Unit were closed in the 
1990s, and the operation of the latter was far more consistent with the general 
aims and approaches of the SPS during that time. But in the mid-1980s, when 
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closure conversations were beginning to proliferate within policy circles, the 
record shows that the BSU was unfavourably compared to the Shotts Unit 
precisely because of its extraordinary deviation from standard methods of penal 
management. Another generous interpretation might be that “modernisers thought 
they had changed things sufficiently to be able to get along without it [the 
BSU]”.32 Certainly improvements were made within and to the SPS, particularly 
following the Opportunity and Responsibility report in the early 1990s – both in 
terms of organisational reform and in terms of the treatment of prisoners. But 
there might still be an element of cognitive dissonance here since (1) conditions 
had not improved that much (the archaic practice of ‘slopping out’, for example, 
with all its associated health and human rights concerns, remained the norm in 
Scottish prisons until the early 2000s), and (2) other progressive modernisers took 
the public view that there was a continued need for small units, the BSU most 
especially (see exchanges from parliamentary debates below).  
Alternatively, the closure of the BSU may have been in large part a response to 
the apparent and undesirable stagnancy the BSU had come to represent - by the 
early 1990s a sense of stasis had certainly set in evidenced by the lack of formal 
progression of many of its inhabitants (many of whom had remained in the Unit 
for many years), and in the increasing lack of so-defined 'purposeful' activities 
prisoners were engaged with. Both these interpretations are accurate, yet the 
closure of the BSU also signals a failure of imagination and, less charitably, it 
might be understood as a reactionary and cynical response to ongoing public 
criticism. This was a moment in time when the tone of public debate had become 
significantly less receptive to liberal penal approaches, and thus approaches that 
were likely to (and did) receive allegations of leniency incurred reputational costs 
to the SPS.  
Mining the archives for clues, one gets the impression that the hegemonic 
institutional position towards the BSU encompassed, at various moments, the 
whole gamut of emotional responses, eliciting degrees of hopefulness, hostility 
and fear (at the beginning), pride, confusion and more hostility (during its middle 
                                                          
32 This point was made to me by Richard Sparks in response to a draft of this chapter. 
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period), neglect and/or avoidance along with returning anxieties (towards its later 
stages), and finally arriving at embarrassment - in the end, mostly at the 
exorbitant costs and distinctly unsystematic (and un-bureaucratic) nature of the 
Unit set against what came to be perceived as very little tangible return. The sense 
of attachment and some degree of historical idealism, that which might have 
ensured continued support for the Unit, was less apparent in the mid-1990s since 
many individuals composing the SPS’ top management brass were people who 
did not have a personal connection to the Unit. They had risen the ranks after the 
Unit’s glory days and were therefore more likely to take adopt a more detached, 
cost-benefit analysis.  
The record shows that the existence of the BSU was never assured. Almost from 
its very beginning the wisdom of maintaining it was questioned. It is difficult to 
establish the exact point at which a concrete decision was made (and by whom) to 
close the Unit, but by the mid-1980s that idea that it would be at some near-future 
point relocated, re-imagined or simply shut altogether, was accepted. In a 
Parliamentary debate of the Scottish Grand Committee on 5th July 1988, convened 
ostensibly to discuss the implications of the series of disturbances that had 
occurred throughout the SPS in the preceding years, Menzies Campbell (for Fife, 
North-East) stated: 
Whatever may have been the total outcome of the Special Unit at 
Barlinnie, it enjoyed spectacular success in some individual cases. I wish 
to be assured that the Government are committed to special arrangements, 
facilities, or units and are prepared to persevere with them so that even if 
they are not 100 per cent successful, they can be successful enough to 
justify their continued existence. 
This view was shared by many in opposition parties, including Alex Salmond (for 
Banff and Buchan), who commented, “There is substantial argument for 
increasing the availability of places for difficult prisoners.” The fact assurances 
were being sought suggests there was already deep unease that the Unit was under 
threat of closure. During this debate, where considerable and intense criticism was 
made of the government in its response to the Peterhead riots in 1987 (particularly 
regarding the use of SAS units to quell the disturbance), calls were made for the 
Government to provide a comprehensive statement of policy objectives and 
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priorities - not only in relation to small units but to the criminal justice system as 
a whole. After all, by the late 1980s reform if not a wholesale re-imagining of the 
justice system appeared well over due – at this time the Prison Rules and the 
Criminal Justice Act were nearly forty years old. Tony Worthington (for 
Clydebank and Milngavie) said: 
We shall never get on top of the problem until the supply side is tackled. If 
we simply keep feeding people into the system, the roof goes off 
eventually. It has proved over and over again…Last year’s Scottish all-
party penal affairs group was told: 
The lack of a coherent strategy at central government level with 
respect to both the prison system and the criminal justice process 
as a whole means that strenuous efforts being made by the prison 
service can never be sufficient. 
The Opposition are not after a soft prison system, but an effective one. We 
have no effective criminal justice system now, and we are asking the 
Minister to provide one. 
With respect to a small units strategy, ironically it was the development of a more 
coherent systems approach that spelled the death of the Special Unit; its 
accomplishments were largely dependent upon its individuality, its freedom to 
operate in a somewhat sealed manner according to a model of self-government. In 
this way, the Unit proved simply too special to be incorporated within a more 
unified institutional structure – even if that structure was, in many respects, a 
practical and ethical improvement to what had gone before. Prior to the troubled 
years of the 1980s (though organised disturbances started to become more 
common in the late 1970s), there was certainly a lack of strategic unity and 
strong, clear leadership. One retired governor remembered: 
There was an enormous amount of complacency when I arrived in the 70s, 
as a new recruit I was coming into a culture of deference. There was no 
co-ordinating vision, it was left very much to the governors of individual 
establishments to decide policy and philosophy.  
This situation had its advantages; it would have been significantly more difficult 
to establish the Unit in the first place if there had been a more uniform penal 
culture, which by definition would have been less conducive to divergent 
approaches (and less likely to produce individual change-agents). But it was also 
a state of affairs that was more open to abuses in the worst cases and basic 
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sloppiness or mismanagement in the best. Precipitated by the violent events of the 
1980s, the conditions were therefore created for a fundamental re-think of at least 
aspects of the SPS (particularly with regard to problem prisoners), which 
eventually rendered the Special Unit unsustainable, or considered in that way. 
Pertinent and largely interconnected factors included: 
- Increased public and political attention. 
- Greater institutional introspection about the SPS’ operating philosophies 
and practices. 
- The strengthening of central leadership, which resulted in fewer examples 
of (destructive) ‘dead wood’ even while it also removed the (generative) 
possibility of mavericks.  
- A prisoner population that was less creatively oriented coupled with a 
general decline in the artistic bent of the Unit, which had formerly 
contributed to its popular appeal.  
- The development of a more coherent strategic approach, especially but not 
only in relation to the small units policy. 
- Concerted attempts to properly address the specific needs and risks of the 
long term prisoner population, evidenced by the establishment of Standing 
Committee and more investment in targeted regimes and living 
arrangements to accommodate this group. 
- The professionalism of the SPS, manifested through standardization and a 
generally more rigorous approach to monitoring and performance-related 
evaluation.  
The confluence of these factors served to highlight how far removed the BSU was 
– as it had always been only now its difference was cast as less positively 
‘special’ and more incompatibly abnormal. Other small units, either in 
development or already established (i.e. the Shotts Units), conformed much more 
obviously to the changing style and approach of the SPS, and appeared to provide 
mostly effective alternative arrangements for those prisoners who could not be 
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suitably managed in the mainstream. This of course had the effect of further 
consolidating the view that the Unit had become surplus to requirement. 
Additionally, in the context of more meticulous accounting procedures (set 
against the ever booming total population size) it became increasingly difficult to 
justify the high financial cost of the Unit (the staff/prisoner ratio remained higher 
than in other specialist arrangements). And, as had been a persistent bone of 
contention, the Unit continued to generate if only sporadically unwelcome media 
attention regarding in particular its visitation policy. While the sex allegations 
were always distasteful, unwelcome and embarrassing for the SPS, by the 1990s, 
they were an irreconcilable nuisance to the sleeker, more professional and 
arguably more humane outfit that the SPS had, by that time, become. Publicly at 
least, SPS management along with the political leadership did not ever support or 
even enter into discussion surrounding the possible benefits of conjugal visits and 
the principle of privacy more generally. Equally, however, throughout the Unit’s 
twenty-three year lifespan no clear policy regarding this was formally presented. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the view adopted internally appears to be rather more 
nuanced than public statement would suggest. In a draft copy of a review of the 
Unit in 1994 (conducted by a special Working Party set-up for this sole purpose), 
we read: “Even conjugal visits and the development of family ties might be 
considered although there are problems with this.” This is something of an 
understatement.  
If the Unit came to be viewed broadly as the old man redundant (rather than the 
dynamic, slightly wild and, to some, threatening firebrand it was initially 
perceived as) this is not to suggest that indifference or something approaching it 
was how the Unit was generally regarded; there still remained amongst certain 
factions within the SPS a passionate hostility towards it. In the summer of 1994 
the Working Party set up to review the Barlinnie Special Unit elicited the views 
of a range of interested parties, including grade officers across the system. Within 
its paper archives I came across several vehement submissions which express a 
strength of feeling indicative of the active opposition to the Unit that still 
persisted. Extracts from a hand-written submission by one Governor in August 
1994 to the secretary of the Working Party exemplifies this: 
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The concept is seriously flawed. If you were to remove a child every time 
he misbehaved where would he end up – the Special Unit. This facility has 
achieved nothing other than to keep a few prisoner quiet at considerable 
cost. The fact that they do behave has nothing to do with a unique 
treatment programme. It is quite simply that they have manipulated the 
system to get exactly what they want and they are not going to give that up 
easily….It is pure fantasy to suggest that agreement can be reached with 
these people as to the length of time they should remain in the Unit before 
returning to the mainstream, or what they should do in the Unit. They 
would of course agree to anything before going but once there any deals 
would be quietly forgotten. I am not speculating over this. The proof lies 
with Shotts Unit where this method has been tried and has failed 
miserably. 
The Working Party’s draft report produced at the end of this review process 
essentially argues for the continued existence of the Unit, it identifies its 
achievements whilst also making quite significant recommendations for 
adaptations to its regime, ethos and, especially its entry criteria. These two 
elements jostle somewhat and are not altogether compatible. Consider these two 
competing statements: 
STATEMENT ONE: 
In our view the strength of the Barlinnie Special Unit was its ability to 
secure conformity by disruptive prisoners through a radically different 
approach to their treatment. By giving them a degree of freedom from 
“petty” restrictions; by encouraging them to take responsibility for 
decision-making in a group; by offering opportunities for self-expression 
through art, education, writing, etc., the Unit challenged these prisoners to 
respond in a different way to their sentence. (para. 6) 
STATEMENT TWO: 
There is no reason why these prisoner should expect a highly participative 
style of management. There is no reason why they should be excused from 
compulsory work. What they require is something a bit more luxurious 
than the normal long term hall where they can come to terms with the 
likely length of their incarceration….The prisoners would have to contract 
in to such a regime with the promise of good behaviour in return for the 
privileges. But there would also have to be realism on both sides that the 
focus of the regime was not on preparation for release but on humane 
containment. It would require a change of attitude to set up such a facility, 
namely an acknowledgement that some lifers are in effect hopeless cases.  
This suggests a depressing return to a more cynical, if more pragmatic, approach 
to problem prisoners where the “good” citizen/prisoner debate is reengaged with 
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the latter taking precedent. It also articulates a view that is logically incoherent, as 
in: ‘the things the BSU has done well with proven success are the things we ought 
to eradicate because without hope for release change is hardly possible, or even 
worth it.’ Suffice to say, these two statements were altered, with certain passages 
deleted altogether (the hand-written notes on the draft copy are revealing - the 
word “luxurious” is circled with the comment: “WHY? So if you are really bad 
you get the rewards but if you conform, tough!”) Essentially, however, the 
Working Party does not advocate for closure per se although the adjustments it 
recommends are substantial to the extent that the Unit it would be replaced by 
would be basically unrecognisable. This tension between the desire to keep the 
Unit but the impulse to radically alter it is also a prominent feature of what was in 
the end the Unit’s final inspection in 1993: 
We do not recommend closure. But we do recommend that a firm decision 
is taken as soon as possible about the future nature of the Unit at Barlinnie 
in order to establish a clearer purpose for it within the SPS – particularly 
with regard to a policy to create movement in and out – so that it can be 
properly aligned with other aspects of the system. (HMIPS, 1993: para. 
10.5) 
Nevertheless, in spite of the reports issued by the Working Party, the Inspectorate 
and the external evaluators (none of which argued for the Unit’s ultimate closure), 
the decision was made public in 1994 to transfer the final prisoners out of the Unit 
and to effectively abandon the experiment. In a statement to the Evening Times, 
the SPS Chief Executive said this of the Unit: “It no longer meets our needs and 
cannot easily be fitted into the new structure in which personal responsibility 
within a suitably structured framework will be a guiding principle” (The Evening 
Times, 1994). Notice it is personal responsibility not autonomy or agency that is 
identified here, which demonstrates a fundamental de-coupling of the 
responsibility concept from that of freedom, a faulty premise which negates the 
fullness of both parts of these intrinsically bound ideas. Moreover, the emphasis 
on “structured framework” necessarily undermines the agency component upon 
which healthy expressions of responsibility are based. This represents something 
of a regression back to the more interventionist rehabilitative models that were 
formerly popular, albeit couched in the modern rubric of ‘responsibility’. Given 
the timing of this statement only a few months after the publication the Working 
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Part’s review and the external evaluation, we might conclude that the resolve to 
close the Unit was entrenched prior to these reports. The fact that the least 
flattering elements of these various reports found their way most rapidly to the 
public arena (as observed by Sparks, cited above) indicates that perhaps one 
crucial function of them, from institutional perspective, was to provide validation 
for a decision that had already been made.  
Final Remarks 
In this chapter I have attempted to chart the peculiar life of the Barlinnie Special 
Unit, specifically focusing on its accomplishments as an environment of change – 
both in the sense of the Unit’s malleability and the attending attitudinal and 
behavioural shifts experienced by many of the prisoner who lived within it. Space 
was the lens through which these external and internal movements were largely 
viewed but it was also shown to be a key correlative determinant for generating 
personal change. It is in this sense that the BSU literally shaped hope (upon which 
transformation of any kind is predicated). The consequences of granting prisoners 
fundamental ownership of the Unit by extending the level of choice-power they 
had to personalise that space and to act in and on the environment in ways they 
had actively chosen, enabled some prisoners to experience quite remarkable 
behavioural transformations. Part of the explanation for this is based on the 
simple and powerful effect of having one's autonomy respected in a continual and 
pervasive sense (i.e. the more it is practiced the better it functions – which is to 
say, the healthier and more responsible one’s choices become) but equally, 
another part is what this indicates about the innate value others are ascribing to a 
person, particularly by those who are positioned as superior in a given 
hierarchical order. In other words, the high levels of environmental agency 
guaranteed to BSU prisoners established a dynamic that was grounded by trust - a 
rare enough commodity in relations between problem prisoners and the staff who 
manage them, and one that clearly had a profound effect on prisoners who were 
otherwise treated with heightened suspicion.  
The protracted movement towards the Unit’s closure is documented here with the 
somewhat despondent conclusion that by viewing the whole history of the BSU - 
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its remarkable achievements, its flaws, its tragedies, and especially its idealism - 
one is left with a palpable sense of waste. Not (only) that the Unit itself ceased to 
be but that its most valuable lessons were all but un-learnt once this unique 
arrangement was finally discarded. Despite laudable improvements across the 
SPS in terms of the treatment of staff and prisoners, in management approaches 
more generally, and in the concerted efforts to incorporate aspects of a desistance 
framework into standard practices and procedures, no part of the prison system 
(perhaps with the partial exception of the open estate) grants prisoners a degree of 
autonomy, thereby fostering deeper social as well as personal responsibility, 
comparable to what the BSU did.  
In the final chapter of John Steele’s autobiography, The Bird that Never Flew, he 
tells the story of how he came to the Unit, of how uncertain and suspicious he was 
during the selection process, and about how ambivalent he felt “leaving what 
seemed to be the worst behind” (1992:362). The title he began that chapter with is 
















Segregation: between Scylla and Charybdis? 
 
 
This thesis began by offering an expanded portrait of segregation, demonstrating 
the ways in which it has become a fundamental feature of modern prison 
administration. By definition, prisons are restrictive places which practices such 
as classification, spatial zoning and situational controls compound, with the aim 
of producing minimally well ordered, safe and secure institutions. Inevitably 
some prisoners will resist those strictures, while others will find they simply 
cannot cope with the burdens imprisonment imposes. It is those prisoners who are 
routinely considered especially problematic, and to whom, as a consequence, 
special handling measures are typically applied. The demands of maintaining 
security and order, as well as protecting both prisoners and staff, set against the 
individual rights of especially troublesome and/or vulnerable prisoners presents 
deep challenges of an operational, political, legal and, most pertinently, ethical 
nature. Charting an effective, efficient and morally legitimate course represents, at 
times, if not quite a choice between two evils, then a perpetual and possibly 
irreconcilable dilemma for past, present and future generations of penal managers. 
Drawing on archival records, personal testimonies and original interview data, 
this research has explored Scottish approaches to such prisoners in the context of 
a number of specific, particularly unusual and revealing segregation 
arrangements. I have identified a range of variables that have contributed to how 
exactly the ‘problem’ prisoner category has been understood, the precise 
management techniques used in response to those belonging within it, and the 
physical sites that have been considered most suitable for their containment. 
Adopting a deliberate ‘spatial consciousness’ was one means by which these 
matters, as well as questions of personal experience, could be engaged with, 
hopefully with the effect of adding nuance to the topic, along with additional 
layers of thought that otherwise often go unnoticed.  
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What I wanted to do most of all in the project was represent the history of 
segregation truthfully, which meant more than offering a comprehensive policy 
account, or a evaluative analysis with a set of neat conclusions from which 
recommendations for future directions might be drawn. It also meant finding 
ways to describe the complexity and the mess. In addition, but actually the 
principal concern, I wanted to see, turn over and then portray the emotional 
resonances of segregation. Where one set of people are enclosed – whether 
struggling in holes, silenced in grave-like spaces, sheltered in sanctuaries, or 
ensconced in colourful places of hope - and another set of people do the enclosing 
(all the while themselves in various ways cornered), the emotional content is, for 
those people, central to the experience.  Alison Liebling (2015:17-18) stated the 
case perfectly in a recent article when she argued that “our main moral purpose 
[as researchers] is ‘getting the description right’” – a way of working (and being) 
that requires us to both “lower our sights and raise our standards of research 
integrity.” A high aspiration but one I have strived for in this research.   
When considering aspects of segregation from the various viewpoints of 
prisoners, prison officers, managers, policy-makers, and the public at large, it is 
clear there were, amongst each group at different penal moments and in different 
ways, both winners and losers. The originality, innovation and, regrettably, the 
brutality of certain segregation arrangements in Scottish prisons offers instructive 
examples of what it means both to impose walls and to build bridges. Whether 
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There’s a beggar in the heart of me 
And he pleads for not a lot, 
But he’ll be the death of me 
For the things he hasn’t got – 
And what the hell he’s got in mind 
Can never be as such 
Because to ask for a little freedom 
Is to ask for far far too much – 
But he’ll be the bleeding death of me, 
Of that there is no doubt, 
For its hard being on the inside 
With the beggar wanting out. 
 
There’s a beggar in the heat of me 
And he’s got a lot to say, 
And its ‘Aww, hey!’ this and ‘Aww, hey!’ that 
And ‘Aww hey, come away!’ 
But he’ll be the bleedin’ death of me 
Because of that and this 
And it’s this and that and other things 
The beggar seems to miss. 
 
There’s a beggar shares my eyes each day 
And he looks beyond the pale 
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But he drops more than he ever drinks in 
And its seldom he sets sail. 
He’ll be the bleedin’ death of me – 
(Or maybe my rise and fall) 
Still, I’ll spare a smile, for one so vile 
And the beggar in us all. 
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